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Abstract 
The UK’s commitments to addressing climate change require a radical 
restructuring of the electricity sector. This thesis examines what role the electricity 
transmission networks could play in this transformation. In order to examine the possible 
role of policy making within a socio-technical system under conditions of long-term 
uncertainty, a novel scenario method is developed which accounts for political values, actor 
dynamics and technological networks. The approach is used to examine possible pathways 
for the electricity transmission network within alternative policy value-sets, which are 
defined by the level of locational signal provided to generators in respect of their network 
usage, and the degree of anticipatory or strategic planning involved in network policy. The 
scenarios emphasise the importance of a locational signal which acts at the operational 
timescale as well as the investment timescale. They also suggest a role for strategic 
coordination, particularly to join up planning across onshore, offshore and interconnector 
regimes. However, due to the range of possible generation and network configurations the 
scenarios span, they do not support the idea of a central design authority working to a 
single network blueprint. Specific policy recommendations aim to incorporate these 
suggestions within the grain of the existing policy trajectory and its prevailing value system. 
The two principle policy recommendations are therefore, the inclusion of a locational 
signal within the BSUoS charge in order to better reflect network usage at the operational 
timescale, and the establishment of an independent body with a remit to identify and 
contributed needs cases for cross-regime strategic coordination opportunities. The latter 
recommendation could be achieved with some adaption and clarification of the remit of the 
ENSG.  
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Acronyms 
AF Availability Factor 
BETTA British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements 
BGSA British Grid System Agreement 
BM Balancing Mechanism 
BSUoS Balancing Services Use of System 
CUSC Connection and Use of System Code 
DECC Department of Energy and Climate Change 
DUKES Digest of UK Energy Statistics 
GB Great Britain 
GW Gigawatt 
ICRP Investment Cost Related Pricing 
LF Load Factor 
LMP Locational Marginal Pricing 
LNP Locational Nodal Pricing 
MW Megawatt 
MWh Megawatt-hour 
NETS SQSS National Electricity Transmission System Security and Quality of Supply Standard 
NETA New Electricity Trading Arrangements 
NG National Grid 
OFTO Offshore Transmission Owner 
RO Renewables Obligation 
SHETL Scottish Hydro-Electric Transmission 
SO System Operator 
SPT Scottish Power Transmission 
TEC Transmission Entry Capacity 
TIRG Transmission Investment for Renewable Generation 
TNUoS Transmission Network Use of System 
TO Transmission Owner 
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TPCR Transmission Price Control Review 
UK United Kingdom 
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Glossary 
Availability Factor (AF): a measure of the available output of a generator 
at any given time, given by the ratio of the available output at that time to the theoretical 
maximum output. 
Balancing Mechanism (BM): the mechanism through which the System 
Operator ensures that supply and demand is balanced across the system, and that the 
relative location of generation and demand respects transmission constraints. 
Balancing Services Use of System (BSUoS) charge: charge levied on 
generators, and large consumers and retailers of electricity, to cover the costs incurred by 
the System Operator in balancing the network. 
British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements 
(BETTA): electricity market arrangements which have governed the GB market since 
2005, when the principles of NETA were extended to include Scotland as well as England 
and Wales, making GB a single integrated market. 
British Grid Systems Agreement (BGSA): contractual arrangements 
which governed technical issues associated with interconnecting the English and Scottish 
systems, before they were integrated under BETTA. 
Connect and manage: a principle under which new generation could be 
accepted onto the transmission network as soon as its local connection had been built, 
without needing to wait for wider grid reinforcements. 
Connection and Use of System Code (CUSC): the contractual 
framework for connection to and use of the national electricity transmission system. 
Constraint costs: costs incurred by the System Operator as a result of 
having to trade in the Balancing Mechanism to rearrange the distribution of generation, as a 
result of network constraints. 
Constraints: imposed limitations in power output of generators, caused by 
limitations in the power carrying capability of the network 
Deep connection charging: a connection charging approach where the 
costs of both local enabling works and wider reinforcement works are targeted at the new 
generator. 
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Gate closure: under the BETTA electricity trading rules, the point in time 
up to which trading for any given settlement period may occur - gate closure is one hour 
before the start of the settlement period. 
Gigawatts (GW): unit of power - 1,000,000,000 Watts. 
Great Britain (GB): the island which includes the nations of England, 
Scotland and Wales. 
Interim connect-and-manage: a policy approach adopted from 2008-
2010 in GB, when the principle of 'connect and manage' was adopted as an interim 
measure, before being adopted as an enduring regime in 2010. 
Invest-then-connect: a principle under which new generation can only be 
accepted onto the transmission network once necessary wider reinforcements have been 
made to the transmission network, sufficient to accept that generator's output under most 
conditions. 
Investment Cost Related Pricing (ICRP): approach to transmission 
charging which reflects the different costs imposed on the network by generators in 
different locations. 
Load Factor (LF): a measure of the annual average output of a generator, 
given by the ratio of the actual measured output to the theoretical maximum output. 
Local enabling works: electricity network infrastructure sufficient to 
enable the carrying of electricity from a generating station to the nearest access point on 
the electricity network. 
Locational charging: the principle that the different costs imposed on the 
maintenance and operation of the transmission network by generators and users in different 
locations should be reflected in appropriately weighted charges. 
Locational marginal pricing (LMP): a system in which the price of 
electricity is allowed to vary at each location on the system, reflecting the value of 
additional generation at that point, given transmission constraints. 
Locational Nodal Pricing (LNP): a system in which the price of electricity 
is allowed to vary across the system, as in LMP, but with prices smoothed across zones 
surrounding central nodes. 
Market coupling: the joining up of previously separate markets to become 
price zones within a single market 
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Market splitting: the division of a market previously operating under a 
single price, into zones with their own prices, which may vary from each other. 
Megawatt (MW): unit of power - 1,000,000 Watts. 
Megawatt-hour: unit of energy - the quantity of energy delivered in one 
hour by a rate of power of 1 MW.  
National Electricity Transmission System Security and Quality of 
Supply Standard (NETS SQSS): the document which defines the technical standards for 
the operation of the National Electricity Transmission System in Great Britain 
New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA): measures introduced 
in 2001 to change electricity trading in England and Wales from a wholesale pool market 
with a single price set by the marginal trade, to a voluntary market more closely modelled 
on conventional commodity markets, allowing multiple bilateral trades between 
participants.   
Renewables Obligation (RO): policy introduced in 2002 to promote 
renewable generation, by placing an obligation on suppliers to source a certain percentage 
of their electricity from renewables, facilitated by a system of tradable certificates 
representing generated renewable electricity. 
RIIO: Revenue set to deliver strong Incentives, Innovation and Outputs. The 
approach to regulating transmission charging which replaced RPI-x from 2013. 
RPI-x: a formula used by a regulator to control price rises levied by the 
owner of a monopolistic infrastructure. Prices are permitted to rise in accordance with the 
retail price index (RPI), reflecting inflation, with a percentage (x) subtracted, reflecting the 
potential for increased efficiencies. The formula is intended to mimic the effect of a market 
in driving real cost reductions in infrastructure charges. In electricity network charging, 
RPI-x was replaced from 2013 by the RIIO formula. 
Shallow connection charging: a connection charging approach where 
only the costs of local enabling works are targeted at the new generator. 
Socialisation: the principal of recouping a system cost in a charge levied 
equally across all users, regardless of their relative responsibility for causing the cost. 
System operator (SO): the entity responsible for the operation and 
balancing of the electricity system. 
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System peak: the point in the year when the electricity system experiences 
highest demand - typically between 5pm and 6pm on a winter evening in December or 
January. 
Transmission Entry Capacity (TEC): the maximum declared power 
output of a generator. 
Transmission Investment for Renewable Obligation (TIRG): scheme 
introduced in 2004 to allow Transmission Owners to make investments outside of the 
normal price control review process, when the need to do so was a direct result of 
investments in renewable generation.   
Transmission Network Use of System (TNUoS) charge: charge levied 
on generators and large consumers / retailers of electricity, for their use of the 
transmission network 
Transmission Owner (TO): company that owns and maintains electricity 
transmission network infrastructure. 
Transmission Price Control Review (TPCR): periodic review of the 
charges levied by Transmission Owners on generators and suppliers. Under RPI-x, the 
review took place every 5 years. Under RIIO, the review period was extended to 8 years. 
United Kingdom (UK): the nation state comprising the countries of 
England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
Wider reinforcement works: any additional grid reinforcement works, 
beyond local enabling works, that may been required by the change in power flows caused 
by a new generator connecting to the electricity network. 
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1 Introduction 
Most modern large-scale electricity systems rely on networks of high voltage 
transmission wires to integrate generation and demand across the geographical area they 
cover. High voltage wires are able to transfer electrical energy in large quantities, over long 
distances, and with minimal losses1. These characteristics mean that high voltage 
transmission networks can enable the system to benefit from potential advantages which 
may arise from having generation sources located distantly from load centres – for 
example, the economies of scale accruing to larger generators, or the benefits to the 
generator of locating closer to its primary fuel source. Networks strongly interconnected 
by high voltage high capacity wires may also benefit from higher security of supply, if these 
networks provide greater capacity for trading of electrical energy between regions. Highly 
interconnected networks may also reduce costs for customers, by providing wider access to 
the most efficient generators. Transmission networks have therefore been described as the 
‘motorways to the market’ (Helm, 2003). 
However, there is of course a trade-off in that high voltage transmission wires 
do not come for free – notwithstanding the potential benefits listed above, they have a 
significant visual and aesthetic impact upon the areas they traverse, and have significant 
costs. The decision to build a new transmission line – whether it is taken in a centrally 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  This is because for a given power flow, current is inversely proportional to voltage, and resistive losses are 
proportional to the square of the current. See Appendix A.1.1. 
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controlled manner by a committee, as happened in Britain in the early and mid-twentieth 
century, or whether it is a more decentralised process involving a policy regime which 
conveys price signals to generators and transmission network owners – essentially comes 
down to the costs and benefits of this trade-off. 
As such the evolution of transmission networks is strongly influenced by the 
pattern and location of generation investments, but equally by political decisions relating to 
energy system priorities – such as decisions on market separation or integration, 
commitment to intervention or devolution of decision-making, or approaches to 
regulation. The interaction of these factors since the earliest years of the electricity industry 
has contributed to the development of the transmission network we now inherit. The 
continuing interaction of these factors over the coming decades will contribute to the 
development of the system that emerges by the end of that period. 
One of the most significant long-term political commitments undertaken by a 
British government in recent years is to reduce national greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
by 80% from 1990 levels by 2050 (HM Parliament, 2008). Meeting this commitment will 
have a major impact upon the structure of the electricity system (Ekins et al., 2013, Skea et 
al., 2011). Given the importance of high voltage transmission networks to large electricity 
systems, and their inherent relationship to the structure of generation and demand on the 
system, it is a reasonable supposition that the major structural changes required in the 
electricity system over the coming decades will have major implications for the 
transmission network. The aim of this thesis is to test this supposition in some detail, by 
exploring possible evolutionary paths of the electricity transmission networks over the next 
two decades in the context of this low carbon objective, and to consider how policy choices 
might affect or improve the path taken.   
1.1 Background: the UK’s climate commitments 
and the role of electricity 
The United Kingdom (UK)’s commitment to reduce national GHG emissions 
by 80% from 1990 levels by 2050 became legally binding with the passing into primary 
legislation in 2008 of the Climate Act (HM Parliament, 2008). Energy system modelling 
studies have explored the implications of this target for the technological transformation of 
the energy system. A highly consistent outcome of these studies is the conclusion that 
achieving the 2050 target will ultimately require reducing the carbon emissions from 
electricity generation to close to zero. A further, very common outcome is the suggestion 
that the total amount of electricity produced will at the same time have to grow, as low 
carbon electricity replaces high carbon fuels such as natural gas and liquid fossil fuels as an 
energy vector for heating buildings and for meeting transport demand (Usher and Strachan, 
2010, Skea et al., 2011, AEA, 2011, Ekins et al., 2013).   
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More specifically, energy system studies have increasingly converged around 
the recommendation that the cost-effective path to the 2050 target requires a near-total 
decarbonisation of electricity generation to an average carbon intensity of 50gCO2/kWh by 
as early as 2030 (Usher and Strachan, 2010, AEA, 2011, Ekins et al., 2013) (CCC, 2008, 
CCC, 2010a). As a result the recommendations of the Committee on Climate Change 
(CCC) in relation to the fourth carbon budget make clear that this should be the objective, 
and base their discussions and recommendations around electricity system decarbonisation 
on this assumption (CCC, 2010a, CCC, 2013a, CCC, 2014). 
The critical role of the electricity sector in the process of decarbonisation is 
related to the wide range of low carbon energy conversion technologies which produce 
electricity as their output vector. Nuclear power, onshore and offshore wind, fossil fuelled 
plants with carbon capture and storage (CCS), wave, tidal power and solar photovoltaics 
(PV) are all technologies which have the potential to be suppliers of low carbon electricity, 
and all are selected to different degrees in the energy system modelling studies referred to 
above. In the case of cost-optimising models such as MARKAL, the quantities of each 
technology selected in any given model run are highly dependent upon the input 
assumptions provided to the model, in relation to their future cost and performance 
characteristics. The numerical ranges from which these input assumptions can be selected 
in turn reflect high levels of uncertainty around these parameters. 
Bringing these points together, it can be said that there is a high level of 
certainty that achieving the UK’s legally binding carbon emissions reduction target will 
require a radical reconfiguration of the electricity generation mix; but there remains a high 
level of uncertainty around precisely what combination of low-carbon generation 
technologies will in fact deliver this mix (Ekins et al., 2013). The aim of this thesis is to 
explore what implications this transformation of the electricity sector may have for the 
transmission networks which are indispensable to its operation. The extent to which the 
challenges on the generation side as a result of the certain need for transformation, but a 
highly uncertain pathway, create equivalent challenges in the planning and development of 
transmission networks is the central area of interest for the thesis. In exploring the 
interaction of generation and transmission over future pathways within the context of a 
decarbonising system, this thesis aims to identify policy recommendations appropriate to a 
network which may have to undergo considerable change within conditions of uncertainty.       
1.2 The challenges of decarbonisation for 
electricity transmission networks 
The challenges which could be posed by a decarbonising generation mix to the 
electricity transmission networks relate to two critical features of low carbon generation 
technologies – their geographical location, and their operational characteristics.  
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The structure of the current network owes much to the preferred location of 
what was the dominant generation technology for much of the industry’s history – coal. 
Thus the most well-developed areas of network run from the coalfield areas of the 
Midlands and north of England, to the biggest demand (or load) centres in the south of 
England (Hannah, 1979). The structure also relates to political decisions to develop first 
the northern Scotland area as a separate system, and then to separate off southern Scotland 
from the England and Wales system (Hannah, 1979, Hannah, 1982). In each case, decisions 
on major network expansions historically were not taken with the location of renewable 
resources in mind, and so the network has not evolved to be a close fit with the relative 
location of renewable resources to load centres. One of the key network challenges of 
decarbonisation therefore is the prospect that many of the most renewable resource-rich 
areas most suited to the development of renewable energy technologies, may be located in 
the areas of the network with the lowest levels of interconnection capacity with the rest of 
the system, and most distantly located from the largest load centres. 
An additional challenge relates to the operational characteristics of low carbon 
technologies. Most renewable generators are dependent on weather conditions which 
means that their output can vary substantially. The average output of a renewable generator 
is usually estimated to be 30-40% of its total maximum output (see Appendix E.5.4). This 
large difference between average and peak output becomes a challenge for networks, as if 
networks are designed with sufficient capacity to meet the peak output of the generator, 
there may be times when they are heavily under-utilised.  
1.2.1 Insights from scenario and modelling studies 
Given the potential challenges to the existing design of the electricity 
transmission network posed by the prospect of decarbonising electricity supply, 
investigating how transmission networks may be required to evolve in the face of this 
prospect is an important research priority. However, a relatively few number of studies 
have addressed this in detail. 
A first important point to make is that the influential and policy-facing energy 
system modelling studies mentioned in the Section 1.1 do not have a spatial dimension. In 
their standard modes of operation, these models balance aggregate energy supply and 
demand on an annual basis, but do not account for the geographic location of either, and 
are thus unable to consider possible requirements of transmission and distribution 
infrastructure. One study (Strachan et al., 2009a) reports on soft-linking the UK MARKAL 
model to a geographical information systems (GIS) framework in order to investigate 
spatial aspects connected with possible future hydrogen distribution infrastructures; 
however comparable work to extend energy system models such as MARKAL and TIMES 
for electricity transmission infrastructure analyses have not so far been undertaken.  
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National Grid’s Future Energy Scenarios (FES) are re-issued annually and 
consider possible changes to the electricity supply mix and electricity demand profiles 
(e.g., National Grid (2013c)). The precise drivers and content of the scenarios vary from 
year to year, however they are in general derived from broad, high-level drivers such as 
‘affordability’ and ‘sustainability’, which give rise to ‘axioms’ – effectively a series of 
instructions for how the high level drivers are interpreted within the various sectors of each 
scenario, to produce quantitative assumptions across a range of indicators. An ever-present 
feature of the FES report has been the inclusion of a scenario called ‘Gone Green’, though 
the precise numbers which constitute the scenario have been modified from year to year. 
The essence of Gone Green is a scenario which meets Government targets on renewables 
and carbon budgets. As a result, it is typically the most quoted and analysed of the scenarios 
in any FES year, as it provides a convenient set of figures for testing the possible 
implications of government policy. Reports from ENSG (2009, 2012) and Gerber et al 
(2012), which are discussed further below, based their analysis on versions of the Gone 
Green scenario.  As an example of an FES output, Figure 1 shows the GB Average Cold 
Spell (ACS) peak demand and electricity generation installed capacity evolving through 
time in the Gone Green scenario. 
 
Figure 1: Demand and generation background for 'Gone Green' scenario. Source: (National Grid, 2013c) 
Although the FES method of deriving quantitative assumptions from high level 
trends and axioms is in contrast to the linear-programming optimisation energy system 
models referred to in studies such as Ekins et al (2013), the results outputs are similar in 
that they relate to the aggregate annual balancing of supply and demand across the whole 
system. Although National Grid’s detailed commercial knowledge of the prospects for 
particular plant, and its access to demand data are likely to feed in to the development of 
the scenarios, the final publicised versions of the scenarios are geographically aggregated, 
with no detail on locational changes in the balance of supply and demand, or on resulting 
implications for networks. The network development plans of the transmission companies 
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(National Grid, 2012d, SP Transmission, 2012, SHETL, 2011a, SHETL, 2011b), discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 4, use the National Grid FES and particularly Gone Green as an 
external evidence base, but the transmission companies are required to make their own 
assumptions about the geographical distribution of the scenarios’ plant mix, as these 
assumptions are not made explicit at least in the public versions of the FES. 
The Transition Pathways to a Low Carbon Economy project has focussed on 
the electricity system, exploring alternative pathways differentiated by contrasting power 
dynamics within society, with the activities of government, business and civil society 
alternately setting the agenda in the different pathways (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Patterns of governance: the action space for competing 'logics' in a transition. Source: J. Burgess and T. 
Hargreaves (Foxon, 2013)  
These have produced rich narrative storylines associated with each pathway, 
alongside quantitative outputs (Foxon, 2013). Initially the quantitative outputs were 
defined, as in the other work so far discussed, on an aggregated non-spatial basis, that is on 
the basis of the total supply, demand and installed capacity in the system as a whole. 
Despite being non-specific in spatial terms, the storylines do mention networks and suggest 
different implications for transmission and distribution networks. Two of the pathways 
(‘Market Rules’ and ‘Central Coordination’) describe supply mixes dominated by large-
scale generators, which suggest a continuing important role for high voltage transmission 
infrastructure. By contrast, the other pathway, known as ‘Thousand Flowers’ has high 
levels of distributed generation, which could be interpreted to require a slimmed down 
role for transmission networks, with considerable investment at the distribution level 
(Foxon, 2013). Work has been undertaken by Barnacle et al (2013) to interpret the 
pathways’ generation and demand figures spatially, and to identify network implications 
from this. Their analysis has so far been conducted as far as 2020 for one of the pathways, 
Market Rules. It uses a genetic algorithm to identify optimal transmission infrastructure 
investment plans compared to the base year of 2009, required to resolve transmission 
constraints arising from the generation mix in the stated year and pathway (Market Rules in 
2020). The study finds the required transmission investment for this pathway and year to 
be relatively small, being in a similar range to the planned Beauly-Denny upgrade, 
suggesting that beyond this project little further transmission investment would be needed 
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by 2020 to accommodate the generation mix associated with this pathway. The cost figures 
from Barnacle et al (2013) will be returned to in comparisons with outputs from the 
scenarios undertaken in this thesis, in Chapter 8. 
The Ofgem commissioned Long-term Electricity Network Scenarios (LENS) 
project (Ault et al., 2008) was a scenarios project more explicitly concerned with the 
future prospects for electricity network architecture and management, both at transmission 
and distribution level. The broad drivers through which scenarios were generated in this 
project were the level of environmental concern (high or low), level of consumer 
participation in the electricity market (active or passive) and preferred model of 
institutional governance (market led or government led). The selective combination of 
different levels of these three variables produced five scenarios, initially characterised in 
some detail with narrative storylines which described investment in electricity generation 
capacity, network investment, consumer behaviour and changes in market structures and 
institutions, albeit in an almost entirely qualitative way. The quantification of the storylines 
took place within the MARKAL model which was used subsequently to reproduce as 
closely as possible the scenario descriptions. As a non-spatial model, the MARKAL analysis 
dealt with spatially aggregated energy supply-demand balances, and did not produce 
network information. In some cases the MARKAL generation mix produced contrasting 
results to those suggested in the scenario storylines, as the model was not constrained to 
reproduce the scenario storylines exactly. As a result the relationship between the 
narrative, network focussed storylines, and the quantitative generation-supply focussed 
modelling, was a loose and flexible one. The LENS scenarios, while useful as explorations 
of the range of possible network futures, do not directly assess and quantify network 
requirements arising from particular generation mixes. 
The Electricity Networks Strategy Group (ENSG), a group convened from 
representatives of the electricity industry, has produced reports examining the possible case 
for upgrades to the transmission network on the basis of assumed generation mixes in line 
with meeting the government’s renewables targets for 2020 (ENSG, 2009, 2012). The 
analysis is based on high-level assumptions about the location of a plant mix which would 
succeed in meeting the government’s 2020 targets. The generation mix assumptions are 
based on National Grid’s FES Gone Green scenario, which, in the version used by ENSG 
(2012) includes 28 GW of wind (11.2 GW onshore, 16.6 GW offshore), 12.3 GW of 
nuclear and 41.7 GW of gas (ENSG, 2012). In response to this generation mix scenario, 
ENSG recommends a number of transmission system reinforcements, most notably a 
significant strengthening of the England-Scotland boundary through two 1.8 GW HVDC 
subsea cables, off the east coast between Peterhead and Hawthorne Pit, and off the west 
coast between Hunterston and Deeside. Other potential offshore HVDC strengthening 
projects include a connection from the north to the south of Wales (Wylfa to Pembroke), 
and from Caithness to the Moray Coast, across the Moray Firth. Additionally, other 
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strategic onshore upgrade needs are identified, notably in the north-west and on the east 
coast of England, and in mid-Wales (Figure 3). The ENSG work provides rich spatial detail 
around specific transmission network upgrade possibilities, in relation to the possible future 
electricity mix considered. However, the reliance on a single scenario, ‘Gone Green’, 
means that the analysis does not engage explicitly with questions of alternative policy 
options, or with the interrelated uncertainties affecting both transmission and generation 
investment. The analysis is also relatively near term – so far, the ENSG has not undertaken 
studies extending beyond 2020. The ENSG scenario analysis is compared with relevant 
outputs from the current analysis in Chapter 8.  
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Figure 3: GB Electricity Transmission System showing potential reinforcements by 2020, according to ENSG analysis. 
Source: (ENSG, 2012)  
Using a DC power flow of the winter peak, (Gerber et al., 2012) also model 
the Gone Green scenario. The reference case scenario which includes ‘expected’ 
transmission reinforcement (e.g. including the Beauly-Denny line, but not the additional 
lines proposed by ENSG), shows that roughly 2 GW of wind generation in Scotland is 
curtailed. The addition of the eastern HVDC link reduces curtailment by 1GW, and with 
127 
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both the eastern and western HVDC links, no wind curtailment is necessary. This reduces 
system costs as the wind displaces comparatively costly gas fired generation, in comparison 
to the reference case. Thus, the analysis of Gerber et al(2012)broadly agrees with that of 
ENSG (2012), as would be expected given that they analyse the same scenario (Gone 
Green) at the same future year (2020).  
The analyses undertaken by ENSG and by Gerber et al suggest that the need to 
consider quite substantial changes in the architecture of the transmission network in the 
context of the decarbonising generation mix is already significant. However, the analyses 
also reflect a relatively near-term situation in which the strong growth of renewables in 
northern areas of GB is comparatively certain, due to a strong queue of projects in 
Scotland, arising from decisions taken in relation to the unification of the Scottish system 
with the England and Wales system under the British Electricity Transmission and Trading 
Arrangements (BETTA) in 2005, and the subsequent connect-and-manage regime 
(discussed in Chapters 4 and 5). Beyond 2020 there is greater uncertainty about the precise 
pattern of connections that will occur; but nonetheless the pace of decarbonisation will also 
be required to increase substantially in order to fulfil the CCC’s recommendation of a 
carbon intensity of around 50g/kWh by the early 2030s (CCC, 2013a).  
Despite the critical role for the electricity sector raised by energy system 
modelling studies (Usher and Strachan, 2010, AEA, 2011, Ekins et al., 2013, CCC, 2008, 
CCC, 2010a) and growing awareness of the possibility of significant implications of this 
decarbonisation for electricity networks (Ofgem, 2010c), there is a relatively small body of 
literature which explicitly and systematically explores implications for the transmission 
network of deep decarbonisation of electricity generation in the UK. ENSG (2012), 
Barnacle et al (2013) and Gerber et al (Gerber et al.) are most the relevant studies in that 
they offer detailed, systematic and transmission focussed analyses – however each of these 
extends only to 2020. Further, none of the above studies engage with transmission network 
policies, and how different policy choices could affect the way the transmission network 
evolves and its suitability to deal with and adapt to the decarbonising generation mix. 
If the transmission upgrade requirements for meeting the needs of system 
decarbonisation up to 2020, according to ENSG and Gerber et al, are likely to be very  
significant, as the pace of decarbonisation accelerates through the 2020s  it is a reasonable 
hypothesis that transmission upgrade requirements out to 2030 may be even greater. There 
is therefore a need to consider the transmission network implications of the 
decarbonisation of the electricity system to a carbon intensity of 50g/kWh, and of doing 
this within the next twenty years. Because of the particular characteristics of low carbon 
generators, and the particular challenges these could pose for transmission networks in 
large quantities, the analysis needs to involve sufficiently high spatial as well as temporal 
resolution, in order to consider both how the location of generators affects transmission 
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requirements, but also how the interaction of supply and demand under different weather 
conditions could affect power flows. The approach also needs to take account of the 
uncertainties which increase significantly as we look beyond 2020, and to consider the 
effect that transmission policy choices could have on the direction of evolution of the 
system, in order to deliver tractable policy recommendations from the analysis. 
1.3 Research question 
The discussion in the previous section suggests the following key points: 
• UK energy policy is driving a major transformation in the electricity 
generation sector over the next fifteen to twenty years 
• Given the critical role of transmission networks in large electricity 
systems, and the particular locational and operational characteristics of 
low carbon generators, it is a plausible hypothesis that the proposed major 
structural changes in electricity generation will have major implications 
for the electricity transmission network 
• Despite a variety of long and short term UK energy scenario and 
modelling work, some of which has considered aspects of network 
development, no studies have yet fully explored the implications of a long 
term heavily decarbonised electricity mix for transmission networks, 
including a quantified spatial analysis of network power flows and 
representation of alternative network policy regimes 
• Therefore there is a need to explore in detail the implications of 
electricity decarbonisation for networks. In order for such an exploration 
to be of practical use for policy makers, it must have embedded in it 
options which relate to real policy options that could be pursued in 
transmission network management.  
This leads to the following research question for the thesis: 
• How can transmission network policy choices affect the role that the 
transmission network plays in helping to deliver a low-carbon electricity 
system by the early 2030s? 
The question clarifies that the area of interest is the role of electricity 
transmission networks in delivering a low carbon electricity system within the next two 
decades – defined in this research as a system with a carbon intensity of 50gCO2/kWh. 
More specifically, the interest is in exploring how policy choices made in relation to the 
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management and operation of the transmission network could (positively or negatively) 
affect the role that the transmission network plays in that process.  
1.4 Methodology 
 
This section briefly outlines the methods employed in order to address the 
central research question of the thesis. In this thesis several aspects of the method are 
original, therefore methods are developed and explained in greater detail in specific 
relevant chapters of the thesis, and constitute part of the original contribution of the thesis. 
This section however provides an overview of the methods used and how they relate to 
each other. 
The research question concerns a technological system (the GB electricity 
generation and transmission network). It deals with the way in which policy choices could 
impact upon this network, and by implication, it acknowledges that alternative policy 
choices could contribute to different outcomes, and therefore that there are multiple 
possible future outcomes for the system. Addressing this research question will therefore 
require three synthesising areas of work:  
• Technical analysis: a technical understanding of the transmission 
network and electricity generation system, and a means of simulating 
aspects of its performance under alternative future hypothetical 
conditions. 
• Policy analysis: an analysis of GB electricity transmission network 
policy, and its context within broader UK energy policy paradigms 
• Scenario analysis: a process for ordering and analysing hypotheses 
about the future, which, while acknowledging uncertainty, is nonetheless 
conducive to deriving policy relevant insights. This process also needs to 
be capable of integrating largely qualitative policy analysis with 
quantitative generation and transmission power flow analysis 
The next section discusses for each of these synthesising requirements what 
tools and methods were fed in, and why they were chosen. 
1.4.1 Technical analysis 
At the heart of the research question is a technical system, which, although it 
has numerous interactions with other energy subsystems, is primarily defined in this 
project as the GB high voltage electricity transmission network, and the large-scale 
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generators that connect to it. The research question therefore demands technical and 
quantitative representation and simulation of the output of generators, and the transmission 
networks through which their power output is connected to demand.  
An analysis of how power flows through a network under given generation 
and demand conditions is called a load flow analysis. A load flow analysis enables the 
consideration of power transfers between different areas of the network, which can in turn 
suggest requirement for re-dispatch of plant, or in the longer term, network upgrades. It is 
a widely used approach for considering the impact of future generation scenarios on 
network infrastructures, and was accordingly the method employed in the studies by ENSG 
(2012), Gerber et al (2012) and Barnacle et al (2013) reported in Section 1.2.1. A load 
flow is an analysis of the power flows across a network at an instantaneous point in time, 
when demand and generation at each node have been defined. The division of power across 
the various junctions of the network is dictated by the relative arrangement of load and 
generation around the network, but also by the relative impedences of the various sections 
of circuit. When presented with two parallel lines, current divides between them in 
inverse proportion to their impedances. This follows Ohm’s law (Equation 4, Appendix 
A.1.1), which shows that current is inversely proportional to resistance (or impedance in 
AC circuits).  
Load flows can be simulated of both AC and DC systems. AC simulations 
record reactive power, losses and voltage drops, and are required for sufficiently accurate 
simulations of distribution networks. DC load flows have the advantage of being 
computationally simpler, and with a faster simulation time (Gerber et al., 2012). They 
treat the network as if it were DC, and although this simplification is not appropriate for 
distribution networks, DC load flows can simulate high voltage transmission networks with 
a high degree of accuracy (Gerber et al., 2012). Although they do not account for resistive 
losses, this simplification is considered acceptable for high voltage networks, where losses 
are significantly lower than on distribution networks. On the GB transmission networks, 
losses are typically 2% of generation (Elexon, 2013).  The DC load flow tool provided by 
the open source programme MATPOWER (Zimmerman et al., 2011), provided as a plug-
in to the MATLAB software, is used for this analysis. 
The load flow requires three separate input matrices. One matrix defines the 
line parameters of the network connecting the various nodes. In this study, these were 
based on real line data provided by National Grid (National Grid, 2011b, National Grid, 
2012a), as reported in further detail in Chapter 6 and Appendix E.1, and on assumptions 
about future upgrades to this existing network, developed as part of the scenario process, 
as described in Chapter 7. Another matrix defines the demands at each node on the system. 
As reported in Chapter 6 and Appendix E these were based on current information from 
National Grid (2013a) and DECC (2012b, 2013a), and by assumptions on future trends 
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drawing on National Grid (2013c). A third matrix defines the generator output at each 
node. As described in Chapter 6 and Appendix E this required data on current installed 
capacities which were largely drawn from National Grid (2011b)as well as from 
RenewableUK(2013b) and other commercial sources. As described in Chapter 7 these 
were added to by assumptions on future generation installed capacities which were 
elaborated as part of the scenario process. Each generator was also subject to limits on 
availability which vary according to the time of year and the weather conditions, and set 
within a merit order, as reported in Chapter 6. An Excel spreadsheet was assembled to 
combine the various data assumptions on the nodal demands, generation mix and output of 
renewable generators in different seasons and weather conditions, in order to produce a 
merit-order dispatch of generation to meet various specified combinations of seasonal 
demand and weather conditions, as reported in Chapter 6. The combination of these 
various data therefore enabled production of the three matrices – network, demand and 
generation – required to perform a load flow in MATPOWER.    
The branch flow outputs from the load flow tool were fed back into the Excel 
spreadsheet for a constraint analysis, which was also assisted by visual representation of 
the power flows and constraints using geographical information systems (GIS) 
software, Quantum GIS (QGIS), as described in Chapter 6. The constraint analysis in Excel 
highlights precise quantities of power flow as well as exceedences across individual sections 
of line; the visual and spatial representation of GIS is useful for clearly identifying patterns 
of exceedences, and evidence of inter-regional power flows in addition to specific line 
exceedences.    
1.4.2 Policy analysis 
As well as being focussed on a particular technological system (the GB 
electricity transmission network), the research question is also explicitly concerned with 
how alternative policy choices could affect the development of this technological system. 
This policy element of the research question demands an analysis of existing policies and 
institutions in relation to the transmission network, what possible options there may be for 
altering these policies and institutions, and the motivations or propositions that might 
provide the rationale for doing so. 
The question of what motivations underlie policy choices has been examined 
by various authors in political economy and political science literatures, who have 
considered the role of ‘doctrine’ (Crick, 1964), ‘ideology’ (Sunderlin, 2003) or ‘policy 
paradigms’ (Hall, 1993) in shaping policy discourse. These and other authors’ contributions 
are considered in Section 2.5, and inform the inclusion of a ‘values’ level within the 
scenario process developed in Chapter 2. Identifying the deep ideological or value-trends 
and paradigm shifts which have affected the practice of energy policy in the UK is then the 
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task of Chapter 3 – this chapter undertakes a historical review of the evolution of the 
GB electricity system and the long-term policy trends and value shifts that have 
accompanied this process.  This historical review is based on a literature review of works 
by energy system historians, with a particular debt to Leslie Hannah’s two-volume history 
of the British electricity industry (Hannah, 1979, Hannah, 1982), as well as on historical 
data published by DECC and other internet sources including archived media reports.  
Chapter 4 then summarises and analyses the current policy mix in 
relation to transmission network planning and regulation. This was undertaken through an 
analysis of consultation documents, evidence submissions and other documents relating to 
the policy areas of direct relevance to transmission networks, which are available on the 
relevant pages of Ofgem and National Grid websites. This chapter also uses the context of 
the long-term historical analysis undertaken in Chapter 3 to identify how different elements 
of the current transmission network-related policy mix appear to be expressions of 
different policy ‘value-sets’. It further uses the context of Chapter 3 to suggest that if one 
of these policy ‘value-sets’ were to become more dominant, this would create a different 
forward pathway of evolution for the system.  
A further important element of bringing together the present set of policy 
options with the deeper historical context was provided by the outputs of 
semistructured qualitative interviews, reported in Chapter 5. Semistructured 
interviewing is an established social science research method which allows researchers to 
engage with the viewpoints and opinions of a particular relevant set of participants. The 
method ‘reflects an ontological position that is concerned with people’s knowledge, 
understandings, interpretations, experiences, and interactions’ (Mason, 2004). In contrast 
to structured interviews, which involve a rigid schedule of questions posed in exactly the 
same way to each of the interviewees, semistructured interviews have a ‘flexible and fluid 
structure’ organised around an ‘interview guide’, which provides a list of topics to be 
covered, but allows flexibility in how they are explored and the order they are explored in, 
as well as allowing the possibility for other topics to be brought up by the interviewee 
(Mason, 2004). Thus, in the semistructured approach ‘the interview can be shaped by the 
interviewee’s own understandings as well as the researcher’s interests, and unexpected 
themes can emerge’ (Mason, 2004). The approach is broadly characterised by ‘the 
interactional style of dialogue; a relatively informal style; a thematic, topic-centred, 
biographical, or narrative approach; and the belief that knowledge is situated and 
contextual, and that therefore the role of the interview is to ensure that relevant contexts 
are brought into focus so that situated knowledge can be produced’ (Mason, 2004). 
Accordingly in the case of the current research the role of the interviews was 
to make a connection between the broader value trends identified as applying to the UK 
energy system in Chapter 3, and the specific policy choices identified in Chapter 4. The 
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interviews explored participants’ views on a number of specific transmission policy 
options, but also situated these views within the context of broader narratives and 
paradigms about the appropriate ways of governing energy systems, aiming to uncover how 
these broader contexts could translate to and inform policy preferences in the specific area 
of transmission policy. The flexible and fluid structure of the semistructured approach also 
allowed for the experts being interviewed to raise additional areas of interest and concern 
which may not have already been identified in the literature reviews – in a complex and 
evolving technological system it is possible that certain aspects of its practical operation, or 
issues concerning its future development, may not be spelled out explicitly in the various 
codes and consultation documents which relate to the industry, but rather held as tacit 
knowledge by those whose full time occupation is to work in and run that industry. The 
semistructured interview approach leaves open the opportunity for such tacit knowledge to 
emerge.  
In the semistructured interviews for this thesis key system actors discussed 
their views on the current transmission policy arrangements, and future options. In these 
interviews, the context was set by framing the different value-systems which could underlie 
decisions to take policy in a certain direction, and participants views on the current policy 
mix were collected in the context of having asked them to state their position on the 
principles of the broad values. These helped to connect the current policy mix to broader 
value trends and to clarify how current actors think about the options going forward. This 
further illuminates possible alternative policy pathways based on different combinations of 
value-systems. The interviews were undertaken on the basis of the ‘Chatham House Rule’, 
meaning that views could be quoted but not attributed to individuals or organisations. A 
potential disadvantage of this was the possible loss in explanatory power which might have 
been available in being able to connect views to organisations – as some views could be 
affected by the commercial interests of the organisation to which the individual belonged. 
However, the benefit of offering anonymity from the outset was in facilitating a more open 
and less guarded discussion, and given the seniority of those approached for interviews, was 
considered a price worth paying in order increase the chances of interviews being given. 
Moreover the loss of being able to connect views to organisational interests was not 
considered grave given the purpose of the interview process. The aim of the interviews was 
not to provide data for mounting a critique of any particular view by exposing the possible 
vested interests that support it; rather, the aim was to identify the spectrum of principles 
held by different actors, each of which could then be explored within scenarios. In this 
context, the identification of who holds any particular view or value-set is not critical. 
1.4.3 Scenario analysis 
The research question invokes the consideration of alternative possible 
futures. Creating hypotheses about the future inherently involves uncertainty. The future is 
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uncertain in part because of unpredictable or uncontrollable factors which could impact 
upon it; however, it is also uncertain because human actors could take decisions the effect 
of which would be to construct the path of the future in one direction or another. ‘The 
plurality of the future and the scope for freedom of human action are mutually explanatory; 
the future has not been written, but remains to be created’ (Godet, 1987). A scenario 
process is a structured approach to considering the future in a way that assists scenario 
users in assessing the uncertainties, including both threats and opportunities, and 
considering their own decision options within this context. Far from dismissing or 
diminishing uncertainty, scenario analysis should help users to ‘accept uncertainty, try to 
understand it, and make it part of [their] reasoning’ (Wack, 1985b). As a result, the 
process should have a positive impact on improving the robustness of decisions which must 
be taken in spite of the uncertainty, helping users in ‘making choices today with an 
understanding of how they might turn out’ (Schwartz, 1991), and allowing users to weigh 
‘opportunities and threats carefully when making short-term and long-term strategic 
decisions’ (Scearce and Fulton, 2004). 
The literature on scenarios is vast and varied, which attests to the widely 
understood need to think about the future when making strategic decisions, to the utility of 
having some kind of structured process for doing so, but also to the impossibility of 
applying a single universal scenario method template to the great variety of sectors in which 
scenario thinking has been applied. Taking a scenario approach to a new problem therefore 
requires careful engagement with the existing body of literature, combined with the ability 
to pick out key insights and approaches which are of relevance to the question under 
consideration. In particular, for the current research question, a scenario process is 
required which allows for the integration of technical system analysis and qualitative policy 
analysis, in a way that allows the elaboration of technically precise scenarios which have the 
potentially to usefully inform the decisions of policy makers. Chapter 2 presents the results 
of an extensive review of the scenario literature, identifying salient distinctions 
between scenario methods, before drawing together an original scenario 
development process tailored to the needs of the research question. This original 
process provides the overarching unifying structure within which the other methods and 
tools described in this section are integrated. 
1.5 Synthesis, analysis and contribution of the 
thesis 
The bringing together of technical system analysis and policy analysis within an 
original scenario development process, produces transmission network scenarios which are 
conducive to being analysed for their implications for technical system performance and 
policy choices. The analysis of the scenarios allows conclusions to be drawn, and 
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recommendations to be made, in relation to electricity transmission policy. Reflection on 
the overall process also produces insights relating to the process of scenario development 
itself.  
Thus the original contribution of the thesis is two-fold. The primary 
contribution of the thesis is to answer the central research question, and explore how 
policy choices can affect the role played by the transmission network in a decarbonising 
system. In doing so it produces policy recommendations. 
Additionally, in order to successfully achieve the primary aim of the thesis, it 
will have been necessary to develop a scenario process tailored to the needs of the question. 
Reflections upon the scenario process itself produces methodological insights gained from 
carrying out a novel mixed-method scenario process. These insights are a relevant 
methodological contribution to the scenario literature, in particular for scenarios 
considering policy-led energy system decarbonisation.  
1.6 Structure and outline of the thesis 
Figure 4 illustrates the discussion of Sections 1.4 and 1.5 by showing how the 
various methods and processes described fit together, also indicating the chapters in which 
the full discussion of each element takes place. The top level shows the various existing 
research methods and tools that are drawn upon to support the research. The middle level 
shows how these research methods and tools feed into synthesis and analysis: the research 
methods and tools feed into the three synthesising areas, as described in sections 1.4.1 – 
1.4.3, which in turn produce original transmission network scenarios, which are analysed. 
The lower level shows the outcome of this work, which is in two forms of contribution: 
conclusions relating to electricity transmission policy choices, and methodological insights 
into the process of low carbon scenario development. 
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Figure 4: Schematic outline of thesis 
The sequential ordering of these chapters in the remainder of the thesis is as 
follows: 
• Chapter 2 reviews the literature on scenario methods and sets out the 
original scenario development process used in this thesis 
• Chapter 3 undertakes a historical analysis of the evolution of the GB 
electricity system and associated policy trends and values 
• Chapter 4 analyses the current policy mix pertaining to the management 
and operation of the GB electricity transmission networks 
• Chapter 5 reports on the outcomes of semi-structured interviews with 
key system actors on the current mix of policies pertaining to electricity 
transmission networks, and future options 
• Chapter 6 describes the construction and parameterisation of the technical 
simulation tools used as part of the scenario process 
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• Chapter 7 summarises how the various technical tools and policy analyses 
are integrated into the scenario process developed in Chapter 2 
• Chapter 8 describes the scenarios which emerge from this process 
• Chapter 9 discusses the insights and analysis arising from the scenarios 
• Chapter 10 draws conclusions. It reflects upon the validity of the new 
scenario process, and sets out the recommendations on transmission 
network policies arising from the scenarios. It also makes 
recommendations for future research. 
1.7 Conclusions 
In order to meet the carbon budgets set out by the CCC, the UK’s electricity 
system will have to undergo profound structural change, with significant implications for 
the GB electricity transmission network. Low carbon generators, in particular renewables, 
will present challenges to the existing GB transmission network structure, due to their 
locational and operational characteristics. However there is significant uncertainty around 
the precise mix of future low carbon generation, and hence also around the precise 
implications for the future electricity transmission network. This thesis aims to explore 
how policy choices could affect the role that the transmission network plays in a 
decarbonising electricity system. In order to address this question it develops a novel 
scenario development process which integrates a variety of quantitative and qualitative 
information and approaches. The contributions of the thesis are therefore, first, policy 
recommendations on approaches to transmission network planning and management in the 
context of a decarbonising electricity system, and second, the development of a new 
scenario method suitable for deriving tractable policy relevant outcomes to questions of 
long term energy system change and decarbonisation. 
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2 Principles of 
scenario theory and 
their application to 
questions of energy 
policy  
The research question of this thesis is concerned with the possible effect that 
policies could have on the development of electricity transmission networks in a possible 
future transition towards a highly decarbonised electricity system. This is not a question 
which can be addressed purely empirically, as such a transition has not yet happened, in the 
UK or any other country. The question requires the hypothetical analysis of the possible 
future impact of alternative sets of decisions which could be taken now. This type of 
thinking is commonly referred to as ‘scenario analysis’. Scenario analysis has been 
undertaken in a wide range of contexts by widely contrasting organisations – and the 
literature on scenario theory is correspondingly broad. This chapter engages with that 
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literature in order to assemble a coherent approach to undertaking a scenario analysis 
suitable for the consideration of the research question of this thesis, and of potentially 
wider application to other questions of energy policy and long-term system 
decarbonisation.  
2.1 Thinking about the future – introduction to 
scenarios 
The use of the imagination to think hypothetically about alternative possible 
future outcomes is an intuitive, and apparently unique, human capability. ‘As far as we 
know, no other species is able to envision something that does not exist’ (Gabora, 2010). 
The ability to imagine the future for strategic purposes is believed to have developed early 
in the evolution of the human family, and is associated with the arrival of Homo erectus 
approximately 1.8 million years ago (Gabora and Kaufman, 2010, Donald, 1991). Homo 
sapiens, arriving 40-50,000 years ago, added to this capability increased cognitive fluidity 
and ‘meta-representational thought’, enabling increased connection between ‘previously 
encapsulated (functionally isolated) brain modules’ (Gabora and Kaufman, 2010). Modern 
human minds are able to ‘shift smoothly between past, present and future almost without 
our being aware of it’ (Gabora, 2010), and our ability to imagine the future in order to 
inform and improve the decisions we make, is one that we readily and naturally deploy 
almost continuously throughout our lives.  
More formal and collaborative attempts at thinking about the future – in 
military planning, business strategy and public policy – also draw on this innate skill. ‘The 
unceasing transformation of facta into futura by summary processes in the mind is part of 
our daily life, and thus the undertaking of conscious and systematic forecasting is simply an 
attempt to effect improvements in a natural activity of the mind’ (de Jouvenel, 1967). 
However, converting an internal and personal process undertaken within the mind of an 
individual to a public process whose genesis, reasoning and outcomes can be shared and 
understood by multiple parties, is not always straightforward. Indeed the apparent 
intuitiveness of the process at the individual level can be an obstacle to its application 
within organisations or in public contexts, if this perceived intuitiveness works against the 
perception of any requirement for formalisation. 
The term ‘scenario’ has become commonly used as a collective term for the 
images that arise out of speculation about the future – the particular hypothetical future 
situations or conditions that are imagined. The original use of the term in this context has 
been attributed to strategists working in the US Air Force Research and Development 
(RAND) arm in the late 1940s, one of whom, Herman Kahn, later became a well-known 
futurist in his own right. The term is said to have been borrowed by the RAND group from 
the lexicon of film-making, where the scenario is the outline of the plot of a proposed film 
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(Kleiner, 1996). Attempts to define the term more specifically than this in the context of 
strategic futures thinking however, quickly run into controversy as there are widely varying 
interpretations as to what it may cover. The sheer range of activities from which the word 
‘scenario’ emerges within the equally broad field of ‘futures studies’, renders impossible 
any attempt to define a single ‘scenario method’. As reported by Bradfield et al (2005), the 
wide usage of the term has been commented on, often with barely concealed irritation, by 
a number of scenario theorists. Schnaars (1987) observes that the futures research literature 
‘offers a plethora of methods for constructing scenarios, some of which are reasonable, 
many of which are arcane and impractical, most of which have never been fairly tested’. 
The lack of clear definition of the term (Mason, 1994), which is ‘increasingly misused and 
abused’ (Godet, 1990) has resulted in ‘methodological chaos’ (Martelli, 2001), and 
accordingly ‘few techniques in futures studies have given rise to so much confusion as 
scenarios’ (Khakee, 1991). Useful contributions to impose some order upon this 
‘methodological chaos’ have been made by authors who have summarised the literature 
through typologies of scenario methods, bringing out the main ‘schools’ or traditions 
within the field (Bradfield et al., 2005, Börjeson et al., 2006, van Notten et al., 2003, 
McDowall and Eames, 2006, Huss and Honton, 1987). However, such is the apparent 
flexibility of the term that even agreement on a broad typology of scenario approaches has 
not yet been achieved amongst these and other reviews. Nonetheless, each alternative 
typological arrangement is useful in as much as it brings out important common factors as 
well as contrasting approaches within scenario methods – even if the definitive scenario 
typology remains elusive. 
It may in fact be necessary to acknowledge that methodological diversity is 
and always will be associated with the term ‘scenario’. Thinking about the future is a 
requirement of almost every human activity. That those who attempt to formalise this 
process within fields as diverse as military planning, political strategy, business strategy, 
health, education, welfare and energy policy should all converge on just a handful of 
methods which between them are applicable to all possible situations, may be an 
expectation which is unrealistic and potentially counter-productive. However, even if a 
new scenario practitioner could, on the basis of this argument, feel justified in customising 
a scenario method to his or her own particular needs, this is not equivalent to justifying a 
studied ignorance of the various methods which have been developed before, or the 
undertaking of a scenario process without any reflection on or consideration of 
methodology. This chapter therefore reviews previous approaches to low carbon energy 
scenarios, in the context of a review of the broader scenario literature. It brings out 
concepts and techniques of most relevance to the current research question, and combines 
these into a scenario development process designed for use in this thesis. 
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2.2 The objectives of scenario thinking  
Intuitively when thinking about the future we think sometimes about risks or 
threats against which we would like to be resilient, as well as scanning for opportunities 
from which we could benefit if prepared. The objectives of scenario thinking are often 
summarised in a similar way: ‘Scenarios serve two main purposes. The first is protective: 
anticipating and understanding risk. The second is entrepreneurial: discovering strategic 
options of which you were previously unaware’ (Wack, 1985a). A similar two-fold 
distinction is made by various other theorists (Wright and Cairns, 2011, Schwartz, 1991, 
Scearce and Fulton, 2004). Different scenario exercises will strike a different balance 
between these two objectives, with perhaps the most important factor affecting this balance 
being the agency of the ‘scenario user’ – the actor or organisation using the scenarios to 
improve their decision making – in relation to the ‘system under study’ – the system 
within which that scenario user acts, and which the scenarios are exploring. De Jouvenel 
writes that for any actor, the future may be divided into ‘dominating’ elements, which 
cannot be controlled by that actor but only reacted to, and ‘masterable’ elements over 
which the actor in question has some agency to exert influence (de Jouvenel, 1967).  
Typically, scenarios conducted by businesses will find themselves more 
frequently in a protective mode – searching for external threats and planning accordingly. 
The classic example of such a use of scenarios is provided by the series of scenario exercises 
conducted by Shell during the 1970s (Wack, 1985b, Wack, 1985a). By contrast, public 
policy scenarios, for which the implicit ‘scenario user’ is often the policy making body of a 
nation state, an actor with greater agency within its own ‘system’, more elements of the 
future may be considered potentially ‘masterable’, hence the scenarios may operate more 
frequently in a proactive mode. An example of this approach is the ‘Prospective’ school of 
scenario building, developed in the late 1950s in academic institutions in France but with 
an explicit intention to link to policy making processes, such as the five year French 
National Plans (Bradfield et al., 2005). The language of the Prospective school is clearly 
about forming the future, as an alternative and preferable strategy to passively allowing the 
future to take shape. Thus, ‘it is not so much about divining the future as constructing it, 
not so much about forseeing a probable future as preparing one that is hoped for. It 
amounts to making desirable ends a powerful enough lever to act on the present’ (Massé, 
1966). 
However, in many public policy situations, the model of the policy making 
executive as a highly powerful actor able to turn policy options on and off in line with 
centrally devised plans, would appear too simplistic. A policy process is often less about a 
simple proactive forcing of a strategy by one actor (the policy maker), and more about 
coordination and alignment of activities and viewpoints of multiple actors. In this context 
too scenarios can be used to illustrate the potential outcomes of different combinations of 
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activities and alignments of multiple actors. A key example of this approach is the Mont 
Fleur scenarios process which occurred in South Africa during the transition period from 
apartheid system to multi-party democracy. The process drew together actors from across 
the political spectrum, with accordingly divergent views. Emphasising that ‘the future is 
not fixed but can be shaped by the decisions and actions of individuals, organisations and 
institutions’ (Le Roux and Maphai, 1992), the scenarios were used to elicit agreement as to 
how decisions and actions taken by various actors in the present could lead to future 
outcomes, to ‘find and enlarge the common ground’ (Le Roux and Maphai, 1992), thereby 
enabling the building of consensus  between actors. 
Three potential objectives of scenarios processes can therefore be identified. 
Scenarios can be used to assist with: 
• Protective decision making 
• Proactive decision making 
• Consensus building  
These objectives, though contrasting, are by no means mutually exclusive. 
However, as discussed, the balance between these aims in any particular scenario process 
depends upon the level of agency of the scenario user or users in the context of the system 
under study. Therefore, a clear identification of the scenario user or users – the actor or 
actors who will be using the scenarios to assist their decision making – and their level of 
agency within the system under study, is crucial to understanding the objectives of the 
process. A clear definition of the system under study, including its boundaries, is also 
critical to understanding the role and level of agency of the scenario user or users within it. 
Table 1 shows how these three objectives map onto different types of low-carbon, climate 
and energy scenarios, and the connection in each case to the agency of the explicit or 
implied scenario user in the context of the system under study. 
	   56	  
Table 1: Low carbon, climate and energy scenarios: comparison of focal questions, scenario users, system under study and 
type of objective 
Scenario 
examples 
Focal question Scenario user and 
system under 
study 
Type of objective 
Climate impact 
scenarios (IPCC, 
2007b, IPCC, 
2007a, UKCIP, 
2009) 
What is the possible 
range of greenhouse 
gas concentrations by 
a given date, and 
what is the possible 
range of impacts 
associated with them? 
National policy 
makers; global 
climate system 
Protective: suggests 
actions to adapt to 
climate change 
Proactive: informs 
discussion of what a 
global emissions 
target should be 
Socio-economic 
scenarios (Berkhout 
et al., 1999, 
UKCIP, 2001) 
How would different 
policy trajectories be 
affected by different 
socio-economic 
contexts? 
National policy 
makers; social, 
economic and 
cultural system 
Protective: suggests 
actions to improve 
robustness of 
particular plans to a 
range of (external) 
socio-economic 
conditions 
Technical energy-
emissions scenarios 
(IEA, 2012, CCC, 
2008, DECC, 
2010a, Skea et al., 
2011) 
How can the energy 
system reduce its 
greenhouse gas 
emissions to a given 
level by a given date? 
National and 
international policy 
makers; technical 
energy system 
Proactive / 
consensus building: 
aiming to 
demonstrate how 
policy driven 
technological 
deployment can 
achieve desired 
emissions reduction 
targets 
 
The three objectives also identify another important characteristic of 
scenarios: a scenario process is purposeful activity, in which thinking about the future is 
done in order to inform and improve current and near-term decision making. Scenarios are 
not simply stories about the future, told with no other objective than the enjoyment and 
amusement derived from story-telling itself. Scenarios have a strategic purpose, connected 
with near-term actions. Thus, for Schwartz (1991), ‘scenario planning is about making 
choices today with an understanding of how they might turn out’, and for Scearce and 
Fulton (2004), they allow us to weigh ‘opportunities and threats carefully when making 
short-term and long-term strategic decisions’. Godet (1987) emphasises that ‘despite the 
unknown horizons, we have to take decisions today that commit us for the future’, and that 
in this context, a scenario process helps us ‘to create the future rather than submit to it’. 
Speaking of business scenarios, Wack (1985a) asks, ‘Do they lead to action? If scenarios do 
not push managers to do something other than that indicated by past experience, they are 
nothing more than interesting speculation’, and in the context of public policy scenarios, 
Volkery and Ribeiro (2009) affirm that ‘having an impact on the design and choice of 
policies remains a litmus test for the relevance of scenario planning’.  
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The requirement for the futures explored within scenarios to assist with 
current decision making has implications for the structure of the scenarios themselves. In 
order to see how current decisions could affect future outcomes, it is usually important for 
scenarios to describe not just a future ‘snapshot’, but an evolving sequence of events 
through time, connecting the actual present in which current decisions can be made, with a 
range of possible future pathways, defined at least in part, by the different sets of decisions 
taken. Thus for Kahn and Wiener (1967), ‘scenarios are attempts to describe in some detail 
a hypothetical sequence of events that could lead plausibly to the situation envisaged. By 
the use of a fairly extensive scenario, the analyst may be able to get a feeling for events and 
the branching points dependent upon critical choices’. A further benefit of scenarios as 
sequences of events through time is the requirement for the argumentation of a logical, 
causative process. As was found during the Mont Fleur scenarios process (Le Roux and 
Maphai, 1992), and by Pierre Wack during the development of Shell’s early scenarios 
(Wack, 1985b, Wack, 1985a), this can lead to the challenging of preconceived ideas or 
entrenched world views, which can cloud judgement. For Wack, this process of working 
through sequences of events was a key part of how scenarios enable users to understand the 
system under study: ‘power comes with an understanding of the forces behind the 
outcome’ (Wack, 1985a). 
The value of undertaking a scenario process at any given time is therefore in 
exploring the potential longer term impacts (both positive and negative) of near-term 
choices. As the future is less fixed the further ahead we look, it follows that the further 
ahead we look the greater potential we have to construct the future in a desirable way. This 
is the fundamental justification for long-range planning. As de Jouvenel writes, if decision 
makers ‘cannot be blamed for a decision that was in fact inevitable, they can hardly escape 
censure for letting the situation go until they had no freedom to choose’. However, as 
found by Volkery and Ribeiro (2009) in the context of public policy scenarios, the many 
hetereogenous concerns and short-term time frames within which decision makers usually 
operate, can make it hard for an issue that is fundamentally about long-term planning to 
gain traction within the policy making process. Therefore, a key challenge for scenarios in 
public policy issues is to show how long-term planning goals can be connected with the 
near-term decisions which are required to bring them about, in a way which locates the 
issue alongside the nearer-term issues which normally dominate the policy-making field of 
vision. 
2.3 The nature of future uncertainty and the role 
of human agency 
The justification for a scenario approach is often made with a strong reference 
to the uncertainty of the future, and the assertion that other methods for considering the 
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future, such as extrapolative forecasts, take insufficient account of this inherent uncertainty 
(Wack, 1985b, Wack, 1985a). With this in mind, scenario studies are often quick to 
reassure the reader that the future descriptions contained in the report are not predictions. 
They rather seek to outline a range of possible outcomes. Whether scenarios should be 
limited to describing futures in terms of ‘possibility’, or whether they can invoke concepts 
of ‘probability’, is a matter of debate amongst practitioners. Whilst some practitioners are 
comfortable with ranking possible scenarios according to calculated probabilities (Godet 
and Roubelat, 1996, Godet, 2000), others maintain that probabilistic ranking is too close 
to prediction, and has the effect of closing down perceptions of what is possible. For such 
commentators, both prediction and probabilistic ranking are antithetical to the scenario 
approach, which should be fundamentally about opening up, rather than narrowing 
horizons (Wilson, 2000). In either case however, the single point predictions of forecasting 
models tend to be viewed as naïve; the scenario approach with its fanning out of multiple 
possible outcomes, proclaimed as more subtle.  
However, although it may be a prudent approach on behalf of the futures 
thinker, bearing in mind the well-known ‘perils of long-range forecasting’ (Smil, 2000), to 
avoid single point forecasting and to emphasise the uncertainty, or even unknowability of 
the future, neither is it always immediately clear what the point is of making any 
speculation about the future, when every aspect of such speculation is so heavily caveated 
by the authors’ insistent emphasis upon doubt and indeterminacy.   
It would be generally accepted by most that anyone who claims to have the 
ability to predict the future in every aspect is excessively hubristic. However, it would also 
be widely recognised that anyone who, conversely, proposes that a pall of total uncertainty 
is draped over every aspect of the future, and that nothing at all can be known or 
reasonably predicted about it, is guilty of going too far to the opposite extreme. 
Uncertainty will always surround human decision making, however, it is not clear that a 
process which provides only the insight that ‘the future is very uncertain’ is of any practical 
use to a decision maker. What is more useful is an analysis which provides some reasonable 
basis on which to make some kind of decision, despite the uncertainty and its attendant 
risks.    
A structured scenario approach delivers this kind of analysis, not by simply 
asserting the obvious fact that there is variability concerning possible future outcomes, but 
by categorising the different kinds of future variability, and connecting these to the 
different strategic options available to the scenario user. The future is not a homogenous 
canvass, but can be viewed as consisting of many different components. These different 
components have different levels of variability – or degrees to which they could be 
different in the future. Moreover, this future variability is in different cases a result of 
different forces. Consideration of the causes of the variability of the future reveals that 
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there are different kinds of uncertainty about the future, which can be understood and 
considered in different ways. A particularly important consideration is the extent to which 
the variability of the future is related to the scope for freedom of human action – there is an 
important distinction to be made between aspects of the future whose variability depends 
on the choices that human actors could make to behave in one way or another, compared 
to those which are outcomes of systemic processes, and those which may be associated with 
a more profound or random kind of uncertainty.  
2.3.1 The distinction between process and action in 
human systems 
In his extensive discussion of futures thinking, The Art of Conjecture (1967), 
Bertrand de Jouvenel recalls a physical scale model of Rangoon Harbour constructed by 
Scottish civil engineer Sir Alexander Gibb. The model successfully predicted the build up 
and subsequent dispersal of a silt bar in the harbour. The accuracy of the model was due to 
its ability to capture all of the significant variables affecting the build up of the silt, and to 
reproduce their interactions with sufficient accuracy in the simulation – the laws that 
govern the movement of silt and water in Gibb’s scale model are the same as those that 
apply in the real Rangoon harbour. In principle, in natural systems where bodies and fluids 
are governed by fixed laws, as long as these laws are known, highly accurate simulations of 
future conditions can be made.  
Models of human systems can also be constructed based on ‘laws of human 
behaviour’, however, as de Jouvenel notes, ‘in the models human behaviour is represented 
by rigid behavioural equations, whose only justification lies in statistical observations’ (de 
Jouvenel, 1967). Many would argue that in most situations such evidence is sufficient, in 
that, despite the appearance of free will at the individual level, at the aggregate level, mass 
human behaviour can indeed be predicted with laws of immutability approaching that of the 
laws of motion of physical bodies. Godet proposes that ‘history does not exactly repeat 
itself, but, over time, people show disturbing similarities in their behaviour, which leads 
them to react, when faced with comparable situations, in an almost identical way, viz 
predictably’ (Godet, 1987).  
In contrast to such a position however, it might be proposed that as well as 
being part of larger processes, human actors can also at times take decisive and influential 
actions, which are external (exogenous) to any essentially predictable systemic process, but 
which have a significant subsequent effect on the ongoing dynamics of the system. 
De Jouvenel observes that human behaviour ‘has a twofold role: it is both 
internal (endogenous) and external (exogenous) to the process... Men are submitted to the 
process (as objects), but are also masters of it (as acting subjects); and this twofold role of 
men is characteristic of the social and political order as a whole’ (de Jouvenel, 1967). Thus 
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de Jouvenel draws a crucial distinction between process – the dyamics which take place 
within a system and which are not explicitly willed by any individual human actor; and 
action – the conscious intervention of a human actor upon a system. Described as a process, 
a sequence of events is not susceptible to human intervention. By contrast, what de 
Jouvenel refers to as actions in this context, are attempts to act exogenously on the system, 
with a consciously sought goal in mind. With the dual role of humans as objects within 
processes, as well as subjects of actions upon processes, it might be asked what causes or 
allows a human agent to move between being an object and a subject. This is clearly a 
question of the level of agency of the actor in relation to the system in question: ‘things are 
different for the agents of exceptional weight who figure in the system. It is a matter of 
indifference to the railways if I decide to take my sons on a journey I normally make alone, 
but not so if the minister of war requires railway facilities for an important movement of 
troops’ (de Jouvenel, 1967). The level of agency of the actor in respect of the system being 
analysed is thus a crucial factor in considering whether to analyse change in terms of 
process or action. In many cases, of course, an actor could be both able to exogenously 
affect the system through an action, as well as affected by it subsequently as an object 
within an ensuing process. 
For de Jouvenel, ultimately, the recognition of both process and action is 
necessary in considering the future development of human systems. ‘If we understand that 
processes exist in human affairs and grasp their dynamics as well as possible, we stand to 
gain everything in the spheres of both intellect and utility’. However, ‘we gain nothing in 
the intellectual order, and lose a great deal in the field of action, if we insist on integrating 
all history into a process that embraces all human actions. What is important is to find 
points of fulcrum on which we can exert pressure, thereby deflecting the course of events 
in one direction rather than another. The common sense distinction between process and 
action is therefore salutary’ (de Jouvenel, 1967).  
Whilst the consideration of human actors as ‘objects’ within ‘processes’ relies 
for its evidence on statistical observations of past aggregated behaviour, consideration of 
human actors as ‘subjects’ of ‘actions’ requires some kind of hypothesis about what 
motivates the free-thinking actor to act in a particular way. It requires an attempt to 
understand the internal motivation of human actors and how this might cause them to 
choose to act.    
Such attention to actor motivations was central to the approach of several of 
the more renowned scenario processes. In the 1950s, the US Air Force think-tank RAND 
pioneered scenario work exploring possible reactions of the various actors in the emerging 
‘cold war’ drama under a variety of different conditions, such as the development of new 
technologies and weaponry (Ghamari-Tabrizi, 2005, Kleiner, 1996). A key figure to 
emerge from RAND was Herman Kahn, who in later work developed the concept of the 
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‘escalation ladder’ to explore actor motivations and responses to emerging conflict 
situations (Kahn, 1965). In his descriptions of the 1970s Shell scenario processes, Pierre 
Wack describes his team’s characterisations of the views and motivations of the various oil 
producing and consuming countries; in one telling illustration, the various oil producing 
countries are grouped into four quandrants, and it is illustrated that no country has both the 
means as well as the motivation to increase production (Wack, 1985b). This lack of 
motivation on the part of major oil producing countries to keep pace with growing demand 
was an example of an actor motivation which was not being represented in forecasting 
models. A Saudi oil minister declared, ‘we should find that leaving our crude in the ground 
is by far more profitable than depositing our money in the banks’ (Wack, 1985b), and 
considering the emergence of a similar position from Iran, Wack’s team realised, ‘if we 
were Iranian, we would behave the same way’ (Wack, 1985b). In post-apartheid South 
Africa, the Mont Fleur scenarios process worked through the interactions of the various  
motivations of key actors in South African society. In this process the motivations of the 
various actors became seen as source of future variability with a strong upside – that 
harnessing the influential power of actor choices could facilitate the co-creation of desirable 
futures: it was shown that ‘the future is not fixed but can be shaped by the decisions and 
actions of individuals, organisations and institutions’ (Le Roux and Maphai, 1992), or in de 
Jouvenel’s terminology ‘points of fulcrum on which we can exert pressure’ were 
identified. In each of these cases the identification and understanding actor motivations was 
undertaken using intuitive methods: ‘brain-storming’ and role play were important tools in 
the Shell and RAND processes (Wack, 1985b, Wack, 1985a, Kleiner, 1996, Ghamari-
Tabrizi, 2005), and guided discussion between relevant system actors provided the material 
for the Mont Fleur scenarios (Le Roux and Maphai, 1992). Intuitive methods draw on the 
natural skill of human participants to imagine their own reactions or the reactions of others 
in a range of alternative future conditions. Whereas quantitative models of agent behaviour 
can powerfully be applied in situations where the aggregation of human behaviour creates 
an effect as if human actors were bodies with fixed propensities – ‘objects’ within a 
process; intuitive methods on the other hand are often the appropriate tools to consider 
human motivation emerging from a human actor with choice and agency – a ‘subject’ of an 
‘action’.  
2.3.2 Different kinds of future variability 
With the distinction between process and action in mind, it is now possible to 
consider more specifically how different types of future mobility may be characterised. In 
order to gain this more constructive view of the contours of the future system, an essential 
starting point is a detailed scoping of the present system – for one certain thing that can 
always be said about any future system, is that it evolves out of the present system. Hence 
much can potentially be known about the future system through the identification of signs 
or indications in the present one. The first phase of Godet’s ‘structural analysis’ approach 
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to scenario generation is to obtain ‘as thorough a representation as possible of the system 
under study’ (Godet, 1987), and de Jouvenel describes a possible future element, or 
futurible,  as ‘a possible descendant from the present state of affairs… a descendant to 
which we attach a genealogy’ (de Jouvenel, 1967). The scoping of the present system can 
reveal different types of emergent element, each of which contributes to future variability 
in different ways. Drawing on a typology proposed in (Hughes et al., 2013), they are 
summarised here as pre-determined, actor-contingent, and non-actor-contingent elements.  
2.3.2.1 Predetermined elements 
Although scenarios are traditionally associated with uncertainty, a detailed 
scoping of the system can reveal that some aspects of the future system can be known with 
greater certainty than others. Wack writes, ‘scenarios structure the future into 
predetermined and uncertain elements. The foundation of decision scenarios lies in 
exploration and expansion of the predetermined elements: events already in the pipeline 
whose consequences have yet to unfold, interdependencies within the system (surprises 
often arise from interconnectedness), breaks in trends, or the “impossible”. Decision 
scenarios rule out impossible developments; they deny much more than they affirm’ 
(Wack, 1985a). Wack’s image of ‘events already in the pipeline whose consequences have 
yet to unfold’ resonates with a view of the system as a process – preconditions are set and 
the playing out of resulting dynamics is a matter of inevitability. Such reasoning enabled 
Wack’s scenarios team to conclude with a high degree of certainty, in the 1972 scenarios 
that an oil shock should be expected (Wack, 1985b), and in the 1974 scenarios, that 
governments would attempt to reflate their economies in the aftermath of the crash (Wack, 
1985a). In both of the above cases, the conditions which led to the predetermined elements 
included motivations of system actors which the team had assumed to be unchanging; in the 
first case that governments of oil consuming countries would not legislate to reduce 
consumption, and oil producing companies would not sell oil when it would become more 
valuable left in the ground; and in the second case that the electoral pressure on 
governments would be such that they would inevitably attempt to reinflate their 
economies. The decision to treat actor motivations as fixed was a matter of judgement 
taken by the scenarios teams – in other situations actor motivations may have been 
considered as having the potential to change, creating potentially variable, not 
predetermined, future elements. These kinds of pre-determined elements are therefore 
outcomes of processes, in which the human actors are considered as ‘objects’ with fixed 
propensities, and thus predictable reactions in specified situations. Their implication is that 
the present system already contains a number of elements, the combination of which must 
inevitably lead towards a certain outcome.  
In large technological systems, predetermined elements may also include the 
existence of physical systems and infrastructures which have been built to last for years into 
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the future. Due to the sunk investments associated with such infrastructures, it is often 
reasonable to assume that they will remain a feature of the system for the remainder of 
their expected operational lifespan. Equally however, such predetermined elements have 
an expiration date – some pieces of infrastructure may be considered predetermined up to 
a certain time, but not beyond this.  
On a more practical note, predetermined elements may also include elements 
which are treated as fixed because it is beyond the scope of the scenario process to consider 
their variability. This is different from claiming that they are fundamentally unvariable – 
rather they are being treated as unvariable because they are not one of the variables of 
primary interest. Understanding the variables of primary interest is achieved by having a 
clear focal question. 
2.3.2.2 Actor-contingent elements 
Having identified any predetermined elements which held within the system 
for the timefame of the scenario, Wack then proceeded to examine the uncertain elements. 
However, further differentiation can be made within this category as events are uncertain 
for different reasons. The uncertain elements were variable (in some cases) as a result of 
different decisions and actions that could be taken by different actors. For example, in the 
1974 scenarios different policy choices by governments led to different outcomes in the 
form of the ‘boom and bust’ and ‘muddle through’ scenarios (Wack, 1985a). These are 
therefore actor-contingent variabilities; the variability of the future is dependent upon the 
choices which specific actors could make. The identification of actor-contingent elements is 
therefore predicated on the understanding that certain actors have sufficient agency within 
the system under study to be ‘subjects’ of ‘action’ and not only ‘objects’ of a ‘process’. 
These actors may be thought of as ‘prime mover’ actors – in that their agency is such that 
their choices and actions can directly affect and alter system processes. Other lower agency 
actors who are part of those system processes may be thought of as ‘second mover’ actors – 
their behaviour is altered in response to prime mover actor decisions, and their ensuing 
impact on the system is as part of a system process, and less as a result of their own 
autonomous decisions. 
In order to understand actor contingent elements, two things are needed.  
First we need to understand and describe the internal motivation, reasoning or value 
system which causes the prime mover actor to choose to implement the action. For 
example, Wack analysed the business strategies of the corporate players and governments 
in his system (Wack, 1985b, Wack, 1985a); Kahn considered the motivations of defence 
staff operating with limited information in a situation of high-loss risk, and a perception of 
an adversary whose own motivation was largely malevolent (Kahn, 1965). Scenarios that 
deal with longer term societal change also need to consider motivations that may change 
more dramatically from the status quo, as a result of long-term value shifts. Second, we 
	   64	  
need to consider how that action impacts upon ongoing processes within the system – this 
is because we understand that even high agency actors do not have a total god-like control 
over the system, they can act decisively but the full impacts of their action will be modified 
by system dynamics. 
2.3.2.3 Non-actor-contingent elements 
There remains a third category of future variability, not so much considered 
by Wack, but of likely greater importance to scenarios considering longer term futures, 
involving significant technological change. In any future system there remains the 
possibility of significant variability arising from events which are not easily ascribable to 
identifiable actors within the system. This may be because the event is external to the 
system. For example, a system defined by the boundaries of a nation state would still be 
susceptible to variability caused by events emanating from outside its borders. Additionally, 
variability may arise from events which although they might be said to have emerged within 
the system, are not easily ascribable to conscious willed decisions of system actors – for 
example, an unforeseen technological breakthrough. These are examples of events which 
could create significant system variability but are not entirely within the control of system 
actors to decide to bring them into being or not. Just as de Jouvenel argued for 
consideration of both ‘masterable’ and ‘dominating’ events, a prudent scenario process 
should consider the potential effects on the system of events which cannot be entirely 
controlled by system actors. 
2.3.2.4 Typology of future variability 
Thus, a synthesis of Wack’s distinction between ‘predetermined’ and 
‘uncertain’ elements, with de Jouvenel’s distinction between ‘masterable’ and 
‘dominating’ elements, in addition to his distinction between ‘process’ and ‘action’, leads 
to the following taxonomy of future elements. 
• Pre-determined elements: process outcomes, fixed assets, variables out of 
scope 
• Actor-contingent elements: variable elements dependent on choices of 
identifiable system actors 
• Non-actor-contingent elements: variable elements outside of the control 
of system actors 
Categorising the causes of future variability in this way is critically important 
for relating the content of each scenario to the strategic objectives of the scenario process, 
identified in Section 2.2. Pre-determined elements must be accommodated in all futures, 
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and non-actor-contingent elements cannot be influenced by system actors; hence both of 
these elements prompt protective thinking, to ensure robustness against them. Actor-
contingent elements, on the other hand are brought about by choices and decisions of 
system actors, and thus system actors have agency to directly influence these outcomes, 
which prompts proactive decision making (Hughes et al., 2013). Conflating these different 
types of future variability produces scenarios which emphasise uncertainty but leave the 
scenario user with very little information as to what kinds of decision can be taken with 
respect to this uncertain future. Separating and categorising future variability on the other 
hand, greatly increases the power of the scenario user’s decision making, through enabling 
a clearer understanding of ‘the forces behind the outcome’ (Wack, 1985a). Table 2 
summarises the taxonomy of future elements by type of variability, and relates each to the 
three scenario objective types identified in Section 2.2. 
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Table 2: Taxonomy of future mobility 
Category Sub-category Example Scenario 
objective type 
Predetermined 
elements 
Process outcomes – 
the logical outcomes 
of elements already 
present in the 
system 
Due to an existing 
government policy, 
investment project A 
will definitely not 
proceed. 
Protective 
Fixed assets Existing power 
stations X,Y,Z will 
remain operational 
for the rest of their 
operational lifetime. 
Protective 
Variables out of 
scope 
Possible decisions of 
actors X,Y, Z are 
treated as fixed 
because it is beyond 
the scope of the focal 
question to treat their 
decisions as 
additional variables 
N/A 
Actor-contingent 
elements 
Internal actor-
contingent (prime 
mover) 
Government may 
decide to implement 
policy X. 
Proactive  
Internal actor-
contingent (second 
mover) 
If policy X were 
implemented, the 
logical response of 
company Y would be 
Z. 
Proactive / 
consensus building 
Non-actor-contingent 
elements 
External to system If country A (not a 
part of the system 
under study) strongly 
pursued market 
integration policies, 
this would have 
impact X on the 
system under study 
Protective 
Profoundly 
uncertain 
The cost-competitive 
breakthrough of 
technology X by year 
Y, would have impact 
Z on the system 
under study 
Protective 
 
2.4 Representing the ‘system under study’ 
The previous discussion has identified different types of future system 
variability which could act on the system under study. As noted, a clear definition of the 
system boundary, which corresponds to the scope of the problem posed by the focal 
question, is vital to ensure that the analysis of the different kinds of variability is sufficiently 
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clear to enable insightful analysis of the ‘forces behind the outcome’ (Wack, 1985a).   A 
scenario process involves the consideration of different types of variability and their role in 
creating different alternative possible future system states. In addition to enumerating the 
sources of variability therefore, such a process also requires some kind of model or 
representation of the system to explore how the system could change from its present state 
to the number of possible future states dictated by the internal variables of the scenario. A 
model is a simplified version of some aspect of reality, created for the purposes of analysing 
and understanding particular dynamics of interest. In scenario literature, the means by 
which the system under study has been represented are as varied as other aspects of 
method, again reflecting the wide variety of sectors to which a scenario approach has been 
applied. This section groups scenario approaches according to the manner in which they 
have conceived the system under study. The way in which the system is represented affects 
which aspects of the present system are analysed, and how these aspects are extended into 
the future.  
2.4.1 The system as the outcome of high level values 
and long range trends 
A common way to delineate future systems in scenario approaches has been 
through the extrapolation of values and trends from the present system. Such an approach 
conceptualises the system primarily as an embodiment of certain cultural or socioeconomic 
trends or values. This is achieved either through the replication of historically observed 
trends or ‘cycles’, or by extending currently nascent aspects of the present system into 
major culturally defining future trends. This approach can be elaborated quantitatively, as 
shown by the work of Herman Kahn and the Hudson Institute, which was driven by fitting 
data to models designed to recreate long range trends such as Kondratieff’s theory of 
economic cycles (Kahn, 1982). A trend based view also underlies qualitative approaches by 
which values evident to some extent in the current system are extended and imagined to 
become dominant cultural values, to provide socially and culturally contrasting scenarios. 
Thus future change is imagined almost entirely in terms of major cultural value shifts in one 
direction or another. This approach frequently uses a 2x2 matrix to represent the 
contrasting values being considered by the scenarios (Schwartz, 1991, Nakicenovic and 
Swart, 2000, PIU, 2001). Berkhout, Hertin and Jordan developed a 2x2 scenario 
generation matrix for the UK Socio-economic Scenarios (SES) as described in Berkhout et 
al (2002). Similar matrices were deployed by the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) (Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000), the UK Performance and Innovation Unit 
(PIU, 2001), and the UK Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP, 2001). Berkhout et al’s 
version combines a ‘values’ axis contrasting ‘individual’ with ‘community’ values, with a 
‘governance’ axis, contrasting ‘interdependence’ with ‘autonomy’ as possible dominating 
preferences and trends in the nature of politics and governance. The four possible 
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combinations of the extreme ends of each axis yield four scenarios (Figure 5). Figure 6 shows 
a similar matrix as presented by PIU, with slightly different labels but the same broad 
spectrums of social values and governance or geopolitical trends. Interestingly, both 
highlight the same area on the grid corresponding to ‘conventional development’ 
(Berkhout et al., 2002) or ‘BAU’ (PIU, 2001), apparently suggesting that the ‘world 
markets’ scenario would be the least radical departure from current trends.   
 
 
Figure 5: 2x2 scenario matrix for representing scenarios based on high level trends, as proposed by Berkhout et al (2002) 
 
Figure 6: 2x2 matrix for representing scenarios based on high level trends, as proposed by PIU (PIU, 2001) 
The approach to producing scenarios based on the interaction of different 
high-level trends and values became influential and much imitated in subsequent low 
carbon scenarios, including those already discussed in Section 1.2.1. The National Grid 
Future Energy Scenarios (FES) are typically derived from a 2x2 matrix, the most recent of 
which representing the interaction of the axes of ‘affordability’ and ‘sustainability’ 
(National Grid, 2013c). The LENS scenarios were also derived from the interaction of high 
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level trends, though in this case there were three axes: environmental concern, consumer 
participation and type of institutional governance (Ault et al., 2008).  
The high-level trend or values based approach to scenario generation tends to 
be the most ‘narrative’ or novelistic of the scenario approaches. Indeed, such futuristic 
novels as Orwell’s 1984, Huxley’s Brave New World and Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale, are 
essentially scenarios generated in a similar way, via the extrapolation of emergent trends or 
values the author perceives in their contemporary environment. Trend and value-based 
scenarios can produce broad and sweeping storylines, encompassing descriptions of 
technology, politics and culture. The conceptualisation of the system in terms of values and 
trends may allow for a view of system change which accords more easily with long range 
historical views of societal changes, incorporating major structural change. Over long time 
frames, major technological shifts, cultural, economic and political changes can appear to 
be interrelated phenomena propelled by an irresistable wave of history (Freeman and 
Louça, 2001). From the macroscopic perspective, the major historical changes appear to be 
driven by something larger than the plans of any individual human actor. 
However, there are potential conceptual criticisms which can be made of 
high-level trend or values based approaches. The typology which separates and contrasts 
apparently opposite values in a manner which implies their mutual incompatibility can 
appear too simplistic. For example, as noted by Anderson et al (2005), in relation to the 
PIU axes (Figure 6) ‘‘community values’ are not at the opposite end of an axis which has 
‘consumerist values’ at the other end and it is possible for an individual or collective to 
hold both sets of values concurrently’. Value-based scenarios can appear overly-polarised, 
‘rather than the more realistic, complex and ‘messy’ world in which we live, which 
entertains elements of all these ways of organising’, and in which opposing values are in 
constant tension and debate. Responding to this criticism within a value-based approach is 
not straightforward. One approach would be to diffuse the polarisation inherent in the 2x2 
matrix, by incorporate more intersecting axes, as the LENS scenarios did – however the 
number of combinations of these variables, and the number of possible resulting scenarios if 
all combinations are used, quickly becomes unmanageable. In the LENS scenarios some 
possible value-combinations generated by their three intersecting variables had to be left 
out for practical reasons. However the justification for doing so is not always 
straightforward – for example the LENS scenarios do not include a scenario with high 
environmental concern but low consumer participation, and it is not clear that such a 
combination is necessarily contradictory. Morphological analysis has been proposed as one 
method of combining and cross-checking the consistency of multiple variables (Ritchey, 
2011, Zwicky, 1969). An alternative response is to reduce the scope of the system and the 
problem being addressed until it can satisfactorily be summarised by two intersecting 
variables. This would preserve the clarity of the 2x2 axis and give much greater focus to the 
key research question. However, it might be seen as a disadvantage that the broad horizons 
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that high-level trend scenarios typically scan are somewhat closed down by such an 
approach.  
Further problems can emerge when values appear to be responsible for 
technological choices – for example scenarios characterised by ‘community’ values often 
feature high levels of decentralised generation (Hughes and Strachan, 2010). Whilst the 
link between the value and the technology is on a superficial level understandable, 
nonetheless there is clearly nothing inherently contradictory about the valuing of social 
communities and the existence of a centralised generation system. Such scenarios can imply 
worlds in which values alone have a creative power which supersedes technological path 
dependency and magically unifies actors with previously conflicting world views and 
ideologies. Values certainly underlie the motivations of human actors, however the effect 
of values is modulated by how they are enacted by actors, and how these actions are 
accommodated by the rest of society and the technological system.   
The failure to identify the effect of actor actions is also reflected in the fact 
that value based scenarios tend to make no distinction between masterable and dominating 
(actor-contingent and non-actor-contingent) elements. Events which could potentially be 
influenced by scenario users (domestic policy choices) and events which cannot 
(geopolitical dynamics) – are all wrapped up in an essentially fatalistic view of a society 
drifting to one corner of the values matrix or another. This may mean that, as a means of 
conceptualising a system for a scenarios project, a trend-based approach may be 
problematic as it appears to distance the evolution of the future system from the conscious 
actions of any particular system actor, or to identify with any specificity what forces lie 
behind particular outcomes. The structural issue is that broad trend based scenarios tend to 
aim for a very wide system scope. This is conscious and intentional, as the scenarios are 
desired to be rich and comprehensive descriptions of the various facets of society. The 
inevitable result of this is that each individual scenario attempts to vary simultaneously a 
large number of variables. Because attempting to vary each of these as strictly independent 
variables would produce more scenarios than is practical, the broad trend approach is to 
yolk a number of variables together as if they are all co-dependent on the same intangible 
force – the high level trend. However, this trend is not a real world action, but an 
imaginary novelistic construct. It is a fatalistic pre-determination of the outcome - a deus ex 
machina – rather than a genuinely explanatory force for which there is an understandable 
real world equivalent. Scenarios developed in this way therefore, whilst they may be 
appealingly rich, wide ranging and novelistic in content, can struggle to achieve genuine 
strategic effectiveness for the user, because they contain no mechanism through which the 
user can understand how these possible futures may be caused to evolve from the actual 
present. This makes it harder for the user to develop strategic insights on the basis of either 
being prepared for such futures, or to play an active role in bringing them about. 
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2.4.2 The system as the outcome of actor interactions 
An alternative approach to constructing scenarios views the system as a 
network of human actors, the interactions between which define the manner in which the 
system changes through time. Thus for le Roux and Maphai (1992), ‘the future is not fixed 
but can be shaped by decisions and actions of individuals, organisations and institutions’, 
and for Godet ‘the future of a system [can] be considered as resulting from the 
development of the balance of power between the actors driving the system’(1987). For 
many proponents of an actor-focussed approach, the key advantage of scenarios constructed 
in this way is the identification of how decisions taken by actors can cause bifurcations or 
‘branching-points’ leading towards different future outcomes – this is potentially an 
empowering perspective for a scenario user. Thus, Kahn and Weiner write ‘scenarios are 
attempts to describe in some detail a hypothetical sequence of events that could lead 
plausibly to the situation envisaged… by the use of a fairly extensive scenario, the analyst 
may be able to get a feeling for events and the branching points dependent upon critical 
choices’ (Kahn and Wiener, 1967). De Jouvenel emphasises that ‘what is important is to 
find points of fulcrum on which we can exert pressure, thereby deflecting the course of 
events in one direction rather than another’ (de Jouvenel, 1967). The work of Kahn, 
Weiner and de Jouvenel was drawn on by Hughes (Hughes, 2009a, Hughes, 2009b) in 
placing ‘branching points’ arising from ‘actor decisions’ at the centre of a proposed 
scenarios approach for the Transition Pathways to a Low Carbon Economy project (Figure 
7). The ‘branching point’ concept was adopted within the Transition Pathways project as 
part of their socio-technical scenarios approach, in which it was defined as ‘a key decision 
point on a pathway at which choices made by actors, in response to internal or external 
pressures, determine whether and in what ways the pathway is followed’ (Foxon et al., 
2013). 
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Figure 7: Illustration of actor decisions causing 'branching points' which forge alternative scenario pathways. Source: 
(Hughes, 2009b) 
An actor-focussed approach then can potentially offer the scenario user a 
greater ability to identify how conscious decisions and actions upon the system can 
influence the direction of its development. However, this puts considerable emphasis on 
defining each of the relevant actors in the system, their relative power and influence, and 
on defining each actor’s motivation. The outcomes of actor motivations can be explored 
through intuitive methods such as brain storming or role play, as used in Shell’s original 
scenarios process (Wack, 1985b, Wack, 1985a) and by the US Air Force think tank RAND 
in the early 1950s (Ghamari-Tabrizi, 2005), as well as through guided discussion between 
all relevant system actors (Le Roux and Maphai, 1992). Equally, there is an important 
tradition of using models to replicate the numerous possible ways in which actors could 
interact, including matrix based approaches (Godet, 1987, Gordon and Hayward, 1968, 
Dalkey, 1971, Godet and Roubelat, 1996) and agent based modelling (An, 2012).   
As discussed in Section 2.3.2.1, if actor motivations are assumed to be 
unchanging, actor interactions can be viewed as delivering predetermined elements, as was 
the case in particular in the Shell 1972 scenarios. However, if actor choices are linked to 
motivations which are not yet fixed, scenarios based on actor interactions also have the 
	   73	  
potential to explore how actor choices may contribute to different system outcomes. Thus 
an actor-based conceptualisation of the system may allow users to explore proactive and 
consensus building objectives. A significant advantage of the actor-based approach 
compared to the high-level trend approach is the clear linking of future events to tangible 
drivers – most frequently, the decisions and actions of actors. However, most actor-
focussed scenarios have a relatively near-term focus, in contrast to the longer-range trend 
based studies. Understanding how future actor motivations which significantly contrast to 
current actor motivations could develop over longer time frames, may be a challenge for 
this type of scenario approach. 
2.4.3 The system as a technological configuration 
A third contrasting way of conceptualising the system for a scenarios process is 
as a configuration of technologies. In the manner of models of physical systems, such a 
system conceptualisation enables the application of fixed properties to its various 
components, such that with given preconditions a linear solution may be derived. Scenarios 
representing the system as a technical configuration have been developed in particular 
around questions of energy and low carbon policy. The properties with which the 
components of such systems are characterised include inputs (fuels), outputs (refined fuels, 
energy services, emissions) and the per-unit cost of these activities. With such properties 
defined, the model of the system can demonstrate how overall energy system demand can 
be met by supply technologies. It can further demonstrate how this condition can be met 
within an emissions constraint (DECC, 2010a, Anderson et al., 2005). Economic energy 
system models are additionally able to show how this constraint can be met at least cost, 
based on the assumptions of current and future technology costs provided (CCC, 2008, 
Skea et al., 2011, Ekins et al., 2013).   
Low carbon scenarios based on systems represented as technological 
configurations have made important contributions to low carbon policy debates, both in the 
UK and internationally. Strachan et al (2009b) discuss the iterative role of low carbon 
scenarios in the UK context. They show such studies supported an initial aspirational target 
of 60% CO2 reductions by 2050, as well as subsequently supporting efforts to strengthen 
the target to an 80% reduction across all greenhouse gases, through demonstrating the 
technical feasibility and economic viability of such targets. The latter target was established 
in UK law by the Climate Change Act 2008 (HM Parliament, 2008).  At the international 
level similar studies have been undertaken by the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2012). 
As well as demonstrating overall technical feasibility, such studies can also identify 
important cross-sectoral interactions. In the UK context, for example, a consistent message 
to emerge has been the growing importance of electricity in the overall decarbonisation 
effort (CCC, 2008, Skea et al., 2011, Ekins et al., 2013).  
	   74	  
These are clearly important insights. However, it must also be acknowledged 
that actor-level processes such as politics and investment uncertainties, as well as the role 
that values may have in influencing such decisions, are mostly absent from such system 
representations. Technical system scenarios achieve the desired end point as a result of the 
user-defined emissions constraint under which the quantitative model is forced to operate. 
In a comparable manner to the high level trends which pre-determine the outcomes of 
trend based scenarios, emissions constraints also operate as a kind of deus ex machina – a 
construct of the modelling process for which there is no clearly defined real-world 
equivalent. This is potentially problematic, if it is acknowledged that large technological 
systems are not autonomously self-assembling, but emerge as part of an iterative process 
involving human actors taking decisions in particular situations with imperfect knowledge. 
As noted by Thomas Hughes, large technological systems are ‘both socially constructed and 
society shaping’ (Hughes, 1987). Scenarios based purely on technological system 
representations do not represent this two-way interaction between human actors and the 
technological systems they create and are subsequently shaped by. 
2.5 Representing the system for low carbon 
scenarios 
The purpose of constructing scenarios of a low carbon system is to identify 
how the system can evolve over time from its current state to a future, usually more 
desirable one. From a policy maker’s perspective this implies an interest in suggestions for 
proactive decision making. However, given the multiple actor nature of the energy system, 
some form of consensus building around the process may also be an important output. In 
addition, major technological or external uncertainties, not directly controllable by system 
actors, can draw in the need for protective decision making.  
Hughes and Strachan (2010) reviewed the methods which have been applied 
to the construction of low carbon scenarios. The review found that previous low carbon 
scenarios have predominantly been concerned with representing the system as a 
technological configuration. There are also some examples of value- and trend-based 
system representations, but actor-based system representations are rare in low carbon 
scenarios. The Hughes and Strachan review made two main criticisms of the existing low 
carbon scenario literature. The first can be summarised as an unrealistic depiction of how 
technological transitions are achieved, which diminishes the role that networks of human 
actors play in the process. In technological scenarios this arises from reliance on 
exogenously imposed emissions constraints, and other ways in which the modeller can 
intervene directly in the technological system in a manner which is not analogous to a real-
world process involving multiple actors. High level trend scenarios similarly provide a 
deterministic end point condition which pulls focus from the process by which transitions 
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are achieved. The second criticism is related, and points to the lack of depiction of a fully 
‘socio-technical’ system in which society and technology co-evolve through time – the low 
carbon scenarios were either primarily social value driven, or technologically defined. The 
result of both of these problems is that, although low carbon scenarios have provided 
detailed images of how aspects of low carbon futures could look, the scenarios are not 
explicitly connected to the actor decisions which cause them to come about. This means 
they have no direct relation to near term policy choices, and thus reduced ‘strategic 
effectiveness’. The Hughes and Strachan review therefore called for low carbon scenario 
approaches which elevated the depiction of actor decisions and movements in the system, 
and the iterative co-evolution of these alongside technological system developments, 
through time (Hughes and Strachan, 2010).  
It is undoubtedly the case that specific technological details are of major 
importance to understanding whether a system is successful in meeting an emissions 
reduction target. As low carbon scenarios are explicitly concerned with understanding how 
a system may successfully deliver low carbon energy, the representation of the system in 
terms of its technological configuration must remain central to low carbon scenarios. 
However, as noted by (Hughes and Strachan, 2010), it is equally important for low carbon 
scenarios to represent the network of actors which relates to this system, and to be able to 
trace the effects of actor decisions to related technical system changes. It is also the case 
that the effects of technical system changes upon actor behaviour must be represented, in 
order to reflect that long-term technological system change happens as a result of ‘co-
evolving’ dynamics between social systems and technological systems (Berkhout et al., 
2004, Geels, 2002, Freeman and Louça, 2001, Hughes, 1983, Hannah, 1979). The 
scenario must trace this development through time, as any actor decision is critically 
affected by the existing system at that time, as well as expectations about the future. 
This suggests that a combination of actor-based and technological system 
representations would benefit low carbon scenarios. The technological system permits 
analysis of the technological effects of decarbonisation, the actor system of the effects that 
alternative actor motivations and decisions could have on technological configurations. 
However, if actor motivations are hypothesised as changing, this opens the question as to 
the justification of assuming that motivations will change, and requires some consideration 
of the processes which underlie changing actor motivations, in particular over long time 
frames. It is notable that actor focussed scenario approaches in the literature have tended to 
operate with a relatively high level of confidence in assertions of actor motivations, 
because, in general the time frames of such scenarios have been relatively short term. 
Investigation of potential actor motivations over long-time frames requires a framework for 
considering how actor motivations are formed.  
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Contributors in a number of disciplines have found it useful to describe the 
mental processes which underlie and inform the decisions that actors take, as a means of 
understanding how and why actors take important decisions under conditions of 
uncertainty. In his seminal work discussing the use of scenarios in a corporate context, 
Pierre Wack describes ‘mental models’ which affect the ‘world views’ of managers, and 
hence the decisions they take (Wack, 1985b, Wack, 1985a). The use of such mental 
models has an important practical benefit for the decision maker: in a complex world it is 
usually not possible to enumerate all the factors which could impact upon the outcome of 
any decision that may confront us, and to compute from all of these the best option. 
Instead, mental models provide a cognitive short-cut – by starting with a previously 
established idea of what the world is and how it works, we cut out potentially vast 
permutations and proceed more quickly to a decision. Thus, ‘the image of the world 
around us, which we carry in our head, is just a model. Nobody in his head imagines all the 
world, government or country. He has only selected concepts, and relationships between 
them, and uses those to represent the real system’ (Forrester, 1971). However, as Wack 
found, conditions in the external world can change, meaning that a previously useful and 
appropriate mental model can become misleading. In such a situation, decision makers 
need to attempt to change their mental model, or they run the risk of making poor 
decisions (Wack, 1985b).  
Similar kinds of mental models, or internal world views, are drafted in to 
operate upon political decisions, which involve commitment of substantial resources to 
projects, despite high uncertainty about their outcome. De Jouvenel writes, ‘It is all very 
well to say that the future is unknown. The fact remains that we treat many aspects of it as 
known, and if we did not we could never form any projects’ (de Jouvenel, 1967). The 
approximations to certainty which human decision makers draft in to short-cut the 
pervasive uncertainties of the real world are largely drawn from internal models. In 
politics, the mental model of decision makers is identified by Sunderlin (2003) through the 
tem ‘ideology’ which, ‘though tainted by negative connotations, is the best term available 
to describe the mental models we all carry of how the world works, of how it ought to be, 
and of how it should be set right so that our fondest hopes can be realised’. Sunderlin 
argues that the solutions which actors perceive as appropriate to addressing complex  
problems are inevitably affected not just by an objective assessment of the problem itself, 
but also by pre-conceived mental models, values and ideas. In public policy such values are 
frequently found as principles which are proposed despite the absence of concrete 
empirical evidence to prove their veracity, due to the singular context specific nature of 
most public policy issues, and the absence of counter-factuals. The impact of ideological 
values in influencing decisions about policy design and subsequent directions of travel in the 
UK electricity system, are discussed in Chapter 3. Mental models of the world can also be 
influenced by visions of what the future system could look like, the desirability of which 
influences current actions: ‘the image summons a future reality... My imagination... jumps 
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to a time not yet accomplished and builds something there... and this “construct” beckons 
and exercises a present attraction on me’ (de Jouvenel, 1967). Bernard Crick, in his essay 
In Defence of Politics brings much of this together in his discussion of the concept of political 
doctrine. Crick writes, ‘A political doctrine I take to be simply a coherently related set of 
proposals for the conciliation of actual social demands in relation to a scarcity of resources’. 
It is this attempt at providing coherence throughout the various trade-offs involved in 
resolving competing social demands that constitutes the attractiveness, indeed the 
necessity, of political doctrines. Crick continues his definition in a manner which reflects 
the inclusion of both visions and values in this level. Crick argues that a political doctrine is:  
... necessarily both evaluative and predictive. For a political doctrine always offers 
some generalisations about the nature of actual, or possible, political societies, but it 
always also offers some grounds, however disputable, for thinking some such 
possibilities desirable. By prediction I do not mean something that is necessarily 
measurable as in natural science, but merely something that guides our present actions 
according to our expectations of what will happen in the future... And it is evaluative 
not merely because all thought is an act of selection from a potentially infinite range of 
relevant factors, but because we do in fact seek to justify some act of selection as in 
some way significant. A political doctrine will state some purpose, but it will claim to 
be a realisable purpose; or it may state some sociological generalisation. But 
argument, if not analysis, will always reveal some ethical significance in wanting this 
relationship to be true, or remain true. A political doctrine is thus just an attempt to 
strike a particular harmony out of many possible different (temporary) resolutions of 
the basic problem of unity and diversity in a society with complex and entrenched 
rival social interests. 
Crick (1964) 
The political economy literature has also drawn on the concept of ideology 
and explored its effect upon political decision making. Leach et al (2010) suggest that 
ideological framings become narratives that are employed by decision makers to justify sets 
of actions, while Naes et al ((2011) describe them as ‘storylines that help identify 
competing ways of viewing a particular policy problem’. Clapp and Dauvergne (2005) 
identify broad sets of environmental ideologies – market liberals, institutionalists and 
bioenvironmentalists – each of which inform the perspectives of different groups. 
Chinsinga et al (2011) and Alam et al (2011) discuss how narrative framings or ideologies 
have influenced political and policy outcomes in Malawi and Bangladesh.  
A similar phenomenon has been described by other authors who have noted 
the effect of prevailing ideas and systems of thought on how policy problems are 
interpreted, and the solutions proposed for them, describing these thought-systems as 
‘policy paradigms’. A seminal contribution was made by Hall (1993), who borrowed the 
term ‘paradigm’ from Thomas Kuhn’s work on scientific revolutions (Kuhn, 1970).  
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Hall adopts Heclo’s argument that ‘policy-making is a form of collective 
puzzlement on society’s behalf… Much political interaction has constituted a process of 
social learning expressed through policy’ (Heclo, 1974) (305-6). By taking up the notion of 
policy making as social learning, Hall asserts the significance of the flow of ideas, as well as 
the struggle for power between various groups and interests, in the policy-making process. 
He defines three distinct kinds of policy changes. First, changes in the levels or 
the settings of a given policy – where the policy itself is the same but its setting or level, 
such as the setting of a particular tax or incentive, is changed. Second, changes in the basic 
techniques used – a different policy mechanism is introduced – while overall goals remain 
the same. These two kinds of changes occur relatively straightforwardly as a learning 
process in response to events and the effectiveness of preceding policy choices. As such, 
Hall writes, these first and second order changes ‘correspond quite well to the image of 
social learning presented by Heclo and many theorists of the state. Changes in policy at 
time-1 were clearly a response to policy at time-0 and its consequences’ (Hall, 1993) 
(p.287-288). However, third order changes involve changes in the hierarchy of goals 
behind the policy.  That is, a policy response is not carried out just by an adjustment to 
existing policy, or by the addition of a new policy within the same broad hierarchy of 
objectives – rather the objectives themselves and the values underlying them are entirely 
reappraised and reordered. Therefore, writes Hall, ‘in order to understand how social 
learning takes place, we also need a more complete account of the role that ideas play in 
the policy process’(Hall, 1993) (p.279).  
In considering the role that ideas play in the policy-making process, Hall 
begins from an observation by Anderson (1978) that ‘the deliberation of public policy takes 
place within a realm of discourse… policies are made within some system of ideas and 
standards which is comprehensible and plausible to the actors involved’ (p.23).  Hall 
continues, ‘more precisely, policy-makers customarily work within a framework of ideas 
and standards that specifies not only the goals of the policy and the kind of instruments that 
can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be 
addressing. Like a Gestalt, this framework is embedded in the very terminology through 
which policy-makers communicate about their work, and it is influential precisely because 
so much of it is taken for granted and unamenable to scrutiny as a whole. I am going to call 
this interpretative framework a policy paradigm’ (Hall, 1993) (p.279). 
This definition reprises the concept found in the political science and political 
economy literatures, quoted earlier in this section, that a belief or view about the world 
can influence how a problem is understood, what the preferable means of addressing it is, 
and what the desirable end-state or outcome of the system is perceived to be. For a number 
of authors who have picked up on Hall’s notion of policy paradigms, a key insight is that a 
prevailing paradigm can constrain views on preferred policy choices and desired outcomes 
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(Wilson, 2001, Hay, 2001, Mitchell, 2008, Campbell, 2001). Campbell writes that 
paradigms ‘constitute broad cognitive constraints on the range of solutions that actors 
perceive and deem useful for solving problems’ (Campbell, 2001). Mitchell argues that in 
the case of UK energy policy, the effect of a certain prevailing paradigm has been to 
exclude certain policy options which have been shown to be effective in other countries – 
thus, in her view, the paradigm has had an exclusionary and negative impact on the 
effectiveness of policy making (Mitchell, 2008). This view of policy paradigms as having a 
constraining effect on policy choices also emerges from Hall’s discussion (1993), who 
writes, ‘the terms of political discourse privilege some lines of policy over others, and the 
struggle both for advantage within the prevailing terms of discourse and for leverage with 
which to alter the terms of political discourse is a perennial feature of politics’ (p. 289-
290); and, ‘policymaking in virtually all fields takes place within the context of a particular 
set of ideas that recognize some social interests as more legitimate than others and privilege 
some lines of policy over others’ (p.292). 
In Hall’s analysis, paradigms are relied upon to strengthen the position in 
favour of certain policy options in the face of alternatives. For example, he argues that the 
failure of the Heath government in the early 1970s to introduce monetarist policies 
compared to the success of the Thatcher government in the 1980s, was due to the fact that 
during Heath’s tenure, the paradigm shift away from Kenynesianism had not yet been 
achieved. ‘Policymakers are likely to be in a stronger position to resist pressure from 
societal interests when they are armed with a coherent policy paradigm. If it does not 
dictate the optimal policy, at least it provides a set of criteria for resisting some societal 
demands while accepting others’ (Hall, 1993) (p. 290).  
Policy paradigms, as discussed by Hall and others, are thus comparable to 
what are described elsewhere as doctrines (Crick, 1964), ideologies (Sunderlin, 2003, 
Clapp and Dauvergne, 2005) or world views (Wack, 1985b). If these internal mental 
models or paradigms can have a strong effect on the goals of policy and the means chosen to 
achieve these goals, a phenomenon of particular interest for a developer of policy-driven 
scenarios is the process by which one dominant mental model is replaced by an alternative 
one, or ‘paradigm shift’. 
As discussed, a policy paradigm in the work of Hall and others, is a coherent 
set of ideas which affect policy choices by privileging some options over others, and 
considering some types of outcome more inherently desirable than others, based on a 
particular interpretation of how the system works. A prevailing policy paradigm therefore 
has a directive effect, and from some perspectives possibly a constraining effect, on policy 
choice. A shift in the prevailing paradigm, by contrast, would logically have the effect of 
very significantly altering the perception of a problem, the tools used to address it and the 
desired end state. With reference to his three-level categorisation of policy change, Hall 
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(1993) writes, ‘first and second order change can be seen as cases of “normal 
policymaking”, namely of a process that adjusts policy without challenging the overall 
terms of a given policy paradigm, much like “normal science”.  Third order change, by 
contrast, is likely to reflect a very different process, marked by the radical changes in the 
overarching terms of a policy discourse associated with a “paradigm shift” ’ (p. 279).  
Hall (1993) discusses the effect of a paradigm shift on UK economic policy 
between 1970 and 1989, from a ‘Keynesian mode of policymaking to one based on 
monetarist economic theory’ (p.283). He argues that the changes amounted to a paradigm 
shift because ‘not only did the policy prescriptions of monetarists diverge from those of the 
Keynesians, they were also based on a fundamentally different conception of how the 
economy itself worked,’ (p.284) meaning that the perceived hierarchy of the desirable 
goals of policy shifted, as well as the choice of instruments. ‘Inflation replaced 
unemployment as the preeminent concern of policymakers. Macroeconomic efforts to 
reduce unemployment were rejected in favour of balanced budgets and direct tax 
reductions. Monetary policy replaced fiscal policy as the principal macroeconomic 
instrument, and it was reoriented toward fixed targets for the rate of monetary growth’ 
(Hall, 1993) (p. 284). 
Hall (1993) (p.280) considers how and why paradigm shifts occur. He begins 
by observing, again drawing by analogy on Kuhn’s discussion of scientific paradigms, that 
‘paradigms are by definition never fully commensurable in scientific or technical terms. 
Because each paradigm contains its own account of how the world facing policy-makers 
operates and each account is different, it is often impossible for the advocates of different 
paradigms to agree on a common body of data against which a technical judgement in 
favour of one paradigm or another might be made’. This observation has three key 
implications for how and why paradigm shifts occur. ‘First, the process whereby one policy 
paradigm comes to replace another is likely to be more sociological than scientific… the 
choice between paradigms can rarely be made on scientific grounds alone … [and]… will 
entail a set of judgements that is more political in tone’ (p.280). This coexistence of 
subjective or normative judgement about the ethical significance of the paradigm, alongside 
evidence of effectiveness, when competing paradigms clash, recalls Crick’s definition of 
doctrines as both ‘evaluative and predictive’, in that ‘a political doctrine always offers some 
generalisations about the nature of actual, or possible, political societies, but it also offers 
some grounds, however disputable, for thinking some such possibilities desirable’ (Crick, 
1964).  
As a result, Hall’s second implication is that ‘issues of authority are likely to 
be central to the process of paradigm change. Faced with conflicting opinions from the 
experts, politicians will have to decide whom to regard as authoritative, especially on 
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matters of technical complexity… the movement from one paradigm to another is likely to 
be preceded by significant shifts in the locus of authority over policy’ (Hall, 1993) (p.280).  
Hall’s third implication gets to the heart of what causes one paradigm to be 
threatened and eventually replaced by another. ‘Finally… a policy paradigm can be 
threatened by the appearance of anomalies… developments that are not fully 
comprehensible… within the terms of the paradigm. As these accumulate, ad hoc attempts 
are generally made to stretch the terms of the paradigm to cover them, but this gradually 
undermines the intellectual coherence and precision of the original paradigm. Efforts to 
deal with such anomalies may also entail experiments to adjust existing lines of policy, but 
if the paradigm is genuinely incapable of dealing with anomalous developments, these 
experiments will result in policy failures that gradually undermine the authority of the 
existing paradigm and its advocates even further’ (Hall, 1993) (p.280) 
This account has strong resonances with Kuhn’s account of scientific paradigm 
change, in which a ‘model’ of reality is increasingly challenged by initially apparently 
anomalous developments, which build up and cause the paradigm to be adapted and diluted 
to such a degree that eventually it must be replaced (Kuhn, 1970). The image of the 
paradigm being ‘stretched’ to accommodate anomalies has strong resonances with policy 
making, in which apparently fundamental principles of the aims and processes of policy 
making remain enshrined, even while increasing numbers of ‘anomalies’ are 
accommodated with measures which, apparently, go against these fundamental principles. 
As will be discussed in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, this description has strong correspondences 
with the current state of energy policy in the UK, especially following the rise of 
decarbonisation and security of supply as energy policy concerns, since the turn of the 
century.    
The contest of ideas between old and new paradigms ‘may well spill beyond 
the boundaries of the state itself into the broader political arena’ (Hall, 1993) (p. 280-81). 
In the case of the economic policy change in Britain, ‘the ensuing struggle to replace one 
paradigm with another was a societywide affair, mediated by the press, deeply imbricated 
with electoral competition, and fought in the public arena… Policy changed, not as a result 
of autonomous action by the state, but in response to an evolving societal debate that soon 
became bound up with electoral competition’ (Hall, 1993) (p. 287-288).   
Other contributors in this literature have also considered why and how 
paradigms can shift. Whereas Hall’s model might suggest a gradual erosion or dilution of a 
paradigm, through its ‘stretching’ to accommodate anomalies, Mitchell (2008) conceives of 
the possibility of more sudden paradigm shifts, where the incumbent policy paradigm is like 
a ‘band of iron’, which for some time resists pressure to change, but is finally and suddenly 
broken following a long build up of pressure from a variety of actors. Mitchell views 
paradigms as obstinate but brittle – remaining in place despite contrary forces, but capable 
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of eventually being broken by a build up of pressure: ‘A paradigm is propelled into being 
by the very force that builds up behind it, and it is then ‘lodged’ and codified through 
principles, institutions and policies. It remains there until the force of a new paradigm is 
built up, like the stretching of an elastic band, and propelled forward, knocking the old 
paradigm out of the way’ (Mitchell, 2008) (p.17). This image is somewhat in contrast to 
Hall’s notion of a gradual dilution of the dominant paradigm through successive 
concessions. Perhaps elements of both apply – in retrospect it is often possible to identify 
moments at which a major paradigm shift appeared to occur, such as the 1979 election 
victory for the Conservatives; however as Hall argues this apparent sudden arrival of a new 
paradigm had been preceded by gradually increasing inconsistency in the Keynesian 
paradigm throughout the 1970s (Hall, 1993); and indeed it might be argued that the re-
organisation of economic policy according to the new paradigm was a project not 
completed overnight, but one which developed throughout the 1980s, entailing 
considerable social conflict, and whose progress was still continuing in areas such as interest 
rate setting and the balance of public and private activity in services such as education and 
health, after the return of the Labour government in 1997 (Moran, 2003, Driver and 
Martell, 2006).  
As will be discussed in Chapter 3, Hall’s concept of gradually increasing 
incoherence of the dominant paradigm as a result of a series of incremental concessions 
made within it, has a strong resonance with current UK energy policy in which a paradigm 
of market-led policy, characterised by minimal state intervention, has been incrementally 
eroded with the state being increasingly drawn back into intervening in the system.  
The underlying systems of thought which form and direct policy-making 
decisions under conditions of uncertainty, described variously in the literatures referred to 
in this section as mental models, ideologies, doctrines and paradigms, are of critical 
importance to explaining the policy making process. They therefore constitute the 
important ‘third layer’ – in addition to layers already mentioned which consider the 
activities of actors and the performance of technologies – of the overall system 
representation which will be proposed as part of the scenario development process in this 
thesis. In this system representation this third layer is given the more neutral term of 
‘values’. Values, in this thesis, are the systems of belief which provide the motivation to 
choose one policy over another, in the absence of incontrovertible evidence arising from 
clear counter-factuals as to which policy choice is in fact superior. As in the discussion of 
doctrines, ideologies and paradigms, values supply both a normative expectation of what 
the hierarchy of goals for policy should be, as well as preferred approaches by which these 
goals should be achieved.  
It is also important to clarify that in this scenario process, the ‘values’ of 
primary concern are quite specifically those that apply to the area of policy with which the 
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scenario focal question is concerned. As discussed in Section 2.6.2, achieving clarity about 
the scope of the system under study, and precisely relating this scope to the terms of the 
focal question (Section 2.6.1), is important for delivering a scenario process that is cogent, 
tractable and capable of producing clear policy recommendations. However, this means 
drawing a boundary around the system under study which precludes related but broader 
dynamics as ‘out of scope’. The values pertaining to the specific area of the system under 
study may have links and correspondences to values associated with broader related policy 
areas, but are not necessarily entirely identical to the dominant direction of the values, or 
policy paradigms, in such broader policy areas. It is possible to explain this relationship 
using Hall’s image of accumulating anomalies within a dominant paradigm. Value shifts in a 
particular sub-section of a policy area may undergo a shift even though the broader value 
system (or policy paradigm) remains in place – what Hall describes as responses to 
anomalies within the paradigm. In the longer term, it may be that the paradigm is capable 
of being ‘stretched’ to accommodate such anomalies, and thus broadly speaking remains in 
place; or an accumulation of similar anomalies contributes to an eventual paradigm shift. 
However the absolute correspondence of values in a particular sub-section of policy and the 
values of the broader policy paradigm is not fixed, and contrasts between values expressed 
within particular ‘anomalous’ policy decisions and the broader accepted paradigm are 
possible, as discussed by Hall. Therefore the values expressed in any particular policy sub-
section, and the values contained within an overall policy paradigm, can be considered 
linked, or loosely coupled – but nonetheless essentially independent variables.  
Therefore the ‘values’ which drive the policy-focussed scenario approach 
presented in this thesis are systems of thought within a particular area of policy, which may 
run with or against the direction of the values of the prevailing larger paradigm. The 
relevant values are identified by a scoping of both the broader policy area (Chapter 3) as 
well as a more focussed scoping of the particular system under study (Chapter 4).  
  
2.5.1 The three-level system representation 
Three levels of analysis are therefore relevant to the representation of the 
system in the development of low carbon scenarios. The interaction of actors and technical 
systems is key to an understanding of the system as a co-evolving sociotechnical system. 
However, in addition a basis on which to hypothesise future changes in primary actor 
motivations is required, and for this a third level of values is introduced. 
The incorporation of values into the scenario process is not intended to 
provide fully-formed and pre-determined scenario end points, as is sometimes the case in 
purely value and trend based scenarios. Rather, the values are provided as starting points 
for hypothesising the possible motivations of prime mover system actors – the actors with a 
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level of agency such that their choices have an impact on the positions of other actors 
(secondary movers) and on resulting processes in the system. The effect of these combined 
actor interactions ultimately result in decisions and investments which have an impact upon 
the technological system. Thus the overall system is viewed as consisting of three levels: 
the level of visions and values which underlies motivations; the level of actor networks 
which describes actor actions and reactions; and the level of the technological system which 
is physically constructed by the outcomes of actor actions and reactions. There is a 
movement through each of these levels, through motivations, actions and technological 
system outcomes. Further, as the scenario progress through time, there may be movement 
back through the levels in the opposite direction, as technological system changes effect 
subsequent actions of actors and may even refine and influence visions and values. The 
movement in both directions is the co-evolutionary dynamic of socio-technical systems.  
 
Figure 8: 3 level representation of the system for low carbon scenarios 
To this vertical plane of analysis must be added a horizontal plane, 
corresponding to movement through time. For as the dynamics between each of these 
levels unfold, they each contribute in different ways to establishing a ‘lock-in’ to a 
particular pathway, which ex post will be described as a historical sequence of events. In 
each case the values level provides a rationale for hypothesising the motivations of key 
system actors, the results of which are then traced through the dynamics of the other 
levels. Thus, this conceptualisation represents co-evolutionary system dynamics, or 
‘process’ dynamics, but also maintains a clear view of how conscious actor actions can drive 
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and influence system dynamics, as well as clarifying the values and motivations which 
would underlie these actions.  
A brief illustration of the interaction between technological networks, actor 
networks and broader high level values as a temporal process, can be provided by 
considering the historical evolution of the electricity networks in the UK. The earliest 
electricity networks grew up in the UK in urban areas in the early years of the Twentieth 
Century, driven by activities both of public municipalities and private entrepreneurs. It 
took place against a more general political discussion around the relative merits of public 
vs. private provision of utilities and services. For political reasons, centralised government 
intervention in the emerging system was initially avoided (Hannah, 1979). However, the 
emerging realities of the technical network soon began to challenge this political 
orthodoxy, as the uncoordinated manner in which the networks had evolved was resulting 
in major operational inefficiencies. For example, by 1920 in greater London alone, 80 
different supply companies were operating 50 different systems, under 24 different 
voltages and at 10 different frequencies, supplied by 70 different power stations (Gordon, 
1981). By this time, electricity had become a culturally accepted commodity, and the 
presence of price-regulation (as early as the 1892 Electricity Act) was indicating an 
acceptance that access to this commodity was no longer simply a matter of luxury but of 
civil right. These factors combined to put pressure on the government to act, which they 
did in 1926 through the creation of a Central Electricity Board which had powers to direct 
planning and operation to improve overall system efficiency. The CEB decided to begin 
construction of a132kV interconnected network (which would later evolve into the 
‘national grid’) which provided opportunities previously missing in the fragmented, 
piecemeal network, for large scale higher efficiency power stations. The result was that the 
average efficiency of British power stations increased from 9% in 1920 to around 20% in 
1940 (Hannah, 1979).  Moreover, the success of the programme locked-in, both 
technologically and institutionally, the principle of a centrally planned and operated high 
voltage transmission network, with uniform pricing, for many decades. This has had 
significant effects on the current structure of the UK electricity system as well as on public 
perceptions of both the pricing and production of electricity. 
The above discussion is summarised in Error! Reference source not 
found. in terms of the three levels: visions and values; actor networks; technological 
networks. The figure also describes a progression through time from left to right along the 
horizontal plane. The interaction of values, actor networks and technological 
configurations through the historical evolution of the UK electricity supply system, is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
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Figure 9: Case study of early evolution of UK electricity networks in 3 level framework 
 
2.6 A process for low carbon scenario 
development 
This chapter has explored the objectives of scenarios and their relation to the 
agency of the scenario user; the different kinds of uncertainties involved in considering the 
future; and the different ways of conceptualising the system under study that scenarios can 
employ. The final section of this chapter draws the discussion together to provide a 
development process for low carbon scenarios, as proposed in Hughes et al (2013). 
Although this process is presented as a linear sequence, there may in practice be some 
iteration between stages. For example, the scoping of the system may reveal details which 
require an adjustment of the focal question and objective type. 
2.6.1 Define the question and objective type, and 
identify the scenario user or users 
A scenario process requires clarity of purpose, and this can often be best 
expressed in the form of a focal question – the central question about the future that the 
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scenarios are investigating. Another important step, which may be made explicit by the 
focal question, is to define the scenario user or users – the actor or actors who are 
intending to use the scenarios to improve their near term decision making in respect of the 
future. In turn, the type of actor or actors who will use the scenarios affects the type of 
objectives the scenarios may serve – proactive, protective or consensus building. The type 
of objective is also affected by the boundaries of the system under study, and the scenario 
user or users’ relationship to this. Hence, the subsequent system scoping stage may also 
contribute to refining the focal question and objective type.   
2.6.2 Scope and define the system in terms of visions 
and values, actor networks and technological 
configurations, and the system boundary 
As well as identifying the scenario user or users, and the type of objective, a 
clear scenarios process depends on a clear definition of the system under study. The system 
under study will in part depend upon how the focal question is defined. One of the most 
important aspects of defining the system under study will be the drawing of boundaries 
around the system under study. Given that in reality most systems are almost endlessly 
inter-linked with other ones, the construction of a system-boundary to signify the limits of 
research scope can appear an artificial and arbitrary activity. Nonetheless, demarcation of 
research scope is an inevitable part of research, and therefore being clear and transparent 
about where those boundaries lie is an important part of research integrity. In energy 
scenarios, relatively clear system boundaries can sometimes be suggested by existing 
national jurisdictional boundaries. However, even in this case, imports and exports of 
energy cut across these boundaries, and within the national boundaries a variety of internal 
subsystems and interlinkages are present – for example, electricity generation, demand, 
transport, and industrial sectors. Decisions must be made about which of these systems and 
subsystems to define as being within the system under study. 
The scoping of the system and the delineation of its boundary also has an 
important connection with the transparency and clarity of the process, and the policy-
relevance of its output. The system boundary can be thought of as the area within which 
elements, which have the potential for variation, will be allowed to vary as part of the 
scenarios. Outside of the system boundary, it is possible that many other elements could 
vary in a way which also has an impact within the system under study, but these variations 
being outside the system are not the primary concern of the scenarios (though their impacts 
may be considered at a later stage in the process, as described below). As described in 
Section 2.4.1, many scenarios have been created which set very wide system boundaries 
which include a vast number of possible variables, many of which are varied simultaneously 
within single scenarios. As discussed, such value- or trend-driven scenarios effectively 
assume that large numbers of independent variables are in fact all dependent on the same 
	   88	  
high-level driver, using very broadly identified tendencies such as ‘globalisation’ or 
‘community values’ as justifiers for correlating assumptions across a very wide and 
contrasting range of indicators. As noted in that discussion, the inherent co-dependence of 
possible areas of future variability such as energy technology deployment, shopping habits 
and living arrangements is very far from certain. Most of the variables which are co-varied 
in such scenarios are in fact not inherently coupled but largely independent variables. By 
contrast a more scientific approach to scenario building is to respect the independence of 
variables where this is stronger than their co-dependence. Respecting the independence of 
variables means varying them independently of one another. Clearly, with an increasing 
number of variables, each of which having more than one alternative state, the number of 
different combinations of those variables, and therefore different scenarios, increases 
exponentially. Therefore, a strict approach to the principle of independent and co-
dependant variables is likely to require a much more tightly defined system boundary than 
is common in many broad trend based scenarios, in order to keep the number of 
independent variables treated as within system scope to a manageable level. 
Once boundaries have been established, the internal structure of the system 
must be characterised. This chapter has argued that for low carbon scenarios, a strategically 
effective description of the future evolution of the system will be provided by the 
characterisation of the system in three interlinked levels – visions and values, actors and 
technological configurations.  
2.6.3 Identify pre-determined or unvarying elements 
The scoping of the system may reveal elements which can be regarded as fixed 
for a certain period of time within the scenario process, or inevitable future outcomes of 
processes in motion. Such elements could include physical pieces of infrastructure which 
have an expected lifetime, or policy processes which are committed to and can be 
considered reasonably certain to deliver particular outcomes. The system scoping may have 
excluded potentially mobile elements due to research practicalities, which are as a result 
‘out of system’. As such these elements will also be effectively unvarying – although the 
impacts of their variability may be considered via ‘non-actor contingent elements’ in a later 
stage of the process. 
2.6.4 Identify actor-contingent elements 
This involves identifying the key variable elements within the system under 
study, the variation of which as a result of actor decisions, will create the different scenario 
pathways. These elements begin in the values level as alternative value sets which are 
understood as creating motivations in key ‘prime mover’ system actors, and are followed 
through in terms of their effects on system actors and subsequent effects on technological 
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configurations. If it is found that there are too many mobile actor contingent elements to 
be practically considered, this may require a further narrowing of the system boundary, to 
put those elements which for practical reasons cannot be considered, ‘out of system’. 
2.6.5 Describe system evolution via branching points 
along alternative pathways 
The alternative actor-contingent elements – sources of variability contingent 
upon explicit actor choices – will create different dynamics within the system under study, 
creating alternative ‘branching points’ (Kahn and Wiener, 1967, Hughes, 2009b, Foxon et 
al., 2013). Branching points lead the system to progress along different pathways – the sum 
of which at the end of the process will constitute the ‘scenarios’. The scenarios are 
developed through a number of timesteps. At each timestep analysis is made of the 
conditions which have been reached and how these would influence actor decisions in 
respect of the future. Thus, the scenarios become rooted in their emerging historical 
context, illustrating the path dependencies that emerge in socio-technical systems.  
2.6.6 Assess actor contingent scenarios against non-
actor contingent uncertainties 
The scenarios have thus far been developed focussing on how active choices of 
actors within the system under study may influence the development of the system. This 
provides information about how proactive decisions may affect system development. 
However, it is also important to consider how the outcomes of these decisions may be 
robust against variable elements external to the system under study, or outwith the control 
of the system actors. A selected number of key non-actor contingent uncertainties can be 
applied to the scenarios, to test their resilience. 
2.7 Conclusions 
Consideration of possible future scenarios to support and improve decision-
making is a natural human activity, practised intuitively by individuals on a day-to-day 
basis, as well as in more formal structured settings by a range of business and government 
organisations. There is a wide range of approaches to undertaking formal scenario building, 
reflecting the wide range of situations within which scenario thinking has been applied. This 
chapter has engaged with the scenario literature and identified aspects of method of 
particular relevance to the construction of low carbon scenarios. There are two main 
outcomes of this. The first is the observation that the future is not uniformly uncertain, and 
that a categorisation of different kinds of future element which may be present in the 
scenarios assists with the connection of scenario content to strategic decision making. 
Specifically, the identification of future elements which are pre-determined, those which 
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are variable but beyond the control of system actors, and those whose variability is 
contingent upon decisions within the remit of identifiable system actors, clarifies whether 
the appropriate response to each element is protective, proactive or consensus building 
decision making. The further ahead one looks, the more that proactive choices of actors can 
affect future outcomes, for ‘the plurality of the future and the scope for freedom of human 
action are mutually explanatory; the future has not been written, but remains to be 
created’ (Godet, 1987). 
The second outcome is the identification of the need for low carbon scenarios 
to conceptualise the system under study in three levels: values, actors and technologies. 
This three level conceptualisation acknowledges the co-evolutionary nature of 
sociotechnical systems, where large technological systems are ‘both socially constructed 
and society shaping’ (Hughes, 1987). It also provides a coherent structure through which 
alternative pathways for that system can be hypothesised, based on alternative decisions by 
prime mover actors, whose motivation is understood on the context of prevailing value 
systems, drawing on commentary in the political economy literature of the importance of 
values, ideologies or framing narratives in influencing political decision making. 
These two structural aspects were brought together through a proposed 
scenario approach which clarifies the aims and scope of the question, and provides a process 
through which the iteration between the three system levels can be seen to evolve into 
alternative pathways of development for the system. These pathways are primarily 
differentiated by the alternative value sets which lead to alternative actor-contingent 
outcomes – suggesting options for proactive or consensus building decision making. These 
actor-contingent scenarios can subsequently be tested against non-actor-contingent 
elements, which may suggest requirements for protective decision making. 
The next four chapters of the thesis are concerned with scoping the system 
under study, providing information of relevance to each of the three levels required for the 
scenario framework outlined in this chapter. The system scoping considers the guiding 
values which have ebbed and flowed during the development of the system, and how 
emergent value-sets may guide its future development. It considers the actors and 
institutional networks which have emerged from previous system configurations and which 
currently govern the operation of the system. It considers the technologies and 
infrastructure which are physical and technical embodiment of the system, and their link to 
investment decisions and policy choices of system actors. The scoping is undertaken 
through historical analysis (Chapter 3) analysis of current policies and institutions (Chapter 
4), semi-structured interviews with system actors (Chapter 5) and the assembling of data 
pertaining to the physical properties of the current configuration of technologies and 
infrastructure (Chapter 6).    
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3 Scoping the system: 
historical evolution of 
the UK electricity 
system 
Large socio-technical systems are conditioned by history – at any time the 
contemporary configuration of the system shows the impact of past policy choices and 
investment decisions. In order to understand the current state of the system and the 
possible directions of its future development, it is necessary to understand its historical 
development. This chapter therefore reviews the historical development of the UK 
electricity system and of the GB electricity transmission network based on a literature 
review of historical accounts of UK electricity system development. This broad historical 
review enables a mapping of the major policy currents, how these were related to shifts in 
underlying values, and the impact these had on the organisation of the actors and the 
development of the technological configuration of the system.  
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3.1 Early development and consolidation 
Demand for electrical services began to grow in the UK from the 1880s 
onwards, with growth picking up rapidly around the turn of the century (Figure 10). 
However, the piecemeal development of the industry and lack of overall coordination had 
resulted in a large number of companies supplying highly specific loads on dedicated lines 
(Gordon, 1981). This absence of network benefits resulted in low load factors for 
individual stations and resulting low overall system efficiencies (Hannah, 1979).   
 
Figure 10: Sales of electricity by public supply undertakings, UK 1895-1913. Source, (Hannah, 1979), citing Byatt, 
I.C.R, The British Electricity Industry 1875-1914, unpublished D. Phil thesis 
The early years of the industry also saw some jostling for position between 
private entrepreneurs, often responsible for demonstrating innovations, and public 
municipalities who were keen to take over the technologies for the public benefit (Hannah, 
1979). The political debate reflected this, and was ongoing. In 1894, Joseph Chamberlain 
wrote, ‘it is most desirable that... the municipality should control the supply, in order that 
the general interest of the whole population may be the only object pursued’; whereas in 
1925, in cabinet minutes, Conservative Andrew Bonar Law was recorded as arguing that ‘it 
was the private enterprise man and not the municipal man who would run the business to 
the best advantage and make the most money out of it’ (Cited in (Hannah, 1979)). 
An important exception to the problems arising from the extreme lack of 
coordination and piecemeal development in the majority of the country was found in the 
North East of England. Here, by 1908 the Newcastle-upon-Tyne Electric Supply Company 
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(NESCo) was running an interconnected network of generators and transmission lines 
operating at 20 kV (then the highest voltage in the country) at a standardised frequency of 
40 Hz, supplying the majority of the Northumberland coal field area, and various 
municipalities including Newcastle, Tynemouth, Cleveland, Durham and Middlesbrough. 
The diverse loads connected to the system meant that its stations achieved an average 45% 
load factor, more than double those in other industrial areas. The success of NESCo’s 
integration of the electricity supply of the area was in large part due to an early merger of 
two local private companies, whose amicable cooperation was a result in part of existing 
close family ties. The cooperation of these two companies allowed the sharing of loads 
which gave them an initial critical advantage over competitors, which was increased the 
more customers took the logical decision to commission their supply from the NESCo. 
Thus family cooperation had laid the foundation for what could not be achieved elsewhere 
in the country (Hannah, 1979). 
Meanwhile, a report into the problem of lack of coordination in the rest of the 
country, which was leading to inefficient system operation, was commissioned by Lloyd 
George's liberal government in 1917. It advised that the operation of the six hundred 
separate supply undertakings which had grown up throughout the country should be 
consolidated into 16 electricity supply districts, each of which would be charged with 
constructing large power plants. The system would benefit from the economies of scale of 
the larger plants, the combination of diverse loads would increase load factors, and 
interconnections between districts would decrease the margin of spare plant required. It 
also suggested that the ownership of generation, transmission and high voltage power sales 
should be centralised (Hannah, 1979). 
The recommendations of the report were transferred into a bill which came to 
parliament in 1919, but the strong Conservative opposition objected that it amounted to a 
prelude to nationalisation – an idea to which they were strongly opposed. The bill was 
eventually passed with several crucial amendments. Instead of the creation of District 
Electricity Boards with powers to take over generation and establish interconnection, the 
provision was made for the creation of Joint Electricity Authorities which were to have the 
same aims but without the compulsory purchase powers. The process would be overseen 
and encouraged by Electricity Commissioners, who would be tasked with bringing about 
greater integration, but again with no compulsory powers to draw upon (Hannah, 1979). 
This voluntary approach proved unsuccessful, and by the mid 1920s no further 
progress had been made towards integration. The Weir report was commissioned in 1925 
to address the continuing problem of the industry's failure to capitalise on the large 
potential efficiencies which would result from greater integration. It stated frankly: 
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The policy of persuasion can only be written down as failure... delay and 
procrastination are widespread... the resultant loss to the country has been heavy and 
becomes daily heavier.  
Cited in (Hannah, 1979) 
Thus by 1926, it was the turn of a Conservative Government to propose a 
bill, proposing to create a Central Electricity Board, with powers to force integration. 
Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin was however eager to stress:  
When I speak of a Board I do not mean a nationalised authority. I do not mean a 
Government Department. What we have in mind is a Board managed by practical 
men closely in touch with the industry. 
Cited in (Hannah, 1979) 
The1926 Electricity (Supply) Act did bring into being the Central Electricity 
Board (CEB). This was a panel of engineers and businessmen, independent of government 
control. Its function was to take judgements about the optimal development of the sector 
from a whole-system perspective, and it had the powers to exert its will on the industry- a 
change from the 1919 legislation. The board’s main task was to plan and commission a new 
interconnected ‘gridiron’ network of transmission lines. It would then be able to select the 
most efficient stations to connect to this network, control their operation, and buy and sell 
their output to the supply undertakings. Between 1926 and 1933, the CEB designed and 
built a network of circuits running at132 kV and 50 Hz. The bulk of the construction of the 
grid took place during the recession years of 1929-33, when most of British industry was 
cutting expenditure. The programme was thus able to make use of ample labour, and also 
provided increases in jobs in depressed industrial areas (Hannah, 1979).  
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Figure 11: The 132kV grid at its inception, 1932. Source: Hannah (1979) 
The network became known as the gridiron or ‘grid’ because of its lattice-like 
structure, with two major North-South lines running along the East and West of the 
country; and five major East-West Links. This structure remains the backbone of the 
present national grid. However, the grid was not initially intended as national network for 
the purpose of facilitating large scale long distance transmission, but as a network of 
separately controlled regional grids with the potential for some interconnection between 
them, in order to make best use of the most efficient plants. The links between the regions 
in most cases allowed for only 50 MW of transfer capacity. The regions were thus intended 
to be run separately, at seven regional control centres in Glasgow, Newcastle, Manchester, 
Birmingham, Bristol and London. The structure of the 1933 grid provides for large rings 
around different regions of the country, with sub-rings in the industrial areas of the country 
where generation and demand was highest, for example the central belt of Scotland, 
Lancashire, the Midlands, South Wales and London. The grid saved money for suppliers by 
breaking private monopolies, maximising use of most efficient plants, and reducing the 
need for reserve margin (Hannah, 1979).  
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Power stations were still built, owned and run by the corporations, but their 
planning, expansion and operation was directed by the CEB. Hannah notes that this 
influence was highly material, as by the end of the '30s, 'more than half the capacity of the 
Grid power stations had been installed in the previous decade, during which the CEB's 
influence had been clearly felt' (Hannah, 1979: 132). Hannah notes that 'the essence of 
inter war progress in electricity generation was improvement and economy rather than 
fundamental innovation, but the effect of such steady progress on efficiency could none the 
less be large'. The impact of the grid was in aggregating loads in a way that justified the 
construction of larger, more efficient power plants, benefitting from economies of scale. 
The average efficiency of British Steam Generating Stations had improved from around 9% 
in 1920 to around 20% in 1940. By the end of the 1930s, the wide gap in efficiency 
between British and American stations which had been present in the 1920s, had been 
virtually eliminated (Hannah, 1979). 
Although the grid had not been conceived for bulk long distance transmission, 
it did have an impact on increasing the development of hydro power in Scotland, which 
now had the potential for export to Southern load centres. New coal stations were growing 
in size and efficiency as a result of the aggregated loads available from the grid. 
The Grid was first run as a national grid experimentally in 1936. In 1938 the 
harsh winter demonstrated the advantages of this for real, as the nationally integrated 
system was used to overcome fuel shortages in the South. From 1938 onwards the Grid 
increasingly began to be operated as a fully nationally interconnected system. The Second 
World War further demonstrated the advantages of a fully 'national' grid, as for example 
when air raids knocked out power stations, supplies were available from more remote 
stations. Various new grid connections were made during the early years of the war to 
allow for changes in load flow in response to wartime conditions. Manchester needed to be 
connected to Sheffield to improve security of supply in these areas of munitions 
manufacturing, though this had not been deemed necessary in peace-time. Other 
strengthening of links to munitions areas in the West, Midlands, North West and Scotland 
were needed. New connections were also made between the South East and South West – 
stations in London and the South East were being underutilised due to evacuations and the 
decline of commercial activities, but munitions factories in the South West and Midlands 
were expanding output. By 1943, London was exporting 292 MW to the Midlands and 
South West at peak demand. Between 1940 and 1943 544 miles of new 132 kV lines were 
constructed (Hannah, 1979). 
Another significant war-time development was the decision in 1941 of Labour 
MP Tom Johnston, newly appointed Secretary of State for Scotland, to appoint a 
committee for investigating the potential for developing hydro power in North Scotland. 
This led to the decision to create a new, publically owned North of Scotland Hydro-
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Electric Board, alongside already existing undertakings. The board was created in 1943, 
began generating power in 1950, and was to become a vertically integrated utility in the 
North of Scotland. It was to retain its independence from the rest of Britain in the 
nationalisation of 1947, as well as resisting moves to merge it with the South Scotland 
board in the early 1960s (Hannah, 1979, Hannah, 1982). 
3.2 Nationalisation 
The CEB had largely been regarded as a success in increasing power station 
efficiencies and effecting benefits of increased interconnection through the grid. However, 
electricity distribution and supply still remained a complicated picture, with distribution 
networks owned by a large number of different undertakings within each region – there 
were close to 600 franchised electricity supply undertakings across the country (Hannah, 
1982). The fragmented structure of the distribution industry, together with uncertainty 
caused by the fact that many private undertakings held their franchise on a tenure basis 
which would soon be elapsing, leaving them vulnerable to take over by municipalities, was 
holding back investment and preventing the benefits of efficiencies from economies of 
scale. ‘Both companies and municipalities found that their franchised supply areas were too 
small for efficient operation’ (Hannah, 1979)(p. 329). The patchwork nature of the 
distribution networks resulted in a lack of standardisation – the London area for example 
was still operating with 17 different DC and 20 different AC voltages. (Hannah, 1982) (p. 
70). At the same time, electricity demand was increasing rapidly throughout the 1920s and 
1930s (Figure 12). 
 
Figure 12: Annual electricity supplied, GB, 1920-1950. Source: DECC 
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It seemed that intervention would again be required. There were essentially 
two proposed options emerging from political debates around the issue. The first was to 
facilitate and encourage the take over of smaller undertakings within regional distribution 
areas by the most successful existing companies or municipalities in each region; the second 
was for the government to acquire all of the undertakings and reorganise them into large 
publically owned distribution boards. The latter option began increasingly to appeal to the 
Labour party as it would fit within a programme of nationalisation, a process which it was 
increasingly beginning to propose for a number of industries in line with the principle of 
Clause 4 of its constitution:  
To secure for the producers by hand and brain the full fruits of their industry, and the 
most equitable distribution thereof that may be possible, upon the basis of the 
common ownership of the means of production and the best obtainable system of 
popular administration and control of each industry and service  
(Cited in Hannah (Hannah, 1979) p. 330) 
For the Conservative government in power during the 1930s, the latter 
option was clearly unpalatable; however the former was appearing to be unworkable. 
Despite various efforts, a stalemate in resolving the problems with the distribution system 
emerged during the 1930s. Again, the prospect of Government intervention in the industry 
began to seem to many an increasingly reasonable option. The Times commented:  
The electricity industry, for its part, cannot ignore the issue; nor can it refuse to 
admit that the continuation of competitive enterprise is consistent with, and indeed 
requires, a definition in the national interest of limits beyond which competition 
degenerates into waste. (The Times, in Hannah (1979) p. 306) 
In opposition, the Labour party began to develop a blueprint of full national 
ownership with a national electricity board, and regional boards controlling large 
distribution areas. Though this fitted well with the ideological values of the party and its 
commitment to public ownership suggested by Clause 4, Herbert Morrison also proposed 
the programme as a practical solution to the otherwise intractable problems of the 
industry, espousing as Hannah puts it, ‘the public corporation as a technocratic solution to 
a business problem’ (Hannah, 1979)(p. 332).  
The success of previously created public corporations to manage industry 
sectors, including the London Passenger Transport Board (of which Morrison himself was 
the architect), the BBC and the Central Electricity Board, was contributing to a growing 
section of opinion that this was a reasonable way forward. 
 Nor was this merely a convenient practical gloss on the ideology of Clause 4: it was a 
view which was increasingly accepted by those outside of the Labour Party… Both 
within the industry and among the Liberals and younger Conservatives, also, the 
Central Electricity Board model was increasingly admired as a businesslike and 
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effective way of managing the public utility industries… As alternative attempts at 
distribution reorganisation were seen to have failed and at the same time technical 
developments seemed to dictate even larger enterprises, the schemes first formulated 
by Morrison in 1930-1 were attracting growing support as the only way in which 
economies of scale could realistically be obtained. (Hannah, 1979: 334). 
In 1945 then, the newly elected Labour government acted on its electoral 
mandate to nationalise the electricity supply industry. The 200 companies and 369 local 
authority undertakings which now made up the industry, were merged, together with the 
CEB, to form the British Electricity Authority (BEA), which would have responsibility for 
generation and transmission. The distribution and supply functions were devolved to 14 
Area Electricity Boards, which were given the freedom to act autonomously from the BEA. 
In so doing, the new procedures tried to strike a balance between centralisation and 
decentralisation of control in the industry.  
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Figure 13: The area boards of the BEA, 1952. Source: Hannah (1982) 
Hannah concludes that although there may have been some exaggeration of 
the benefits of nationalisation on the part of its proponents during the 1930s and 1940s, 
overall the efficiency gains from the economies of scale at the distribution level brought 
about by the reorganisation, were material. The centralisation of metering, billing and 
accounting functions all made savings, as did the more coordinated approach to distribution 
network planning and engineering (Hannah, 1982). 
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As noted, power shortages in the 1930s and the particular conditions imposed 
by conditions during the war had pressed the grid into use as a network for long distance 
power transfer, rather than only a number of narrowly interconnected regional grids. 
However, apart from the inter-regional upgrades made during the war years, there had 
been little additional development of the 132kV grid. As the growth in electricity demand 
became even steeper in the immediate post-war years (Figure 12), a report by Graeme 
Haldane argued that there was an economic case for the high voltage transportation of 
electricity from power stations in coal mining areas, rather than the transportation of coal 
via rail to power stations closer to loads. As the original grid had done, a superimposed 
high voltage grid (or ‘Supergrid’) would also further aggregate national demands, allowing 
economies of scale and a smaller plant margin. In eventually being persuaded by these 
arguments, the BEA was taking the significant step of using a planned transmission upgrade 
programme to facilitate the transfer of power to load from the most suitable generation 
centres – rather than compelling generation to site closer to load. The next extension of 
the grid therefore was made with strong awareness of the optimal locations of coal 
generating plants. The proposal accepted by the BEA in 1950 was for a £52 million project 
over ten years to build 1150 miles of 275kV Supergrid lines (Hannah, 1982). 
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Figure 14: Outline of 275kV Supergrid, 1950. Source: Hannah (1982) 
The clear aim was to strengthen north-south interconnections, which had 
been limited in the 132kV network. The new lines had more than six times the capacity of 
the 132kV lines. Further, sections expected to have growing loads, such as those 
connecting the East Midlands coal fields and London, were constructed with wide 
clearances to allow for subsequent additional voltage upgrade. 
The investment in the 275kV network was vindicated by continuing rapidly 
growing demands during the 1950s (Figure 15). Additionally the existence of the new 
network influenced subsequent planning decisions on generation by the BEA. Sites close to 
towns and cities were increasingly less likely to gain planning permission; with the new 
network the BEA now had the flexibility to site new plants away from load centres, and 
optimise their location by other criteria – close to the coast for access to cooling water, or 
to coal fields for access to fuel. Discussions with the coal board also indicated that cheaper 
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coal would be found in the East Midlands and Yorkshire than in Kent, South Wales and 
Scotland – again the grid provided the flexibility to locate stations according to these 
considerations. The network was therefore now developing in a way which prioritised the 
optimal location of plant according to its own operational criteria, not according to its 
relative location to load.   
The Conservatives returned to power in 1951. In opposition they had attacked 
Labour for inefficient over-centralisation. Whilst eventually ruling out a full reversal of 
Labour’s nationalisation programme, the Conservatives resolved to go some way towards 
decentralising the electricity industry by splitting off the two southern Scottish boards. This 
happened in 1955, when both regions were taken over by a new South of Scotland 
Electricity Board, a vertically integrated board with responsibility for generation, 
transmission and distribution. In addition to the existing North of Scotland Hydro-Electric 
Board, this then meant that there were two boards in Scotland, both vertically integrated. 
The BEA was renamed the Central Electricity Authority (CEA).  
Subsequent efforts to merge the two Scottish boards were not successful, 
however, the two boards developed good working relations and physical interconnections 
(Hannah, 1982). Scotland as a whole, however, became effectively a separate system from 
England and Wales, with the systems planned on the basis of zero-trade across the Scottish 
border. Limited interconnection was maintained, though primarily for security of supply 
rather than bulk trade (Chesshire, 1996). The separation of Scotland persisted until the 
British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements (BETTA) came into force in 
2005. 
Further reforms followed with the Electricity Act of 1957, which responded 
to an inquiry criticising the over-centralisation of control and bureaucracy in the CEA.  The 
Act created a Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) with specific responsibility for 
generation and transmission. It would not have the hierarchical oversight over the Area 
Boards that the CEA had had. The Area Boards, as well as the new CEGB, reported 
directly to the Minister. The CEA was reduced to an Electricity Council, with a remit to 
oversee labour relations and coordinate research, but not to issue directives to any of the 
boards. 
Decisions on the design of generation sets remained centralised throughout 
the nationalised period, successively by the BEA, the CEA and the CEGB. This had mixed 
results. At times the board pushed for innovation and increased efficiency in station design; 
at other times a cautious conservatism dominated the outlook, and the efficiency of 
Britain’s stations lagged behind those of other countries. The combination of political 
influence and the management of the BEA and CEGB of the nuclear programme, caused a 
rush for Magnox and AGR designs before their economic viability was established, 
resulting in a programme which had exhausted its capital on sub-standard designs by the 
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1970s, at which point other countries began to invest more successfully in now-mature 
designs. The difficulties which emerged from the centralisation of generation planning 
contrast with the relative success of the centralisation of decisions around transmission 
planning. Hannah observes, ‘centralised control of transmission had had a successful and 
continuous history since its inception under the CEB. In contrast, the generation side had 
been plagued with organisational problems which they had been unable to resolve’ 
(Hannah, 1982) (p. 253). 
 
Figure 15: Annual electricity supplied, UK, 1951-1980. Source: DECC 
Despite the problems with the early nuclear designs, demand for electricity 
was still growing rapidly in the early 1960s (Figure 15), and the CEGB made orders for 
several 2000 MW coal stations (based on 500 MW sets), and also ordered some small-scale 
gas turbine plants for peak-lopping. With the new large sizes of coal plants, and 
increasingly stringent planning regulations, it became clear that the location of plant close 
to load was no longer possible. ‘In the early 1960s, then, when they were embarking on 
large investments in new power stations, planned expenditure on the Supergrid also rose 
markedly, and the two investments were seen as complementary’. (Hannah, 1982) (p. 
253). It was decided that a new Supergrid would be required, at higher voltage, to carry 
power from increasingly large and remote power stations. The CEGB decided to upgrade 
275kV lines to 400kV where possible, and also construct some new 400kV lines. The 
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design of the new supergrid was centralised in a new CEGB transmission group (Hannah, 
1982).   
From 1955 to 1970 UK electricity demand continued to grow rapidly, at an 
average of 7% per year (Chesshire (1996)and Figure 15). However, in the 1970s the 
discovery of North sea oil and gas, and the economic downturn, contributed to a significant 
slowing in demand for electricity, the first sustained slow down since the start of the 
industry, as gas gained an increasing share in domestic and industrial energy demand. 
Electricity’s share in national investment declined. As a result the CEGB’s five-year 
forecast made in 1970 proved to be 24% too high. In addition the CEGB had increased its 
planned capacity margin, due to the number of new station designs, both nuclear and coal, 
and the perceived increased risk of their breakdown. The capacity margin for forward 
planning was therefore raised from 17% to 28% between 1968 and 1977. The combination 
of over-optimistic demand forecast and a highly risk averse forward planning margin, 
meant that in the winter of 1975/6 the CEGB met a peak demand of 41,353 MW with 
58,677 MW installed capacity – a margin of 42%. (Hannah, 1982)(p. 287). There were 
comparable margins for the UK as a whole (Figure 16). Having comparatively recently 
emerged from a period of post-war boom in which it was struggling to maintain pace with a 
rapidly growing demand, by the end of the 1970s the CEGB was running a system which 
was over capacity for both generation and transmission, just as the apparently unending 
exponential growth in demand for electricity was finally levelling off (Figure 15).  
 
Figure 16: UK electricity capacity margin, 1970-2012. Source: DECC 
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3.3 Privatisation 
The period from the early 1980s to the present time was one in which 
demand for electricity grew at a markedly slower rate than in any previous period. This 
slow-down in demand served to further emphasise the high levels of investment which had 
occurred during the later phase of nationalisation, creating a high margin of 
manoeuvrability for the supply side. It was against this backdrop that a major reorganisation 
of the industry occurred.   
 
Figure 17: Annual electricity supplied, UK, 1981-2012 
In 1979 a Conservative government was elected. This marked the beginning 
of a new phase in which, after 30 years of state ownership of the electricity industry, the 
debate on private and public ownership was to be profoundly shifted. Nigel Lawson, as 
Secretary of State for Energy set out his principles in a speech to the BIEE conference in 
1982. ‘The proper business of government is not the government of business... Our task is 
rather to set a framework which will ensure that the market operates with a minimum of 
distortion and energy is produced and consumed efficiently’ (Pearson and Watson, 2012). 
Privatisation began in earnest with the Electricity Act 1989. This privatised 
the 12 Area Electricity Boards in England and Wales into Regional Electric Companies 
(RECs). The new companies had the monopoly of distribution and supply to their regional 
customers, but purchased electricity from a wholesale market. The National Grid 
Company, of which the RECs were initially made joint owners, was created to manage the 
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transmission network and the ‘pool’, a wholesale power market (Pearson and Watson, 
2012). The Office of Electricity Regulation (Offer) was created to regulate the charges 
levied by the National Grid Company. The CEGB’s generation assets were split between 
two new private companies, National Power and Powergen. The nuclear plants could not 
be privatised and so were subsumed into a state owned company, Nuclear Electric. 
Another state owned company, Scottish Nuclear, was created to take over the Scottish 
nuclear plants. British Nuclear Fuels would handle supply and disposal of fuel and 
decomissioning. In Scotland, with the exception of the nuclear assets, the two boards – the 
South of Scotland Electricity Board (SSEB) and the North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board 
(NSHEB) – became vertically integrated private companies, Scottish Power (SP) and 
Scottish Hydro-Electric (SHE).  
The 1989 Act also created the Non-Fossil Fuel obligation (NFFO), requiring 
the RECs to purchase a fixed percentage of their electricity from non-fossil sources, and 
the Fossil Fuel Levy to provide funds for nuclear reprocessing and waste management. The 
NFFO was initially created to support nuclear power generation, but the European 
Commission required that the scheme also extend to renewable generators (Rai and 
Watson, 2013).  
There was a phased opening up of competition in supply. Customers with 
maximum demands more than 1 MW could choose their supplier from 1990, greater than 
100kw from 1994, with all remaining domestic and small consumers able to choose 
supplier from 1998 (Rai and Watson, 2013). 
The National Grid Company was listed on the stock exchange in 1995, and 
the RECs, at the instigation of the regulator, were required to sell their shares soon 
afterwards (Thomas, 1996). Many of the RECs were subsequently purchased by domestic 
and foreign firms (Rai and Watson, 2013). 
Privatisation marked the removal of the centralised plan for the electricity 
system. A 1995 review on the prospects for nuclear power, which found no evidence of the 
need for new nuclear build in the near future, also reaffirmed the principle that it saw no 
reason why the electricity market should not ‘of its own accord provide an appropriate 
level of diversity’. The seven AGRs and Sizewell B were privatised in 1996 as British 
Energy. The Magnox stations had an estimated £7 billion of liabilities, and remained in 
public ownership, eventually to be transferred to BNFL (Pearson and Watson, 2012). The 
1995 nuclear review therefore confirmed the complete withdrawal of the state from long-
term planning in the electricity system, to a position of setting the conditions for a freely 
operating market.  
The transmission network itself was considered a natural monopoly which 
would be regulated by a system which mimicked the effects of competition in the market. 
	   108	  
This was the RPI-X formula: as a baseline charges levied by network owners could rise in 
line with inflation, indicated by the retail price index (RPI), but would be suppressed by a 
factor, X, ‘reflecting the potential for real price reductions arising from both technical 
progress, and output expansion in a decreasing cost industry’ (Weyman-Jones, 1990). The 
ownership of the GB network was now split, reflecting historical divisions – the England 
and Wales network, formerly the CEGB’s region became owned by the National Grid 
company, the South of Scotland board area by SSE, and the northern board area by SHE. 
The three transmission owning companies inherited what might be called ‘gold plated’ 
networks – the investments leading up to the early 1970s had left the system over capacity 
at the time. There was no urgent need therefore for the companies to make significant new 
investments in the network, but neither was there any incentive within the RPI-X 
framework to consider longer term investment plans, as its focus was on near term cost 
reduction. RPI-X has been criticised for giving the incentive for utilities to cut costs and 
maximise profits in a manner not necessarily consistent with the long-term best interests of 
the consumer. For example, Helm (2009) and Helm and Tindall (2009) argue that the 
companies maximised profits, at the same time as driving down costs, by avoiding capital 
investment and running highly leveraged (debt heavy) balance sheets. Helm (2003) 
observes,  
RPI-X regulation in the hands of Offer, Ofgas and Ofgem proved successful at 
sweating the assets. It gave high-powered incentives to cut OPEX costs, and to cut 
CAPEX too… Prices fell as a result, and, as regulators screwed down the returns, the 
flight of equity and consolidating mergers began. By the early 2000s, most of these 
cost savings had probably been made… RPI-X does not encourage investment, and 
truncates the management of the networks into five-year periods, creating a mismatch 
between the time horizon of asset management and investment decisions, and those 
which are profit-maximising under RPI-X. 
Arising from concerns about the lack of attention to long term quality of 
supply under RPI-X, Ofgem’s Incentives and Innovation Project (IIP) project in 2000-2001 
attempted to explore mechanisms through which quality of supply could be monitored 
alongside costs. Although in the short term the project did not lead to any radical reforms 
of RPI-X, it did, according to Helm, ‘shift regulatory attention away from network prices 
and more towards investment and hence security of supply’(Helm, 2003). It is also perhaps 
noteworthy that its two ‘I’’s, ‘incentives’ and ‘innovation’, did appear at the centre of what 
was in fact to become the successor of RPI-X, RIIO, discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.  
The only major structural change in the generation mix was the so-called 
‘dash for gas’, which saw a significant move to CCGT due to recent technological advances 
in CCGT technology, the accessibility of North Sea Gas, the effect of environmental 
regulations in EU directives (Watson, 1997), as well as the lifting of European and UK 
legal restrictions on the use of gas in power generation (Pearson and Watson, 2012). By 
1997, around 15 GW of CCGT was operating – the share of gas generation had grown 
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from zero to 27% in six years, largely at the expense of coal (Pearson and Watson, 2012) 
and (Figure 18). 
 
Figure 18: Electricity supplied, UK, 1970-2012. Source: DECC / DUKES 
This period also saw a notable increase in the extent to which environmental 
impact was recognised in energy policy. Having been castigated by Scandinavian countries 
as ‘the dirty man of Europe’ during the 1980s, due to its coal plants’ emissions of SOx and 
NOx which were a major cause of acid rain, in 1988 the UK finally signed up to the EU’s 
Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD), aimed at reducing emissions of SOx and NOx 
from power plants. In 1990, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher made a landmark speech to 
the Royal Society on the need for action on climate change, and the White Paper ‘This 
common inheritance’ acknowledged climate change as a major global issue. In 1993 a coal 
white paper acknowledged that energy policy should have regard to environmental impact 
(Pearson and Watson, 2012). One of the notable impacts of the dash for gas which 
followed liberalisation, was to allow the UK to claim substantial reductions both of acid 
pollutants and carbon emissions, owing to the lower content per unit of energy of both in 
natural gas compared to coal. 
The liberalisation period also coincided with clear reductions in consumer 
electricity prices (Figure 19). There are a number of causes for this price fall. The effect of 
the RPI-X framework in reducing regulated charges for transmission and distribution was 
one factor. The costs of producing electricity from coal also fell due to the ability of 
generators to buy the fuel on global markets, rather than being tied into contracts with the 
British Coal Board. A reduction in the Fossil Fuel Levy from the early to late nineties may 
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also have had an impact (Pearson and Watson, 2012). However, by the early 2000s these 
sources of cost reduction were more or less saturated, and prices began to rise again in real 
terms (Figure 19). 
 
Figure 19: UK electricity price indices, 1970-2010. Source: DECC 
3.4 Post-privatisation 
The change of government following the 1997 election did not mark a value 
shift on the question of the relative roles of the private and public sectors. Just as, during 
the early 1920s, the practical experience of the failure of the industry to self-coordinate in 
an efficient manner decisively weakened objections of principle to increased centralised 
coordination in the industry, so now, with the view that the privatised industry was 
achieving efficiencies and cost-savings following the nationalised period of over-investment 
and inefficiency, and showing decisiveness in rejecting one government-sponsored failed 
technology (nuclear) and embracing a new innovative one (CCGT), whilst successfully 
maintaining system margins and a diverse supply mix, the argument against state 
intervention in energy systems seemed to have won the day. Tony Blair had succeeded in 
revising Clause 4 of the Labour Party’s constitution, with its apparent commitment to 
nationalisation, in 1995. In an announcement to accompany the new government’s first 
Energy White Paper in 1998, Peter Mandelson, the grandson of the architect of Labour’s 
nationalisation programme, Herbert Morrison, affirmed his conviction that ‘competitive 
markets are the best way of stimulating efficiency in industry, of providing consumers with 
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real choice and bringing down prices. They are the cornerstone of our approach to energy 
and power generation’ (Pearson and Watson, 2012).      
The new government therefore continued with the programme of improving 
the functioning of the electricity market. Despite the growth in new CCGTs mostly 
commissioned by the RECs, they and the nuclear plants tended to run as baseload, leaving 
the two large companies National Power and Powergen to meet peaks and set prices in the 
spot market. The Utilities Act 2000 was a response to resulting concerns about market 
power in the pool, and paved the way for the New Electricity Trading Arrangements 
(NETA) in 2001 – a voluntary market much more closely modelled on conventional 
commodity markets. The Act also introduced the Renewables Obligation (RO) to replace 
the NFFO. Over the NFFO period (1990-2002) renewables only grew from 2 to 3% of 
UK generation (Pearson and Watson, 2012, Rai and Watson, 2013). The replacement of 
the NFFO with the RO preserved support for renewables but removed it from nuclear. 
NETA was subsequently replaced by the British Electricity Trading and Transmission 
Arrangements in 2005, which brought the whole of Scotland back within a single GB 
market. Ofgem’s NGC review in 1999 established separate controls for the System 
Operation (SO) function of the company, and its function as the Transmission assets owner 
(TO), ultimately leading to a separation of these functions of the company (Helm, 2003). 
In 2000, a report by the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution drew 
on the available climate science of the time to propose that UK’s fair contribution to a 
global greenhouse gas emissions reduction effort was a reduction of national greenhouse gas 
emissions of 60% by 1990 (RCEP, 2000). Although awareness of climate change had been 
growing through the nineties, this report was highly significant in re-establishing a long 
term policy goal for the energy sector – after just a decade of deliberate extrication of 
government planning from the energy sector, policy was now on the point of being 
dragged back into energy. The commitment to markets was to remain strong – now 
however there would be an aspiration that the markets would deliver on quite specifically 
defined policy objectives, in addition to simply achieving an efficient balancing of supply 
and demand. This was to become a significant tension in the energy arena.    
An Energy Review undertaken in 2002 placed environment at the centre of 
energy policy, with strong reference to the RCEP’s 60% target. The review downplayed 
concerns about energy security, which it argued could be addressed by strengthening 
international markets (Pearson and Watson, 2012).The UK was still a net energy exporter 
at this time. This fact, combined with the experience of steadily falling prices since 
privatisation put cost and security lower down the agenda, enabling a pole position for 
decarbonisation as the key energy policy priority. An Energy White Paper in 2003 
endorsed the 60% target (DTI, 2003), but in the context of a government bail out in 2002 
for British Energy, there was a lack of support for nuclear (Pearson and Watson, 2012).  
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The primary duty of the regulator Ofgem (formed in 1999 when Offer and 
Ofgas were merged) at this point was to protect the interests of consumers, and its primary 
means of doing this was to encourage competition. In June 2003 however, the DTI issued 
draft Guidance to Ofgem that it should take account of the 2003 White Paper. From this 
point, promoting decarbonisation therefore became a secondary duty of Ofgem, alongside 
the primary duty of protecting the interests of consumers (Helm, 2003). Exactly how these 
duties coexist was not entirely clear. Helm observed, ‘it is not an objective of Ofgem to 
deliver a low carbon economy, and it does not have the machinery or powers to promote 
renewables and energy efficiency’ (Helm, 2003).  
The UK became an energy importer again in 2004 after two decades of being 
a net exporter (Pearson and Watson, 2012). Further, the future impacts of the EU Large 
Combustion Plant Directive, which the UK had signed up to in 1988, were beginning to 
seem closer – non-compliant plants would have to close before the end of 2015. The 
question of adequacy and security of supply was beginning to seem more pressing than had 
been the perception in the 2003 White Paper. By 2005, Prime Minister Tony Blair was 
signalling that he favoured nuclear power. In 2006, an Energy Review was launched which 
concluded that ‘nuclear energy has a role to play in the future UK generating mix alongside 
other low-carbon generation options’. In the next Energy White paper of 2007, security of 
supply was firmly back on the agenda, and the nuclear option open – however the 
government at this stage maintained that no subsidies would be given to nuclear. A CCS 
competition was also announced. The mood of the time is summed up by the then Trade 
and Industry secretary Alistair Darling, in an interview with the Observer at the time of the 
publication of the 2007 White Paper (Morgan, 2007):  
What’s clear in my mind is the urgency of the situation both in relation to climate 
change and security... in 10 to 15 years’ time we will come terribly close to a 
situation where demand and supply come too close for comfort.  
On nuclear, he remarked:  
In the Eighties I had huge reservations, but I did not know about climate change then, 
as very few people did. As Keynes said, ‘when the facts change I change my mind. 
What do you do?’ 
A short time before this, as signalled in the 1995 review on nuclear, the 
government had been happy to accept the apparent judgement of the market that nuclear 
was yesterday’s technology. The combination of climate change and security concerns was 
now prompting a shift in thought, which appeared at least in part to be suggesting that the 
market could get things wrong, or at least not have a sufficiently long term view, and that 
where important strategic long term objectives emerged, some kind of policy direction was 
needed. Whether direction counted as simply giving ‘signals’ or more concretely setting 
incentives or targets, would be an area for experimentation in subsequent years. The 
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potential tension however was that this perception now existed alongside the previously 
established view that market decisions about energy technologies were the most efficient. 
These views are not logically compatible, and there must exist a line where one of these 
ideologies gives way to the other. Exactly where this line is, is unclear, and represents one 
of the ongoing confusions in UK energy policy.     
Before these tensions became too apparent however, climate policy was 
moving quickly. A Climate Change Bill was in development which would establish a legally 
binding 2050 CO2 reduction target. Following pressure (based on emerging climate 
research) the target was strengthened from the 60% recommended by the RCEP, to 80% 
(HM Parliament, 2008). It passed the Commons stage in 2008 with only 5 votes against. 
The strength of the Commons’ resolution on this is worth remarking on. The bill was 
initially developed by a coalition which included a Conservative opposition with growing 
electoral credibility, and which was beginning to set up its environmental credentials as one 
of its major appeals to the electorate – opposition leader David Cameron having travelled 
by dog-sled through the Svalbard Arctic archipelago in 2006, to highlight his party’s 
concern about climate change (Jowit and Nigar Aarskog, 2006). In the run up to the vote 
then, a debate had emerged in which all parties were competing to ‘out-green’ each other, 
which largely explains the significant consensus when it came to the vote. Enthusiasm for 
the bill may also have been bolstered by a strong sense of optimism around the delivery 
process. The UK was comfortably on track to meet its Kyoto targets for the 2008-2012 
period, and has also successfully left behind its ‘dirty man of Europe’ image in meeting EU 
standards on NOx and SOx. There was a tendency of both Conservative and Labour 
politicians to attribute this to the direct success of environmental policies whilst in office, 
and not to emphasise that the displacement of coal by the ‘dash for gas’ was the main factor 
behind these successes, itself a side-effect of the liberalisation process. With memories of 
emission reductions successes still green, and the target in prospect such a far-off one, the 
moment at which the bill came to parliament may have been extraordinarily optimal from 
the perspective of garnering maximum support.   
3.5 Austerity 
In 2008, following an escalating crisis in the global financial markets, the 
collapse of Wall Street investment bank Lehman Brothers signalled the start of a global 
recession (Elliott and Treanor, 2013). The change in political climate was dramatic. In the 
UK, the balance between maintaining the country’s financial deficit, and stimulating 
economic growth through government spending, was now the dominating topic of political 
debate in the run up to the 2010 general election (Winnett, 2010, Krugman, 2015).  
For the time being however, energy policy continued to be propelled by the 
force of the wave that had carried through the climate act in 2008. A significant 
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institutional change was the creation of a Department for Energy and Climate Change in 
October 2008. This new department emphasised the return to prominence of energy as a 
government policy portfolio, and also emphasised the main reason for its return to 
prominence, climate change. A civil service review of the department from 2009 declared, 
‘The Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) was created in October 2008 to 
take the lead across government for tackling climate change and securing clean, safe and 
affordable energy for the UK. The Department’s mission is global change on a historic 
scale. Its role is to lead this change’ (Civil Service, 2009). DECC’s low carbon transition 
plan was published in 2009 (DECC, 2009), showing a ‘roadmap’ broken down by sector 
and technology, towards achieving the both the EU 2020 renewables targets and the first 
three carbon budgets set out by the Committee on Climate Change, under the provisions 
of the Climate Change Act. More broadly, since the 2003 Energy White Paper (DTI, 2003) 
a debate had been emerging around the institutional arrangements required for delivering 
on the UK’s ambitions for cutting carbon emissions by 2050(SDC, 2006a, SDC, 2006b, 
Lockwood et al., 2007). In order to improve the investment climate for renewables, 
banding of the Renewable Obligation certificates had been undertaken to improve returns 
for higher cost renewables at an earlier stage of development (Carbon Trust, 2006). Now 
however, more profound market changes were also being discussed, and Ofgem’s Project 
Discovery presented a series of institutional arrangements which spanned the spectrum 
from minimal to high government intervention (Ofgem, 2010b). With the UK’s carbon 
targets now set into law by the 2008 Climate Change Act (HM Parliament, 2008), there 
was increasing acceptance in the possibility of a stronger intervention in electricity markets 
being justified. Thus, in 2009, Dieter Helm observed, ‘As the replacement cycle bites in 
the next decade, and given the scale of the expenditure on wind, there are considerable 
doubts as to whether the privatised industry structure, with liberalisation and competition, 
is up to the task. A return to greater state intervention is almost inevitable’ (Helm, 2009). 
In this context, when the 2010 election returned a Conservative – Liberal 
Democrat coalition to power, there was already considerable momentum behind the idea 
that the electricity market was going to need another significant overhaul if it was going to 
deliver the kinds of structural changes required by a low carbon transition. Just as Labour 
in 1997 did not demur from the established value set of government extrication from the 
electricity markets, so now the new coalition did not challenge the new emerging value set 
which was increasingly justifying government policy intervention to deliver long-term 
policy goals. Thus in its White Paper of 2011 (DECC, 2011b) the new government 
introduced proposals for Electricity Market Reform, which were discussed from 2010 
onwards eventually came before Parliament as the Energy Bill in 2012. The bill contained 
four main pillars: the provision of subsidies through differentiated feed-in-tariffs for all low 
carbon technologies including nuclear; the establishment of a carbon price floor; a capacity 
mechanism to reward generators for making capacity available, in view of increasing 
penetrations of intermittent generation; and a minimum emissions standard to prevent 
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building of unabated coal. The Energy Act received Royal Assent in December 2013 
(DECC, 2013b).  
The role of Ofgem itself was evolving again. With the government’s low 
carbon aspirations having been included in Ofgem’s remit as a secondary duty following the 
2003 White Paper, in July 2010 the new government launched an Ofgem Review, to 
consider again its duties. The conclusions, published in 2011 (DECC, 2011a), rephrased 
the body’s principal objective as: 
To protect the interests of existing and future consumers where, taken as a whole, 
those interests include the reduction of greenhouse gases and security of supply 
Its primary duties were now to further the principal objective, ‘wherever 
appropriate by promoting competition’, but also to consider ‘how far promoting 
competition would protect consumers and whether there are alternatives that would better 
protect [their] interests’ (DECC, 2011a). Thus the government effectively enshrined 
within the duties of its regulator, all of the cornerstones of its energy policy, with the 
facilitating of efficient markets only one of several possible means towards achieving these 
policy goals. The argument in favour of such an approach, as stated in the DECC report, is 
that the ‘strategic direction’ provided by the Government, and Ofgem’s ‘independent 
regulatory role’ should be ‘aligned and coherent’ (DECC, 2011a) – in other words the 
latter should not frustrate the former. The argument against it is that the balancing of cost, 
decarbonisation and security of supply requires trade-offs between the objectives. Such 
trade-offs are inherently political decisions. It is perhaps unclear what basis Ofgem has to 
make these trade-offs, in a manner which preserves its independent and non-political 
nature. Considering the proposed alterations to Ofgem’s remit in 2009, Helm observed, 
‘the relationship between the duties would need to be sorted out: it is not the role of 
regulators to make what are ultimately political trade-offs between customer bills, carbon, 
security, and other duties’ (Helm, 2009).  
The effect of the enlargement of Ofgem’s remit may have encouraged a very 
public intervention made by Alistair Buchanan, the outgoing head of Ofgem, in 2013. This 
intervention, in turn, gave further support to the justification for government intervention 
in the electricity. Buchanan warned of power shortages as the margin between available 
capacity and peak demand narrowed in the years approaching 2015. He argued that this 
was due to the combination of factors: the remaining plant closures resulting from the 
LCPD, the lack of new investment in CCGT due to the low ‘spark spread’, and more 
generally due to the policy uncertainty caused by the unresolved EMR process (Buchanan, 
2013). A similar argument was made by other industry and independent contributors 
(Royal Academy of Engineering, 2013), who pushed for the government to prioritise 
system security by fast-tracking measures to reward capacity credit. Whatever the rights 
and wrongs of this particular debate, Buchanan’s intervention was notable as an example of 
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how the line between Ofgem’s role as a purely economic regulator, and as a kind of 
‘energy agency’ with a broader policy remit, was becoming blurred.    
Analysis was also being undertaken on the role of electricity networks in the 
low carbon future. This was prompted by the emergence of the work of the Electricity 
Network Strategy Group (ENSG) which effectively presented an engineering plan for the 
future network out to 2020. Whilst its reports (ENSG, 2009, ENSG, 2012) do not engage 
in policy discussion, the implication of their network plans derived from the impacts of 
government policies on the generation side, give a strong suggestion towards planned, long 
term strategic investment in electricity networks, in the name of delivering on long term 
government policies. 
Meanwhile, the effect of the recession meant that increasingly financial 
debates began to impinge upon energy policy. From the early 2000s, electricity prices 
began to rise again as North Sea gas expired and the more straightforward network savings 
wrung out under RPI-X became more scarce (Figure 19). The costs of the low carbon 
transition became increasingly scrutinised. At the same time, mistrust in energy companies 
was growing. Energy price rises at a time of economic downturn were controversial, 
amidst allegations that the price rises did not reflect upstream costs but were the result of 
the companies acting unfairly as a cartel. Opposition leader Ed Milliband made political 
capital in a swingeing attack on the energy companies, the heads of which were soon called 
before a House of Commons Select Committee. 
Thus, energy policy, which in the 1990s had been apparently extricated from 
policy intervention, had seen the creep back of policy goals in a remarkably short space of 
time. First decarbonisation, beginning with RCEP report in 2000. Then security of supply, 
as the UK became a net energy importer in 2004, and the impacts of the LCPD began to 
loom. Then, in the context of deep economic downturn, prices would become a dominant 
feature of the energy debate. These three objectives, now existing simultaneously, meant 
that analysts began to present UK energy policy as a ‘trilemma’, suggesting that optimising 
for one objective causes trade-offs against the others. 
 
Figure 20: 'The trilemma'. Source: Boston (Boston, 2010) 
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The trade-offs between these three corners were, deliberately or not, not 
always made explicit. For example, calls for government intervention through policies to 
guarantee capacity and avoid ‘the lights going out’, did not often address the alternative 
risk of ‘gold-plating’ the system to such an extent that the impact on consumer prices 
would be significant. The trade-off between cost and climate change measures on the other 
hand, were made more explicit, and in the midst of controversies around energy price 
rises, climate change and other policies appeared to be vulnerable to political claw back 
(Carrington, 2011, Mason, 2013).     
3.6 Discussion 
The evolution of the GB electricity system through the twentieth century 
provides an informative case study on political decision making within large sociotechnical 
systems. The impacts of decision making within such systems are long term, and therefore 
involve engaging with long term future uncertainty. As such, political decision making 
affecting large sociotechnical systems relies in part on evidence arising from the 
performance of the current system, but also on ‘value systems’ – evaluative judgements 
about what the appropriate governing principles should be for such a system, as well as 
images of what it could or should look like in the future (Sunderlin, 2003, Crick, 1964, 
Hall, 1993).  The historical discussion of this chapter has traced the ebb and flow of 
different political value systems or paradigms, and seen their effect on political decision 
making in respect of the electricity system.  
A value spectrum – or contest of paradigms (Hall, 1993) – which has been 
significant throughout the development of the electricity supply system, is that relating to 
the view on the relative roles of the state and the private sector. This debate has occurred 
since the earliest years of the development of the system, and was at the root of many of 
the most significant structural changes to the industry, notably the coordination and 
creation of the first national grid from 1926, the development of the Supergrid following 
nationalisation from 1950, and the privatisation of the industry from 1989, which preceded 
the ‘dash for gas’. Although the opposing ends of this value spectrum appear broadly to 
have political colours, value waves have in several instances proved stronger than changes 
in the political colour of government. It was a Conservative government which eventually 
accepted the rationale for increased coordination of sections of the industry in 1926; a 
Labour administration which in 1997 fully accepted the rationale of stripping back 
government involvement in the electricity system; and a Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
coalition which accepted the need for electricity market reform in the direction of greater 
government intervention, in 2010. At the present time, the political management of the 
industry is still strongly affected by the value system that drove the privatisation process of 
the 1980s and 1990s, the central tenet of which is that markets deliver the most efficient 
outcomes. However, this value system is now increasingly jostling for position again with 
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another long-held value system, which mistrusts the ability of markets to deliver long term 
policy goals for the public good, and accordingly perceives value in the state intervening 
upon the activity of private actors in order to make the delivery of these goals more secure.   
There is currently therefore a slightly uncertain balance in the role of the State 
in the electricity system. The core evaluative principle of the privatisation process, that the 
system should be allowed to naturally find its most efficient course within an open market, 
without the need for the hand of the state upon the tiller, still has a strong influence on 
policy debate. However, such a condition has never quite been reached, and the hand of 
state guidance has consistently given into the temptation to make adjustments to help the 
system navigate the shoals of long term policy obligations – climate, cost and security. 
Decisions about levels of State intervention in the system, and which of these policy 
objectives should be prioritised, still remain political judgements, strongly rooted in 
political value systems.  
A number of authors have used the concept of policy paradigms to analyse the 
tension between these alternative value systems in UK energy policy. In particular, they 
have considered the key attributes of the policy paradigm, or value system, that had been 
established by the late 1990s, and whether emerging new priorities around decarbonisation 
and security of supply will require a ‘paradigm shift’, or indeed whether a paradigm shift 
has already occurred. Mitchell (2008) defined the existing UK energy policy paradigm, at 
the time she wrote, as the Regulatory State Paradigm (RSP) (drawing on Moran (2003)). 
Her view is that this paradigm hands down key principles which define and constrain the 
way policy is designed and enacted: ‘The essence of these RSP principles are that: markets 
and competition are seen as the most effective way of meeting society’s choices; politicians 
should be legally separated from the regulation and decision-making of industry; the means 
of ‘steering’ the delivery of efficient management of the UK’s industries should be based on 
‘expert’ knowledge and economic analysis using open and transparent processes and data; 
markets should be designed to be technology and fuel blind so that outcomes are not 
‘picked’; if an outcome is wanted, the policy put in place should mimic markets as far as 
possible and should not intervene directly in the market or network rules and incentives 
(for example, the Renewables Obligation); as far as possible, direct regulatory measures 
should be instituted only in the face of substantial market failures (for example, the banning 
of incandescent light bulbs). It is these principles which inform and sometimes constrain, 
policies across Government, including (sustainable) energy policy’ (Mitchell, 2008) (p.23).  
Mitchell argues that the effect of this paradigm is that energy policy choices 
are constrained to those that fit within the logic of the existing paradigm, rather than 
following a neutral evidence based view on what policy is most effective.  For example, she 
suggests that a feed-in tariff approach to subsidising renewables has been shown to be more 
effective in other countries than the UK’s Renewables Obligation – the latter was 
	   119	  
nonetheless favoured as its structure more closely conformed to the principles of the RSP 
set out above (Mitchell, 2008). As a result, Mitchell concludes that the complete 
replacement of the RSP with an alternative paradigm is required as a pre-requisite of a 
sustainable energy transition.  ‘… The current political paradigm in place in the UK will 
not help the UK to achieve sustainable development. In order for the UK to achieve a 
sustainable future, there is a need for a political paradigm shift’ (Mitchell, 2008) (p. 198).  
Interestingly, however, her own definition of the RSP contains an ambiguity, an area of 
possible tension or ‘anomalous’ developments. The principle attributed to the RSP that ‘as 
far as possible direct regulatory measures should be instituted only in the face of substantial 
market failures’, of course implies that direct regulatory measures could co-exist with 
market based incentives in the case of a perceived ‘substantial market failure’, as proved by 
the example of lightbulbs which is provided. What is considered to be a ‘substantial market 
failure’ is open to interpretation, and the negotiation created by this caveat gives a clear 
example of the testing and stretching that goes on within a paradigm, without necessarily 
entailing its wholesale replacement. In recent years, as discussed in this chapter, 
strengthening perceptions of possible market failures in key energy policy areas has meant 
that the market paradigm has been increasingly tested and stretched by ‘anomalies’ of state 
intervention. 
It is because of this increasing awareness of potential market failures in energy 
policy objectives that Dieter Helm (2007a, 2007b), by contrast, argues that a paradigm 
shift in UK energy policy has already occurred, and indeed pinpoints the moment of 
paradigm shift quite specifically to the year 2000. However, in much of Helm’s discussion, 
his use of the term paradigm shift, and thus the criteria for understanding whether one has 
happened, is significantly different to its use by Mitchell (2008) and indeed Hall (1993). In 
Helm’s discussion, a paradigm shift occurred in the year 2000 due to a marked change in 
oil market structure spelling an end to the low oil prices of the 1980s and 90s, and creating 
security of supply concerns; and the rise of climate change in the political agenda. His 
description of a paradigm shift tends to refer more to external events which change the 
context for policy-making decisions, rather than necessarily a reorganisation of the very 
ideas and principles which underlie policy-making, as described by Hall (1993) and 
Mitchell (2008).  Of course, a significant change in the context of policy making may well 
in turn demand policy change: ‘Paradigm shifts necessitate more radical policy reappraisals 
than gradual evolutionary changes’ (Helm, 2007a) (p. 5) – however, in Helm’s analysis, 
this is mainly presented as a rational reaction to a changing circumstance, rather than the 
paradigm shift itself. In discussing the challenge of ‘designing energy policy in the new 
paradigm’ he argues that a mixture of adding and improving existing market mechanisms, 
and creating ‘new institutional structures to reflect the new priorities’ is required (Helm, 
2007a) (p. 7-8). In other words, for most of Helm’s discussion, the paradigm shift seems to 
be about factors external to policies, where the job of policy design is to undertake a 
rational response to the requirements of this – using both market based and interventionist 
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measures as most suited. This is somewhat different to previous definitions of paradigms 
which have emphasised paradigms as internal generators of ideas, which form, direct and at 
times constrain approaches to policy by defining both the objectives and the means of 
policy (Hall, 1993).   
However, at other points in his discussion, Helm clearly does take up the 
notion of paradigm shifts occurring in policies: ‘But paradigm shifts happen in policy, too: 
events can conspire to change the historical context to a sufficient degree to make it 
increasingly hard to reconcile the existing mindset of policy-makers with the evidence, 
leading eventually to new objectives and new policy instruments. Paradigm shifts in policy 
typically require a change in the context and a change in the ideas in response’ (Helm, 
2007b) (p.9). This understanding of the change in ‘ideas’ and the ‘mindset of policy-
makers’ is closer to Hall’s definition of policy paradigms. Helm continues, ‘One policy 
paradigm in energy has been provided by the set of ideas surrounding privatisation, 
liberalisation and competition developed in the 1980s. It is an internally consistent view of 
the world, and provides a ‘preferred solution’ to problems as they arise. If a particular 
outcome is unsatisfactory in some way, the answer, in this paradigm, is more private 
ownership, the removal of restrictions on trading, and the promotion of competition.’  
Helm argues that this paradigm ‘worked well in the 1980s and 1990s’, but that 
circumstances have changed since then. Helm contends that ‘this shift in external 
circumstances, combined with new knowledge about climate change, cannot be adequately 
addressed within this paradigm of privatisation, liberalisation, and competition. Though 
these polices continue to contribute both to the context and the outcomes, they are no 
longer sufficient.’ (Helm, 2007b) (p.9-10).  
Thus, whereas the paradigm shift in terms of events can be apparently quite 
sudden, the process of policy paradigm shift is slower and more ‘evolutionary’, as ‘not 
surprisingly, energy policy has lagged events…’ (Helm, 2007b) (p.32). Therefore, ‘the 
paradigm shift in policy objectives has yet to be translated into a coherent set of policy 
instruments, which have to be grafted on to a privatised and liberalised market structure… 
Rather than adding on new interventions, and ever more institutions, in an ad hoc way to 
the existing framework, the new paradigm requires a greater degree of clarity and focus. 
But, contrary to Kuhn’s description of paradigm shifts, the new paradigm is not 
incommensurate with the old. The task is to build upon the strengths of the 1980s and 
1990s approaches, rather than reject it wholesale’ (Helm, 2007b) (p.34-35). Thus Helm 
ultimately re-interprets the notion of policy paradigm shift, arguing for a rationally 
conservative policy response to changing events, which builds upon existing strengths, 
rather than rejecting old priorities and entirely re-ordering the hierarchy.  
If this policy grafting project envisaged by Helm succeeds, it will be a matter 
of debate and opinion whether to call such an evolution a new policy paradigm. For 
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example, Kuzemko (2013) argues that although the shift in UK energy policy since the rise 
in prominence of concerns around carbon emissions and security of supply represents ‘a 
significant break from pro-market orthodoxies and institutions of the past, it cannot yet be 
described as a coherent and alternative policy paradigm… This is partly because neoliberal 
economic, or ‘pro-market’, ideas have not been completely rejected… while the 
government intervenes at a much higher rate than in the past the private sector maintains a 
high degree of responsibility, as well as influence, in delivering energy to consumers’ (p. 
3).  
It may be that the accumulation of exceptions which are undoubtedly being 
made within the fabric of the 1980s and 1990s market based energy policy paradigm will 
eventually be of so substantial a nature that observers will agree that a new paradigm has 
been brought about. Alternatively, it may be agreed that the paradigm successfully 
stretched and adapted to accommodate the demands of what initially appeared to be 
anomalous developments, without being fundamentally displaced. At present UK energy 
policy appears to be undergoing that process that Hall (1993) describes during which the 
paradigm is being stretched to accommodate anomalies. In Hall’s discussion, this process 
culminates in the incumbent paradigm becoming so weakened that it is entirely superseded. 
In the current case of UK energy policy, it seems, as argued by Kuzemko (2013) that the 
paradigm is being stretched but not yet entirely replaced. Further paradigm stretching may 
occur in different areas of energy policy, including transmission network policy. Whether 
the ultimate fate of the paradigm is Helm-style evolution or Mitchell-style complete 
displacement remains to be seen.  
It is clear that the developments of the past have created the current system 
and also condition our current experience of it, and our views of its future. A strong 
element of this is how our understanding of past successes and failures feed into the values 
that we hold, and how these subsequently influence our perceptions of the right choices 
going forward. The nationalised period is a rich source of such value fortifiers: mistakes, 
particularly around the nuclear programme, have become a powerful cautionary tale 
against the folly of the Government attempting to ‘pick winners’. The nationalised period 
has also been presented, especially during debates running up to privatisation, as a time of 
wasteful ‘gold-plating’ – essentially implying that the balance between cost and security of 
supply was not appropriate. On this point, it might be observed that for most of the 60-
year period of centralised decision-making on transmission and generation, far from gold 
plating, the CEGB and its predecessors were struggling to keep up with burgeoning 
demand, at times appealing to domestic consumers to voluntarily reduce demand at peak 
times. It is true that during the 1970s, the CEGB was operating with somewhat risk averse 
planning margins, in part as a result of over-forecasting demand; however it should perhaps 
be conceded that this situation was in contrast to the comparatively thin margins within 
which the system had operated for much of the preceding decades. In the UK, the arrival of 
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North Sea gas and the domestic gas programme, which saw a prolonged flattening out of 
electricity demand for the first time in the industry’s history, may have partially 
contributed to the gap between forecast and out-turn demand. However, CEGB’s over-
forecasting of demand was echoed in similar forecasts made in the US, including forecasts 
by the US Atomic Energy Commission and other independent analysts, as noted by Smil 
(2000) and Craig et al (2002). Contemporary commentators drew attention to potential 
flaws in such analyses which amounted to a simple extrapolation of past trends, for 
example Ehrlich and Holdren (1971) in the US, and Leach et al (1979) in the UK. 
Especially with hindsight it can be seen that over-forecasting of demand during the 1970s 
and 1980s was caused by a relatively simplistic extrapolation of past trends, without 
accounting for sectoral substitution and saturation effects especially in the case of electricity 
demand forecasts (Ehrlich and Holdren, 1971, Smil, 2000, Craig et al., 2002), or for 
substantial increases in energy efficiency across the whole of the economy (Leach et al., 
1979, Craig et al., 2002, Smil, 2000).  
Although forecasting errors are a major source of risk associated with a highly 
centralised and government co-ordinated model of energy system governance, history also 
shows that in large, highly-networked industries, there are significant upsides to some kind 
of more centrally controlled approach, at certain times – especially when on the cusp of 
periods of extensive new investment. Full nationalisation in 1947 may not have been the 
only possible way forward for achieving the kind of cross-industry co-ordination required 
at the time, and history cannot tell us how successful other routes would have been by 
comparison. However, what seems to be inescapable is that the problems with piecemeal 
development and lack of network coordination with which the industry grew up would 
have required some kind of intervention if the industry was to deliver the kind of 
investment required to support the growth in demands which were actually seen up to the 
1970s. The successes and failures of both periods must be seen in context. As Helm 
observes, ‘because the 1980s inherited assets built in the public sector in the 1960s and 
1970s, the need to commit to investors was largely overlooked. The lessons of the 1930s 
and 1940s were forgotten’ (Helm, 2009).  
The physical configuration of the system is also a legacy of past decisions. The 
current distribution areas in large part reflect the layout of the 14 Area Boards established 
at nationalisation. The grid itself still carries the backbone of the 132kV network designed 
in 1926, and its current areas of capacity and bottlenecks strongly reflect strategic and 
political decisions taken since then – the construction of the 275kV and 400kV networks 
with a view to transporting power from the most economic coal producing regions, and the 
largely political decision to separate off the South of Scotland board, which became 
operationally distinct from the England and Wales network, reducing the need for 
interconnection.  
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The past has also bequeathed a network of actors and institutions, whose 
configurations reflect an overlay of various political and commercial decisions. The fact that 
there are three TOs in Britain relates to decisions taken in 1943 to establish the North of 
Scotland Hydro-Electric Board, in 1955 to split off the South of Scotland Electricity Board 
from the BEA, as well as the phased privatisation of these boards from 1989. The National 
Grid Company, as the inheritor of the CEGB’s mantle, took over system operation 
functions through its responsibility to operate the pool. Its system operation functions were 
eventually split out in 1999. The current dominance of six large energy companies in the 
generation market reflects in part the hurried timetable to privatisation, such that the new 
system launched with just two fully privatised companies, and one state-owned nuclear 
company. 
The evolution of actor networks reflects that fact that at each reorganisation a 
balance was struck between trying to create new actors and institutions to serve the aims of 
the new approach, and trying to work with what was already there. Actors (including 
organisations) can be harder to change than institutions, the ‘rules of the game’ (Young, 
2002). Policy objectives can move and evolve quite fluidly, and sometimes move ahead of 
the organisational structure, which may be still constructed around a previous system. For 
example, there is some current ambiguity about the role of Ofgem, which nominally 
remains an economic regulator, but which is increasingly finding prominent politically 
derived objectives to be part of its remit. The current set of actors were established at 
privatisation on the basis of a market system allowed to find its way with minimum state 
intervention. Now that state intervention increasingly seems to be required, it is not always 
entirely clear which of the current actors has the remit to define the plan and set the 
boundaries for the behaviour of the others. Instead there is continually evolving a set of 
guidelines by which various actors are broadly expected to continue with their previously 
established duties but with increasing levels of implied responsibility for the delivery of the 
government’s policy goals. In this context the question arises as to whether the current set 
of actors can be adapted to the needs of the current policy agenda, or whether new actors 
will be required in the future. Helm (2009) argues for the creation of ‘arm’s-length 
agencies’ to deliver government specifications for new infrastructure requirements, noting 
that ‘these are agency functions, and not ones which lie easily with notionally independent 
economic regulators’ (Helm, 2009). 
In reviewing the history of the system, an important observation is that almost 
without exception, electricity networks, which connect up diverse sources of demand and 
supply, either within regions or across the nation, have been planned and delivered as a 
result of significant intervention, planning and coordination by the state, or by a body with 
equivalent powers to make decisions about the optimal development of the system as a 
whole, and to make interventions upon the system accordingly.  
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The main exception is worth noting however – prior to the 1926 creation of 
the CEB, the North-East Supply Company (NESCo) had already created an AC 
interconnected network supplying industrial centres in the North East region. This early 
success can be attributed to far-sighted engineering decisions, but also to the company’s 
critical early merger with a rival company, achieved in part due to family ties, which 
enabled the company to capture a larger range of customers, and to secure a reasonable 
rate of return on larger network investments – which companies in the fragmented supply 
areas in other parts of the country could never achieve. The rate-of-return is key for sunk 
investments; the development of networks in the private sector in other countries, notably 
the US, has relied upon Government intervention to mimic the long term commitment of 
this captive consumer through rate-of return regulation (Helm, 2009, Thomas, 1996). The 
NESCo example highlights that for the successful coordinated development of network 
infrastructures, it is not public ownership per se which is the key factor. However, it does 
appear that such infrastructures do depend on the activity of some level of coordination, 
and some means by which large scale investments can convey an acceptable rate of return 
to the investor. The situation is understandable in terms of the ‘free rider’ effect. Whilst it 
may be in every actors overall interest for some kind of infrastructure to be in place, 
nonetheless it cannot be expected that that infrastructure will emerge as the amalgamated 
result of all actors actions, because it is in no actor’s interest to construct more 
infrastructure than is required for its own operations and provide ‘free’ infrastructure for 
the benefit of rivals.  
Reflecting on the pattern of network design that has emerged from these 
periods of coordinated planning, it is worth noting that, at least from the 1950s on, the 
planning and design of transmission networks in Britain was based around facilitating the 
transfer of power from power stations optimally located according to their own criteria. 
Thus we have inherited a network which is largely constructed to transport power from the 
Midlands and northern coalfields to the South. 
On the other hand, periods can also be cited in which centralised control and 
planning yielded less optimal decisions. This may particularly have been the case in relation 
to designs of generating units. Hannah (1982) reports that efficiencies of coal units in the 
UK lagged behind other countries, as the CEB continued to opt for tried and tested 
designs. It appears that lack of competition may have resulted in an overly risk-averse 
strategy which made little allowance for innovation. Similarly the choice of nuclear reactor 
design was dogged by wider political considerations.  
The private sector is good at delivering efficiency within a given framework – 
however when new a framework or an upfront network-type expansion is required, it has 
historically required high levels of coordination, either as a result of state-intervention, or 
to circumstances leading to unusually high levels of coordination between actors. Whilst 
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‘picking winners’ on the generation side has a murky history, the benefits of long-term 
coordination and strategic planning for transmission networks have in general been high 
over the course of the system’s history. Helm (2003) writes that networks  
…are the motorways to the market, and over-provision is greatly preferable to 
under-provision. The optimal level of interconnection will not be developed by 
private vertically integrated oligopolists and their design and development have 
system-wide characteristics. An element of planning and a (heavy) dose of regulation 
is essential. It was a lucky coincidence that the market approach of the 1980s and 
1990s was applied in the context of mature and well-invested electricity and gas 
networks. The assets could be sweated without worrying too much about the cost of 
capital or supply security. That luxury is no longer available, and hence the regulatory 
priority, and the appropriate instruments, need to shift towards investment. (p.423). 
3.7 Conclusions 
Political decision making in the GB electricity sector has been strongly 
influenced by the ebb and flow of alternative competing political value-sets. Value-
influenced judgements about the appropriate relative roles of state ownership compared to 
private ownership, and of state coordination compared to market based self-coordination, 
have consistently overlain considerations of technical system issues. Values will continue to 
effect political decisions. The current system is influenced by a mixed value set. The 
appropriateness of market based self-organisation of energy systems, with minimal state 
intervention and regulation, continues to have an ideal and aspirational quality with which 
policy discussions are infused. However, the emergence of major long term challenges in 
the early twentieth century – particularly climate change and security of supply – have led 
to a situation which might be summarised as a market-based system in which the state is a 
very prominent player. The justification of significant state involvement has now 
established itself in the political value set, across party lines, in a way that marks a 
significant shift from the late 1990s. At the same time the actors established at the time of 
privatisation to operate the system with minimal intervention, have not fundamentally 
changed, although the duties laid upon them have. An important question for the electricity 
system is whether the existing set of actors is the appropriate one to operate a system in 
which a market-based structure is combined with high state intervention aimed at 
delivering major system change in pursuit of long-term public policy goals.    
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4 Current policy mix in 
relation to 
transmission 
networks 
Policy approaches to any particular area of electricity system management are 
constructed within the context of the broader value shifts that occur within the politics that 
pertains to the system as a whole, as discussed in the previous chapter. Hence, the current 
chapter, which focuses on recent developments in the regulation of electricity transmission 
networks and of the use of networks by generators, will also reflect some of the themes 
identified in the previous chapter. The aim of this chapter is to set out the current 
arrangements for the governance of the transmission network, and its relation to the 
evolving generation mix, and to identify how broader objectives and value-sets are 
expressed within the specific area of transmission regulation.  
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As noted in Chapter 1, the central trade off in transmission investment is 
between the potentially increased benefits of greater transmission capacity, in terms of 
increased security and greater access to the cheapest or otherwise preferred technology 
types, and the costs and aesthetic impact of that transmission investment. Whereas for 
most of the history of the GB electricity system in the twentieth century – specifically 
between 1926 and 1989, as discussed in Chapter 3 – this trade off was made on behalf of 
consumers by central committees, the privatised era has required a decentralised approach 
to this trade-off, in which market mechanisms and resulting price signals inform 
transmission companies when new investments are required and recover costs for that 
investment, and also provide signals to generators about the costs that will be imposed on 
the network by decisions to build generation in specific locations. This chapter discusses 
the key mechanisms by which these signals are conveyed, with some reference to their 
emergence during the privatised era.    
There are four main areas of interaction: 
• Transmission access: the process by which generators gain access to the 
transmission network 
• Transmission charging on long term costs: the process by which 
generators are charged for the right to maintain access to the transmission 
network 
• Transmission charging on real-time operation: the process by which the 
System Operator recovers costs of real-time balancing of the electricity 
system, including the resolution of constraints caused by limited available 
transmission network capacity at key transfer points 
• Planning and investment in transmission: the process by which new 
investments in the network are triggered and undertaken 
 
4.1 Transmission access 
When a new generator wishes to connect to the Transmission Network, two 
things must be considered: first, the requirement for local enabling works to allow the 
generator to physically connect to the nearest grid access point; second, the wider network 
effects of this new connection. If the generator is connecting in an area of the network 
which already has an excess of supply in relation to demand, then the new generator may 
add to congestion and network management costs. 
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In the nationalised system, the need for and location of new generation, as 
well as the need for expansion of new transmission network, could be co-ordinated 
internally by the CEGB (as for example discussed in Section 3.2). The privatisation of the 
electricity system enforced the separation of generation and transmission ownership. This 
required generation owners to make an application to the relevant Transmission Network 
Owner for the right to connect to the network. At this point, applications to the grid were 
dealt with on a first-come first served basis, and each application would only be granted 
when sufficient grid reinforcement throughout the network had been made such that the 
new generator’s output could be accepted under most conditions, without imposing 
constraints on the system. As such it was known as an ‘Invest-then-connect’ approach 
(Green, 2010). To secure the costs of undertaking wider network investments, generators 
were required to pay a ‘security’ or deposit, to give transmission owners the confidence to 
proceed with the upgrade.  
By the mid-2000s, generation incentives under the new RO scheme were 
encouraging greater investment in renewables, in particular in Scotland where average 
wind speeds are highest. In 2005, preceding the integration of the Scottish and England & 
Wales systems under BETTA, generators in Scotland were given the opportunity to submit 
connection applications without securing the costs of any required network upgrades (see 
interview discussions, Chapter 5). The number of applications following this amounted to a 
capacity significantly greater than could be accommodated by the historically low transfer 
capacity of the network between Scotland and the north of England. As applications from 
renewable generators for connections in congested grid areas accumulated faster than 
wider grid reinforcement could be undertaken under the ‘invest-then-connect’ standard, a 
queue began to emerge, at the back of which generators were being offered connections as 
late as 2025 (DECC, 2010b). 
The length of this connection queue was seen to be jeopardising the 
government’s targets for renewable energy in 2020.  On 27 July 2010, following 
consultation, the Government announced that ‘Connect and Manage’ would be adopted as 
the enduring regime for grid access, along with ‘socialisation of constraint costs’ (Bell et 
al., 2011, DECC, 2010b). The overall effect of this regime is that generators are able to 
connect to the transmission network as soon as local enabling works are completed, but 
without waiting for wider reinforcement works to be completed (Bell et al., 2011). All 
constraint costs, ‘including those arising from the advanced connection’ would be 
‘socialised equally among all generators and suppliers on a per-MWh basis’ (DECC, 
2010b). The government’s aims in establishing this regime were to ‘provide sustained, 
commercially viable connection opportunities’; ‘deliver security of supply and a clear path 
to delivering our renewable energy targets’ which would be implemented ‘in a time-scale 
consistent with delivery of the Government’s aspirations for 2020’ (DECC, 2010b). In 
other words, targets for renewable energy were the principal driver for this policy reform.   
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The implementation of ‘connect and manage’ does appear to have coincided 
with rising transmission constraint costs.  
Table 3: Annual constraint costs (£m) (National Grid, 2011a) 
 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 
England & 
Wales 
13 28 29 31 37 20 
Cheviot 
boundary 
44 25 22 178 86 132 
Within 
Scotland 
26 55 20 54 16 18 
Total 84 108 70 263 139 170 
 
As the table shows, there was a notable increase in constraint costs from the 
year 2008/09 onwards, which coincides with the introduction of ‘interim connect and 
manage’. A high proportion of the constraint costs, particularly post-2008, are found at the 
Cheviot boundary (the boundary between the south of Scotland and the north of England). 
However, in interview discussions for this thesis (reported in Chapter 5), connect-and-
manage was argued to be a rational response to the already existing queue arising from the 
pre-BETTA decision to waive the requirement for generators in Scotland to secure the 
costs of network upgrades. In any case, Bell et al (2011) suggest that such high constraint 
costs in Scotland and on the Cheviot boundary are ‘arguably’ evidence that transmission 
access rights have been oversupplied in northern Britain. Concerns have been raised that 
the current access regime, combined with socialisation of constraint costs, raises 
opportunities for the exploitation of transmission constraints – that is, generators may 
produce power behind a constraint in the knowledge that the SO will have to sell them 
back their power through the balancing mechanism (BM), at a margin (Bell et al., 2011).  
4.2 Transmission charging on long-term costs: 
TNUoS 
In the GB system, generators pay an annually calculated levy for their ongoing 
right to access the network, known as the Transmission Network Use of System (TNUoS) 
charge. The charge is calculated using a method known as Investment Cost Related Pricing 
(ICRP). The key features of this charge are: 
• It is a capacity based charge, calculated per MW of Transmission Entry 
Capacity (TEC) required by the generator 
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• It contains a locational element, which is calculated based on the 
incremental increase in overall power flows (measured in MWkms) 
caused by adding an additional MW in each area of the network at the 
time of system peak demand 
• The purpose of the charge is to reflect the network costs that generators 
impose from different locations, and thus encourage generators to make 
an efficient trade-off between expected marginal costs of generation and 
network costs; as well as to recover revenue for Transmission Companies 
for network upgrades that may be required. 
It therefore provides a long-run smoothed marginal cost signal for generators 
– generators pay a charge that reflects the long term impacts of their location on network 
costs, but they do not directly pay for the wider works that their connection may trigger – 
otherwise the marginal generator triggering an upgrade would be charged significantly 
more than the previous or subsequent generator to connect in that location. More detail on 
the TNUoS charge calculation method is provided in Appendix B.2. 
The table below presents the results of the TNUoS tariff calculation for 
2013/14. 
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Table 4: 2013/14 generation TNUoS tariffs by zone (National Grid, 2013b) 
Zone Zone Name 2013/14 Tariff 
(£/kW) 
1 North Scotland 25.42 
2 East Aberdeenshire 22.80 
3 Western Highlands 26.15 
4 Skye and Lochalsh 30.25 
5 Eastern Grampian and Tayside 21.55 
6 Central Grampian 19.75 
7 Argyll 18.25 
8 The Trossachs 16.49 
9 Stirlingshire and Fife 16.40 
10 South West Scotland 15.53 
11 Lothian and Borders 12.84 
12 Solway and Cheviot 11.07 
13 North East England 8.64 
14 North Lancashire and The Lakes 7.48 
15 South Lanacashire, Yorkshire and Humber 6.34 
16 North Midlands and North Wales 5.18 
17 South Lincolnshire and North Norfolk 3.49 
18 Mid Wales and the Midlands 2.44 
19 Anglesey and Snowdon 7.41 
20 Pembrokeshire 5.57 
21 South Wales 2.92 
22 Cotswold 0.04 
23 Central London -4.44 
24  Essex and Kent 0.19 
25 Oxfordshire, Surrey and Sussex -1.69 
26 Somerset and Wessex -3.05 
27 West Devon and Cornwall -5.17 
 
The table indicates the clear shift in the costs imposed upon the network by 
generation in different regions of GB. Generators in North Scotland experience high 
TNUoS charges due to the relative lack of need for generation in this region due to low 
demand. This low demand means that an incremental MW of generation will be exported 
out of the region, imposing costs on the transmission network. Conversely, in West Devon 
and Cornwall demand is greater than supply, hence an incremental MW of generation 
actually reduces network costs, because it can meet demand within the zone and cause a 
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lower requirement for import. Thus generators in this region experience a negative 
TNUoS charge – in other words, they receive a payment. 
The locational element of the charge is therefore intended to reflect the costs 
that generators impose on the network, and encourage them to locate new projects close to 
demand and where the network is less congested, thus helping the transmission network to 
develop efficiently and cost-effectively.  
In September 2010 Ofgem launched project Transmit, a review of the 
transmission charging arrangements. In their commentaries on existing and potential future 
transmission charging arrangements for Ofgem’s Project Transmit, academic reviewers 
raised a number of observations in relation to the ICRP methodology (Bell et al., 2011, 
Baldick et al., 2011, Newbery, 2011). An important point is that the charge is issued to 
each generator per MW of their TEC rights. For conventional generators which would 
typically aim to use close to their full TEC at the time of system peak demand, this is a 
reasonable approach. However, due to their inherent variability, renewable generators 
have lower load factors of around 30% - thus their average energy output at system peak 
may be considerably less than the TEC they might apply for in order to be able use all of 
the energy they generate when at full power. A MW-based charge therefore may be argued 
to considerably over-estimate the actual costs imposed by variable generators on the 
network. 
The method of deriving costs directly from increased MWkm flows arising 
from a notional incremental MW increase in generation at a given node does not take 
account of the actual physical line ratings on the existing network – that is, an increased 
power flow over a branch that has ample capacity to accept the increase, is treated no 
differently to an increase in power flow over a branch which would not have that capacity. 
The effect of this is that the charge does not reflect when an investment actually takes 
place. It can be argued that a positive outcome of this is that it smooths the ‘lumpiness’ of 
network costs, rather than placing all of the costs of a given upgrade on the marginal 
generator who finally triggers the need for investment – it is in this sense a ‘long-run’ 
charge (Bell et al., 2011). However, by not accounting for available or spare capacity it 
may not be correctly valuing the actual stresses that additional generation places on 
different parts of the network. 
The charge is reviewed annually and the load-flow exercise re-performed with 
the latest data on generation, load and transmission. Thus the TNUoS charge in a given 
region, as well as the boundaries of the regions themselves, can change annually. Notably, a 
generator which in the past took a decision to invest in a given region in part because of the 
TNUoS charge applied there, could see that charge increase during its operational lifetime, 
as a result of other generators deciding to connect in the same region, against a stable 
demand background within the region. Whilst noting this as a possible criticism, Bell et al. 
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(2011) also acknowledge the argument that despite its earlier connection date, the 
generator in this example is nonetheless continuing to put power onto the network at the 
time the charge is calculated, just as the other newer generators are, and should therefore 
experience the same charge. Baldick et al. (2011) however argue that ‘it is unclear what 
market efficiency goal is served by setting locational TNUoS charges that change yearly for 
existing generation units, because their entry decision was typically in the distant past’. The 
authors hold as a principle that ‘sunk costs should be recovered in a manner that does not 
distort usage of the transmission network’. Their preferred approach, therefore, is to 
separate out operational decisions of already existing assets from investment decisions of 
potential future plants, by including locational costs in the price of energy but not in the 
fixed transmission charges (Baldick et al., 2011). In Newberry (2011), the need for 
transmission charging to give both long and short term signals is discussed. Long term 
signals should be given regarding network investment and generation location; short term 
signals about dispatch to avoid congestion in real time. However, the author argues for the 
separation of these charges into different mechanisms, in particular with Locational 
Marginal Pricing of energy (explored in Section 4.5.1 and Appendix B.4) suggested as the 
best way of achieving efficient dispatch.   
Project Transmit presented three possible future approaches to transmission 
charging for consultation. 
• Status quo – retaining the existing form of ICRP 
• Improved ICRP – making incremental changes to the ICRP model to 
improve the accuracy with which generation is charged 
• Socialisation – changing the approach to entirely avoiding giving locational 
signals through the transmission charge 
Modelling undertaken by Redpoint (2011b) for Ofgem showed that although 
the socialisation approach provided a slightly increased chance of meeting the 
Government’s renewable targets, it did so at a significantly increased cost. Ofgem 
considered the cost to consumers of the socialised option to be excessive, and also noted 
that they considered that ‘formulating regulatory policy on the basis that the EMR does not 
deliver would be inappropriate based on our discussions with the UK government’ 
(Ofgem, 2012a). This rationale is admittedly slightly confusing as it appears to call into 
question why the study investigating the effect of the different charging models on the 
likelihood of hitting the Government’s renewable targets was commissioned in the first 
place. It perhaps reflects some confusion around Ofgem’s remit in relation to its now 
expanded duties, as discussed in Chapter 3. The argument for not using socialisation of 
network costs as a means of delivering on renewables targets is more strongly put by 
Baldick et al (2011) who hold as a point of principle that ‘environmental objectives are 
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most efficiently pursued through mechanisms that directly address those objectives’. In 
other words, direct mechanisms such as the feed-in-tariffs for low carbon generators should 
address low carbon objectives, rather than trying to deliver them by proxy through 
adjusting other kinds of charges.  
In a decision document published on 4th May 2012, Ofgem instructed 
National Grid and the Connection and Use of System Code (CUSC) industry group to 
develop changes on the basis of the Improved ICRP approach. This approach was favoured 
because locational cost reflectivity was considered to be beneficial in terms of driving 
efficient investment decisions; however the changing energy mix required some alterations 
to the existing ICRP model (Ofgem, 2012a).  
In the improved ICRP the approach of using load flow to identify network 
changes resulting from incremental generation at each grid location, will be maintained. 
However, Ofgem have proposed that instead of running load flows based on a single system 
peak condition, two separate conditions should be modelled, producing two components 
to the tariff. The system peak condition will continue to be modelled, producing a peak 
security charge, which intermittent generation will not pay on the basis that they are not 
assumed to provide firm capacity at system peak. In addition an alternative condition will 
generate a ‘year-round’ locational charge which all generators will pay based on their 
location. Ofgem has instructed the industry group to explore alternative ways of 
calculating the year round component of the charge, which would reflect more precisely 
the different ways in which different generator types use the system. Departures from the 
simple MW based charge, which is argued to be less appropriate for generators whose 
average load factor is substantially less than their peak output, are being considered. For 
example the TEC could be multiplied by a historic typical load factor for the generation 
type, or for the specific generator; or the charge could be levied ex-post based on actual 
load factors or actual MWh produced (Ofgem, 2012a).   
In July 2014, Ofgem took the decision to adopt the above approach, with the 
additional split of the year-round charge into ‘shared’ and ‘non-shared’ elements to reflect 
the potential for network sharing between different types of generators. The code 
modification will be implemented from April 2016 (Ofgem, 2014). 
In summary, the incremental revisions to the TNUoS charging methodology 
are primarily intended to achieve a more precise calculation of the usage made of the 
transmission network by different generator types. This should produce a more beneficial 
outcome for low load-factor renewables than the current system. The locational element of 
the charge will be maintained. The charge will continue to be re-calculated annually, which 
means that incumbent generators will continue to be affected by investment decisions of 
new entrants, as well as by their own activities.  
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4.3 Transmission charging on real-time 
operation: BSUoS 
Under the British Electricity Trading and Transmission arrangements 
(BETTA), the majority of electricity trades are bilateral. It is the role of the system 
operator (SO) National Grid to monitor the trades and to ensure that overall the system 
remains balanced between supply and demand, at the same time as respecting transmission 
constraints. Bilateral trading ends one hour before real time (called ‘gate closure’) after 
which point only the SO may undertake further trades, within the Balancing Mechanism 
(BM) (Green, 2010). In the BM participants can volunteer to trade with the SO to increase 
or reduce their output. Increases in output will be sold to the SO at a premium, whereas 
decreases in output involve energy being ‘bought back’ from the SO at a discount. With all 
trades accounted for the BM typically results in an overall balancing cost for the SO. 
Further detail on the operation of BETTA and the BM is provided in Appendix B.1. 
Some of the trades made by the SO within the BM may be required as a result 
of participants final contracted positions (the energy that participants have contracted to 
buy or sell as a result of bilateral trading) differing from their intended physical positions 
(the energy they actually expect to supply or consume, which may be different from the 
contractual position due to unexpected events). In this situation the participant is penalised 
through energy imbalance prices, which recover the cost of balancing as a result of 
contractual imbalances. However, there are also occasions when, even though a participant 
may be fulfilling its contractual position, its output cannot be accepted on to the network 
due to transmission constraints. In this case the SO must use the BM to sell energy back to 
the participant behind the constraint at a discount, and buy an equivalent amount of energy 
at a premium from a participant beyond the constraint. These activities also result in a cost 
for the SO, and these costs are recovered through the Balancing Services Use of System 
(BSUoS) charge. 
The key characteristics of BSUoS are:    
• it is an energy based charge levied ex post on generation and demand per 
MWh of energy actually produced or consumed  
• the amount charged per MWh does not vary between different areas. This 
means that generators whose output contributes to constraints pay no 
more for each MWh generated than those whose output does not cause 
constraints, or ameliorates them  
• the charging split between supply and demand is roughly 50/50.  
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• as well as constraint costs, it also covers the cost of paying for reserve, 
response and reactive power services.  
The combined effect of the TNUoS and BSUoS charges on generators are 
therefore that generators receive an annual charge related to their expected contribution to 
power flows at system peak, charged on a capacity basis, and with locational diferentiation; 
they are also charged for the overall effects of constraints from real-time system operation 
– however these charges are not locationally targeted, but socialised amongst all users. 
4.4 Planning and investment in transmission  
4.4.1 Onshore transmission: RPI-x and RIIO 
The evolution of the locational balance of generation and demand over time 
can lead to requirements for transmission investments. Transmission owners (TOs) must 
ensure that the networks are of sufficient capacity to manage system power flows as well as 
having resilience to additional stress factors. In the current GB system, the requirements 
for transmission network performance are defined in the document known as the National 
Electricity Transmission System Security and Quality of Supply Standard (NETS SQSS) 
(National Grid, 2012b). More detail on the NETS SQSS is provided in Appendix B.3.  At 
the same time, this security requirement must be balanced against incurring unnecessary 
costs for consumers by over-investing in network to a level in excess of the requirements of 
the security standards. 
During the nationalised period, both generation and transmission assets were 
owned and controlled by the CEGB, which set a ‘Bulk Supply Tariff’ related to the long 
run marginal cost of its assets, for the wholesale of electricity to the Area Electricity Boards 
(AEBs). As such, the particular costs of various components of the charge (for different 
generation and transmission assets) were relatively opaque. Criticisms levelled at the CEGB 
by the UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission in the run up to privatisation, which 
included that of an inefficient operation of the transmission system, as well as the 
unwillingness of the CEGB to relate its maximum demand tariffs to the level of unused 
capacity on the system (Weyman-Jones, 1990), suggest that the priorities in network 
investment during this period may have been more towards security than cost minimisation 
(as discussed in Section 3.2).  
In this context, one of the key aims of privatisation was to reduce system 
inefficiencies. The transmission network was now separated from generation and treated as 
a regulated monopoly. The responsibilities of the three new TOs were detailed in the 
NETS SQSS, and the fulfilment of these responsibilities would at times require network 
investment. The companies were entitled to recoup the costs of this investment through 
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charges levied on the users of its network – the TNUoS charges discussed in the previous 
section. However, the appropriateness and efficiency of its investments were to be kept in 
check through regular 5-yearly Transmission Price Control Reviews (TPCRs) undertaken 
by the regulator (OFFER, later Ofgem). TPCRs employed the formula ‘RPI-X’ to identify 
the extent to which transmission charges would be allowed to rise (as discussed in Section 
3.3).  
Thus the Transmission Price Control Reviews were focussed on driving 
efficiencies within the standards of the NETS SQSS, within relatively near-term 5-year time 
periods. When new network investment was required, this would be signalled through 
changes in the calculated TNUoS charges, and via the Balancing Service Incentive Scheme 
(BSIS) which provides incentives for the transmission owners to limit congestion costs 
(Baldick et al., 2011).  
In March 2008, Ofgem launched a review of the TCPR process entitled ‘RPI-
X@20’ – reflecting the almost twenty-year time period for which RPI-x had been used as 
the price control formula. The RPI-x@20 review highlighted the challenges that faced 
energy networks in the future. These included: drivers for decarbonisation of electricity 
supply; electrification in heat and transport; smart grids; interactions of renewables and 
nuclear; increase in local generation. Further, all of these challenges would take place 
against a background of ageing network assets due for renewal. By contrast the period for 
which the efficiency focussed RPI-x formula had been in place, had been one in which 
Transmission Owners had been able to manage existing assets with little need for 
significant new investment (Helm, 2003; 2009). It was concluded that RPI-x was not the 
appropriate model to meet these challenges (Ofgem, 2010c).  
There was a notable shift in perception of the role of networks. The review 
began to reflect an acknowledgement that networks could no longer be treated as passive 
systems to be regulated deterministically under static security conditions – rather networks 
were now being presented as active enablers for delivery of policy objectives. Just as the 
role of Ofgem was at this time being enlarged through addition of broader policy goals to 
its principal objective (Section 3.5), now the network companies were to receive an 
enlarged remit. The aims of the new price control approach were now to include that of 
encouraging energy network companies to ‘play a full role in the delivery of a sustainable 
energy sector’, as well as, perhaps more conventionally, to ‘deliver long-term value for 
money network services for existing and future customers’ (Ofgem, 2010c). 
The new model was christened RIIO, for ‘Revenue set to deliver strong 
Incentives, Innovation and Outputs’ (Ofgem, 2010c). RIIO utilises many of the same 
structures and processes as its predecessor. However, there are a number of key aspects of 
the RIIO model which differentiate it from RPI-X.  
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First, there is a broader definition of the kinds of activities for which network 
companies can justifiably seek to raise revenue. Rather than only seeking to maintain the 
NETS SQSS, network investments can qualify under six categories of output: customer 
satisfaction, reliability and availability, conditions for connection (which broadly cover 
traditional aspects of network performance and security of supply); environmental impact 
(which includes the carbon footprint of networks as well as their role in facilitating long 
term decarbonisation); social obligations, safety (which cover compliance with HSE 
legislation).  
Second, RIIO encourages a longer-term outlook on network investment. This 
is in part due to the extension of the price control period from 5 to 8 years. Perhaps more 
significant, however, is that the measurable outputs of the six categories described above 
can be classed either as primary outputs, if the output is expected to be fully delivered 
within the price control period; or as secondary outputs, if the output is in itself a 
milestone or contribution towards a longer term objective which spans several price 
control periods. The inclusion of secondary outputs is thus intended to guard against short-
termism and invite companies to plan investments on the timescales equivalent to those of 
broader policy objectives, such as the 2050 carbon targets. Companies are required to 
‘consider the costs of reinforcing the network in the context of a twenty-five year asset 
management plan, rather than in the context of what is needed for the price control period 
itself’ ((Ofgem, 2010a), p. 50). Given the uncertainties which play out over such time 
periods, companies are required to take a view of future demand which is ‘underpinned by 
a range of potential scenarios’ (ibid). 
Third, RIIO aims to encourage and reward innovation. This is partly achieved 
by allowing innovation development activities to qualify as secondary outputs in the 
business plan, but also through a separate innovation stimulus package, built on the Low 
Carbon Networks fund model, which provides ‘discretionary rewards for commercial 
innovation’ (Ofgem, 2010c).  
Fourth, in assessing the needs for the various outputs under each category, 
network companies are encouraged to ‘engage’ with consumers of their services, and 
‘work with others’ in the industry or in other sectors ‘to identify potential joint solutions 
that may provide long-term value for money’ (Ofgem, 2010a).  
Under RIIO, Ofgem’s assessment of the companies’ required outputs and the 
associated revenue to which they are entitled, is made in response to business plans put 
forward by the companies at the start of the price control review. ‘The onus is on network 
companies to justify their view of required expenditure’ ((Ofgem, 2010a), p. 47). 
Companies should set out ‘what they will deliver and how’, with a ‘key focus on primary 
outputs linked to objectives’ and a ‘transparent link between primary outputs and delivery 
costs’. Companies should also provide ‘clear evidence of long-term value for money’ and 
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evidence that the activity is ‘is likely to facilitate longer term efficient delivery’. The last of 
these may be supported by showing that the company has considered ‘a range of options’, 
considered ‘the longer term’ including the ‘context around cost numbers’ and has engaged 
with stakeholders ((Ofgem, 2010a), Figure 18 p. 47).     
Incentives are provided to companies in a number of ways. The possibility of 
qualifying for ‘fast-track’ approval of the business plan, is intended as an incentive to 
produce a detailed and robust business plan in the first instance. There are also a number of 
financial reward and penalty mechanisms which can be implemented according to the 
performance of the company in delivering its outputs (Ofgem, 2010a). Late on in the 
development process, Ofgem further introduced an Environmental Discretionary Reward 
– a financial prize awarded annually to Transmission Companies according to how well 
they performed against a ‘scorecard’ of six indicators: strategic understanding of and 
commitment to low carbon objectives; involvement in whole electricity system planning 
for low carbon future; approach take to connections for low carbon generators; quality of 
innovation; approaches to demand side response; and direct environmental impact 
(Ofgem, 2012b). 
RIIO was first implemented in the 5th TPCR beginning in April 2013. Prior 
to this transmission companies had submitted their initial business plans in August 2011. 
The initial assessment of these business plans was published in October, including the 
decision to retain SPT and SHETL in the fast-tracking process. The final decision to fast-
track SPT and SHETL was announced in January 2012, and the final proposals for SPT and 
SHETL were published by Ofgem in April 2012. After further iteration final proposals for 
NG were published in December 2012. 
Much of the discussion around National Grid’s business plan related to their 
costing methodologies, including the costs of line upgrades, and the sums which could be 
claimed for improving the visual amenity of existing lines in environmentally sensitive 
areas. Ofgem drew on scaled comparisons of costs incurred in TPCR4, as well as by those 
provided in the business plans of the two Scottish network owners, to make their case that 
National Grid’s costs were inflated (Ofgem, 2012f).  
More generally in relation to their outlook on network investment in the 
context of wider low carbon policy, all three of the final published business plans took a 
comparable approach. A ‘best view’ expectation of the new generation they would need to 
connect over the period was based on National Grid’s ‘Gone Green’ scenario (National 
Grid, 2013c). However, this total investment level was split between ‘baseline’ activities 
which would definitely go ahead, and the remainder which would be part of ‘uncertainty’ 
mechanisms, triggered by certain volumes of generation connections. 
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RIIO represents a shift in approach to managing expenditure on the 
transmission network, from one where network owners are passive recipients of load and 
generation, and must simply respond to this within the security bounds set by NETS SQSS 
requirements and the price cap set by RPI-X, to one where network owners are expected, 
on top of these requirements, to act as active leaders in the transition to a low carbon 
system. 
The business plans generated by RIIO tread a balance between a strategic, 
anticipatory approach to facilitating the connection of large amounts of low carbon 
generation, using the ‘Gone Green’ scenario as a basis for these assumptions, and a more 
risk averse view of network investment, shown by the uncertainty mechanisms. Ofgem’s 
own guidance also reflects these different priorities. A variety of different mechanisms in 
the process encourage ‘strategic understanding of and commitment to low carbon 
objectives’ (Ofgem, 2012b) and consideration of ‘the longer term’ (Ofgem, 2010a). 
However, despite the apparent prominence of the Gone Green scenario in forming such 
longer term views, companies are also required to take a view that is ‘underpinned by a 
range of potential scenarios’ (2010a, p.50). Further, Ofgem emphasises that ‘the RIIO 
framework provides the flexibility to assess the case for network investment when there is 
sufficient certainty for a project to be brought forward and therefore to ensure that the 
most efficient cost solution is adopted’ (Ofgem, 2012e). 
What the appropriate level of strategic, forward planning activity in support 
of a low carbon transition should be does not have a precise answer. Though Ofgem’s 
guidance emphasises that the plans will be judged in terms of long term value, exactly what 
constitutes long-term value may be hard to demonstrate precisely and may therefore be 
contentious. The review of the companies’ business plans has shown that Ofgem can 
engage in relatively precise and empirical debates around issues such as the cost of specific 
network upgrades, the correct implementation of financial instruments, the appropriate 
balance between debt and equity funding. However, there remain fundamental decisions in 
the business plan – what level of low carbon generation connection to plan for, what to 
consider baseline investment and what to retain as an option – the merits of which cannot 
be precisely and objectively evaluated, because the level of future low carbon generation is 
itself considered an external uncertain factor. Yet these questions are at the crux of 
whether the TOs are playing a ‘full role in the delivery of a sustainable energy sector’ 
(Ofgem, 2010c). These questions are largely about judgement, and about the kind of 
‘values’ that underlie Ofgem’s review process – precisely, on the balance Ofgem wishes 
TOs to take between being the active progenitors of a low carbon transition, and being the 
reactive respondents to the moves of other system actors. 
The TOs are in some ways and from some quarters being viewed as ‘prime 
movers’ of the low carbon transition – the expectation is present by implication in some of 
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the criteria set for them in the RIIO process, as well as in more explicit statements of key 
stakeholders, for example as garnered by National Grid during its consultation process. 
The company reports from stakeholder workshops that ‘Several stakeholders called for an 
integrated strategic view of the future of energy’; that ‘there was strong widespread 
agreement that to inject speed into strategic network development requires two broad 
elements: 1) a stable strategic plan for the energy network system, allowing a strategic 
approach to the development of the network 2) anticipatory investment that ensures grid 
connections are in place ahead of demand’; and quoting one stakeholder directly, ‘ 
“National Grid needs to take the leadership role on strategic development of the grid” ’ 
(National Grid, 2012d). SPT also appear to assert a leading-edge role for transmission 
network companies in the introduction to their business plan: ‘Key to [delivering UK 
energy policy] will be transmission as by its very nature it has to lead the way and underpin 
energy policy by being ahead of the generation curve’ (SP Transmission, 2012). However, 
it is also evident that none of the TOs see themselves entirely as having the ability or the 
remit to be the ultimate driving forces of the transition. For most anticipatory network 
investments, the long-term value of the decision depends at least in part on activities of 
actors whom the network companies are unable to influence directly (e.g. generation 
companies). Despite the more active enabling role that RIIO expects the TOs to take, it is 
clear that each is also looking to external sources to be the final arbiter on ‘the direction of 
travel’. This is clear from the TOs’ reliance on the Gone Green scenario as an external 
bench mark for their plans. SPT also used their business plan to make a direct appeal to 
Ofgem to ensure that ‘as well as protecting the consumer in terms of cost, they send out a 
strong signal that they support the blueprint laid out by the Government in July for 
Renewables and the required infrastructure to support this development’ (SP 
Transmission, 2012). Again, the question of whether Ofgem is the right actor – or indeed 
whether the appropriate actor currently exists – to send out that kind of strong signal, is a 
critical one.  
4.4.2 Offshore transmission investment process 
In March 2007 Government announced that the framework for offshore 
transmission would be a ‘competitive, asset-based regulatory regime’. Under this regime, 
licenses to build, own and operate offshore transmission are issued through a competitive 
bidding process run by Ofgem. The companies compete in terms of the 20-year revenue 
stream they require to carry out these activities. Generators may either request an Offshore 
Transmission Owner (OFTO) to be selected to build the assets for them (‘OFTO build’), 
or they may build the assets themselves (‘Generator build’) and transfer them to an OFTO 
upon completion (Ofgem and DECC, 2012). 
This approach ensures that the separation between generation and 
transmission ownership is maintained in offshore networks – this is a principle of the GB 
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onshore system and is also required by the EU’s Third Energy Package. However, the 
‘generator build’ option is felt to offer flexibility and to help ensure timely connection. In 
contrast to the regulated monopoly approach used for the onshore networks, a further 
potential advantage of the approach is that it avoids the need for regular price control 
reviews, as, in theory, efficient revenue prices are set up front through the competitive 
tender process.  
Possible disadvantages to this approach relate to questions of whether it would 
impede the co-ordinated development of the offshore network, which may be more cost-
effective in the long term than an incremental, piece-by-piece approach. When bidding in a 
competitive, price-based tender process to provide the infrastructure for a certain offshore 
asset, it is not clear what incentive a potential OFTO would have to over-size the 
infrastructure it installs for the benefit of possible future wind farm developments, even 
though such anticipatory investment might be optimal in the long term.  
Reports commissioned by the Government have indicated potential benefits of 
a co-ordinated approach to offshore infrastructure planning (Redpoint, 2011a, TNEI and 
PPA, 2011). The Government is therefore continuing to investigate how co-ordination in 
offshore planning can be achieved in tandem with the existing regulatory regime. Ofgem’s 
ITPR project has also been launched to consider the potential interactions between 
onshore, offshore and interconnection regimes, and whether more deliberate coordination 
between these regimes is required (Ofgem, 2012d). 
4.5 Discussion 
This chapter has discussed the policies and institutions which govern the 
relationship between generation owners and transmission owners within the GB electricity 
system. At the heart of this relationship is the trade-off between the benefits of building 
more transmission, which facilitates greater access to the system by more generators, and 
the costs that such new transmission investment entails. The policies and institutions 
discussed are designed to strike a balance in this trade-off. Traditionally, the potential 
benefits of increasing transmission capacity were increased security of supply, and reduced 
system costs as a result of increasing access to the network of the most efficient generators. 
There is now a third major policy objective in the electricity sector, which is 
decarbonisation. The question of whether and to what extent the policies and institutions 
governing transmission-generation interactions should be adapted in view of low carbon 
objectives, is a recurring theme within transmission network policy. In this chapter’s 
discussion of the current policy regime, this can be summarised in two questions: 
	   143	  
• Should locational signals in transmission charging be maintained, in view 
of the fact low carbon generators, especially renewables, would 
frequently experience high locational charges? 
• Should the approach to network investment become more anticipatory or 
strategic, in view of the significant changes to the generation mix pending 
as a result of low carbon policies?     
4.5.1  Locational signals of network use   
In the current system, locational signals are provided to generators as part of 
the TNUoS charge. However, the current ‘connect-and-manage’ regime, ‘shallow’ 
targeting of connection costs, derogation from SQSS requirements in Scotland, and the fact 
that constraint costs are socialised across all users via BSUoS, means that the locational 
signal provided to generators is not as strong as it could be. Newbery (2011) is blunt about 
this, arguing that ‘the present system over-rewards costly distant locations and over-
rewards renewables in favoured (e.g. windy) locations, rather than minimising consumer 
costs and making electricity more affordable’ (Newbery, 2011). 
There are a number of aspects to this. The first is how the network costs 
arising from a new generator are targeted. A ‘shallow’ connection charging approach 
targets only the costs of local network connections at the new generator; wider network 
reinforcements are considered a shared responsibility arising from the activity of all 
generators, and are therefore socialised. A ‘deep’ connection charging approach considers 
the new entrant fully responsible for both local and wider network upgrades that may be 
required by its new injections – the full responsibility for a network upgrade is targeted at 
the ‘marginal’ generator.  
Newbery (2011) argues for a ‘deep’ connection charging approach in which 
the cost of network upgrades are targeted on new entrants who cause the need for the 
upgrade by their location decision. A possible objection to such an approach concerns the 
‘lumpiness’ of transmission investment. There may be many generators connecting to a 
section of network with spare capacity, who thereby avoid the deep connection charges. 
However, it is the marginal generator whose added entry capacity, however small, triggers 
the eventual upgrade, and bears all the costs. 
In the current arrangements, new generators pay for only the ‘shallow’ 
connection costs. The deeper connection costs are recaptured via the TNUoS charge which 
is designed to smooth out this ‘lumpiness’ and spread it across all generators. It is thus 
‘ultra-long run’ (Bell et al, 2011). However TNUoS charges can vary for generators, 
depending on the changing pattern of generation and demand. This means that an 
incumbent generator who made an investment decision based on low TNUoS charges in a 
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particular region, may find that TNUoS charges in that region rise if more generators 
subsequently connect. Baldick et al (2011) hold as a principle that sunk costs should not be 
subject to this kind of variation. 
The TNUoS charge then from one perspective may be argued to be too 
variable to provide the correct cost recovery method for sunk network costs. However, 
from a different perspective it may be argued to insufficiently variable to achieve other 
kinds of objectives. As noted by Bell et al. (2011), the locational element of the charge is 
based on the calculated marginal increase in power flows in MWkms from an additional 
MW in a given location at system peak, but this does not factor in what the network 
capacity is in each region, so that it does not reflect actual costs and constraints in the 
different parts of the network. Further, it does not reflect the variation in actual constraints 
which may occur on the network at different times and under different conditions – for 
example as a result of the varying output of renewables. 
Thus, the outcome of the combined effect of locational TNUoS and socialised 
BSUoS is that a locational long-run marginal cost signal is provided to generators, which 
influences their decisions on an investment time scale, although this signal has the potential 
to change during the lifetime of the investment, due to other system changes; however 
there is no locational signal provided to generators’ decisions on the operational dispatch 
time scale. 
Some commentators do favour the inclusion of a locational element in the 
real-time costs experienced by generators, which would affect their dispatch decisions. 
This would provide generators with an incentive, where possible, to avoid using the 
network at times of high congestion, and to plan their output for times of lower network 
congestion – a more efficient outcome for the network. For commentators such as 
Newbery (2011) Baldick et al. (2011) and Green (2010) the desirable way of achieving this 
would be the full locational pricing of energy through Locational Marginal Pricing or 
Locational Nodal Pricing. Locational Marginal Pricing operates in the PJM market in 
eastern United States, as well as other networks in the US. Under LMP the price at each 
node reflects the marginal cost of the most expensive generator still having access to that 
node within the available transmission capacity. The variations in nodal prices therefore 
incorporate the limitations on power flows placed by the available transmission network 
capacity. As well as influencing short-term dispatch decisions, persistent high or low LMPs 
also provide long term investment signals to generators and transmission owners (see 
Appendix B.4 for further discussion).  
The debate around how far and in what way to signal locational elements of 
network costs to generators is given another angle by the broader policy goal of 
decarbonisation. This policy involves the direct promotion of renewable generation 
sources, which have strongly locational characteristics – all else being equal, it is clearly 
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most preferable for developers of wind farms to locate in the windiest areas, for developers 
of wave farms to locate where the waves are strongest, etc. However, these areas are also 
geographically distant from the average demand ‘centre of gravity’ of the system, and, for 
various historical reasons as discussed in Chapter 3, are not strongly interconnected with 
southern demand centres. If charging arrangements are such that the locational signals are 
very strong, this could inhibit the commercial viability of renewable generation, which is 
constrained in terms of where it can locate, and thus potentially frustrate a primary energy 
policy objective.  
However, Newbery and others argue that environmental objectives are most 
efficiently met by incentives which target exactly what is wanted, not indirectly by trying 
to remove barriers which are not exclusive to the favoured technology (i.e. coal plants in 
Scotland would benefit from socialisation of transmission charges as much as renewables 
would). The correct approach, Newbery argues, is not to price the network incorrectly, 
but to set the low carbon strike price sufficiently high to overcome the network cost 
specifically for the favoured technologies (Newbery, 2011). Baldick et al. (2011) also argue 
that ‘environmental objectives are most efficiently pursued through mechanisms that 
directly address those objectives’. 
4.5.2 Strategic coordination and anticipatory investment 
As discussed in Chapter 3, tolerance of centralised planning and control of the 
system has shifted throughout its history. It is noteworthy however that the shape of the 
current transmission network was very largely established during periods of planned 
strategic expansion of the network by a centralised agency, on the basis of predictions of 
the major future load and generation centres. Equally noteworthy is the dominance since 
the 1990s across the political spectrum of a value set which considers State-led centralised 
decision making to be inefficient, and to involve risk of sub-optimal outcomes compared to 
market-led activity. The dominance of this value set has meant that the arrangements for 
identifying the appropriate level of transmission investment have had to evolve into a 
regulated process through which transmission and generation provide signals to each other: 
broadly, generation receives signals through TNUoS charges, and the signal for new 
transmission investment is largely read from the levels of constraint costs imposed by the 
activities of generators.  
The current network was planned for a coal-intensive system. The system is 
now in the process of an attempted major transition to a low carbon system. This 
potentially raised the question of whether the network should be re-planned according to 
the expectation of a low carbon generation mix, just as the expectation of future large coal 
stations influenced its planning the in the 1950s and 1960s; or whether, the existing 
network being what it is, for whatever historical reason, efforts should be made to fit the 
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new generation mix as far as possible into the existing network design, with major new 
expansions to be avoided until their need is beyond doubt, to avoid wasting money in 
stranded assets.  
Each of the academic commentators on Ofgem’s project Transmit referred 
positively to the notion of centralised coordination of transmission network planning. In 
Baldick et al’s preferred proposal, ‘a rational planning process would be undertaken in 
which transmission reinforcements are made that are anticipated to yield the lowest overall 
expected system-wide cost of generation and transmission, subject to environmental and 
security constraints’ (Baldick et al, 2011). Newbery (2011) also considers the potential 
merits of a ‘Transmission System Planning Authority’ as a ‘guiding intelligence’ behind a 
strategic, cost-minimising approach to transmission investment. Evidently, such 
anticipatory investment in the network entails risk due to uncertainties of trying to predict 
where future generation will locate such that the ‘system-wide cost of generation and 
transmission’ can be minimised.  Bell et al. (2011) observe that ‘the ‘correct’ amount of 
transmission is difficult to identify when there is uncertainty about which generators 
holding future access rights will exercise them, many industry stakeholders having in the 
past been particularly concerned about the risk of ‘stranded assets’ consequential to over-
building of transmission. Nonetheless, given the long lead times… and the ‘lumpiness’… 
many others (including Bell (2002) and Baldick (2011) have argued that consumers’ long-
term interests would be best served by at least some degree of ‘strategic’ or ‘anticipatory’ 
investment in transmission’. 
As observed in this chapter, the new RIIO framework for governing transmission 
investments makes considerably greater allowance for longer term thinking and strategic 
investment with the goal of delivering on low carbon targets in mind. The framework even 
encourages TOs to be at the forefront of the transition. National Grid’s stakeholder 
consultation also appeared to reveal a more general appetite for TOs to ‘take a leadership 
role on strategic development of the grid’ (National Grid, 2012c). However, as Bell et al 
(2011) observe, the activity of the TOs is itself affected by significant uncertainties around 
what will in fact be the activities of generators following any investments that they make – 
uncertainties over which the TOs themselves evidently have no direct control. A notable 
feature of the regulatory reforms which have emerged since the rise of decarbonisation on 
the political agenda, is the gradual increase of responsibility for considering long term 
decarbonisation included in the remits of key actors, notably Ofgem and the TOs. 
However, the fundamental structure of the actor-institution network has not changed, and 
the system remains one in which, formally, no single actor has direct responsibility or 
remit for taking a strategic leadership role for the transition as a whole. There remains then 
a question about whether there is a gap in the actor-institution network for what Helm 
(2003) has called an ‘energy agency’, with responsibility for translating government targets 
into a more concrete plan. 
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4.5.3 The intersection of locational pricing and strategic 
planning in the current policy mix 
Questions around the balance between fully locational pricing of network 
costs and socialisation of costs for wider policy reasons; and between strategic, anticipatory 
planning of the network, and a network responsive to generation developments, are an 
ongoing balancing act in UK transmission policy. Figure 21 shows these two value systems 
as an intersecting grid. Along each of the axes have been placed elements of transmission 
policy, according to which of the values or principles they favour. As the diagram shows, 
the UK has a number of different components to its transmission regulation policy, leaning 
in different directions within this spectrum of values. 
 
Figure 21: 2x2 grid of values affecting UK transmission network policies, and location of specific policies and frameworks 
along each axis 
Some of the elements of this policy mix – TNUoS and BSUoS – have been 
present since privatisation. Others – connect and manage, RIIO – have emerged in 
response to system challenges and requirements since then. A question this poses is 
whether this resulting mix of policies, different elements of which lean in different 
directions of the axes, is something which is inefficient and contradictory, and which should 
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be reformed so that all elements consistently point in the same direction for each axis- in 
other words, that all policy elements can be placed within one quadrant. A notable feature 
of academic perspectives on this balance is a tendency to favour an overall approach located 
in the top right-hand quandrant. Academic commentators such as Newbery (2011), Baldick 
et al (2011) and Green (2010) favour strong locational signals which operate both on long-
term investment and short-term dispatch decisions of generators, with the preferred means 
of achieving this typically involving locational marginal pricing. At the same time, academic 
views are also typically supportive of a strongly anticipatory and coordinated approach to 
network management, often involving some kind of energy agency, planner or ISO 
(Newbery, 2011, Baldick et al., 2011, Bell et al., 2011). Baldick et al. (2011) summarise 
the intersection of these two axes, describing their preferred approach as ‘ “generation 
follows transmission” or “plan and then price”... Under this approach, a rational planning 
process would be undertaken in which transmission reinforcements are made that are 
anticipated to yield the lowest overall expected system-wide cost of generation and 
transmission, subject to environmental and security constraints... Generators would not be 
subject to locationally differentiated fixed annual charges for sunk transmission costs... 
Instead, projections of locational energy prices would incent siting of generation in the 
most economically efficient locations’. 
4.5.4 Relationship of the transmission policy values 
grid to wider energy policy values and paradigms 
Alternative decisions about where to locate GB electricity transmission policy 
on each of the two axes shown in Figure 21 are underlain by alternative value systems about 
what the priorities and objectives for electricity transmission networks should be, and the 
best way to achieve these. These value systems have clear correspondences with the values 
systems which compete in the wider energy system, discussed in Chapter 3. The prominent 
underlying issue of principle in the broader energy area – the question of the relative roles 
of state coordination and market activity – echoes through both of the two axes identified 
in this specific policy area.  
However, it is also worth acknowledging that how this general issue of 
principle translates into a specific policy area such as transmission, creates particular and 
technical questions specific to that area. The two axes are transmission policy 
interpretations of the broader state versus markets question – the translation may reveal 
different specific issues if applied to other sectors such as electricity generation, transport 
or domestic building efficiency. 
The two axes are also each slightly different versions of the state versus 
markets question, one considering the role of the state as a designer, the other the value of 
a technology-blind mechanism for increasing market efficiency. Though it might be 
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possible to combine these variables into a single axis – with state design and no locational 
market signals opposing no state design and strong market signals – on further reflection it 
becomes evident that these are in fact two independent variables. For example, the high 
state role in terms of design could be combined with strong locational market mechanisms 
– indeed, as noted, this is the combination favoured by several academic commentators. 
This discussion shows that, while considering the effect of values on policy 
making is important, it is rarely so simple as to imagine that all policy options within a 
policy area will align with high consistency on the same side of a binary division. The same 
goes for the relationship between policies within a given area (such as transmission policy) 
and policies within a broader related area (such as energy policy in general). Though they 
are clearly related, and value shifts in the broader area are likely to infuse debates within 
the specific area, it is possible for one to move at a different speed, or even in a different 
direction, to the other. For example, it is possible to imagine the continuation of a 
technology neutral, market-led paradigm on generation incentive policy, at the same time 
as increasing co-ordination and anticipatory planning in transmission networks; as well as a 
lurch to highly technology-directive approach on generation combined with a decentralised 
and responsive approach on transmission policy. Such perturbations and inconsistencies 
within the ideological fabric are, in Hall’s terminology (Hall, 1993), accommodations 
made for anomalies within the prevailing paradigm. With the mix of value systems evident 
in current transmission policy, and the mixture of value systems suggested by broader 
energy policy – for example in the question of technology specific or technology neutral 
generation incentives – it is far from evident that developments in all areas should 
simultaneously move in an ideologically unified fashion. For this reason it seems prudent to 
regard values in the specific area of transmission policy, and values in broader energy policy 
as related but not strongly coupled. As such, from a scenario structure point of view, 
transmission policy and wider energy policy have to be considered as independent 
variables. How this conclusion affects the structure, scope and boundaries of the scenario 
system under study will be discussed in Section 7.3.1.1.       
4.6 Conclusions 
An analysis of the current policy mix which governs the relationship between 
generation and transmission shows how actors and institutions established at privatisation 
with the aim of achieving an economically efficient trade-off of the costs and benefits of 
transmission investment, have become increasingly overlaid with adjustments made in 
response to system challenges that have arisen since then. Key challenges have included the 
non-compliance in Scotland arising from its unification with the England & Wales system 
under BETTA, the growth of renewables driven by the decarbonisation agenda, and the 
further even greater changes to the system expected in line with low carbon targets over 
the next few decades. The resulting mix of policies has been analysed in terms of two 
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dimensions: the degree of locational signal provided to generators; and the extent of 
anticipatory or strategic planning involved in network investment. Each of these 
dimensions has strong resonances with one of the key value spectrums identified in the 
historical analysis in Chapter 3, around the relative merits of market-based private sector 
delivery and state-led strategic coordination. However, at the same time each of the two 
dimensions is a different version of the market-state question of Chapter 3, and indeed they 
are sufficiently different to be considered independent variables, as depicted by their 
representation as 2x2 matrix. As a result of the various objectives and stresses it has 
responded to since privatisation, the current policy mix contains a mixture of elements 
tending in each direction of both axes. This opens the question of whether a more efficient 
mix would more consistently commit to one of the four quadrants. 
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5 Current actor 
perspectives on 
network 
management 
In order to explore further the issues uncovered in the policy analysis 
reported in Chapter 4, semistructured interviews were undertaken with a number of key 
system actors. The individuals interviewed were all senior-level representatives of 
organisations directly involved as actors within the system under study. The interviewees 
covered representatives of energy companies, transmission owners, the system operator 
and the regulator. Interviews were undertaken on the basis of the Chatham House Rule – 
as a result, the views quoted in this chapter are not attributed to individuals or 
organisations. The intention of the interviews was to make a connection between the 
broader value trends identified as applying to the UK energy system in Chapter 3, and the 
specific policy choices identified in Chapter 4. The interviews were intended to explore 
participants’ views on specific transmission policy options, and to situate these views within 
the context of broader narratives and paradigms uncovered in Chapter 3. There were also 
opportunities for the experts being interviewed to raise additional areas of interest and 
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concern which may not have already been identified by the literature review, thus adding 
further insight to the policy analysis of the thesis.  
The structure of the interview was directly derived from the policy analysis 
reported in Chapter 4, with the diagram (Figure 21) representing the intersection of the 
two key policy variables – locational signal and strategic-anticipatory approach – used as 
visual aid to discussions. The interview guide is reproduced in Appendix C. 
5.1 Current context 
5.1.1 Where are we on the axes? 
The interview was begun by presenting the 2x2 matrix shown in Figure 21. 
Interviewees were invited to indicate where on this axis they would locate the current GB 
transmission regime, and also to highlight issues of importance to transmission not covered 
by the two axes. 
Views on the current location of the GB regime suggested that it was not 
perceived as being ideologically at the extremes of either axis, but also suggested reasons 
why the system could move along either dimension, not least of which was EU energy 
policy.   
We’re coming from somewhere in the middle, maybe marginally more locational 
than the rest of Europe, but we’re coming from somewhere that’s fairly responsive, 
reactive, and there’s a number of initiatives that might move us in a different 
direction, but none of them have moved yet. 
Another comment suggested it was not the intention to be at the extreme 
ends: 
In terms of the overall pattern of charges, there is no clear indication that Britain 
wants to be at the extreme ends of either of these axes, for example strongly 
locational or strongly anticipatory. The mix of policies hasn’t been devised with this 
kind of framework in mind. 
5.1.2 The EU context 
One interviewee viewed the locational axis in terms of significant fluctuations 
in direction over recent years, with further changes possible as a result of the EU context.  
A lot of where we are, or might be moving to, is being driven by third package and 
European network codes… Five or six years ago the drivers would have been more 
towards the locational with a stronger commitment towards markets leading decision 
making in networks… [However, subsequently] the UK probably was moving more 
towards the weak locational signal, if you look at what Transmit was doing and what 
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they discussed, it was generally around trying to dilute the locational signal. Europe’s 
not pro-locational signals, but things like capacity allocation and congestion 
management network code, market coupling, the target model, all this kind of stuff, 
subtly points towards the importance of locational signals. I find that this axis is 
confused in terms of where we end up moving to.  
5.1.3 The recent background – BETTA, the GB queue, 
TIRG, Connect and manage 
The diagram also raised some discussion around the broader context and 
background behind the current mix of policies it depicts, and the balance between them. A 
key issue here was the transition from NETA to BETTA in 2005, one of the results of 
which was a large queue of generation projects with applications to connect in Scotland.  
Prior to BETTA, the boundary capacity between Scotland and England was regulated, 
and agreed as part of… the British Grid System Agreement (BGSA) …  The capacity 
on the interconnectors was handed out between the two Scottish companies and 
EDF… As part of the BETTA decision in 2004, they said if you apply for connection 
prior to BETTA go live, you won’t secure the wider works associated with 
connection to achieve compliance between Scotland and England. So everyone who 
was thinking about building a wind farm in Scotland put it in an application – resulting 
in a large queue. Because securities are a very material cost. 
The result was a large queue of projects, totalling about 9 GW. The 
Transmission Investment for Renewable Generation (TIRG) scheme provided for uprating, 
reconductoring and substation rebuilds, and in 2012 following ENSG the work, the TOs 
received agreement for series compensation and the Western Link. By 2016 it is 
anticipated that the England-Scotland boundary will be close to compliant.   
Connect and manage was brought in [in 2010] to relieve the pressure in the queue… 
if you’ve got a whole load of projects waiting in Scotland, they’ve all got dates. But 
with connect and manage you can offer all of them the earliest date, socialise that risk. 
You’ve got potential for congestion – but what actually happens is some projects go 
away, some connect a bit earlier, some a bit later. For every MW of connect and 
manage you offer, you typically only get 0.2 MW actually connecting, and you 
generally are maintaining either your level of compliance or non compliance. What 
it’s really doing is giving you a way to manage the future queue of connections in a 
way that socialises risk. What it also does, is it doesn’t provide a short term locational 
signal once they’re connected because we don’t have locational BSUOS. But doing 
locational BSUOS with an intrinsic net non-compliance on the Scottish boundary 
would have effectively undone that policy decision from 2005, which would have 
been politically very difficult. 
It was estimated that the non-compliance resulting from the pre-BETTA 
decision caused “an underlying level of congestion of somewhere between £100-200m per 
year”, with connect and manage adding “about £30m per year on top of the non-
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compliance costs”. Connect-and-manage was described as accepting and socialising the risk 
of having constraints, in order to manage the risk of having to make transmission 
investments in advance against a queue of uncertain projects. 
So you actually only invest at a time when you’re much more certain about what’s 
really going to connect. And instead of queuing up likely projects behind unlikely 
projects, you allow stuff to come forward when it’s ready, and improve clarity about 
what will connect and bring forward the drivers for investment… One of the 
outcomes is that that risk is socialised so you don’t get locational signals – but you’ve 
got to put it in that policy context, back from 2005. 
Thus previous policy decisions, in this case relating to the decision to join up 
the markets of two previously separate systems connected by limited and regulated 
interconnector capacities, create important context to the mix of policy frameworks at 
work in the present system. 
5.2 Locational signals 
5.2.1 The principle of locational transmission network 
charging 
The principle of locational signals is to expose generators to at least some of 
the network costs of their activities, to enable an efficient choice to be made which balances 
the benefits they experience in marginal generation cost advantage of different locations, 
against the cost that generation in that location may impose upon the network. The 
majority of interviewees were broadly in support of this principle. Referring to Project 
Transmit and its consideration of alternative charging models including the ‘postage stamp’ 
socialised transmission charging model, one interviewee commented: 
We thought that the right answer was cost-reflective charging because that will 
deliver benefits, ultimately, to consumers. 
The importance of achieving energy policy goals in the most economically 
efficient way possible was an important priority for many, and using market signals was 
generally argued to be a more effective way of delivering this objective than a command-
control approach. 
Correct network pricing can bring efficiency to the overall goal that you have in mind, 
so if the goal is a certain amount of renewables by 2020, you want to do that in the 
most efficient way possible, and if you have postage stamp approach to transmission, 
what behaviour does that engender? … It’s important to know what’s the efficient 
thing to do and to incentivise that appropriately. Otherwise government becomes the 
central purchaser for everything... are they best placed to know that? … I’d be 
certain there’s a lot more intelligence in the market as to what the most efficient thing 
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to do is, and having efficient transmission signals can help bring out that market 
intelligence. 
Economic efficiency was also argued to be a critical criterion for the long-
term sustainability of any strategy in view of public and political acceptance.  
You don’t want to see five years go by and the rules change again… Stable and 
enduring solutions are needed, and the only way to get an enduring solution is to get 
the fair and balanced solution that meets the needs of consumers. 
In discussions the proposition was made to interviewees that the requirements 
of carbon budgets and renewable energy targets created a different context – that given the 
tendency of the best renewable resources to be located in northern areas distant from 
southern load centres, locational pricing works against a higher order government policy 
objective. For those in favour of locational pricing, the responses to this proposition most 
frequently drew on the principle of not mixing up different objectives between policy 
mechanisms.  
We don’t see transmission charging as a lever to deliver other policies. If as a result of 
cost-reflective transmission charging you have to pull another lever to deliver on 
policies, then so be it. They have the appropriate lever, in this case the strike price 
given for low carbon technologies. 
You should keep your objectives separate – if you want to subsidise technologies you 
should keep that separate from distorting the way that networks develop. 
If you start tampering with network charges and reducing social welfare and 
increasing consumer costs through different network charging, that’s effectively an 
additional subsidy for renewables on top of the structural measures they’re also 
getting.… The best way to do this is to understand the trade off on wind speed… 
and… network costs, and for people to pick their own balance between the two… 
To do anything else would reduce transparency around the total cost of subsidy. 
However, others argued that key elements of energy policy – notably low 
carbon and renewables targets – as well as the methods chosen to deliver these – contracts 
for difference and capacity mechanisms – were making locational transmission charging less 
valid. 
It’s highly questionable the way things are going at the moment that it’s still relevant. 
When you look at the degree of state involvement in decision making with CfDs, 
flexibility and system services contracts, and the capacity mechanism, we’re moving 
towards a three layer market of energy, capacity and flexibility and services… It 
seems counterintuitive to be introducing pricing signals when it’s no longer simply a 
case of energy production from the best generating technology located in the best 
place. With low carbon there are other drivers for location which are far more 
important, and less flexible about location than would have been the case in a purely 
CCGT world. Where you’ve got the wind regime saying we are going to invest in the 
north of Scotland, it’s pointless having a transmission charging regime which says you 
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shouldn’t build it there, you should build it in the centre of London. Equally with 
offshore, the transmission charging arrangements should reflect the fact that that’s 
where it’s going to be, not imposing a counter-intuitive pricing signal on it. 
It was also argued that the costs of transmission were small compared to 
generation investment costs, which should affect the view of where to find savings.   
If you try and optimise things for transmission, you might find a 10% saving in 
transmission, but that’s within a cost element which is only 5-10% of what it would 
be in generation. You’d only need a couple of percent increase in generation cost to 
outweigh the benefit of the transmission saving… For example accessing higher load 
factor renewables offers a much greater cost reduction in the overall provision, than 
the optimisation of the transmission network alone would necessarily reflect. 
5.2.2 On TNUoS and the current arrangements 
In the current arrangements the TNUoS charge is levied on the right of 
generators to access the transmission network on the basis of their declared Transmission 
Entry Capacity (TEC), and a calculation of the impact of an additional MW at that location 
on the overall system power flow at system peak. Thus TNUoS has a locational element. It 
is recalculated annually, and thus can in theory change each year if there are changes in the 
relative location of supply and demand on the system. The BSUoS charge is levied on actual 
energy generated and recoups the costs of balancing services including congestion 
management. Its per unit energy charge does not vary between location, thus the locational 
element of congestion is socialised. 
Discussions took place around the current arrangements. A point of discussion 
around the TNUoS charge was the relative advantage of a capacity based charge which is 
stable compared to one which is variable; additionally there were slightly different 
perceptions around whether TNUoS is broadly speaking stable or variable. 
One area of discussion was the differentiation between short and long term 
signals, “whether you are influencing dispatch or investment decisions – which is an 
important aspect of what you look for in a locational signal.”  
To influence investment signals, an important feature would be long term 
stability, which some interviewees felt the TNUoS charge achieved well. 
If you have a stable enduring TNUoS charge, that gives a fairly long term signal that 
affects where you locate your plant. You have reasonable visibility of what the charges 
will be over the lifetime of the plant… To reverse transmission flows from being 
predominantly north to south would be a very long term process, involving a very 
large amount of generation locating in the south. So it’s sending in that sense an 
appropriate large scale signal that where you have the choice you should put your 
plant in the south.  
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Other network signals created by shorter-term dynamics and fluctuations, it 
was argued, should not be locationally targeted, as is the case in the current system with 
the BSUoS charge. 
Other charges that are more constraint related and prone to shorter term investments 
that alleviate or create constraints, are not sending that signal – it’s a signal you can’t 
respond to. That’s an important dimension – is the locational signal part of an 
enduring regime and relatively predictable over the life of the plant, as opposed to 
something short term and which generators had no way of predicting in their 
investment decisions? TNUoS is relatively predictable. With BSUoS you socialise the 
costs because they’re unpredictable and not useful as a locational investment signal… 
You dispatch yourself on your own short run marginal costs, and transmission system 
investment is driven by constraint costs. So everyone is getting their correct revenue 
for the efficiency of their plant, and what is being generated is a constraint cost which 
is socialised among generators and provides a signal to grid to invest to bring down 
the constraint. The constraint cost provides the justification for grid investment. 
In other discussions however, both the rationale for having long-term stability 
in locational network charging, and the proposition that the TNUoS charge even as 
currently designed was inherently stable, were challenged. 
TNUoS is thinking about two things. It’s thinking about the long run marginal cost of 
the asset you’re building, and it’s thinking about how far on average the power is 
travelling, how much network it’s using. The centre of gravity of the system has been 
moving south at about 10 miles per year over the last 10-15 years. Gradually the 
distance travelled is going up, and the LRMC is gradually going up as well. But if you 
get a significant change in the generators connected to the system, that can affect it as 
well. So you’re not getting a sunk cost, a flat charge –  you’re getting what is meant 
to be a marginal signal for the cost of the next MW. So it does move around. 
Given this potential for variability, alternative models which fixed the 
transmission charge based on the parameters of the original investment, were discussed, 
which would have the benefit of providing investors with greater certainty. 
One of which would be to sink all the existing costs and charge that out based on the 
original investment parameters – where was the centre of gravity on the system when 
you started building that, what did you expect it to deliver; and then you get the 
question of do you charge that only to existing generators or to new connectees also? 
If you charge sunk to existing and marginal to new you get differential locational 
signals for different parties. 
However, 
In terms of the most efficient outcome it’s much more efficient to charge everyone 
the marginal. You don’t want to have incredibly expensive connection rates for new 
connectees, and yet have an old generator sitting there with no incentive to close 
because its being charged sunk costs, which over fifty years would disappear to almost 
zero. What you want is that generator to be exposed to the marginal costs and close, 
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while a similarly old generator [in a less network constrained location] can stay open 
instead. Then new generation can connect using the existing network at a much lower 
overall cost. That captures the most social welfare. 
However, it was acknowledged that varying charges levied on sunk 
investments were “tough for those that are exposed to it.” Alternative compromise models 
were to find means of reflecting the long term trend in long run marginal costs, whilst 
dampening the exposure to variability: 
For example could you do what business rates used to do slug, dampen change, over 
seven years. Not do an annual LRMC, but smooth it over seven years, or only start to 
change it once it’s been sustained for a number of years in a row, rather than moving 
it up and down all the time… But that is a big regulatory policy decision whether to 
expose people equally to marginal costs and deliver the best lowest network costs, or 
slug or smooth or socialise those costs and provide greater certainty which you hope 
will reduce barriers to entry and therefore drive greater investment and social welfare 
than minimising network costs. 
The test for creating a new overhead line should be very high, so you should always 
assess the drivers for that at marginal cost. However, those are very long term 
decisions so I also think it’s very fair that in areas of the network that are very mixed 
you should be looking to slug the year on year variation to reflect longer term trends. 
Having a charge that bounces up and down every year feels less appropriate than 
having one that is averaged over seven years, or is based on the last five years and on 
an industry agreed scenario for the next five years, or something else. 
The potential for changes in the power flow on the system were increasing. 
The current system sees relatively stable overall power flows and therefore TNUoS 
charges, largely due to the similar locations of coal and gas plant, which reduces the power 
flow impact of any switch between them, and the reasonable spread of nuclear plants 
around the country. However,  
The potential within the framework is there for large variation. For example if we see 
big swings in solar PV, if we get 10 GW PV south of Birmingham, that will have 
tremendous impact on flows day to day, so the commodity within the network charge 
will change significantly. It won’t affect the peak charge because it’s a darkness peak. 
But all these things have an effect. 
5.2.3 Future developments 
5.2.3.1 The effect of EU policy on locational signals in GB 
Several interviewees emphasised the importance of EU energy policy, in 
particular the Third Energy Package and the ‘Target Model’ for electricity markets 
(Ofgem, 2012c), on the issues being discussed. In several discussions the potential for this 
to drive stronger locational signals within GB were highlighted. A key concept here was 
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‘market splitting’, which refers to an existing market with a single price being split into 
different zones, which are allowed to have different prices from each other. The difference 
between prices in the different zones would reflect the balance of supply and demand 
within each zone, and would also be affected by the amount of transmission connection 
capacity between each zone – high levels of interconnection would tend to facilitate inter-
zonal trade and thus reduce price differences between zones. The related concept of 
‘market coupling’ refers to two or more existing markets being joined up to become 
different price zones within a single market. 
If you take the Nordic market as being the blueprint for the target model, they have 
market splitting, they have much stronger signals for operation of the market in the 
short term, and potentially for transmission signals in the longer term…. Actually for 
us the potential is that market splitting could bring forward much stronger locational 
signals which could be used for investment not just in the shorter term. 
The European network codes may change some of what is done here. It could be in 
terms of locational charging. An extreme example is that one of the codes 
contemplates market splitting as well as market coupling... As more interconnection 
is built, that will affect charges, and market splitting also could affect charges and 
other costs. 
As part of the third package, [market splitting is] one of the options, under the codes. 
If you build the assumption that people are going to run to network capability into 
your model, suddenly you don’t need to build so much network… It places the short 
run costs of congestion onto generators, and further hedges transmission investment – 
so you’d only be building [transmission network] once you could prove a long term 
systemic problem. 
If market splitting were implemented, interviewees considered that it could 
create two or possibly three separate zones within the GB system. A clear potential 
boundary would be between Scotland and England, with some suggesting another could 
emerge separating the south-east corner of England, which would become part of a zone 
with northern France.    
But other comments highlighted EU developments that could work against a 
locational signal. 
The worry from our point of view is that there are a number of tools and regulations 
that will be binding on us, including tariff structures and the level of generation 
charges you are entitled to impose. Ultimately if Europe decides that generation 
charges should be capped, that may impact upon on GB charging and affect how 
strong the locational signal can be.  
5.2.3.2 Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP) 
Going further than the zonal prices which would occur as a result of market 
splitting would be to allow prices to vary at each transmission node, or locational marginal 
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pricing (LMP). The majority of interviewees did not raise this spontaneously, though one 
discussed possible reasons for a reluctance to pursue this option in GB.   
I haven’t come across a reason why we couldn’t do it [LMP], but the main reason I’ve 
come across as to why there’s nervousness around it is how much it would cost and 
how disruptive it is to set up a new market. If you look at the transition from the pool 
to NETA you get some idea. Everybody needs to reform their trading systems, you’d 
need to go back to the pool. LMP is complex compared to NETA. You’d need to be 
sure that it is going to drive efficiencies, I don’t think anyone’s bold enough to say 
that. It’s not going to be driven by the efficient transmission argument – it’s difficult 
to use LMP on its own to get all of the signals you need to drive investment, it doesn’t 
happen automatically.  
While EU codes were broadly considered to have potential to bring about 
market splitting, it was less clear that they could be interpreted as calling for LMP. 
You’ve got to think about how compatible it is with Europe – the main priority is to 
ensure we are not going to infringe what comes out of Europe. This is not really 
pushing towards LMP.  
The possibility of market splitting and zonal splitting leading towards LMP 
was ambiguous. 
In US regions, several have begun with zonal pricing, the zones got smaller until they 
gradually worked towards LMP, although this didn’t happen in Norway. With most 
transitions you have zones gradually moving to LMP. But Europe’s not there yet. The 
pressure to comply with European legislation would mean market splitting at most, at 
the moment. 
5.2.3.3 Wind variability and locational BSUoS 
The variable output of renewables will be a key factor in future system 
regulation. It was a major subject of the discussions in Project Transmit, which proposed a 
charge which differentiated annual from peak contribution, allowing renewables to pay the 
charge at a level which more closely reflected their actual use of the network. There was in 
general broad support for this conclusion of Transmit. 
If you have a lot of wind running, you may well not have the fossil plant running at the 
same time. Transmission owners understand this and will invest accordingly. To 
charge renewables and fossil the same amount, double what they should be paying, is 
therefore clearly wrong. So we support the work done under Transmit. 
Though Transmit proposes to acknowledge the lower peak network utilisation 
of renewables, it does so still on a standing capacity basis and does not respond to real-time 
network conditions.  
There is medium term debate about whether to have locational BSUoS. One of the 
challenges is that there is a cost to operating the network without much thermal in 
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Scotland, because the wind isn’t always blowing. The real tough limit on Scotland is 
importing power into Scotland-  it’s difficult to get power all the way up to the North 
of Scotland, because there’s a whole lot of network and if you haven’t got anything 
connected to it the volts just rise up and up… There are older thermal stations up 
here, which, in an ideal world [would run] off-peak, off the wind, when the wind’s 
not blowing.  
This would allow the network to be sized “to take the wind or the thermal 
plant”, if appropriate incentives could be found to encourage flexible plants to limit their 
utilisation of the network to low-wind and therefore less congested times.  
A key challenge of greater penetrations of variable renewables is that  
… things will start to move more in the short term. We already see significant 
variation GB-continent based on renewable output on the continent, and significant 
variation between Scotland and England, based on renewable output in Scotland, so 
there will be benefits in having a charging regime which reflects that, in the mid-term. 
But again, as with TNUoS, you have to think hard about the trade off between long-
term certainty vs. short term marginal signals. 
Locational BSUoS was seen as  “potentially a very useful tool with greater 
penetration of renewable generation, variable generation and interconnectors as well.” 
However, one interviewee felt that if real-time locational signals do develop “it’ll probably 
happen through market splitting.”  
5.3 Co-ordination, anticipatory planning 
There was wide support for some kind of strategic approach to network 
planning, though differences in views of the degree to which this should extend. During 
discussion two interpretations of “strategic” emerged, which had overlapping elements but 
also slightly separate emphases. The first interpretation encompassed anticipatory 
investment – building transmission network in advance of the commissioning of generation 
assets, in the expectation that these generation assets will be built at some point in the 
future. The second was concerned with the coordination between different transmission 
regimes, notably onshore, offshore and interconnectors.  
There was a common understanding of the main driver behind strategic 
network planning, which was the significant system changes required by the 
decarbonisation transition. 
There’s a pending step change in the energy system… a paradigm shift that’s moving 
towards a future where the tradition of generation follows demand no longer 
works… If you were going to prepare the networks of the future now, you probably 
wouldn’t start with what we’ve got. This says to me there needs to be a step 
change… if you want to make a paradigm shift, someone has to be visionary, 
companies have to make a step change. 
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For some there was a clear justification for anticipatory investment, based on 
the rapid deployment trajectory implied by decarbonisation on the generation side, and the 
fact that much of generation has shorter lead times than transmission, such if that if 
transmission is not anticipatory, the result will be delays and / or constraint costs.  
Unfortunately the development times for transmission are longer than for the 
generation it’s connecting up. In some ways this suggests that a central planning route 
is the way to go –you have to think ahead about what you are trying to create in terms 
of a generation portfolio, to feed that in early enough to have everything coming in at 
the right time… At the moment we are suffering not from over-investment in 
generation but underinvestment in transmission. We’re recognising the longer lead 
times for network infrastructure. That can only be addressed with a much clearer idea 
of where we’re going, so that the network can be put in place in time. Otherwise 
you’ll be in a world of catch up – there’s an awful lot of generation going to be built, 
and if all the transmission is coming after that, then the constraints issues are going to 
be significant. 
This view tended to be supported by the argument that the location of much 
of the generation could be established with high certainty. 
Regardless of whether its renewables, unabated gas, abated gas – it’s almost an ideal 
situation for putting together a scenario to allow transmission planners to draw lines 
on the map. 
Linked to this was a perception amongst several interviewees that the EMR 
programme is highly interventionist and amounts to a commissioning programme of set 
quantities of particular generation types. Some suggested that the government had a clear 
view on how much of different generation types it wanted to commission, which it was 
expressing through EMR and the strike prices, and that as a result having a blueprint and 
making it public so that network companies could plan accordingly, was merely a matter of 
making explicit something which was already decided de facto and was implicit in existing 
policies. 
At the moment we have this pretence that we have a free generation market, but it’s 
hard to see what generation investments are going to be made without some form of 
contractual relationship – new build gas will be done that way, CCS, nuclear, 
renewables. Actually we should say at least we know what we’re going to do in 
generation and feed that into the transmission process. Otherwise we’ll slow the 
process down because we won’t know what generation to build because we’re not 
feeding that information in early enough or in a detailed enough way. 
[Predicting future generation mixes is something] the government is doing a large 
amount of, through the EMR. From the fact that the strike prices vary for different 
technologies, there is an intention to acquire different quantities of each, and that has 
to be a key input. 
As a result, 
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They [the TOs] should be able to say, this is what we are going to design the system 
on, and here are the implications for transmission. The generators can all see that and 
make decisions appropriately… You could match the transmission plan to the levy 
control framework, this gives much greater clarity to the market about what the 
transmission element of all the variables looks like. So you set down the plan on 
transmission, and invite generators to apply and put money down on that basis, and 
say that Ofgem will allow the companies to get on and build this network. 
Others however laid greater emphasis on the uncertainties which could prevail 
around the precise generation mix, despite the effect of EMR, and stressed that the 
government did not want to take such a command control approach. 
I’ve heard the… view [that EMR is] basically a massive procurement exercise to get 
nuclear and certain other technologies done. However that’s not quite right, as they 
are hoping ultimately to move to an auctioning process which would be more 
technology agnostic. The hypothesis that you could make significant savings on 
transmission by having the certainty of what was going to deploy, I think is right, as 
long as the right incentives were on TOs to deliver it efficiently. But it doesn’t feel to 
me like there is appetite for that kind of command and control, centrally dictated 
energy mix – even though you could definitely argue that the EMR looks quite a lot 
like that in its first incarnation. 
We don’t know for sure the government’s direction of travel post 2020 – if there’s 
no subsequent renewables target for 2030, the rate could slow. On the other hand, if 
you did change the regime, you might make it more cost effective to deploy offshore 
wind, so the rate could increase… if you built and socialised the costs of building 
transmission to renewable rich areas, then it’s more likely generation would get built 
there, because the connection costs would be low. However, [it’s not right to take] 
those risks on behalf of consumers. Which is how you end up with connect and 
manage.   
A number of interviewees saw the benefits of an anticipatory approach in 
principle, but also identified risks, and thus argued for a more cautious approach to it.  
The benefit of anticipatory investment is that it can be more efficient, by linking 
schemes up and getting one suitably sized pipe rather than a series of incremental 
upgrades, but it will lead potentially to stranded assets, and that’s where the cost 
reflective pricing breaks down – if you have assets that are not what are needed, it’s 
impossible to charge for them appropriately, and that’s the socialised cost which 
dilutes the locational signals. You’re looking for it to be done, but done very well – 
which is not straightforward. Which is why most investment has tended to be 
responsive – it’s a safer way to proceed. You’d be really looking for some strong 
evidence that it’s justified. 
Getting the right transmission investment is difficult. There’s a trade off between 
under-investing and holding back generation projects, and over-investing and having 
stranded assets. There’s a number of actors in that piece. Some of the recent 
developments have been helpful, other aspects remain which make it difficult for 
generators to make investments. It is complex, there are a lot of actors and large sums 
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of money involved. Most of their interests ultimately are aligned, but they all have 
their own slightly different interests. 
A lot of commentators… have this view that transmission networks should be like 
motorways, and you should build to the islands, and once the connection’s there, 
everyone will turn up... We don’t take that view… 
Some interviewees also qualified the argument that anticipatory network 
investment was required to avoid constraints in a fast decarbonising generation mix, where 
the lead times of the generators were shorter than those of the transmission companies, 
observing that there are different lead times associated with different technologies. 
It also depends on who’s connecting. The nukes are easy because it takes them longer 
to connect than it takes… to build overhead lines… Likewise, offshore wind tends to 
be a 5-7 year timeframe. There are lots of them and it’s not clear how many of them 
will go ahead, so there’s a sizing uncertainty, but you can certainly build out in 
roughly the timescale that they’re going to be doing it. The real challenges … are 
CCGTs – because you can go from final investment decision to operation in under 
two years, or more typically 2.5 -3. And onshore wind which can go from final 
investment decision to operation in less than 18 months, and you’ve got thousands of 
parties in Scotland. So things can move very quickly, and that’s the bit that’s hard for 
network companies. 
One of the advantages of nuclear is that it is relatively well-matched with transmission 
in terms of timescales and location. Some of the examples in Scotland where 
renewables can come on relatively quickly, some of those projects are not always 
aligned with transmission timescales, which means the generation projects can be held 
back. Nuclear is also a very concentrated energy source which again fits well with the 
transmission system. 
Interviewees also discussed various hedging measures in which sufficient 
anticipatory network investment could take place, without the need to attempt to 
undertake full predictions of the entire future generation mix. The balance to be struck was 
between spending as late as possible to maximise certainty about the generation side, and 
spending early enough to avoiding delay and meet generators’ connection dates. Where 
there are single parties with large generation projects, it’s easier to offset the risk of 
transmission investment by holding securities, however 
Where you’ve got multiple parties its much harder and you need to try and take some 
judgement, but on the other hand that diversity also brings diversity of risk. [It’s 
possible to] look at a range of scenarios for potential future networks and connections, 
and look at the least regret investment options driven by those scenarios… That 
gives… a strategic enough driver to invest or not invest.  
It is also possible to undertake “low cost interim options”, 
which might cost a little bit more per unit for a couple of years, but may avoid a 
significant commitment being made earlier than is absolutely necessary. And that’s 
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really important because... if you’re prepared to take congestion costs, or put in a 
temporary way of running the network for a few years, then that gives time for the 
real network need to become much clearer.  
Again, connect-and-manage was seen as an important tool to hedge 
uncertainty around specific generation projects and get clearer view of the genuine 
network need. 
The great thing about connect and manage is you don’t have to build all of the 
network in advance, you can build the network on a slight lagging curve to the 
generation build out. And that again further de-risks your investment. Taking £20-
30m congestion risk for 2-3 years whilst you build your £1bn undersea link, doesn’t 
seem like a bad trade off, given that link’s going to be there for 25 years… If you 
think about trying to make a decision 5 or 6 years out, when no one’s had to put any 
money in, compared to trying to make a decision 2 or 3 years out when people are 
close to final investment, you’ve already seen others come through – it’s a much 
clearer position to be in… So it’s a really useful tool in the long term wherever 
you’ve got significant growth, significant uncertainty. 
Also, it was emphasised that the cost commitment on a new transmission line 
is “a curve over time”. On a new overhead line,  
… your cost commitment builds up gradually from four to five years out through to 
total cost committed probably 2 years out. There’s not one decision to build an 
overhead line, it’s a gradually accumulating cost commitment.  
Thus, network owners can  
… bring forward the low cost element of the start of the projects as early as possible 
to understand the implications. The planning element is often the biggest challenge. 
As much of that as can be brought forward is useful.  
Put together, the combination of these various hedging strategies adds up to 
“an effective way of managing exposure”. 
As well as the question of anticipatory network investment, a slightly different 
emphasis on the idea of strategic network planning was discussed by a number of 
interviewees, which was the possible requirement for coordination between the various 
actors and regimes involved in the system.  
You need to create a structure which will encourage the economies of scale which can 
be achieved by creating a network. This requires a different type of thought process, 
rather than sending one signal to one generator in isolation. 
A key issue was coordination between onshore, offshore networks and 
interconnections. 
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At the moment, they’re different programmes. There’s a different regime for 
offshore, onshore and cross-border. There’s an absence of mechanisms that would 
allow more anticipatory work to be done offshore and cross-border. They’re all things 
that should be considered part of an overall mix rather than pursued individually. 
Interconnection is competing, loosely, with flexible generation, demand side response 
and storage. There probably shouldn’t be a separate programme for interconnection. 
It comes back to locational signals and allowing the market to come forward. If you 
build a lot of interconnection you’re destroying the business case for storage and 
demand side response. The same for the generation mixes onshore and offshore, if 
you prioritise one over the other that means that government and policy is taking the 
decision as to what you want. You shouldn’t be pursuing those things separately – 
how do you stop doing this? A greater commitment to locational signals and market 
derived decision making. That doesn’t have to mean just letting the market get on 
with it. It can look more like a Norwegian example where the market gives you the 
transparency of what needs to happen and then you have an overlay of decision 
makers that come in. They’re pointing to what the prices say, it allows the market to 
respond to a certain extent but then you have a bit more justification for what you’re 
doing in the anticipatory and strategic world because it allows you to make trade-offs 
against different places, particularly in transmission network. 
Some interviewees emphasised the potential savings that could be made 
through multi-purpose projects which combine the connection of offshore zones with the 
creation of additional power flow corridors for the GB system as a whole.  
[There are] options to oversize some of the offshore networks and to couple up some 
of the offshore networks  
Some emphasised that despite these benefits there could be practical problems 
with achieving them due to the numerous actors involved with different projects and 
priorities. 
If there is a sharing case to be made… the TOs have to give a quotation based on the 
share, but you can’t force conjoined application and financial decision on the 
individual power plants. Instead of a simple point to point link which might take a 
year you could be waiting three or four years for a wider network upgrade, because 
that’s all you can get a quote for due to the other projects that are hovering around. 
Or it could work the other way, in that because there is a coordinated network 
approach you get a lower cost connection. But unlocking the key to getting those joint 
decisions is quite hard. 
Interconnection was seen as significant area in which a greater strategic view 
would be needed. 
Europe have a view on interconnection, GB has historically had a view; the two are 
not aligned. Government has put out its policy view on interconnection which gives 
benefits of anywhere between 9 and -9 GW. Is there any leadership in this space? It 
wouldn’t matter if it wasn’t material, but it is. It is an important part of this jigsaw. A 
lot of people just see us in isolation, but I think this is quite a big piece. 
	   167	  
Interconnection is a nice example where you are not clear at all where it lies along the 
anticipatory-responsive axis, Eleclink being an example of a merchant led, responsive 
project, Nemo as an example of a more strategic, regulatory project. There is no clear 
policy which says we prefer this or that kind of model. 
The interesting thing is whenever anyone talks about network planning they talk 
about new connections… In the longer term you have to look more broadly around 
trends: demand, active and reactive power, generation closures, interconnection – all 
come strongly into play. 
The discussions around the potential future benefits of increased coordination 
between regimes, and the challenges to achieving this within the current system, led to 
discussions around the possible need for institutional change in order to address the issues 
which will come into play. Several of the interviewees contemplated that the creation of a 
body with oversight of all three transmission regimes, the ability to join them up and to set 
the direction of travel, could be beneficial.  
You could argue for that. In some ways National Grid is moving in that way. Because 
of its commercial interests it’s not yet able to join up all the thinking that would be 
necessary. You would probably get National Grid to divest itself of its commercial 
interests and then do that. It’s already doing the capacity work, the low carbon work, 
the system planning. Where it gets into a problem is the TO part. 
As in the above quote, the possibility of system change was mostly explored in 
terms of evolving the available existing actors and institutions, rather than root-and-branch 
reform. The issue of resolving conflicts of interest, if this kind of change was to be 
achieved, was mentioned by several interviewees. 
The SO also has some conflict of interest – if the SO is incentivised to achieve certain 
things, it may make a decision which improves its incentive payments, but is not the 
right decision for the system as a whole. But these are incentives that have been 
created by regulatory tools, so could be taken away. 
We have certainly supported the idea of National Grid taking a greater role. Whether 
that goes as far as a design authority depends what you mean by that. But in terms of 
planning, particularly with things like the offshore investments, the interplay with 
interconnectors, the interplay with the Scottish TOs – National Grid as system 
operator have a very light touch role, but ultimately will get landed with the system 
that they’ve got to operate. It seems odd to us that when you’re responsible for 
operating the system you don’t have a greater say in how it’s planned… The challenge 
in solving this problem is that the SO is not entirely independent… as SO they are 
incentivised to operate the system efficiently. You need someone to balance the 
investment cost decisions against the system operational cost decisions. All these 
things are manageable through correct incentives – but it’s not straightforward… our 
view is there could be a stronger co-ordinating role that will help get further down 
that route, though it clearly won’t be perfect. 
Other interviewees were wary of the perils of institutional reform. 
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I would be wary of saying… that there’s a silver bullet of a central design authority or 
that we need to DECC to step up and do something. I don’t think as a nation we can 
deal with that, that’s not the way we’ve done things historically – I think there are 
examples where working collaboratively can also achieve something in a relatively 
short time line. Whereas doing institutional reform to get a central design authority 
or an independent system operator would take a decade. 
Some picked up on the theme of the requirement for coordination between 
the various actors and regimes, but explored the possibility of achieving this through 
improving collaboration and cooperation between them, rather than establishing a body 
with the power to enforce collaboration between the other players. 
You want to make sure that you have the right frameworks, mechanisms in place, and 
the right stakeholders engaged, to get a balance…. You’re never going to get the right 
answer if you’re completely responsive to just the next generator coming online. 
Equally, if you have a blueprint it’s almost certain to be wrong. What you need is 
some mix in the middle… It needs some kind of central collaboration of the key 
players, who are enabled and incentivised to participate, and enabled and incentivised 
to actually do something about it as well. And maybe one of the challenges that we 
have at the moment… is that actually the right players don’t have the right level of 
responsibility... no combination of these parties now has a legal mandate to care about 
what happens in terms of cross border infrastructure. It doesn’t have to be a central 
system planner, but…  if everyone had just a little more responsibility then maybe 
something could happen. 
The ENSG process was cited as an example of this. 
There’s no doubt about the effectiveness of ENSG in releasing forward looking 
transmission investment of the scale and size required for this step change. £4.5bn was 
identified in this needs case that was developed collaboratively. No one single party is 
responsible, which maybe isn’t a brilliant thing, but actually to make a step forward, 
maybe no one single party was responsible, but everyone was responsible, and 
something actually happened. Where we are at the moment, for coordinated 
infrastructure that goes beyond our shoreline, nobody’s responsible for that, and why 
does nothing happen, why are we stuck in this reactive world? Because there isn’t that 
formula where everyone leans on each other. It helps you to get a bit more of that 
happy case in the middle. If you look at what has come out of ENSG, Western Link is 
now under construction. There’s been a lot of rigorous assessment trying to drive out 
efficiencies in procurement and design, there has been a lot of regulatory scrutiny. It 
hasn’t just progressed blindly, at every stage there has been scrutiny. 
However, the lack of formal clarification of the role and remit of the ENSG in 
relation to government policy, left others with a sense of confusion and lack of clarity 
around the precise location of responsibility for establishing a needs case for the 
transmission network.  
There’s obviously the ENSG work which is being continually refreshed, and to some 
extent that gives you a strategic plan for large scale investment. One of the challenges 
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though is that at the same time you’ve got government policy, in terms of what 
investments in generation it wants, and that does have a big impact in terms of what 
transmission investments you might therefore need. The ENSG gives you something 
to look at and to a certain extent some certainty, but you’ve got all these things going 
on on the side, which may mean we don’t need some particular investment after all. 
So the network companies are left in the middle, trying to develop these projects, and 
Ofgem is there signing off the needs case. Ofgem is not responsible for government 
policy, but they’ve got to make sure the investment is signed off in a timely way, so 
they put pressure on the network companies to say whether it’s justified. The 
network companies can say that they have certain connection requests, but actually it 
depends on what the strike prices might be. So the ENSG work is helpful, but there’s 
still quite a lot of uncertainty around it, and our impression is that Ofgem are finding 
it difficult to sign off some of the needs case, which delays things.   
5.4 Conclusions 
Interviews with key system actors based around the key policy value 
dimensions identified in Chapter 4, have helped to situate the current transmission policy 
options within a context of broader values and paradigms concerning energy system 
governance. The interviews also allowed the experts to bring up important insights and 
concerns about issues that had been less strongly identified – including the importance of 
the transition from NETA to BETTA in 2005, and the potentially growing future 
importance of coordination between onshore, offshore and interconnection regimes. 
The interviews revealed some differences in perceptions, as well as some areas 
of higher agreement. The increased level of state involvement in the electricity system in 
view of carbon and security objectives was noted by several interviewees who perceived 
the EMR programme as representing an increasingly interventionist stance of the 
government. For some this perceived interventionist approach on the generation side was 
considered to undermine and render irrelevant the aims to use market-based locational 
signals for transmission network use. Others however viewed the areas as separate, with 
locational signals providing the means by which government targets could be met 
efficiently.   
A majority of interviewees expressed broad general support for the principle 
of locational signals, and some were broadly supportive of the current approach where 
locational signals are provided on a fixed capacity basis through TNUoS, whereas variable 
constraint costs are socialised through BSUoS. Several interviewees were of the view that 
any increase in the strength of locational signals would be most likely to come as a result of 
EU network codes promoting market splitting. There was some discussion of the change in 
network power flows, including intra-annual variability caused by increasing renewable 
capacities, and the prospects for the annually fixed TNUoS charge in this context. The 
possibility of a locational BSUoS charge to reflect greater short-term variability was 
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discussed. However, there was no strong advocacy for a more root and branch reform 
towards an LMP model, with one comment perceiving the political risk greater than the 
certainty of the benefits.   
There was wide support for some kind of more strategic, anticipatory or 
coordinated approach to transmission network planning, though to different extents. Some 
emphasised the possibility of having a very clear idea of the required generation mix 
implied by the government’s renewable and low-carbon targets, and CfD strike prices, and 
of building out the transmission network on the expectation of this mix. Others 
emphasised the remaining room for variability in the precise mix which could meet the 
government’s targets, and the resulting risk of stranded assets. Most acknowledged the 
need for some level of anticipatory build out, particularly in view of the multiple and 
modular nature of renewables projects, but conceived of more graduated approach using 
hedging mechanisms such as least regret analysis, accepting moderate constraint costs 
through connect and manage, and bringing forward early low cost work on transmission 
upgrades whilst keeping the whole project under review.  
A key unresolved issue mentioned by several interviewees was the 
coordination between onshore, offshore and interconnection regimes. Several cited 
potential benefits from coordination of these regimes, as well as risks from lack of 
coordination.  
Institutionally, several contemplated the creation of an independent agency 
with a mandate to undertake these coordination issues, usually suggesting that this could be 
achieved by the complete separation of the SO part of National Grid, and some clarification 
of its incentives. Others favoured preserving the existing structure, due to the transitional 
costs of significant institutional change, but of finding ways to encourage and facilitate 
coordinated thinking. The ENSG approach was cited as an example of how this can be 
achieved, however there were also concerns about the lack of formal remit for ENSG and 
its status in relation to government targets. However, similarly to the locational issue, 
there was no strong advocate for a radical institutional reorganisation of the system. 
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6 The technological 
configuration – 
modelling the system 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 used historical analysis, policy analysis and key actor 
interviews to explore the actors, institutions, policy frameworks and value-sets which 
contribute to the system under study, and are critical to considering its evolution forward 
in time. Equally critical for the representation of the system under study in this thesis, is a 
representation of the physical technologies and infrastructures associated with the system. 
This chapter summarises the process of data collection and model development undertaken 
in order to achieve a coherent but sufficiently detailed representation of the technological 
layer of the system under study.  
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6.1 The system under study – the GB 
transmission network 
The GB transmission network is defined as the circuits operating at 400 kV 
and 275 kV, with the addition of the 132 kV circuits in Scotland. Figure 22 illustrates the 
configuration of the transmission network on a map of Great Britain. 
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Figure 22: GB electricity transmission network ((National Grid, 2011b) 
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Simulation of power flows across this network could be achieved at different 
levels of granularity. Barnacle et al (2013) make full use of available GB network data from 
National Grid (National Grid, 2011b) to produce a model which specifies the network in 
full detail, with 813 buses and 1204 lines. Gerber et al (2012) by contrast represent the GB 
network in a greatly simplified load flow model consisting of 16 busbars connected by 15 
branches. This allows a consideration of power transfer over the key regional boundaries, 
but aggregates over the detail of power flow through more specific sections and corridors 
of the network. 
In the current project a level of spatial disaggregation somewhere in between 
these two studies was sought. The model had to be sufficiently simple to make the 
production of a large number of runs emanating from multiple scenarios and multiple 
system conditions, a relatively tractable prospect. On the other hand, it required sufficient 
granularity to show the effect of particular system upgrades on particular network 
corridors, and to have the flexibility to represent differently evolving system architectures. 
A heuristic process was undertaken to establish the appropriate level of detail, beginning 
with a comparatively simple 17 zone representation of the GB network, and gradually 
adding greater network detail and spatial resolution, undertaking analyses of ‘strawman’ 
scenarios at each stage to test the performance of the model in relation to the requirements 
of the project. This heuristic process and the associated strawman scenario outputs are 
reported in Appendix D. The outcome of the process was to settle on a system 
representation consisting of 50 onshore nodes, with additional offshore nodes and 
interconnector points depending on the scenario.     
The parameterisation of this approximated network is now described in terms 
node and branch data, demand data and generator data. 
6.2 Branch paramaterisation – selection of 
nodes and use of real line and equivalent 
line data 
Developing an approximated network model first required decisions about 
amalgamation of multiple nodes. The amalgamated nodes used to represent the real 
network were selected by referring to the National Grid’s map of the GB transmission 
network (reproduced here as Figure 22). Where possible, simplifications were made by 
combining closely neighbouring nodes into single bus bars. Nodes were chosen in order to 
ensure that the model would have sufficient granularity to capture: 
• Key branching points and alternative corridors within the network 
• The location of large generators, or large clusters of generator types 
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• The potential for new extensions to the network, e.g. offshore networks 
or sub-sea interconnectors 
• Significant demand sites such as large cities or industrial areas 
 
 
Figure 23: Location of nodes for simplified network representation, 2013 system 
Figure 23 shows the locations of the nodes selected for a simplified 
representation of the 2013 network. As well as onshore generation hubs, load centres and 
network junctions, it includes the main offshore hubs and the connection points for current 
interconnections with other systems. There are a total of 50 onshore nodes, 9 offshore 
nodes, and four interconnection points. The location of a number of possible future nodes, 
which may be required to represent the addition to the network of future offshore 
development sites, connection of Scottish islands and international interconnections, 
according to different scenario developments, were also noted at this point.   
Having identified the locations of the nodes to be used to represent the 
current system, the next stage was to parameterise the branches which connect them. The 
main reference source for the data was Appendix B of National Grid’s Seven Year 
Statement (National Grid, 2011b). This appendix provides detailed line parameters for 
every section of the GB transmission network. In each case, the key data provided are the 
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identities of the two nodes connected, the length and voltage of the line, the line 
parameters of resistance (R), reactance (X) and susceptance (B), and the seasonal thermal 
rated capacity of the line. Some of the amalgamated model nodes are close enough to real 
SYS nodes that connections between them can be paramaterised using the real line data 
given for the branches connecting those SYS nodes. In other cases amalgams of two or 
more lines are made by summing their rated capacities, and calculating their combined 
parallel impedances using the formula, 
Equation 1 
 
1𝑍!" = 1𝑍! + 1𝑍! +⋯+ 1𝑍! 
which states that the inverse of the total impedance (Zeq) is equal to the sum of 
the inverse component impedances (Z1 ... Zn). In other cases a line which finishes at a 
certain SYS node for which there is no direct model equivalent may be extended to the 
nearest model node by calculating the RXB /km values for the real line, and multiplying 
this by the required remaining distance. 
An impression of the degree of aggregation from SYS real system data to 
model representation can be attained by comparing Figure 24, a close up of Zones 6 and 7 
from the map of the system provided in the SYS, with Figure 25, a close up of the same 
region showing the nodes and branches represented in the model.  
 
Figure 24: GB Transmission network SYS Zones 6 and 7 (National Grid, 2011b) 
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Figure 25: Simplified model representation of GB transmission network SYS zones 6 and 7 
 
The resulting map of branches across the whole system is provided in Figure 
26. By comparing this map with Figure 22, it can be seen that the equivalent network 
representation greatly simplifies the local arrangement of the shortest sections of line, 
whilst preserving the overall shape of the system including the broad arrangement of the 
key long-distance transmission corridors. 
As well as the key parameters of resistance (R), reactance (X) and susceptance 
(B), each line is parameterised with a seasonal loading limit. The SYS (National Grid, 
2011b) provides thermal loading limits for each of the system branches. These are further 
modified to allow for voltage and stability limits, as described in Appendix E.1. 
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Figure 26: Approximated network map - nodes and branches 2013 
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6.3 Demand side 
6.3.1 Total GB system demand at seasonal peaks 
Traditionally, analyses of system adequacy have focussed on the winter peak – 
the point of the year at which the overall demand on the system is greatest (National Grid, 
2011b, National Grid, 2012a, Gerber et al., 2012). The justification for this is that if the 
network is sufficient to safely carry generation to load at the highest demand point of the 
year, it will, a fortiori, be sufficient for all other times of the year. This reasoning is 
acceptable for a system dominated by dispatchable generators whose outputs will directly 
follow the contours of the load. It may not hold so well, however, for a renewable 
dominated system, in which the outputs of plant are not correlated to load. For example, a 
low demand condition could also place strain on the network if it coincided with a high 
wind condition, resulting in the need to export greater amounts of renewable generated 
power from low-load areas across the network. 
For the current project therefore, there is interest in testing the network 
under different demand conditions. Historical data on total system electricity demand for 
each half-hour period between 2006-2012 was analysed. Electricity demand profiles have 
seasonal patterns, with winter, summer and intermediate (spring and autumn) months all 
exhibiting different patterns. Figure 27, Figure 28 and Figure 29 show the 24-hour demand 
patterns of days in April, July and December from 2006-2012. 
 
Figure 27: Demand profiles in April days, 2006-2012 
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Figure 28: Demand profiles in July days, 2006-2012 
	  
 
Figure 29: Demand profiles in December days, 2006-2012 
As can be observed in the above figures, on winter days peak demand typically 
occurs between 5 and 6pm, and reaches a maximum of 60 GW. In spring and summer the 
profile is much flatter, with a broader daytime shoulder; however in both spring and 
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summer the highest demand is typically found between 12 and 1pm. In spring the highest 
peak is around 50 GW, in summer 45 GW. 
This provides the three seasonal system conditions which will be analysed in 
the load flows: 
• April, 12-1pm. Total system demand in 2013: 50 GW 
• July-August, 12-1pm. Total system demand in 2013: 45 GW 
• December-January, 5-6pm. Total system demand in 2013: 60 GW  
6.3.2 Splitting total GB system demand amongst model 
nodes 
Having established total system demand for each of the three given seasonal 
condition, a further requirement is to divide this total demand between the various system 
nodes, in order to represent the distribution of demand across the country. DECC provides 
the annual electricity consumption of the UK by regional and local authority, for 2011, 
disaggregated by domestic and industrial consumption (DECC, 2011). By overlaying the 
map of the 74 nodes on the map of UK counties and unitary authorities, it was possible to 
‘allocate’ the demands of each of the local authority areas to the closest of the 74 nodes 
(Figure 30).  
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Figure 30: GB unitary authorities and system nodes 
The percentage of total annual demand accruing at each model node was 
calculated. Further analysis showed that the percentage contributions to annual energy 
demand of a region are a reasonable proxy for that region’s percentage contribution to 
system peak (as reported in Appendix E.2). Hence these regional demand proportions 
were used as fixed percentages to divide up the total system power demand between each 
of the nodes for any condition modelled. 
6.3.3 Evolution of demand through time 
The previous two sections showed how the total system power demand in the 
current system at three different seasonal conditions was identified, and how that power 
demand was shared between the system nodes. This section explains how changes to the 
overall power system demand through time are calculated for the purposes of the 
scenarios. 
The evolution of electricity demand over the next few decades is an area of 
significant uncertainty. Overall demand for electricity will be affected by: 
• Growth in use of electrical appliances 
• Growth in industrial demand 
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• Effects of energy saving and energy efficiency measures 
• Growth in demand from new sources such as vehicles and domestic 
heating systems 
Further, the power demand at any given point in time (as opposed to the 
overall energy demand across the year) will be influenced by patterns of use. For example, 
whether all future electric cars are re-charged in the early evenings has a significant impact 
on how large the increase on winter peak will be. 
A demand profile has been constructed, drawing key assumptions from 
National Grid’s Gone Green Scenario (National Grid, 2013c) and the Digest of UK Energy 
Statistics (DECC, 2013a). Although the scenarios in this study will run to 2033, the 
demand profile is extended to 2048, in order to represent a trajectory towards a highly 
decarbonised energy system by mid-century. The key assumptions of the profile are as 
follows: 
• Domestic lighting, appliances and resistive heating, and overall 
commercial sector demand, all decrease as a result of efficiency 
improvements 
• Domestic heat pumps grow strongly, accounting for 95 TWh of annual 
demand in 2048 
• Industrial demand increases from 98 TWh in 2012 to 124 TWh in 2048, 
reflecting growth in the sector 
• Electrification of trains continues at historical rates, electric vehicles grow 
strongly, reaching 90 TWh of annual demand in 2048 
• Electric vehicle charging patterns are spread, reflecting smart meter 
incentives. The percentage of the daily charge coinciding with the winter, 
spring summer peaks are 4%, 2% and 2% respectively. 
The resulting profile of annual electricity demand change is illustrated in 
Figure 31. More detail on working assumptions is presented in Appendix E.3. 
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Figure 31: Annual electricity demand background for scenarios 
According to these assumptions, annual electricity demand in 2048 stands at 
578 TWh, an increase of just over 50% from 2012 levels. Though this is steep, it is not 
extraordinary by historical standards. It compares more with the modest rate of growth 
between 1981 and 2003, which saw a 36% increase over 22 years (Figure 17), than the 
more rapid growth periods, such as the five-fold increase in demand in just over 20 years 
between 1951 and 1973 (Figure 15). This level of electricity demand by mid-century is also 
consistent with MARKAL runs operating under stringent decarbonisation targets (Ekins et 
al., 2013). 
The 2012 ratio of annual demand to system peaks in winter, spring and 
summer, were calculated and applied to all annual demands except that from electric 
vehicles, to derive the peak contribution. This assumes that patterns of use in these sectors 
will remain the same. Electric vehicles were treated separately, enabling the assumptions 
about the percentage of daily charging occurring at each time to be factored in (further 
variations around charging pattern assumptions will be discussed under ‘non-actor-
contingent’ elements). The resulting evolution of winter, spring and summer peak 
demands is illustrated in Figure 32. Further detail on working is provided in Appendix E.3. 
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Figure 32: Growth in seasonal peak demands for scenarios 
 
6.4 Generator data 
6.4.1 Installed capacities of generators by node 
The third key component of the technological configuration is the mix of 
different types of generation plant and their locations. For calibration to the base year of 
2013, SYS (National Grid, 2011b) projected data for the year 2012/13 was used. Data on 
renewables was also double checked against the most up to date sources provided by 
RenewableUK’s Wind Energy Database (RenewableUK, 2013b), and by checking the 
status of projects on individual project websites. The effect of closures, including due to 
the large combustion plant directive, on capacities of conventional plant since the 
publication of the SYS in 2011, was also factored in. Each individual generator was then 
associated to one of the established onshore or offshore nodes shown in Figure 23. An 
aggregated table of installed capacity split into nine GB regions (the regions are indicated in 
Figure 34) is presented in Table 5. Further detail and data sources are contained within 
Appendix E.4. Figure 33 represents the amounts of installed capacity of fossil generators at 
system nodes.  
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Table 5: Installed capacities by generation type and region 
Region Region 
name 
Offshore 
wind 
Onshore 
wind 
Other 
renewables 
Nuclear Thermal Storage Total 
1 Northern 
isles 
0 363.8 0 0 0 0 363.8 
2 N.W. 
Scotland 
0 862.6 1022.8 0 52 740 2677.4 
3 N.E. 
Scotland 
10 213 61.2 0 412 0 696.2 
4 Borders 
West 
787.2 1862.65 33 3482 449 0 6613.9 
5 Borders 
East 
65.9 573.5 0 2422 4937 0 7998.4 
6 Mid- 
West 
240 0 0 490 6884 2004 9618 
7 Mid-  
East 
841.2 0 0 0 24853 0 25694.2 
8 South-
West 
0 299 0 1261 8054 0 9614 
9 South-
East 
1708.8 0 0 2288 12626.9 0 16623.7 
Total 3653.1 4174.55 1117 9943 58267.9 2744 79899.6 
 
 
Figure 33: The distribution of coal and CCGT plants by system node, GB, 2013 
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These installed capacities represent the starting point of each scenario. As the 
scenarios are developed, capacity is added or subtracted depending on investment decisions 
hypothesised within each scenario. This process is described further in Chapter 7.     
6.4.2 Technical availability of generators 
In order to model a power flow at a given point in time, the total installed 
capacity of a generation type at a given node must be modified by an availability factor (AF)  
– the percentage of the generator’s total installed capacity which is technically available for 
dispatch at the time of the condition being modelled.  
6.4.2.1 Availability of fossil fuel and nuclear generators 
In energy system modelling studies, fossil, other thermal and nuclear plants 
are typically applied an annual AF of 0.9 (90%) (e.g. Kannan et al, (2007)). This annual AF 
reflects time during the year that plant may be unavailable due to maintenance, and is 
chosen to reflect the amount of energy available from the pant over the course of the year. 
For a load flow simulation of a particular system condition, this smoothed 90% factor is not 
meaningful – plant will either be 100% available, or considerably less than 100% due to 
maintenance. By ‘availability’ is meant technical availability, not the level of generation a 
particular plant may choose to sell into the market in a particular half-hour. Hence in this 
study, the AF of conventional plant is 1, or 100%.  
6.4.2.2 Availability of wind 
For wind farms, the availability factor will vary by location, season and time of 
day, according to the weather conditions which provide the energy for their output. The 
difference between wind conditions in different parts of the country at is an important 
factor for the power flow – for example higher winds in the North would create higher 
power output from renewables in the North, adding to the north-south power flow.  
The seasons and times to be analysed in each scenario time-step were defined 
to capture a range of demand profiles (6.3.1). In order to explore the contribution of wind 
at these times, it was necessary to access historic data for wind conditions for each of these 
seasons and hours of the year, simultaneously in the different regions in the country to be 
modelled. Grünewald (2012) and Green and Staffell (2012) both in different ways explore 
the effect of geographic diversity on wind output diversity. Both find that, because of the 
high correlation between nearby regions, and the relatively small size of the UK as a whole, 
dividing the UK into four regions is sufficient to capture the essence of the diversity. 
Therefore in this study the division of Britain into nine regions, shown in 
Figure 34 was deemed sufficient for the purposes of geographic diversity. Using the UK 
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Meteorological Office MIDAS database (UK Meteorological Office, 2012), nine weather 
stations were selected and wind speed data extracted for the years 2002-2012. Stations 
were selected based on the following criteria: 
• Geographically dispersed locations 
• Good availability of 10m wind speed data for the duration of the time 
period being studied 
• Open and relatively rural locations (checked using Google Earth) 
The nine selected sites and associated regions are illustrated in Figure 34. The 
wind speeds recorded at these stations were taken as proxies for describing wind speeds 
throughout the nine wind-speed areas, as indicated on the map. Each of the onshore and 
offshore system nodes was enclosed within one of the nine wind speed areas. 
 
Figure 34: Nine selected wind monitoring sites and associated regions 
A possible approach to managing this wind speed data would be to calculate 
average wind speeds for each of the required time periods at each of the nine locations. 
What this could potentially confuse, however, is the degree of spatial interdependence 
between locations, which is also important for a network study. The approach taken, 
therefore, was to identify a range of days and times during the period 2002-2012 whose 
actual wind conditions across the country would collectively span a good range of 
possibilities. The data used for this study is therefore real historical data, selected for its 
representative characteristics, rather than statistically generated or simulated data.  
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There were three seasonal time periods selected for modelling on the basis of 
their demand characteristics (as discussed in Section 6.3.1). These were: 
• Winter peak (December-January, 5-6pm) 
• Summer peak (July-August, 12-1pm) 
• Spring peak (April, 12-1pm). 
Thus, the wind speed data for the hours of 5-6pm every day in December and 
January, 12-1pm in July and August, and 12-1pm in April, from the years 2002-2012, 
were isolated to produce three data sets of wind conditions coinciding with winter peak, 
summer peak and spring peak. Each of these seasonal data-sets was then examined for the 
following candidates: 
• High overall wind speed – the day on which the mean of the wind speeds 
at each location is highest  
• Low overall wind speed – the day on which the mean of the wind speeds 
at each location is lowest 
• North-South gradient (NS) – the day on which the difference between the 
mean of the northern sites and the mean of the southern sites is greatest, 
in favour of the north. 
• South-North gradient (SN) – the day on which the difference between the 
mean of the northern sites and the mean of the southern sites is greatest, 
in favour of the south. 
• “Average” – the day which combines being closest to the overall average 
wind speed, and the closest fit to the most typical north-south gradient, 
for that time and season over the whole period.  
This produced 5 individual historical wind days for each of the three seasonal 
times. Each of these days consisted of real data for each of the nine sites.  
Following this, some simple conversions were made on the data to deliver 
onshore and offshore availability factors for renewable technologies. First the 10m wind 
speed was converted to the wind speed at a hub height of 80m using the formula provided 
by Best et al (2008). Then offshore wind speeds were derived from these onshore speeds 
using the method provided by Hsu (1988). Finally, the wind speeds were converted to an 
AF using a power curve for a Siemens SWT 2.3 provided by Staffell (2012). The full data 
and working are provided in Appendix E.5.1. 
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6.4.2.3 Availability of other renewable technologies 
Wave output is strongly correlated to wind, as wave energy is derived from 
wind. The key difference is that the energy in waves may take longer to peak under a given 
wind condition, and does not drop off as quickly following a drop in wind. The assumption 
is made that the AF for wave energy in each seasonal and weather condition is the same as 
that for wind. The potential for inaccuracy is that for high wind conditions, if the condition 
had recently started the waves would not yet be at their full height, hence the wind output 
factor would overestimate the wave output factor; and correspondingly for low wind 
conditions, had the wind only recently dropped, the waves would still be carrying more of 
their energy, hence the wind output factor would underestimate the wave output factor. 
However, these variations are relatively minor and would cancel out. 
Tidal energy is uncorrelated to wind. The tides follow lunar cycles and shift 
by half an hour each day. This means that although high and low tides can be accurately 
predicted, the time of day at which they occur on any given day is constantly shifting, 
moving half an hour forward every day. This means that for any given time of day – say 5 
to 6pm – the tidal conditions and resulting output from tidal turbines would be different 
each successive day. Therefore, although it would be possible to predict the tidal output for 
a given installed capacity at a specific day and time in the future, it is not possible to match a 
particular tidal output to the more generic time descriptions used in this project – for 
example the winter peak being modelled in the project is 5 to 6pm on any day in December 
or January. As a result it is necessary to apply a fixed availability factor to all tidal sites. A 
standard availability factor of 0.7 was selected as being the highest output that could 
simultaneously occur at opposite ends of Britain. The working for this is given in Appendix 
E.5.2.  
For hydro, the maximum quarterly average load factor for hydro in the last 
three years (0.54, reported in (DECC, 2014b)), has been scaled against the ten year mean 
rainfall for the months of January, April and August weighted by UK hydro resource 
(DECC, 2014c), to produce availability factors of 0.54, 0.25 and 0.38 for the winter, 
spring and summer conditions respectively. These factors themselves average to 0.39, close 
to the typical 40% average load factor reported for hydro (DECC, 2013a). Further detail 
on the working is in Appendix E.5.3.  
Solar PV may potentially play a role in the future electricity mix, either in 
highly distributed residential-scale installations, or in more commercial scale ground 
mounted arrays. However, it makes no contribution to the winter peak, hence any scenario 
including PV would not displace any low carbon generation assuming that the intention was 
to meet winter peak with largely low carbon generators. It is possible that with 
breakthroughs in storage that PV could contribute to winter peak. However, such a storage 
breakthrough is considered to have significant uncertainty and therefore not included as a 
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basic scenario assumption. As a result PV is not considered as an option within the initial 
scenarios, but the effect of adding PV output in summer peak in each of the scenarios is 
explored as a sensitivity in the ‘non-actor-contingent’ element analysis (Section 8.6.8.3).  
	  
6.5 Merit order dispatch 
In order to represent the system condition at a particular point in time, the 
correct amount of generation must be dispatched from the available generation potential at 
the given season and wind condition, to meet the overall system demand corresponding to 
that time.   
This is achieved via an Excel tool which ensures that total system generation 
equals demand via a merit order dispatch by generation type. According to the time of year 
and wind condition selected, the tool calculates the proportion of the total installed 
capacity which is available to dispatch, based on the relevant availability factors. The next 
step is to dispatch from this available generation capacity that amount of power which is in 
fact required – that is, the amount which is equal to the total system demand. This is 
achieved using a simple merit order approach. The merit order used is based on that 
employed by the ENSG study (2009) and is shown in Table 6. 
Table 6: Merit order used for dispatch 
Merit Order 
1 Interconnectors 
2 Offshore wind 
3 Tidal 
4 Wave 
5 Hydro 
6 Onshore wind 
7 Nuclear 
8 CCS 
9 Biomass 
10 CHP 
11 Fossil 
12 Fossil peaking 
13 Storage 
 
The above table represents a reasonable expectation of marginal dispatch 
costs, and assumes that under low carbon policies, low carbon generators would tend to 
have dispatch priority over higher carbon generators. The clustering by ENSG of coal and 
CCGT into one ‘fossil’ category is followed in this approach. This reflects the fact that 
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predicting which of these at any given time will be higher in the merit order is highly 
uncertain. Additionally, the change in network flows caused by a switch between coal and 
gas as marginal generator is not great, as suggested by the fairly strong locational 
correlation of the two generating types (Figure 33), as well as being confirmed from 
experience as reported in key actor interviews (Section 5.2.2). 
The merit order is applied using an Excel-based algorithm. The model 
dispatches in order of technology type, without preference for locational node. It considers 
each technology type in order of merit. If the total available power from all nodes within a 
given class of technology is less than the remaining total system demand (RTSD), it 
dispatches all available power for that technology at each node, and proceeds to the next 
technology type in the merit order. Eventually the model reaches a technology from which 
the total available power is more than the RTSD, due to the technologies already 
dispatched. At this point, available power at each node of this marginal technology is 
reduced in proportion to the ratio of RTSD to the total available power for that 
technology, so that the RTSD is met exactly. Any subsequent technologies in the merit 
order deliver no output. 
6.6 Load flow 
The previous sections describe the process of assembling three kinds data: 
branch parameters; generation at each node; demand at each node. These three data sets 
define a system condition under which power will flow through the branches of the 
network to meet demand at every point. In order to simulate how the power would flow 
through the network in that condition, a load flow analysis is undertaken. A load flow is an 
analysis of the power flows across a network at a point in time, demonstrating how power 
divides across the various junctions within a network. This is dictated by the arrangement 
of load and generation around the network, as well as by the relative impedences of the 
various sections of circuit. When presented with two parallel lines, current divides 
between them in inverse proportion to their impedances. This follows Ohm’s law 
(Equation 4, Appendix A.1.1), which shows that current is inversely proportional to 
resistance (or impedance in AC circuits).  
Load flows can be simulated of both AC and DC systems. AC simulations 
record reactive power, losses and voltage drops, and are required for sufficiently accurate 
simulations of distribution networks. DC load flows have the advantage of being 
computationally simpler, and with a faster simulation time. They treat the network as if it 
were DC, and although this simplification is not appropriate for distribution networks, DC 
load flows can simulate high voltage transmission networks with a high degree of accuracy 
(Gerber et al., 2012). Although they do not account for resistive losses, this simplification 
is considered acceptable for high voltage networks, where losses are significantly lower 
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than on distribution networks. On the GB transmission networks, losses are typically 2% 
of generation (Elexon, 2013).  The DC load flow tool provided by the open source 
programme MATPOWER, provided as a plug-in to the MATLAB software (Zimmerman 
et al., 2011), is used for this analysis. 
However, because the generation dispatch described above is driven solely by 
the merit order, and does not consider the location of the generators, it is a dispatch which 
is not limited by transmission constraints. The purpose of the load flow is to identify 
whether the power flow brought about by this non-locational merit order dispatch would 
result in overloads, and thus whether constraints would need to be applied to the 
generation mix as a result of network limitations. If power flowing down any line is in 
exceedence of the rated capacity of that line, the system operator would have to adjust the 
output of generators either side of the constraint by trading in the balancing mechanism, 
until the overload has been removed. In the scenario development process, the operation of 
the balancing mechanism is not simulated, but the level of line exceedences is taken as an 
indication of the level of constraints which would be experienced on the system under the 
given condition. The power flows are also represented visually using the Quantum GIS 
(QGIS) open source geographical information systems package, in combination GIS data 
from Ordnance Survey Open Data2. The information on power flows and line exceedences 
is used to influence decisions on generation and transmission investment in the subsequent 
time-stage of the scenario, as will be discussed in the next chapter. 
6.7 Conclusions 
This chapter has summarised the process of data collection and model 
development undertaken to support the representation of the technological layer of the 
system under study. It has described the development of a simplified representation of the 
GB transmission network using equivalent line data; the development of seasonal demands 
and their projection through the time period of the scenarios; the assembling of data on 
installed capacities of transmission connected generators for the base year, and on seasonal 
and temporal availability due to weather and other variations; the operation of a merit-
order dispatch algorithm; and the combination of all this data to run a DC load flow, and 
represent using GIS software. The next chapter describes how this technological 
framework interacts with the other two system layers – values, and actors / institutions – 
in the scenario development process. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Contains Ordnance Survey data © Crown copyright and database right 2014 
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7 Application of the 
scenario 
development 
process 
Chapter 2 proposed a scenario process based around a system characterisation 
involving three levels: values, actors and institutions, and technologies. Subsequent 
chapters provided the information required to characterise the system within each of these 
three levels. The current chapter explains how each of these elements will be integrated in 
order to deliver an integrated iterative scenario process, as set out in Section 2.6. The 
resulting scenarios will be narrated in Chapter 8.   
7.1 The structure of the system – values, actors 
and the technological system 
Socio-technical systems involve co-evolutionary dynamics between 
technological artefacts and infrastructures, and actors and institutions (Berkhout et al., 
	   197	  
2004, Geels, 2002, Freeman and Louça, 2001, Hughes, 1983, Hannah, 1979), as large 
technological systems are ‘both socially constructed and society shaping’ (Hughes, 1987).  
Figure 35 summarises the interactions between actors, institutions and 
technologies in the system under study. The technological level of the system under study 
is the generation mix and transmission network installed to meet a given system demand. 
This system configuration produces system conditions of power flows, and sometimes 
constraints, during real time operation. The combination of the system configuration and 
its conditions during operation have effects on future investment decisions both on the 
generation and transmission side, which are communicated through the institutional 
structures which pertain to them.  
On the generation side, the system configuration and system conditions give 
rise to network charges – TNUoS and BSUoS, as discussed in Chapter 4 – which are paid 
by generators. The level of locational signal in network charging may influence generation 
investment plans of the generating companies, along with other government generation 
focussed policies, and ultimately affect generation investment.  
On the transmission side, the system condition, and in particular any 
significant constraints that may arise from it, may also contribute to a case for new 
transmission investment. This investment case may also be bolstered by industry 
expectations of future generation investments, which themselves are informed by 
generators’ investment plans insofar as they are known, and long term government targets. 
The investment case is adopted by transmission companies in presenting their investment 
plans in the RIIO price control process, which is monitored by Ofgem, and at the 
conclusion of which transmission investments can be made.  
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Figure 35: Conceptual map of the system under study, showing interactions of actors, institutions and technologies and 
infrastructure 
 
The picture presented is therefore of a dynamic feedback process where the 
technical outcomes of operating the existing system, and expectations about the possible 
future system, combine to contribute to future investment decisions in respect of both 
generation and transmission assets. The actual path which the system takes however is 
dependent on the tuning of the policies and institutional arrangements which mediate the 
system, and the relative balance they strike between affecting the generation or the 
transmission side. In respect of this balance, the key questions which emerge are: 
• What level of locational signal is provided to generation to influence 
future siting decisions, and operational decisions?  
• What level of anticipatory or strategic thought is present in transmission 
planning?  
Making a judgement about which balance to strike is not a straightforward 
empirical question – in large technological systems with long lead times on investments and 
high levels of technological lock-in, there is no luxury of counter-factual. These are 
ultimately political judgements, taken of necessity from within a value system, which 
!
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suggests both a preferable type of solution or approach to a problem, and a desirable end 
state which is aimed for (Leach et al., 2010, Clapp and Dauvergne, 2005, Sunderlin, 
2003). Section 4.5.3 described the intersection of the two value spectrums associated with 
the questions of locational pricing and strategic-anticipatory investment, in the context of 
the current GB policy arrangements and debates about their future. Figure 36 now reprises 
that intersection, drawing attention to the four policy value-set combinations which arise 
from it.   
 
These four contrasting combinations suggest alternative value-sets which 
could underlie the motivations and decisions of policy-making actors. These alternative 
decisions would create different institutional frameworks, prompting different actor 
actions and subsequent reactions within the actor-institution network, causing different 
investments to be made within the technological configuration. In other words, these 
contrasting value-sets are the starting point for the alternative dynamics which cascade 
down to the other two levels, ultimately resulting in alternative evolutionary scenario 
pathways. As shown in Error! Reference source not found., which illustrated the 
historical case study of the GB electricity system, this flow of influence from values through 
actions and technological configurations, can also be followed by flows back up through the 
Figure 36: The intersection of planning and locational pricing values spectrums 
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levels. For example if technological realities throw up problems or contradictions which 
challenge or force reappraisal of the dominating value-set. 
7.2 The scenario development process 
The scenario development process then is one of joining up the various tools 
and analytical stages described in the previous chapters, in order to achieve a fluid 
movement through the tree levels of values, actors and institutions, and technologies. 
Figure 37 illustrates the scenario process, showing the links between the various tools and 
approaches. 
 
The first step is to establish the demand profile for the given scenario year, 
from the overall system demand profile for the scenario period, the working for which is 
given in Section 6.3. This is combined with the generation mix which in the first year is 
taken from 2013 data, and which in subsequent years is added to according to the 
requirements of each scenario; along with data on seasonal availability factors which include 
wind output in different wind conditions, as described in Section 6.4. These datasets allow 
the Excel dispatch model, described in Section 6.5, to run a generation dispatch according 
to its merit order, for each of the three seasons and five wind conditions as described in 
section 6.4.2.2. The demand and generation data per node for each season and condition, 
are combined with the data on transmission network parameters – in the first year these are 
taken from 2013 data, as described in section 6.2, in subsequent years added to according 
to the requirements of the scenario. These three datasets – nodal demand, nodal generation 
Figure 37: Flow diagram of scenario process 
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and network parameters – allow a load flow to be undertaken for each of the system 
conditions, using the MATPOWER load flow tool. The power flows along each branch are 
fed back into the Excel model to compare power flows against capacity ratings, and identify 
constraints. The constraint patterns are also then represented in the GIS, in order to 
interpret the results visually.  
The above steps represent one complete iteration of the process for the 
generation mix and network configuration in a given scenario year. The crucial next stage 
is the feedback of the outputs of this process, via the mediative effect of the value-set under 
which the particular scenario operates, to create the portfolio of new generation and 
transmission investments which are to take place during the next scenario time-stage. 
The quantitative and visual outputs are analysed to understand the system 
performance – where and under what conditions system constraints are occurring. These 
outputs must then be interpreted in the context of the scenario specific value system. By 
considering the available data in the context of the value system for that scenario, two sets 
of decisions must be made: where and how much do generators invest in the next phase; 
where and how much do network owners invest in the next phase? 
The effect of the four different value systems on these decision points can be 
demonstrated by summarising the decision rules which each scenario would apply to these 
questions. The following paragraphs set out the overall guiding value-set of each scenario, 
as defined by the intersection of the value-axes shown in Figure 36, and explain how this 
translates into decision rules which guide the development of new transmission and 
generation investments in each scenario time-stage. 
7.2.1 Strong location, strong plan (SLSP) 
Strong Location Strong Plan (SLSP) is guided by a policy value-set which 
espouses the benefits of trying to organise regulated markets to accurately reflect all costs 
in order to deliver the most efficient solution within whatever constraints are imposed 
upon them.  For transmission networks this means that strong locational signals are sent to 
generators in order that they make an efficient trade off between costs of generation and 
the costs to network of their locational choice. However, due to the scale and lumpiness of 
transmission investment there is also a belief that while locational signals are important to 
influence the use of the existing network, some element of strategic planning is still 
required to coordinate network expansion, given the significant structural changes 
expected in the system under the decarbonisation programme.  
The decision-making approach for scenario development within this 
framework therefore involves attempting to maximise network utilisation but also being 
open to opportunities for significant strategic network upgrade decisions. In any time-stage 
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the first step is to examine the power flows and constraints of the previous time stage and 
identify the network capacity availability in the different regions of the network. Low 
carbon technologies which are available to be deployed in regions with available network 
capacity will be deployed as a first order priority, moving into constrained regions only if 
more deployment is needed to remain on track for the decarbonisation target. In this way 
network upgrades are minimised. If however the triggering of network upgrades becomes 
unavoidable then network upgrades can be taken in any given time-stage with a strategic 
anticipatory mind-set – that is, building out beyond the immediate needs of that time-stage 
in expectation of future deployment in the region in question.  
The precise policies which achieve the locational signal are not specified in the 
scenario – although potential policy options are discussed across all scenarios in the analysis 
undertaken in Chapter 9. However, an important assumption about the targeting of the 
policies is that they deliver a locational signal which influences not only investment 
decisions, but also real time operational decisions – this would mean that generators and 
interconnector operators have an incentive to respond to real-time locational network 
conditions in their operational patterns. In order to reflect this, this scenario allows 
modelling interventions on the Excel dispatch model. The dispatch algorithm by default 
dispatches by technology type in merit order, but with no preference for location. 
However, in this scenario interventions are made to directly alter the output of flexible 
plant in constrained areas, typically turning down northern fossil plant in high wind 
conditions. Output of fossil plant can be reduced on a regional basis, or by specific plant. 
Regular candidates for this treatment are Peterhead (node 8) and Longannet (node 13). 
This treatment reduces fossil output during high wind conditions, and returning fossil to 
normal output during low wind conditions, effectively mimicking a network sharing 
arrangement. The outputs of the interconnectors are also manually controlled in response 
to the locational network conditions in any given power flow.    
7.2.2 Strong location weak plan (SLWP) 
Strong Location Weak Plan (SLWP) is also guided by a policy value-set which 
espouses the benefits of sending strong locational signals to generators in order that they 
make an efficient trade off between costs of generation and the costs to network of their 
locational choice. Unlike SLSP however, there is no appetite for a forward looking 
anticipatory, or coordinated approach to network development. The belief is that with the 
correct locational signals and generation targeted low carbon policies, the efficient balance 
between network expansion and generation location will be found. There are no 
anticipatory network investments in this scenario – upgrades only respond to visible and 
committed generation projects within each time-stage. 
	   203	  
The decision-making approach for scenario development within this 
framework therefore involves attempting to maximise network utilisation and avoiding 
network decisions which go beyond the visible requirements of the current time-stage. As 
in SLSP, in any time-stage the first step is to examine the power flows and constraints of 
the previous time stage and identify the network capacity availability in the different 
regions of the network. Low carbon technologies which are available to be deployed in 
regions with available network capacity will be deployed as a first order priority, moving 
into constrained regions only if more deployment is needed to remain on track for the 
decarbonisation target. In this way network upgrades are minimised. Unlike in SLSP, 
network upgrades are only triggered on an incremental basis, and building out beyond the 
immediate needs of the current time-stage in expectation of future deployment, does not 
occur. 
As in SLSP, it is assumed that the locational signal influences not only 
investment decisions, but also real time operational decisions, creating incentives for 
generators and interconnector operators to respond to real-time locational network 
conditions in their operational patterns. Therefore, interventions on the Excel dispatch 
model are made to alter the output of flexible plant and interconnectors during different 
wind conditions. As in SLSP, this treatment reduces fossil output during high wind 
conditions, and returning fossil to normal output during low wind conditions, effectively 
mimicking a network sharing arrangement. The outputs of the interconnectors are also 
manually controlled in response to the locational network conditions in any given power 
flow. 
7.2.3 Weak location, strong plan (WLSP) 
Weak location strong plan (WLSP) is guided by a value-set which perceives 
that the targeting of locational costs on generators does not improve the efficiency with 
which the system meets its required targets, but rather acts as an obstacle to the successful 
attainment of those targets. Locational signals are viewed as a lower order priority 
compared to that of achieving carbon targets, and thus have greatly reduced relevance in a 
system undergoing a major low carbon transition. Generators are therefore not provided 
with strong locational signals, and therefore have no incentive to incorporate network 
conditions into their planning or operating decisions. The value-set of this scenario also 
espouses the benefit of making anticipatory and strategic transmission network investment 
planning decisions, rather than responding only to the incremental upgrade needs of firm 
generation projects. 
The decision-making approach for scenario development within this 
framework therefore involves the deployment of low carbon technologies without regard 
for constraints imposed by existing networks, but with a strategic and anticipatory 
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approach to network upgrades in respect of future generation deployment. In any time-
stage generation investment decisions will be taken across a balanced portfolio of 
technologies according to the technology specific locational advantages, but without 
considering what constraint may have occurred in the previous phase. Transmission 
network investments in any time stage are made to bring the system as close to compliance 
as possible – this involves considering areas of emerging network constraint in the previous 
time-stage alongside the implications of the next set of generation investment decisions, 
and with an anticipatory view of likely requirements in future stages. There is no 
intervention upon the dispatch patterns generated by the Excel algorithm in response to the 
operational network constraints emerging in different conditions. 
7.2.4 Weak location weak plan (WLWP) 
Weak location weak plan (WLWP) is guided by a value-set which perceives 
that the targeting of locational costs on generators does not improve the efficiency with 
which the system meets its required targets, but rather acts as an obstacle to the successful 
attainment of those targets. Locational signals are viewed as a lower order priority 
compared to that of achieving carbon targets, and thus have greatly reduced relevance in a 
system undergoing a major low carbon transition. Generators are therefore not provided 
with strong locational signals, and therefore have no incentive to incorporate network 
conditions into their planning or operating decisions. However, it also maintains an 
ambivalence towards centralised planning, coordination or attempts to develop long-term 
blueprints of system development, and so resists the development of institutions which 
have any tendency towards interventionist or centralised planning approaches. Network 
development remains mostly reactive, and there are no anticipatory network investments 
in this scenario – upgrades only respond to visible and committed generation projects 
within each time-stage. 
The decision-making approach for scenario development within this 
framework therefore involves the deployment of low carbon technologies without regard 
for constraints imposed by existing networks, but with a responsive approach to network 
upgrades. In any time-stage generation investment decisions will be taken across a balanced 
portfolio of technologies according to the technology specific locational advantages, but 
without considering what constraint may have occurred in the previous phase. The rate of 
generation investment may be slowed due to lack of available network, but the locational 
choice is not affected. Transmission network investments in any time stage are made to 
bring the system as close to compliance as possible – this involves considering areas of 
emerging network constraint in the previous time-stage alongside the implications of the 
next set of generation investment decisions. However, there is no anticipatory view of 
likely requirements in future stages. There is no intervention upon the dispatch patterns 
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generated by the Excel algorithm in response to the operational network constraints 
emerging in different conditions. 
7.2.5 Reflections on the epistemology of the scenario 
development process 
The scenario development process as described follows a movement between 
the three levels, at each stage considering how value systems, actor-institutional 
relationships and technological system realities combine to inform the decisions taken by 
actors in the next time-stage. This involves the integration of diverse kinds of information, 
and inferring from it plausible resulting strategies from the perspective of different system 
actors. As shown in the flow diagram of Figure 37, this involves an inductive rather than 
deductive approach to reasoning. In philosophy, a deductively reasoned argument is one in 
which the conclusions necessarily follow from the premisses. An inductively reasoned 
argument is one in which the premisses give strong evidence for, but do not logically entail 
or guarantee the conclusions. Thus while deductive arguments can only be valid or invalid, 
inductive arguments have relative degrees of strength (Copi et al., 2006, IEP, 2014). The 
logical dependence of deductive reasoning on the truth of its premises ultimately requires 
the acceptance of some starting axioms, or else no knowledge at all can be established. 
Attempting to reason without accepting either starting axioms or induction is problematic. 
Hume’s refusal to tolerate any form of inductive reasoning led him to an extreme sceptic 
position which rejected the validity of scientific enquiry. In his discussion of Hume, Russell 
concludes ‘that induction is an independent logical principle… and that without this 
principle science is impossible’ (Russell, 1947). 
The principles of deductive and inductive reasoning can also be applied in a 
comparison of alternative approaches to future scenarios and modelling. The output of a 
linear-programmed optimisation model is effectively a complex deductive argument – 
given the premisses of the argument (the costs and performance characteristics of the 
technologies) the conclusion (the cost-optimal mix of technologies for the system as it is 
defined in the model) is logically valid – the conclusion is logically guaranteed by the 
premisses. Evidently, as with any deductive argument, the argument itself does not 
establish whether the premisses are true. In fact, the premisses in this case are subject to 
considerable variation and uncertainty, and this is precisely the main challenge with how to 
interpret the multiple possible outputs of such models. By contrast, the scenario process 
developed in this thesis, proceeds inductively. It uses a combination of premisses which are 
contrasting types of data, both qualitative and quantitative, and which as a result cannot 
logically be combined to produce a deductive argument. However, they can be combined 
inductively to produce strong evidence for the postulated outcome. 
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The deductive modelling approach though ‘valid’ in the strict logical sense, is 
entirely dependent upon a vast number of premisses whose truth is impossible to verify – 
specifically, the costs and other quantified parameters of energy technologies, fuels, 
demand elasticities etc, for many years into the future. The inductive scenario approach 
requires reasoning which cannot be shown to be logically valid in the same way, as it 
involves making mental linkages between logically contrasting (quantitative and qualitative) 
datasets. However, its premisses can be clearly understood, and though they are not strictly 
amenable to being proved as true or false, they can be seen as plausible, and likely 
outcomes from them can be strongly reasoned by anyone with an empathic understanding 
of how humans might behave in certain situations. Thus the scenario approach is built on 
relatively strong inductive arguments of the type: if I were a generation investor with a range of 
technology options, in a system with some congested and some uncongested areas, and which gave 
strong locational signals, I would be likely to invest in the uncongested area.    
Thus inductively reasoned scenarios avoid producing an output which can only 
be said to be ‘valid’ based on a large number of highly uncertain individual premisses to the 
argument, and instead produce an output which can be said to be ‘strongly reasoned’ based 
on a much more limited set of conditions, incorporating technical conditions as well as 
actor perceptions of these in the context of a hypothesised policy value set.   
These are in no sense ‘optimised’ pathways. However, again it must be 
remembered that for an optimisation model the optimisation is based on inputs which are 
highly uncertain, and within a system that has major structural differences to any real 
energy system, notably perfect information and perfect foresight. The scenario approach by 
contrast produces plausible pathways which emerge from the aggregated activities of 
system actors with separate perspectives, limited information and limited foresight. The 
characteristics of the process therefore usefully reflect uncertainties and information 
limitations which exist in real systems. 
7.3 The structure of variability in the scenarios 
Chapter 2 argued that the effectiveness of scenarios is greatly assisted by 
clearly categorising the future variability of the system. This section clarifies which 
elements of the future scenarios will be considered fixed, and sets out how variation 
between the scenarios will be considered. 
7.3.1 Fixed system elements 
A large technological system is highly complex and has a very large number of 
potentially variable elements. Nonetheless, a large number of internal system elements in a 
scenario will be treated as fixed or ‘pre-determined’. This may be because there are 
elements of the system which there are good reasons to consider highly certain and 
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predictable – thus their consistent treatment within all scenarios reflects the high level of 
certainty connected with them. Other elements may be treated as fixed, not because their 
invariability is certain, but because exploring their variability is beyond the immediate 
scope of the process, because they are considered to be less fundamentally connected with 
the concern of the focal question. For practical reasons there must be a hierarchy of 
elements whose variation is explored – all other elements should for consistency be held as 
fixed across all scenarios. The key fixed elements are now discussed, including whether 
they are fixed because they are considered pre-determined, or their variability is beyond 
the scope of the question. 
7.3.1.1 Low carbon policy 
The focal question sets the role of the transmission network within a specific 
low carbon context, defined as a requirement to meet a target of 50gCO2/kWh by the 
early 2030s (CCC, 2010b, CCC, 2013a). This means that in all scenarios low carbon policy 
is a fixed element – the background assumption of the level of commitment to achieving 
this target through supporting and incentivising low carbon generation technologies does 
not vary. This fixed background assumption on decarbonisation is not intended to suggest 
that such a policy background is a foregone conclusion. Rather it is a question of scope of 
the focal question, according to which the research is not concerned with what the role of 
the transmission network would be in a system in which decarbonisation was completely 
off the agenda. The trajectory towards the 50gCO2/kWh target is measured at each time 
stage in each scenario, by calculating the total annual contribution to electricity supply of 
the installed capacities of generators, based on average annual load factors (given in 
Appendix E.5.4), and assuming that low carbon generators are higher merit-order than 
high-carbon generators.  
The precise policies which would be required to incentivise the building of 
low carbon generation plant sufficient to meet this target, are not specified in the scenarios. 
However, it is assumed that all available technologies are given comparable incentives, 
sufficient for each to be competitive, and there is no explicit preference for one technology 
over another. Depending on the scenario and its transmission charging policy approach, 
some technologies may have locational advantages – however this would arise from the 
effect of the transmission charging policy, not from the generation incentive. This 
assumption of technology neutrality in generation incentives involves the assumption that, 
at least as far policy on incentivising low carbon generation is concerned, the existing 
market-led, technology neutral paradigm – what Mitchell has described as the Regulatory 
State Paradigm (RSP) – remains in place, and that there is no shift in any of the scenarios 
to, for example, a more directed state intervention on the generation mix in favour of a 
particular technology type.  
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This freezing of the conditions of the broader energy policy value set or 
paradigm, even while the scenarios explore changing value sets associated with the specific 
area of transmission policy, might be criticised from the point of view of the broader 
internal consistency of the scenarios. For example, in scenarios which are predicated on 
more anticipatory and strategic planning in transmission, the validity of a continuing 
assumption that no comparable strategic planning approach takes place on the generation 
side might be questioned, on the basis that the internal consistency of scenarios requires 
that the same value-system should inform all areas of policy which fall within them. 
The requirement for internal consistency is something strongly argued for by 
proponents of the intuitive logic school of scenario thought (Van Der Heijden, 2004). This 
can be interpreted to mean that any policy or actor decision in the scenario must conform 
to the values which characterise the scenario – the values attain a global currency. 
However, critics have pointed out that this extreme homogeneity is in fact highly 
unrealistic – the world is much more typically heterogeneous and replete with tensions and 
disagreements (Anderson et al., 2005). Unless there is a strong reason why policies are 
yolked together under the same value system, there is no reason to assume that they would 
be. It is necessary to look at the real world system that the scenario is representing and ask 
whether or not consistency of values between given policy areas is guaranteed by inherent 
links between those areas, or whether they are insufficiently strongly linked to guarantee 
that a policy change in one area entails a similar policy change in the other. 
As will be set out in Section 7.4.1, the scenarios in this thesis focus on 
electricity transmission policy choices, and the intended ‘scenario users’ are transmission 
policy makers. The values grid depicted in Figure 21 creates four scenario spaces specifically 
referring to alternative approaches within transmission policy. The question is, should the 
values suggested by these alternative spaces be translated and extended to other, wider 
energy policy areas? Is there an inherent link between transmission policy and other energy 
policy areas, meaning that approaches in transmission policy will be mirrored in other 
areas? 
Transmission policy and other energy policy areas – particularly generation 
incentives – are different areas involving different types of technologies and different sets of 
actors. They are affected by different policy levers (TNUoS, BSUoS, RIIO etc for 
transmission; FITs and CM for generation incentives) which are pulled by different sets of 
people within Ofgem and DECC. The expressions of equivalent values in terms of specific 
policies in the two areas, could also mean quite different things. Attempting to pick a 
winning generation technology is a different kind of risk from being anticipatory about 
future network needs; though the latter involves a degree of technological expectation, it is 
less specific and allows for a greater amount of hedging. The anticipatory transmission 
approach as understood in this thesis, is by no means inconsistent with a technology neutral 
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generation incentive approach. There is no inherent reason why policy levers in these two 
areas should necessarily be pulled at the same time and in the same direction.  
Given that it cannot be conclusively shown that contrasting values in 
transmission and the broader energy system policy cannot co-exist, these have to be treated 
as independent variables. The scenarios are about informing transmission policy, which 
means they must clearly show the possible effects that decisions which could be taken 
within that sphere, by the intended scenario users (transmission policy makers), might have 
on the system. Unless a variable can be shown to be absolutely coupled to one of the key 
variables under study, it should not be simultaneously varied as this would obfuscate what 
the effect of the transmission policy choice had been. The holding constant of independent 
variables other than those directly under study is a matter of upholding the clarity of the 
outputs. This relates to the point of principle developed during the discussions in Chapter 2 
and proposed in Section 2.6.2. 
The co-existence of apparently contrasting value-sets within different areas of 
energy policy is moreover by no means an unexpected phenomenon. As discussed in 
Chapters 3 and 4 it is precisely such a mix which is characteristic of energy policy generally 
and transmission policy specifically, at the present time. Hall’s analysis of policy paradigms 
suggests that it is highly possible that values affecting different policy choices could shift in 
different ways and at different times within the fabric of the policy mix, as the overall 
policy paradigm ‘stretches’ to accommodate an ‘anomaly’. Where, in scenarios presented 
in this thesis, shifting transmission policy values contrast with the frozen wider energy 
system policy values, it is this ‘stretch’ condition that is being represented. Hall notes that 
an accumulation of these stretches can result in the paradigm being ultimately discredited 
and replaced – the appearance of stretches and the tensions which may be caused by them 
are highlighted in the scenarios and discussed as part of the analysis, including observing 
examples in which the tension may be accumulating to such an extent that there could be a 
possibility of broader paradigm shift (for example in Section 9.2.8). This approach allows 
the scenarios to convey a more realistic depiction of policy in which multiple policy areas 
are not inevitably closely aligned and locked together. It also allows analysis of where wider 
regime tensions may arise through increasing anomalies in the paradigm. Such an analysis is 
not achieved in scenarios which smooth such tensions away by pre-supposing unrealistic 
levels of cross-regime ideological harmony. 
7.3.1.2 System security 
It is also a requirement that the generation mixes achieve an acceptable level 
of system security, bearing in mind the increased proportion of variable generation sources. 
Although there is potential for storage, demand side management and interconnectors to 
mitigate the effect of supply side variation, a more conventional response would be to 
ensure that there is sufficient thermal capacity to back up the variable renewables. In the 
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scenarios, a relatively conservative approach is taken of using the derating factors applied 
by Ofgem in their 2013 Capacity Margin Assessment (Ofgem, 2013), to calculate the 
derated capacity margin of the generation mix against the peak demand in the scenario 
year. These derating factors (Table 7) are Ofgem’s statistical assessment of the proportion 
of installed capacity of each generation type which can be reliably expected to be available 
at the time of winter peak. They are therefore different from, and serve a different purpose 
to both the seasonal availability factors discussed in Section 6.4.2, and the average annual 
load factors reported in Appendix E.5.4.  
In each scenario year, the generation mix is required to achieve at least a 
positive capacity margin, through the addition where necessary of firm thermal capacity in 
addition to the low carbon capacity which may have been added in order to maintain the 
decarbonisation trajectory. The requirement for only a positive capacity margin is in 
conventional terms minimal, as currently derated capacity margins less than 5% would be 
considered risky. However the requirement for only a positive capacity margin includes an 
assumption that with a large penetration of renewables some other measures – such as 
demand side response, storage or interconnection – might well become available to add to 
system security.  
The precise policy measures which would be required to ensure that the 
investment required to maintain a positive capacity margin actually takes place, are not 
specifically detailed in the scenarios. For plant whose output would ideally be required on 
an increasingly intermittent basis, as greater quantities of renewables are installed, there 
are essentially two options. One is that if prices are allowed to rise as high as they naturally 
would at a point of supply scarcity, such as a low wind condition, that high price, even 
though only occasionally received, would be sufficient to provide overall annual reward for 
the plant. However, political sensitivity to high prices, even if occurring very seldom, often 
means that in practice such prices are prevented from occurring. If this occurs, this creates 
a ‘missing money’ problem, and means that peaking plant must be given other incentives to 
operate, such as the capacity mechanism, which pays plant a fixed retainer to be available at 
peak times if needed (Royal Academy of Engineering, 2013). The inclusion of a capacity 
mechanism within the EMR package suggests that this latter approach is the one that is 
favoured for the time being.  
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Table 7: Derating factors by technology for capacity margin calculations, used in Ofgem's capacity assessment (Ofgem, 
2013) 
Fuel Type Availability (%) 
Coal / Biomass 88 
Gas CCGT / Gas CHP 85 
OCGT 92 
Oil 82 
Nuclear 81 
Hydro 84 
Pumped storage 96 
Wind 17-24  
 
7.3.1.3 Interconnectors  
The existing interconnectors have default settings in the modelling when their 
behaviour is not affected by specific scenario dynamics. They are all on export, with the 
Moyle and Eire interconnectors each set at 500 MW export, reflecting typical conditions. 
The IFA and Britned interconnectors are set at a nominal 50 MW export – effectively 
therefore the default assumption is that they are net neutral. These central assumptions 
follow those used by ENSG (2012). However the behaviour of these and additional 
interconnectors is varied in scenarios where the policy and operational conditions deem it 
appropriate, as is described in the scenarios.  
7.3.1.4 Demand profile 
Section 6.3 described the process by which system demands for each of the 
three seasons, disaggregated spatially by model node and projected forward through the 
scenario period, were developed. As described in Section 7.2 these nodal demand profiles 
are key inputs to the scenario generation process. Evidently, these input data are based on a 
single projection of the possible evolution of overall system demand. This projection is 
strongly informed by the National Grid’s Future Energy Scenarios report (National Grid, 
2013c), and includes assumptions of the general increase in existing energy system 
demands, as well as additional new energy service demands arising from the electrification 
of heat and transport as part of the energy system-wide low carbon transition, as described 
in Section 6.3.3. The proportions by which the overall system demand is allocated to nodes 
remains fixed, as described in Section 6.3.2.  
However, it is evidently possible that significant variations from this demand 
profile could in fact occur. The overall growth in electricity demand could be curbed by 
even greater uptake of energy efficient technologies than is assumed in the profile, or by 
profound cultural and lifestyle changes. The mass electrification of heat and transport may 
not occur even assuming the low carbon transition as a fixed element, as alternative 
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decarbonisation vectors may be identified for these services. Demographic shifts may run 
counter to the assumption that the locational distribution of energy demands remains 
similar to day, for example if there is a significant change to the concentration of 
population in the south-east of England. All of these things are possible, but the inclusion of 
multiple demand profiles against which to test the scenarios would have expanded the 
number of variables being dealt with by the scenarios beyond manageability. The 
alternative of running each of the scenarios against a different demand profile would have 
significantly reduced the comparability of the scenarios, making analysis relating to the 
focal question of transmission networks extremely difficult. It would also not have had a 
logical justification – the variation between the scenarios is specifically about transmission 
network policy, and there is no clear reason why this should have a direct effect on 
demand. Thus, a single demand profile, broadly compatible with the background 
assumption of overall system decarbonisation, was developed and applied uniformly to all 
scenarios.  
7.3.1.5 Transmission network investments 
Evidently the starting point for all scenarios must be the base year of 2013, 
hence all scenarios have in common the existing transmission network infrastructure of that 
base year, as described in Section 6.2. Each of the scenarios makes different additions to 
this starting network, as the scenarios diverge over successive time periods. However, a 
small number of transmission network upgrade projects were committed and underway in 
2013, and are thus incorporated as fixed and pre-determined elements in each of the 
scenarios. Table 8 lists these projects, all of which are included in each scenario in the 2018 
scenario year. Data sources for this information are the Transmission Owner Major Project 
Update Table, June 2013 (available at (ENSG, 2013)), checked against projections for 
boundary capabilities in (ENSG, 2012) and (National Grid, 2012a).  
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Table 8: Committed transmission network upgrade projects to appear in all scenarios by year 2018 
Transmission 
owner 
Project summary Increase in 
transfer capacity 
or generation 
accommodated 
(MW) 
Action taken in 
model 
SHE Transmission Beauly-Denny 400kV 
line 
850 over B1, 1200 
over B4 
Beauly-Denny 
132kV line (132 
MW) replaced by 
one 400kV line 
(2780 MW) and on 
275kV line (1090 
MW), nodes 5-10-
13 
SHE Transmission Beauly-Blackhillock-
Kintore 275kV 
reconductoring 
300 Line 5-7 uprated by 
800; with 0.38 
derating this gives 
300 
SHE Transmission Hunterston-Kintyre 
240 MVA AC subsea 
link 
350 MW additional 
generation 
Added as two 500 
MW lines with 0.35 
derate, nodes 9-16 
SHE Transmission Caithness-Moray 
HVDC 
Reinforcement 
600 Added as one line 
from 3 to 6, to add 
to the exitsing 6 to 
7 line 
SPT Incremental 
Reinforcement: 
(a) Series 
Compensation  
(b)) East-West 400kV 
Upgrade 
1100 (B6) a) the 1100 B6 
increase achieved by 
changing B6 ratio; 
and b) theeast-west 
upgrade by uprating 
strathaven-smeaton 
to double 400kv 
line  
SPT Western HVDC link  2200 (B6) Western HVDC 
added, nodes 16-33 
SPT East Coast 400kV 
Upgrade  
 1700 (B5) East coast upgrade 
added - uprate to 
400kv line between 
nodes 13-18 (and 7-
13?) 
NGET Scotland-England 
Reinforcement 
(Harker-Hutton 
reconductoring) 
1400 Increased capacity 
of Harker Hutton 
(22-31) line. This 
delivers approx 
1400 extra as stated 
in this list, btu note 
difference in B7 
caps between ENSG 
2012 and ETYS 
2012, and relative 
timing of measures 
NGET North Wales 
(Reconductor 
Trawsfynydd – 
1500 Uprated using 
example lines - 
actually adds 2000 
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Treuddyn) to capacity after 
derating 
NGET East Anglia  
(i) Reconductoring 
Bramford-Norwich +  
(ii) Bramford 
Substation 
Reconfiguration 
1100 Norwich to Sizewell 
now with 'turn in' at 
Bramford. Both 
lines uprated 
 
7.3.1.6 Generation investments 
As with the transmission system, the common starting point for all scenarios is 
the existing generation mix in the base year of 2013, as described in Section 6.4. In 
addition, there are two conventional generation projects which, though not operational in 
2013, are sufficiently advanced to be considered as fixed, pre-determined elements in all 
scenarios. The Carrington 800 MW CCGT plant is currently under construction near 
Manchester, and is assumed to appear in all scenarios in 2018. The Hinkley Point C nuclear 
station is assumed to be online in all scenarios by the year 2023. 
The majority of onshore wind additions in the year 2018 are common to all 
scenarios. These total 2671 MW and constitute the majority of the added capacity between 
2012/13 and 2017/18 in the 2011 Seven Year Statement. This gives a baseline capacity of 
6846 MW in all scenarios (the SYS lists only transmission connected wind). SLWP meets 
only this baseline, whereas the other scenarios include more of the total SYS 2017/18 
listing of 7864 MW, due to different assumptions about connections to remote regions and 
islands. 
Offshore wind sites currently with consent, totalling 2746 MW, and those 
under construction, totalling 1401 MW, are treated as fixed elements and appear in all 
scenarios in 2018 as a minimum baseline (see Appendix E.4 for further detail).   
7.3.1.7 Generation retirements 
There are a number of known factors which will cause the closure of large 
quantities of currently existing conventional plant within the time frame of the scenarios. 
The most significant factors are the age of the plant, the impact of EU regulations such as 
the Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD) and the Industrial Emissions Directive 
(IED), and domestic low-carbon policies. Precisely how these factors will interact, and 
what will be the exact pattern of closures as a result cannot be predicted with certainty. 
Assumptions on generation retirements are therefore, for the most part, not proposed as 
pre-determined elements, but, in the same manner as the demand assumptions, constitute 
a reasonable trajectory taking into account the above factors, which is held constant across 
all scenarios to assist comparability.  
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Table 9 shows the programme of plant closures applying in each scenario. The 
closures listed to take place by the year 2018 are all committed as of 2013, due to a 
mixture of commercial decisions and the effect of the LCPD, and are thus ‘pre-
determined’. The closures listed in subsequent years are more speculative. An influential 
factor in the mid 2020s will be the Industrial Emissions Directive. Ratcliffe-on-Soar is the 
only plant at the time of writing to be fully opted into the IED. It is likely that the IED will 
cause some significant plant closures in the mid 2020s, and those selected for closure in the 
scenarios in 2023 have been done so on the basis of the tone of recent announcements by 
the relevant companies. In 2028 the remaining coal plants except for Ratcliffe-on-Soar are 
closed – this is due to an assumption that with an increasingly strong low carbon policy 
agenda it will be increasingly hard for them to operate. In 2033 a large number of CCGT 
plants, and Ratcliffe-on-Soar, are closed due to reaching the end of their expected 
operational life – the IEA estimates the technical lifetime of a CCGT plant at 30 years 
(Seebregts, 2010). 
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Table 9: List of plant closures and retirements by scenario year 
Scenario 
year 
Plant name Node Plant type Capacity Reason for closure 
2018 Teesside 25 CCGT 1875 Uneconomic 
 Roosecote 31 CCGT 229 Uneconomic 
 Wylfa 34 Nuclear 490 End of life 
 Kings Lynn A 42 CCGT 340 Uneconomic 
 Ironbridge 45 Coal 964 LCPD 
 Uskmouth 57 Coal 363 Uneconomic 
 Tilbury Stage 1 59 Coal 1131 LCPD 
      
2023 Hartlepool 25 Nuclear 1207 End of life 
 Eggborough 27 Coal 1940 End of life / IED 
 Ferrybridge 27 Coal 1014 End of life / IED 
 Heysham 1 32 Nuclear 1160 End of life 
 West Burton 
(half) 
41 Coal 1000 End of life / IED 
 Didcot B 56 CCGT 1550 End of life / IED 
 Aberthaw 57 Coal 1665 End of life / IED 
 Dungeness B 61 Nuclear 1081 End of life 
      
2028 Longannet 13 Coal 2284 End of life / low carbon  
 Hunterston 16 Nuclear 1074 End of life 
 Torness 19 Nuclear 1215 End of life 
 Lynemouth 23 Coal 420 End of life / low carbon 
 Drax 27 Coal 3906 End of life / low carbon  
 Heysham 2 32 Nuclear 1248 End of life 
 Fiddler’s Ferry 33 Coal 1987 End of life / low carbon 
 Cottam 41 Coal 2000 End of life / low carbon  
 West Burton 
(remainder) 
41  Coal  987 End of life / low carbon 
 Rugely 45 Coal 1018 End of life / low carbon 
 Hinkley B 71 Nuclear 1261 End of life 
      
2033 Peterhead 8 CCGT 1180 End of life 
 Brigg 28 CCGT 260 End of life 
 Killingholme 28 CCGT 900 End of life 
 Killingholme 2 28 CCGT 665 End of life 
 Keadby 28 CCGT 735 End of life 
 Deeside 33 CCGT 515 End of life 
 Connahs Quay 33 CCGT 1380 End of life 
 Rocksavage 33 CCGT 810 End of life 
 CDCL 41 CCGT 395 End of life 
 Peterborough 42 CCGT 405 End of life 
 Ratcliffe on Soar 44 Coal 2021 End of life 
 Corby 46 CCGT 401 End of life 
 Little Barford 47 CCGT 665 End of life 
 Barry 57 CCGT 245 End of life 
 Rye House 58 CCGT 715 End of life 
 Barking 58 CCGT 1000 End of life 
 Medway 59 CCGT 700 End of life 
 Damhead Creek 59 CCGT 805 End of life 
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7.3.1.8 Other elements out of system scope 
As defined by the focal question, the system under study for the scenarios is 
the transmission network and the actors and policy values directly linked to this. 
Developments at the distribution network level cannot be considered in detail by the 
scenarios. Distributed generation technologies which would connect directly to the 
distribution networks are not part of the initial storyline development – however a possible 
expansion in solar PV is considered as a non-actor-contingent element. 
The scenarios primarily focus on known and demonstrated technologies. They 
have not included carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology as an option, and biomass 
for electricity generation is also limited to the relatively small capacities listed by 2017/18 
in the SYS. Large scale expansion of biomass power generation is considered too uncertain 
in the light of sustainability concerns. 
Public objections to a major expansion in transmission networks could 
constitute a major part of the story transmission development, as there exist significant 
public concerns around transmission line and pylon construction (Devine-Wright et al., 
2010). It is beyond the scope of the scenarios to represent alternative levels of public 
support for or objection to transmission lines as an additional scenario variable. However, 
the contrasting network architectures delivered by the scenarios may be evaluated in terms 
of the level of investment required and the potential challenges this could present in terms 
of public acceptability.  
Despite the removal of or freezing of assumptions around elements which are 
not directly within the system under study, some of the aspects may have significant 
impacts. A selection of them are analysed via ex-post sensitivity analyses as non-actor-
contingent elements as discussed in Section 7.3.2. 
7.3.2 Categorising future variation: ‘actor-contingent’ 
and ‘non-actor-contingent’ elements 
The previous section described various elements of the system which are 
treated as fixed, either because they are considered as pre-determined or because their 
variation is beyond the scope of the work. This section summarises the approach to the 
scenario elements which are considered subject to potential variation, recalling the 
distinction drawn in Section 2.3.2 between ‘actor-contingent’ and ‘non-actor-contingent’ 
elements. This distinction is useful to clarify the different kinds of decision making to which 
the various future elements could be applied. Actor-contingent elements suggest options 
policy makers could take which could have a material effect on the evolution of the system 
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(proactive decision making). Non-actor-contingent elements are outside of the control of 
policy makers, and the exploration of such elements gives policy makers the chance to 
consider how robust their decisions would be under different uncontrollable aspects of the 
future (protective decision making). In combination, the scenario analysis that this 
structure promotes may yield insights that contribute towards agreed paths forward 
(consensus building). 
7.3.2.1 Actor-contingent elements 
Actor contingent elements are the elements which are within the control of 
key internal system actors to influence. Scenarios which emerge from the active and 
conscious choices of certain key prime mover actors, are ‘actor-contingent scenarios’ – 
contingent upon key choices made by these prime mover actors. In these scenarios, these 
key choices are policy choices which affect the regulation of the transmission system. These 
policy choices are based on alternative value sets as illustrated in Figure 36. The effects of 
these choices are the impacts they have on decision making processes of other actors who 
choose to invest in transmission or generation technologies. The reasoning behind these 
investment decisions in each scenario is represented by the developed by the inductive 
application of the decision rules explained in Section 7.2.   
The transmission and generation investment decisions within each scenario are 
also guided by certain parameters and boundaries. On the generation side, there is an 
impetus that investment decisions as a whole should ensure the system remains on track to 
hit 50gCO2/kWh by 2033, and retain a positive capacity margin, as described in Sections 
7.3.1.1 and 7.3.1.2. In addition, technology specific investment decisions are bound by 
locational specific bounds on maximum deployment potential, and by maximum build 
rates. These data are provided at Appendix E.4. 
On the transmission side, network investment choices can occur in three 
ways. First, where an existing line is low capacity compared to the highest capacity lines on 
the network as defined in the original SYS data (National Grid, 2011b), it is considered to 
have potential for an uprate, which would be achieved by replacement of the line with a 
new higher capacity material, whilst using the existing towers and line route. In this case 
the line parameters of the existing line – thermal capacity and impedance – are exchanged 
for the line parameters of the new higher rated line (based on the parameters of another 
higher rated real line in the SYS data). Second, onshore capacity can be added through the 
building of new overhead lines. In this case line parameters are copied from existing lines, 
multiplied by the distance and the impedances combined using Equation 1. Third, HVDC 
subsea offshore cables can be added. Paramaters for these are based on those suggested by 
Sarkar (2012). Uprates and new overhead lines remain subject to the derating factors as 
discussed in Section E.1, which account for voltage and stability limits. Sub-sea HVDC 
cables bypass these limits and can add capacity at 100% of their rating. 
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7.3.2.2 Non-actor-contingent elements 
Non-actor-contingent elements are those which are uncertain, which could 
have a significant impact upon the system, but which cannot be controlled or are not 
related to the decisions of any identifiable internal system actor. This could be because they 
originate from outside the system, as defined by the focal question, or because the nature of 
their uncertainty is such that they are not easily connected with known possible actor 
decisions. Although system actors cannot control these elements of the future, they may 
wish to consider how robust the decisions they can make will remain under such 
conditions. As the non-actor-contingent elements are unconnected to the decision making 
process which defines the actor-contingent scenarios, they could, logically, be elements 
experienced by any of the scenarios. The non-actor-contingent elements are therefore used 
as stress tests to consider the relative robustness of each of the emergent systems to these 
different aspects.  
Thus following the development of the actor-contingent scenarios using the 
process described in the previous sections, each of the scenarios will be tested against the 
following non-actor contingent variable elements: 
• Growth in solar PV – this would be seen by the transmission network as 
suppressed demand during sunny periods. 
• Alternative EV charging patterns – including greater or lesser peak 
avoidance, locational signals 
• Development of grid scale storage 
• Public objections to transmission network expansion 
7.4 Summary of scenario process 
Section 2.6 developed a scenario development process which clarifies the 
boundaries of the process and draws apart the different kinds of fixed and variable future 
elements of which the future scenarios are comprised. As emphasised in that section, the 
process in practice is not linear. However, with all elements now in place, it is appropriate 
to briefly reprise that process and indicate how the various elements discussed fall in to it. 
7.4.1 Define the question and objective type, and 
identify the scenario user or users 
The focal question for the scenarios is: 
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• How can transmission network policy choices affect the role that the 
transmission network plays in helping to deliver a low-carbon electricity 
system by the early 2030s?  
 The focal question clarifies that the primary scenario users are UK actors with 
the ability to influence electricity transmission network policy. The objective of the 
scenario process is primarily proactive – it aims to inform policy decisions that could be 
made in the near-term by actors who have the agency to make such decisions. The key 
‘prime movers’ in this regard are DECC and Ofgem. However, multiple actors in the 
system, including generation and transmission companies have the potential to influence 
the design of these policies. Hence the scenarios may also have the potential to serve as 
tools towards consensus building between these various actors. Finally, the scenarios will 
be tested against non-actor-contingent events – the relative robustness of the scenarios to 
these will inform protective decision making.  
7.4.2 Scope and define the system in terms of visions 
and values, actor networks and technological 
configurations 
The focal question defines the system as the technologies, policies and actors 
with a direct relationship to the electricity transmission network. Through the discussion in 
Chapters 3 to 6 this system has been characterised across these three levels, and Section 7.2 
described how the movement and iteration between these three levels, as called for in 
Section 2.5, is achieved in practice. 
7.4.3 Identify pre-determined or immobile elements 
Identified pre-determined elements are the generation and transmission 
investments considered committed at the time of writing, as set out in Sections 7.3.1.5  
and 7.3.1.6. Other elements, though potentially variable, are treated as fixed due to the 
scope of the focal question. These are: low carbon policy; requirement for conventional 
plant due to capacity margin; demand profile; generation retirements. Elements which are 
out of system scope are: distribution network activity including distributed generation; 
major demand side changes; unknown or uncertain technologies; and public objections. 
However some of these elements are subsequently explored as non-actor-contingent 
elements.  
7.4.4 Identify actor-contingent elements 
The actor-contingent elements which provide the basis through which the 
scenarios diverge from each other, are the policy decisions which could be made around the 
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signalling of locational network requirements to generators, and the level of strategic or 
anticipatory planning in network development. These options are organised within four 
distinct value-set frameworks (Figure 36) which are hypothesised as being the prevalent 
value-sets within which policy choices are made in each scenario.  
7.4.5 Describe system evolution via branching points 
along alternative pathways 
Using these policy-guiding value-sets as the internal motors of the decision 
making process in each scenario, the evolution of four distinct scenarios is traced forward 
from the identical starting point of the present system, based on how the alternative value-
sets interact with the interpretation of the system condition and how this informs 
subsequent network and generation investment decisions. This requires an iterative process 
as set out in Section 7.2.  
7.4.6 Assess actor contingent scenarios against non-
actor contingent uncertainties 
Having developed scenarios based on the active decisions of internal system 
actors, these ‘actor-contingent’ scenarios can now be tested against non-actor-contingent 
uncertainties (listed in Section 7.3.2.2), which whilst being beyond the scope of the system 
as defined by the focal question, could occur against the background of any of the scenarios.  
7.5 Conclusions 
A scenario process based on inductive reasoning from multiple contrasting 
data sources can make a useful contribution to energy system policy analysis. It is a process 
capable of integrating contrasting but relevant types of information, exploring the 
perspectives of system actors in conditions of imperfect information and limited foresight, 
as would be the case in the real system. Rather than producing numerous optimal solutions 
based on uncertain inputs, it produces plausibly reasoned pathways differentiated by the 
alternative policy value-sets which guide them. 
This chapter has also set out the practical approach for creating scenarios 
which iterate between the three system levels, and identified boundaries, fixed and variable 
elements. It has also shown how the information assembled in Chapters 3-6 fits into the 
outline scenario process set out in Chapter 2, and in so doing has: clarified the focal 
question, objective type and scenario users; identified the values, actors and technological 
configurations relevant to the system under study; and identified the different kinds of 
fixed and variable elements which will affect the development of the scenarios. In the next 
chapter the scenarios will be described.  
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8 Low carbon 
transmission network 
scenarios 
This chapter presents narrative descriptions of four scenarios of the 
development of the GB transmission network in the context of the overall decarbonisation 
of the electricity system, developed using the method previously described. This chapter 
begins by presenting the power flow modelling outputs relating to the system in the base 
year 2013, and then proceeds by describing in turn each of the evolutionary paths taken by 
each scenario from this starting system state. The alternative scenarios are presented in 
turn. Each scenario description begins with a short overview of the whole scenario period, 
after which the five-year time stages are presented in succession. Each time-stage 
description describes the changes to the generation mix and the new transmission 
investments which occur in the scenario time-stage, and the power flows and exceedences 
which arise from these generation and transmission investments against the set demand 
background. The emergence of constraints on the network in one time-stage provides 
information which feeds forward to the investment decisions taken in the next time stage.  
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The scenarios are described in this chapter using a combination of qualitative 
narrative, quantitative data and visual representation of the network. 
8.1 2013: the present system 
8.1.1 2013 Generation mix 
Figure 38 summarises the generation mix in the current system. 
 
Figure 38: Electricity generation installed capacity, 2013 
This generation mix gives the following system indicators in 2013 (Table 10). 
Table 10: 2013 System indicators 
System derated capacity margin 
(%) 
 
4.7 
Proportion of annual electricity 
demand met by (%): 
Renewables 
Nuclear 
Other 
 
 
8 
19 
73 
Carbon intensity of electricity 
(g/KWh) 
 
432 
As discussed in Section 6.4.1 the generator mix for the base year of 2013 was 
based on the 2012/13 projection from the 2011 National Grid Seven Year Statement (SYS) 
(National Grid, 2011b). The SYS had to be used as it provides a detailed breakdown of each 
transmission connected generator by its location on the grid, by specifying its grid access 
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point, whereas the Digest of UK Energy Statistics (DUKES) (DECC, 2013a, DECC, 
2014a) does not provide this locational information. The 2011 edition of the SYS was the 
last to be published – the document was subsequently merged with various other National 
Grid publications to become the Ten Year Statement, first published in 2012 (National 
Grid, 2012a). This new document however did not provide the detailed breakdown of 
plants by locational grid access point in its appendices, as the SYS had previously done. 
Hence the most recent available data for the base year with the required locational detail 
were the 2012/13 projections from the 2011 SYS. 
The use of projected data from 2011 means that there is a possibility of some 
small discrepancies between what was projected by National Grid in 2011 and what 
actually turned out. In assembling scenario base year data, in some cases adjustments were 
made to the 2012/13 SYS projected data in order to account for updated information on 
commercial decisions of operators, which differed from the TEC applications they had 
submitted at the time of the 2011 SYS. A more detailed discussion of generator installed 
capacity assumptions, their adaptation from SYS data and related working, is provided in 
Appendix E.4.  
Table 11 compares the installed capacities in general technology types for 2013 
as projected in SYS 2011 data and used in the scenarios, with the actual recorded installed 
capacities for the year 2013 as reported in DUKES 2014 (DECC, 2014a). In categories 
such as offshore wind, nuclear, wave and tidal and fossil, the difference between the values 
is small, and can be attributed to minor differences between National Grid’s 2011 
projections, and the actual out-turn. However, more substantial differences are found in 
the categories of onshore wind, solar, biomass and waste, and to a lesser extent hydro. 
These differences reflect the fact that the SYS data only captures transmission connected 
generators. However, a substantial amount of the current renewable installed capacity is at 
lower voltage networks - DUKES captures generation installed at both transmission and 
distribution levels, hence the higher figures in some cases. 
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Table 11: Comparison of scenario base year installed capacity assumptions with 2013 reported data from DUKES. 
Source: (DECC, 2014a), table 5.6 (nuclear and fossil data) and table 6.4 (renewables data) 
Technology type DUKES 2014 
Capacity 
(MW) 
Scenario base year data (based on SYS 
2011) Capacity (MW) 
Onshore wind 7513 4175 
Offshore wind 3696 3653 
Nuclear 9906 9943 
Hydro 1693 1117 
Wave and tidal 7 0 
Bioenergy and wastes 4002 97 
Fossil 61,764 55931 
Data from DUKES 2014 (DECC, 2014a) indicates that the amount of 
electricity produced from nuclear closely matches the levels generated by the assumptions 
in the base year modelling: table 5.1 from DUKES 2014 reports 70.6 TWh from nuclear in 
2013, which was 19.8% of the total electricity supply of 356.3 TWh (DECC, 2014a); the 
scenario base year data has 72.3 TWh from nuclear, which is 19.2% of the total electricity 
supply of 376.2 TWh. This close match in energy terms for nuclear reflects the similarity 
of the installed capacity figures (as shown in Table 11, above), which in turn reflects the fact 
that all nuclear is transmission connected. However, the total production from renewables 
in 2013 recorded by DUKES amounted to 53.7 TWh, or almost 15% of total electricity 
supplied (DECC, 2014a), whereas the scenario base year data generates 30.1 TWh which 
amounts to only 8% of total supply. This significant difference is due to the issue, noted 
above, of a significant quantity of renewable power being generated on distribution 
networks, and not recorded by the SYS, and hence not included in the base-year installed 
capacity assumptions for these scenarios.  
The focus on transmission connected generation in these scenarios, and the 
decision not to enumerate and locate all of the existing distribution connected renewables 
to add to the base year generation mix, is justified by the fact that the scope and focus of 
the scenarios and the related power flow modelling is on the transmission network. From 
the perspective of the transmission network, embedded generation on the distribution 
networks is indistinguishable from a reduction in demand. Detailed modelling of power 
flows on the distribution network is out of scope for the current project. The decision to 
restrict the scope of this project to the transmission network was considered necessary for 
the purposes of bounding the work and making it tractable. Nonetheless the potentially 
significant future role of distribution connected renewables, and the possibility that large 
quantities of embedded generation could begin to have quite significant interactions with 
transmission networks, means that a valid criticism could be made that growth in 
distributed generation was not considered as an internal variable within each of the 
scenarios. In order to partially address this potential criticism, one of the ‘non-actor-
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contingent’ variants applied to each of the scenarios, is a condition in which large scale 
penetration of a distributed energy technology – solar PV – does occur, and the effects of 
this on the transmission network are explored (8.6.8.3).       
8.1.2 Resultant power flow 
The modelling of power flows illustrates the present state of the system. 
Although installed capacities of renewables are currently low relative to longer-term 
ambitions, these technologies are having an impact on the pattern of constraints, as shown 
by the generally higher level of line exceedences (which would require constraining 
actions) when the power flow is run for high wind conditions.  
The winter high-wind condition (Figure 39) sees high exceedences between the 
highlands of Scotland and the central belt, over the Cheviot boundary and in the north-west 
of England, as high renewable output in northern GB is exported south. There is also a 
constraint between south Yorkshire and the east Midlands due to high fossil output in this 
region. In the winter low wind condition (Figure 40) constraints in Scotland and northern 
England are almost entirely removed, but there are still some constraints in the Midlands 
and the south-west due to the activity of conventional plant. The relatively small quantities 
of renewables, and their concentration in northern Britain means that in the other 
conditions, NS produces a similar constraint pattern to high wind, and SN and average 
conditions produce a similar constraint pattern to low wind.  
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Figure 39: 2013 Winter High Wind power flow 
 
Figure 40: 2013 Winter Low Wind power flow 
  
KEY TO BRANCH COLOURS 
 Up to 80% utilisation 
 80-100% utilisation 
 Up to 25% exceedence 
 Up to 50% exceedence 
 Over 50% exceedence 
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The Spring high wind (Figure 41), North-South, South-North and average 
(Figure 42) wind conditions have significantly higher exceedences in Scotland than in the 
equivalent winter conditions, but lower or zero exceedences in the midlands and south-
west from conventional plant. This is due to the fact that spring time can still produce high 
winds, comparable to winter time, and combined with significantly lower demand this 
creates a greater export flow from the northern renewable areas. The high wind with 
lower demand also reduces requirements from conventional plant which is why constraints 
in the midlands and southern England are reduced. The spring low wind condition 
produces no exceedences. 
 
Figure 41: 2013 Spring High Wind power flow 
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Figure 42: 2013 Spring Average Wind power flow 
In the summer conditions the constraints are persistent in the north of GB, as 
the lower demand again creates greater export requirement from northern renewables, but 
less stress on the networks in the rest of the country. The summer high wind condition 
(Figure 43) has higher northern exceedences than the winter high wind condition (although 
not as high as the spring high wind condition) due to the lower demand causing more 
north-south export than in the winter case. The low, NS and average (Figure 44) conditions 
also have constraints in Scotland but none in England, and the SN condition, with its 
particularly low northern output, is free of constraints. 
KEY TO BRANCH COLOURS 
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 Up to 50% exceedence 
 Over 50% exceedence 
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Figure 43: 2013 Summer High Wind power flow 
 
Figure 44: 2013 Summer Average Wind power flow 
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These results show that the combined effect of wind conditions and the 
pattern and level of power demand combine to affect the level of constraints required on 
the system. High wind and low demand in exporting areas contribute to highest constraint 
levels, as lower load close to renewables means that more power has to flow elsewhere 
across the network (generally, south). Constraints are persistently found in Scotland in all 
seasons, in most wind conditions, except those with particularly low wind in the north of 
GB.  
8.2 Strong location strong plan (SLSP) 
8.2.1 Overview of whole scenario 
In this scenario there is a clear commitment to use network charging as a 
means of creating locational signals of network conditions, to influence the siting and 
operational decisions of generators. Whilst the specific policy frameworks are not detailed 
in the scenario, it is assumed that the frameworks have the ability to affect operational 
decisions, to help with network congestion in real time, as well as investment decisions. 
However, in addition to the strong locational signals provided by the network charging 
policies, there is also a preparedness to take a long term anticipatory approach to network 
investment – when new investments pass the locational threshold and trigger new network 
investments, these network investments are undertaken not on a piecemeal basis but with a 
long term anticipation of future investments in the region. As a result, this scenario sees a 
relatively limited expansion of the existing network in the first decade of the scenario 
period, as new low carbon generation investment is concentrated on making best use of 
existing network capacity. However, as the potential for the existing network to support 
additional renewables saturates, new network investments are undertaken in a strategic 
anticipatory manner. First, the area in the Scottish North Sea is developed into an offshore 
grid combined with export capacity to Norway as well as England, which allows for 
smoothing of the overall output and interconnection flows. Similarly, in the final part of 
the period, an offshore network develops in the English North Sea, combined with export 
capacity to Denmark. The resulting picture in 2033 is of a highly interconnected system, 
but with different regions of GB interacting differently with their European 
interconnections, due to locationally differentiated price signals. This allows a high 
development of renewables, with networks fairly well utilised and sized to transmit a 
relatively smoothed overall power flow between regions. The resulting network permits 
the development of 68 GW of renewables by 2033. However, due to the low load factors 
of renewables nuclear also plays a significant role in meeting overall electricity demand 
with low carbon sources, reaching 17 GW in 2033. Due to the retirement of all but one of 
the existing nuclear fleet by this point, this involves the construction of five new stations 
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over the whole time period. Despite this heavily decarbonised mix, 37 GW of fossil 
thermal plant is maintained online to meet demand during very low wind conditions. 
8.2.2 2013 - 2018 
8.2.2.1 Overview of period 
In 2013 the most significant network concern is the export of power between 
Scotland and England. This relates to the integration of Scottish and English systems under 
BETTA, and is being added to by increasing development of renewables in the north of GB. 
There are plans to invest in the network to bring the Scotland-England boundary into 
compliance. Notably, these include reconductoring and other works on the existing border 
circuits, and the construction of the new HVDC offshore link between Hunterston and 
Deeside (Table 8).  
The EMR package has come into effect which it is hoped will provide 
sufficient incentive for low carbon generation to meet EU 2020 targets and the CCC 
carbon budgets. 
The key changes during this period therefore are the significant upgrade of the 
Scotland-England boundary, and a development of renewable resources in line with 
available network capacity. The philosophy of this scenario means that the primary aim is to 
meet low carbon and renewable targets in a way which balances the preferences of 
generators to locate in certain regions, with the costs that such locational choices may 
impose on the network. 
8.2.2.2 Generation mix 
Onshore wind is deployed in accordance with applications existing in 2013, 
with the exception of applications in mid-Wales, Shetland and the Orkneys, as the costs of 
securing new network upgrades deter developers. High wind speeds in the Western Isles 
however encourage more development here, and the strategic development of the HVDC 
western link further boosts development. Offshore wind is deployed in accordance with 
planned and under construction sites as of 2013, in addition to 2400 MW at Dogger Bank. 
The final reactor at the Wylfa nuclear site is closed, and a number of closures of coal and 
oil plants occur under the Large Combustion Plant Directive. The locational signal, which 
has an effect at the operational as well as the investment timeframe, encourages fossil 
generators co-located with wind to turn down during windy periods, effectively sharing 
network capacity. Figure 45 shows the effect of these generation investment decisions on 
the total installed capacity during the period.  
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Figure 45: Change in installed capacity, 2013 to 2018, SLSP 
This generation mix gives the following system indicators in 2018 (Table 12). 
Table 12: SLSP 2018 system indicators 
System derated capacity margin 
(%) 
 
3.8 
Proportion of annual electricity 
demand met by (%): 
Renewables 
Nuclear 
Other 
 
 
21 
19 
61 
Carbon intensity of electricity 
(g/KWh) 
 
358 
 
8.2.2.3 Network investment 
Confirmed network upgrades as of 2013, as detailed in Table 8 (Chapter 7) are 
included in this scenario, most significant of which are the upgrades over the Scotland-
England boundary, including the HVDC western link between Hunterston and Deeside. 
Beyond these, an HVDC connection from Beauly to Stornoway is also made, in anticipation 
of renewable development in the Hebrides. The geographical arrangement of the upgrades 
is indicated in Figure 46. 
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Figure 46: Network upgrades SLSP 2013-2018 
8.2.2.4 Resultant power flow 
This scenario finds that due to the upgrades over the Cheviot boundary, this 
boundary is now largely compliant. By contrast, increased constraints are found in 
northern England, as the increased renewable output from Scotland combines with the still 
considerable thermal capacity in Yorkshire and Lancashire. Typical constraint corridors are 
from the Humber through Lincolnshire towards the East Midlands and London; and 
between Deeside and the West Midlands. These constraint corridors reflect patterns of 
existing large scale generation in relation to large load centres. However the constraints are 
also exacerbated by the output of Scottish wind power, which although it now bypasses the 
major constraint area of 2013, the Cheviot boundary, adds to the output of thermal stations 
to produce constraints in northern England. This is particularly the case for the lines 
running south from Deeside, which now also take the power from the landing of the 
HVDC western link. The effect of increased Scottish wind on these corridors can be seen 
by comparing a high wind condition at winter peak with a low wind condition (Figure 47 
and Figure 48). In the low wind condition, constraints are less in these northern England 
corridors, although new constraints emerge in lines running from western England towards 
London, as the lower wind output requires increased output from thermal stations in 
southern Wales and western England. 
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In summary, in 2018 this scenario sees a network in which growing output 
from renewables is continuing to have some impact upon constraints; however, due to 
significant network investments since 2013, these are not occurring in Scotland but in 
northern England; and the activity of large clusters of fossil generators in northern England 
and the midlands is at least as significant as the wind output in affecting the constraint 
patterns.    
 
Figure 47: SLSP 2018 Winter High Wind power flow 
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Figure 48: SLSP 2018 Winter Low Wind power flow 
 
8.2.3 2018 - 2023 
8.2.3.1 Overview of period 
The installed capacities of onshore and offshore wind in 2018 were similar to 
the central range of DECC’s renewable energy roadmap (DECC, 2011c), which is 
constructed with reference to the UK’s EU 2020 renewables targets. In this next period, 
the bedding-in of the EMR and the successful administration of the feed-in tariffs, within 
the pressure of the CCC’s carbon budget which expects deep power sector decarbonisation 
through the 2020s, pushes forward a continued growth in low carbon generation. However 
this occurs within a framework which gives clear incentives to utilise the existing onshore 
network efficiently, in preference to triggering new onshore upgrades. The development of 
offshore wind in the southern North Sea is undertaken alongside a coordinated approach to 
offshore transmission infrastructure which takes account of onshore network capacity in its 
landing points. Marine technologies become commercially available and are developed in 
the south-west, reflecting available network capacity here. 
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8.2.3.2 Generation 
There is a modest increase of 1 GW in onshore wind in Scotland – although 
this is the most cost effective renewable technology it is locationally disadvantaged. This 
increase is permitted by a network charging policy which includes measures to encourage 
thermal generators in Scotland to reduce output during windy conditions, allowing some 
sharing of network capacity. This increase is limited by the available existing network 
capacity, allowing for network sharing with conventional generation. 
Larger developments in offshore wind are possible, connected by project 
specific radial lines to bring power from the projects ashore. However due to the 
transmission charging regime, there is a greater incentive for projects to connect in the 
south of England than in northern England and Scotland. As a result significant 
development occurs in Dogger with a further 4.8 GW, plus 3 GW at Hornsea. The East 
Anglia zone begins its development with 1.2 GW, and the very southerly zones Rampion 
and Navitus are developed to their full available potential of 0.7 and 1.1 GW respectively. 
Locational charging also encourages tidal and wave technologies, which are 
approaching commercialisation, to locate in southerly locations. Tidal stream is installed, 
400 MW in waters off the north Devon coast, and 200 MW in the Solent. A 500 MW wave 
power project is installed off the north Cornish coast. A further important new addition in 
this period is the new nuclear station at Hinkley Point. 
Also significant in this period are plant closures. The effect of the EU’s 
Industrial Emissions Directive is felt, with a number of the older coal and gas plants opting 
out and closing by 2023. In addition, around 3.5 GW of nuclear plant closes due to its age. 
800 MW new CCGT is sufficient to maintain a positive capacity margin. This is sited in 
Yorkshire where there is network capacity available due to the closure of Eggborough and 
Ferrybridge. 
Figure 49 gives the overall impression of the change in plant mix in this period. 
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Figure 49: Change in installed capacity, 2018 to 2023, SLSP 
This generation mix gives the following system indicators in 2023 (Table 13).  
Table 13: SLSP 2023 system indicators 
System derated capacity margin 
(%) 
 
1.1 
Proportion of annual electricity 
demand met by (%): 
Renewables 
Nuclear 
Other 
 
 
33 
18 
49 
Carbon intensity of electricity 
(g/KWh) 
 
271 
Renewables have made considerable advances over the period, however the 
contribution of nuclear remains similar to 2018, as the opening of Hinkley Point C 
compensates for the closures of older stations. The resulting reduction in output from fossil 
stations contributes to a reduction in the carbon intensity of electricity, though with still 
some way to go to the 50g / kWh target. 
8.2.3.3 Network  
Due to the locational effects of charging policy, new generation is located such 
that it causes little requirement for major onshore upgrades. A new 400kV line from 
Hinkley Point to Seabank is constructed to carry power from the new nuclear station. The 
main new offshore infrastructure upgrades are the radial connections to the various new 
offshore sites. In addition Dogger and Hornsea wind farm are connected to each other by 
two 2.4 GW HVDC cables. These allow transport between the wind farms and also 
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provide an additional corridor for power to flow from north to south, allowing some of the 
offshore wind output to bypass the congested Yorkshire-Lincolnshire routes. The 
geographical arrangement of the upgrades is indicated in Figure 50. 
 
Figure 50: Network upgrades SLSP 2018 - 2023 
8.2.3.4 Resultant power flow 
In general similar patterns of constraint can be observed to those found in 
2018 – in particular running south from Humber, south from Deeside, and east from 
Bristol. However, the levels of constraint are in general lower than in 2018. This is due to 
the increased renewable output pulling down fossil output in these areas. In Winter high 
wind (Figure 51), Scotland remains compliant, and the key exceedences are felt in Humber 
to the Midlands, where remaining fossil generators are added to by injection from Dogger 
and Hornsea offshore wind farms. North Wales to west Midlands also experiences 
constraints due to the injection from the western link. Further, the connection of the 
Dogger-Hornsea offshore link introduces significantly increased power flows in the East 
Anglia and Essex areas as power is drawn towards the load centre of London. The winter 
NS condition avoids constraints in the East of the country because of the lower output from 
the North Sea wind farms, however constraints are higher in the west of the country as 
comparatively more of the Scottish wind output is transferred to North West England via 
the western Link. The largest single constraint in the winter conditions is found in the SN 
condition, from Humber to east Yorkshire. This can be attributed to the very low output in 
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Scottish onshore wind in this condition, meaning that comparatively little power is flowing 
down the western HVDC link to reach the western parts of England. This means that 
power is being pulled from Humber westwards, through this now important corridor. A 
similar dynamic is found in the summer SN condition. 
Otherwise the Spring and Summer conditions exhibit similar patterns to the 
winter conditions. The highest summer constraints are found in the NS condition, due to a 
combination of lower overall supply but higher output in Scotland, causing both significant 
North-South export, and high output from southern fossil stations.   
 
Figure 51: SLSP 2023 Winter High Wind power flow 
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Figure 52: SLSP 2023 Winter Low Wind power flow 
  
8.2.4 2023 - 2028 
8.2.4.1 Overview of period 
By 2023, the contribution of renewables to overall electricity generation 
reached 33%. However, with the carbon intensity of electricity in 2023 at 198 g/kWh, 
there is still a steep climb to reach the CCC’s target of 50 g/kWh by 2030. Due to high 
wind speeds, companies are increasingly keen to develop the Scottish North Sea, despite 
higher transmission costs for the power when it reaches the mainland. The development of 
the Scottish North Sea goes alongside the strategic development of an offshore grid in the 
area, linking the Shetland and Orkneys with offshore sites. The use of locational pricing 
sees increasingly different prices occurring in Scotland and England due to their different 
generation portfolios. This creates a case for interconnection between Scotland and 
Norway, as the potentially high renewable output from Scotland can be traded with the 
more dispatchable hydro output in Norway. Therefore, an interconnector between 
Scotland and Norway is integrated into the strategic Scottish offshore network 
development.  
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8.2.4.2 Generation 
The strategic approach to the Scottish east coast offshore grid, along with the 
Norwegian interconnection capability, releases the potential for significant expansion in all 
forms of renewables in Scotland. There are 500 MW of new onshore wind in both Shetland 
and Orkney. The potential to develop Moray and Forth offshore zones is now realised, 
with 1.5 and 2 GW constructed in these zones respectively. Wave and tidal resources can 
also be developed in Scotland, and there are 500 MW of wave devices in the waters of both 
Shetland and Orkney, as well as 300 MW tidal stream amongst each island group. The 
Pentland Firth is also developed with 500 MW tidal stream. Scottish hydro, having been 
limited in its development, now acquires an additional 300 MW. 
In England, Dogger and Hornsea offshore wind zones increase by 800 MW 
each, and East Anglia by 1 GW. A further 500 MW of wave power is added off both the 
Devon and Cornwall coasts.  
As in 2023, a significant factor affecting the generation mix is the effect of 
plant closures. Nuclear stations at Hinkley Point B, Hunterston B, Heysham 2 and Torness 
all close due to age. One new plant at Wylfa comes online. A number of coal plants close 
due to a combination of the IED and age, capacity totalling 13.6 GW. In order to maintain 
a positive capacity margin, around 12.5 GW of new CCGT opens. Locational signals 
encourage most of these to locate south of the midlands.  
Figure 53 shows the effect of these changes on installed capacity during this 
period. 
 
Figure 53: Change in installed capacity, 2023 to 2028, SLSP 
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This generation mix gives the following system indicators in 2028. 
Table 14: SLSP 2028 system indicators 
System derated capacity margin 
(%) 
 
0.3 
Proportion of annual electricity 
demand met by (%): 
Renewables 
Nuclear 
Other 
 
 
41 
15 
45 
Carbon intensity of electricity 
(g/KWh) 
 
189 
Renewables are making a large contribution of over 40%, however due to 
various nuclear closures and only one new plant, the relative and absolute contribution of 
nuclear has declined since 2023. A significant contribution is still required from fossil 
thermal generators – coal plants that closed in the period have been replaced by a similar 
capacity of new CCGTs in order to protect the capacity margin.  
8.2.4.3 Network 
The Scottish North Sea offshore network expands in a coordinated manner to 
combine outputs from Shetland, the Orkneys, Moray and Forth, as well as providing 
export capacity to England and Norway. Table 15 summarises the upgrades and new lines 
which constitute this offshore network. 
Table 15: List of upgrades constituting the Scottish North Sea offshore grid, SLSP, 2028 
Course of line Capacity (GW) 
Orkney to Caithness 1.2 
Shetland to Orkney 1.2 
Shetland to Moray Firth offshore hub 1.2 
Caithness to Moray Firth offshore hub 2.4 (upgraded from 1.2) 
Moray Firth offshore hub to Peterhead 2.4 
Shetland to North sea hub 1.2 
Moray Firth offshore hub to North Sea hub 1.2 
Peterhead to Firth of Forth offshore hub 2.4 
Firth of Forth offshore hub to North Sea hub 1.2 
Firth of Forth offshore hub to Torness 1.2 
Firth of Forth offshore hub to Blyth 2.4 
North Sea hub to Norway 4.8 
 
Figure 54 shows the geographical arrangement of this North Sea offshore grid. 
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Figure 54: SLSP 2028 close up of Scottish North Sea offshore network 
In addition the English North Sea offshore spine, from Dogger to Hornsea and 
Hornsea to Spalding is uprated from 4.8 to 7.2 GW. This is both to manage increased 
output from Dogger and Hornsea but also oversized in anticipation of a future 
interconnector to Denmark. 
Significant onshore network upgrades are also made in England and Wales. 
The connections of Dogger and Hornsea zones at Humber require upgrades in lines 
running out of this area. In particular the line between Humber and Sheffield is doubled, 
allowing greater East-West transport, and the lines between Cottam and the East midlands 
are uprated. New lines, and uprates of existing lines are undertaken in North Wales owing 
to the output from Wylfa nuclear, and in anticipation of future offshore wind from the Irish 
sea zone. There are also significant uprates and additions of new double circuits in the 
network between East Anglia, Suffolk and London, to manage the growth in output from 
southern North Sea wind farms. The geographical arrangement of all network upgrades in 
this period is indicated in Figure 55. 
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Figure 55: Network upgrades SLSP 2023- 2028 
8.2.4.4 Resultant power flow 
In this scenario the Norwegian interconnector alternates between import and 
export depending on the wind conditions in Scotland. In High wind conditions the 
interconnector is exporting excess wind from Scotland to Norway. In low wind conditions 
the interconnector is importing power from Norwegian hydro to the Scottish offshore 
network. A key assumption therefore is of a high degree of complementarity between 
Scottish and Norwegian renewable resources, owing to the use of storage reservoirs in the 
Norwegian hydro system. Under this assumption, the result is a fairly consistent bi-
directional use of the Norway – Scotland interconnector, and a consistent, single 
directional flow of power on the circuits, including both the east and west bootstraps, 
exporting power from Scotland to England. 
The southern North Sea offshore network continues to provide significant 
amounts of power for load centres in the south east. 
As shown in Figure 56, Figure 57 and Figure 58 the combination of 
interconnection and offshore grids provides a fairly stable power flow pattern between 
large renewable sites and large load centres, with comparatively low constraints overall.  
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Figure 56: SLSP 2028 Winter High Wind power flow 
 
Figure 57: SLSP 2028 Winter Low Wind power flow 
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Figure 58: SLSP 2028 Winter Average Wind power flow 
8.2.5 2028 – 2033 
8.2.5.1 Overview of period 
A continued expansion of renewable and nuclear generation allows this 
scenario to hit the target of 50g CO2/kWh by 2033. Locational signals continue to 
encourage location of both nuclear and renewables in areas of the network which as far as 
possible make use of existing network capacity. However, the growth in generation 
capacity continues to stimulate more network expansion, particularly along the English east 
coast where large amounts of power from offshore wind join the network during high wind 
conditions, and in Wales due to the expansion of wind power in the Irish Sea, and onshore 
wind in central Wales. Locational signals operating across the network see different signals 
emerging at different times in different parts of GB. This drives the construction of more 
interconnector capacity with Europe and Ireland. Interconnectors become crucial to the 
operation of the system with areas of highly variable output. By 2033 the picture is of a 
system with highly developed offshore networks and bootstraps, high levels of 
interconnection with neighbouring systems, but having avoided major upgrades and new 
lines across substantial areas of the onshore GB network.    
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8.2.5.2 Generation 
Offshore wind expands to the full capacity of Round 3, adding 1500 MW at 
Forth, 1000 MW at Dogger, 200 MW at Hornsea, and 5000 MW at East Anglia. The Irish 
Sea Zone is developed for the first time, with 4200 MW.  
The closure of a further 14 GW of ageing fossil plant opens up connection 
opportunities in the north of England and Midlands, and 2 GW of onshore wind connects 
in northern England. The wind potential of mid-Wales is accessed with a new strategic 
network investment, and 2 GW connect here.  
The locational charges favour the development of large scale tidal barrage at a 
number of locations, as these can be spread around the country – Solway Firth, Deeside, 
Humber, Severn and Thames. There are further major developments of wave power in the 
largely uncongested south-west, as well as a small additional development of wave power 
off the Western Isles in Scotland, making use of available capacity on the existing offshore 
radial connection built in a previous period. 
Despite the significant strategic development of integrated offshore networks, 
the network capacity is still not sufficient to carry enough power to reach the 50g/kWh 
target with renewables alone. This scenario also requires three more new nuclear plants, 
whose locations can be chosen to reflect available network capacity – the chosen locations 
are Heysham, Bradwell and Sizewell. The already existing Sizewell B is now the oldest 
member of the fleet. Its scheduled decommissioning year is 2035. 
Maintaining a positive capacity margin also requires the opening of 5 GW of 
fossil thermal plant. This plant is distributed across suitable locations across England, most 
of it south of the Midlands. However, this plant operates very intermittently, responding 
flexibly to requirements in low wind conditions.   
Figure 59 shows the effect of these changes on installed capacity during this 
period. 
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Figure 59: Change in installed capacity, 2028 to 2033, SLSP 
This generation mix gives the following system indicators in 2033 (Table 16). 
Table 16: SLSP 2033 system indicators 
System derated capacity margin 
(%) 
 
2.8 
Proportion of annual electricity 
demand met by (%): 
Renewables 
Nuclear 
Other 
 
 
57 
31 
11 
Carbon intensity of electricity 
(g/KWh) 
 
46 
 
8.2.5.3 Network 
New offshore renewable developments trigger a number of upgrades to radial 
connections. In addition, the East Anglia zone is connected via the Thames Array to 
Sellindge, where it meets the France interconnector.  
In Scotland the connection between Argyll and Hunterston is upgraded to 
allow for the increase in wave power in the Western Isles. In Wales, a strategic upgrade of 
the network connects central Wales to Ffestiniog and Ironbridge. A new sub-sea bootstrap 
of 2.2 GW is built between Wylfa in north Wales and Pembroke in south Wales.  
The now significant zonal variation in generation output across the country 
has encouraged the development of interconnectors. The connection to France is increased 
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by a further 2 GW with a new connection running through the Channel Tunnel, and there 
is a new sub-sea connection from Dogger, connecting the English North Sea offshore grid 
with Denmark. The new Irish Sea zone, as well as connecting to Wylfa, also connects to 
the Eire network. Each of these interconnectors exploits low prices in the GB zone to 
which they connect during times of high wind output, exporting power to the 
neighbouring market.  
In the North Sea, the connection between Forth and Blyth receives another 
cable, raising its capacity to 3.6 GW. There is an addition of a subsea direct link between 
Blyth and Humber. Onshore upgrades are made on the East-West lines between 
Northumberland and Cumbria, and the lines running south from Cumbria into Lancashire. 
There are also further significant upgrades in the East Anglian network, owing to the 
increased output from the East Anglia offshore zone, and the new Sizewell nuclear station. 
A new line directly connects Sizewell to Grain on the Thames estuary. The geographical 
arrangement of the network upgrades in this period is shown in Figure 60. 
 
Figure 60: Network upgrades SLSP 2028 - 2033 
8.2.5.4 Resultant power flow 
Under high wind conditions the network succeeds in avoiding excessive 
constraints largely due to the activity of the interconnectors in spilling available power 
from high-generating zones, eastern Scotland, eastern England and north-west Wales 
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(Figure 61). However, in the high wind winter condition, despite full export through 
interconnectors the full output of nuclear stations cannot be used. By contrast, under low 
wind conditions, standby fossil plant are called on to meet demand, even with full import 
from interconnectors. As can be seen in Figure 62, due to the arrangement of fossil plant 
and interconnectors, this condition results in slightly higher constraints than the high wind 
condition in certain corridors, notably in the south east between the French and 
Netherlands interconnectors, and London. When wind output is skewed to the north, 
more constraints emerge in the main corridors transmitting power from north to south, 
notably, in Figure 63, in north Wales. This condition also experiences constraints in the 
areas between the south-eastern interconnectors and London, due to high interconnector 
import resulting from low wind generation in the southern regions. The potential 
variability in output amongst different zones from different weather conditions presents 
challenges to designing a network which remains compliant under all conditions. 
Nonetheless, the development of interconnectors between GB zones and from GB zones to 
other European systems, enables a high degree of smoothing of each zone’s output, keeping 
congestion relatively low. As shown in Figure 64, the winter peak during an average wind 
condition is almost entirely compliant.  
 
Figure 61: SLSP 2033 Winter High Wind power flow 
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Figure 62: SLSP 2033 Winter Low Wind power flow 
	  
Figure 63: SLSP 2033 Winter North to South skew power flow 
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Figure 64: SLSP 2033 Winter Average Wind power flow 
 
8.3 Strong location weak plan (SLWP) 
8.3.1 Overview of whole scenario 
In this scenario there is a clear commitment to use network charging as a 
means of creating locational signals of network conditions, to influence the siting and 
operational decisions of generators. Whilst the specific policy frameworks are not detailed 
in the scenario, it is assumed that the frameworks have the ability to affect operational 
decisions, to help with network congestion in real time, as well as investment decisions. 
However, in contrast to SLSP, there is little appetite on the part of network owners to take 
forward looking anticipatory network investment decisions, and major network upgrades 
are undertaken only in response to firm commitments from generators for substantial 
numbers of MWs. In broad terms, the guiding philosophy is that network investments 
should be entirely neutral about generation technology choice – networks should not be 
planned in advance with the goal of facilitating the connection of a particular technology 
with particular locational characteristics. Rather the generators’ choice of technology and 
location should include exposure to the costs that their connection implies for the network. 
As a result, in the early years of the scenario, there is a modest development of renewables 
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in areas where there is available network capacity. There is some development of offshore 
wind, but this is focussed in the zones connecting in the southern parts of GB. In the 
middle and later periods, low carbon technology choice increasingly favours technologies 
with flexibility around location, which benefit from lower locational charges. This results 
in a significant growth in tidal barrage, and a major expansion in nuclear, with by 2033 all 
eight designated nuclear sites operating with 3.2 GW nuclear power stations. The picture 
in 2033 is therefore of a nuclear dominated system, with contributions from on- and 
offshore wind, tidal barrage and a small amount of wave power in southern locations. 
There are 27 GW nuclear installed, 44 GW of renewables, and 35 GW of fossil thermal 
maintained for flexibility in low wind conditions. This scenario achieves the required 
carbon intensity of electricity of 50g/kWh with comparatively few additional network 
upgrades beyond those already scheduled in 2013.  
8.3.2 2013 – 2018 
8.3.2.1 Overview of period 
In 2013 the most significant network concern is the export of power between 
Scotland and England. This relates to the integration of Scottish and English systems under 
BETTA, and is being added to by increasing development of renewables in the north of GB. 
There are plans to invest in the network to bring the Scotland-England boundary into 
compliance. Notably, these include reconductoring and other works on the existing border 
circuits, and the construction of the new HVDC offshore link between Hunterston and 
Deeside (Table 8, Chapter 7). 
The EMR package has come into effect which it is hoped will provide 
sufficient incentive for low carbon generation to meet EU 2020 targets and the CCC 
carbon budgets.  
The key changes during this period therefore are the significant upgrade of the 
Scotland-England boundary, and a modest development of renewable resources in line with 
available network capacity. The philosophy of this scenario means that the primary aim is to 
meet low carbon and renewable targets in a way which balances the preferences of 
generators to locate in certain regions, with the costs that such locational choices may 
impose on the network. 
8.3.2.2 Generation mix 
Onshore wind is deployed in accordance with applications existing in 2013, as 
discussed in Section 7.3.1.6.  There is no strategic anticipatory development of island links 
to Shetland, the Orkneys or the Western Isles, or high voltage connection of mid-Wales, as 
the costs of securing new network upgrades deter developers. Offshore wind is deployed in 
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accordance with consented and under construction sites as of 2013 (as discussed in Section 
7.3.1.6), in addition to 2400 MW at Dogger Bank. The final reactor at the Wylfa nuclear 
site is closed, and a number of closures of coal and oil plants occur under the Large 
Combustion Plant Directive. The locational signal, which has an effect at the operational as 
well as the investment timeframe, encourages fossil generators co-located with wind to 
turn down during windy periods, effectively sharing network capacity. Figure 65 shows the 
effect of these generation investment decisions on the total installed capacity during the 
period. 
 
Figure 65: Change in installed capacity, 2013 to 2018, SLWP 
This generation mix gives the following system indicators in 2018 (Table 17). 
Table 17: SLWP 2018 system indicators 
System derated capacity margin 
(%) 
 
5.9 
Proportion of annual electricity 
demand met by (%): 
Renewables 
Nuclear 
Other 
 
 
20 
19 
61 
Carbon intensity of electricity 
(g/KWh) 
 
356 
 
Not building the Western Isles HVDC link means around 500 MW less of 
onshore wind than in SLSP in Scotland, which has a small effect on the overall annual 
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contribution of renewables and the carbon intensity of electricity. Other than this the 
generation mix in this scenario is identical to SLSP in the same year. 
8.3.2.3 Network investment 
Confirmed network upgrades as of 2013 are included in this scenario (Table 8, 
Chapter 7), most significant of which are the upgrades over the Scotland-England 
boundary, including the HVDC western link between Hunterston and Deeside. Beyond 
these, no further network upgrades are made. The geographical arrangement of the 
network upgrades in this period is shown in Figure 66. 
 
Figure 66: Network upgrades SLWP 2013-2018 
8.3.2.4 Resultant power flow 
As in SLSP 2018, the upgrades over the Cheviot boundary have made this 
boundary now largely compliant, but increased constraints are found in northern England, 
as the increased renewable output from Scotland combines with the still considerable 
thermal capacity in Yorkshire and Lancashire. As would be expected given the very similar 
plant mix, the same key constraint corridors emerge as in SLSP, namely from the Humber 
through Lincolnshire towards the East Midlands and London; between Deeside and the 
West Midlands. The effect of increased Scottish wind, which although it can now pass the 
Cheviot boundary nonetheless meets constraints in the Midlands, can be seen in a similar 
way to SLSP by comparing a high wind condition at winter peak with a low wind condition 
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(Figure 67 and Figure 68). In the low wind condition, constraints are lower in these northern 
England corridors, although new constraints emerge in lines running from western England 
towards London, as the lower wind output requires increased output from thermal stations 
in southern Wales and western England. 
 
Figure 67: SLWP 2018 Winter High Wind power flow 
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Figure 68: SLWP 2018 Winter Low Wind power flow 
Spring and Summer in general have lower constraints than winter, as the large 
quantities of fossil plant respond flexibly to changes in demand. 
In summary, in 2018 this scenario sees a network in which growing output 
from renewables is continuing to have some impact upon constraints; however, due to 
significant network investments since 2013, these are not occurring in Scotland but in 
northern England; and the activity of large clusters of fossil generators in northern England 
and the midlands is at least as significant as the wind output in affecting the constraint 
patterns. 
    
8.3.3 2018 – 2023  
8.3.3.1 Overview of period 
The installed capacities of onshore and offshore wind in 2018 were similar to 
the central range of DECC’s renewable energy roadmap (DECC, 2011c), which is 
constructed with reference to the UK’s EU 2020 renewables targets. In this next period, 
the bedding-in of the EMR and the successful administration of the feed-in tariffs, within 
the pressure of the CCC’s carbon budget which expects deep power sector decarbonisation 
through the 2020s, pushes forward a continued growth in low carbon generation. However 
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this occurs within a framework which gives clear incentives to utilise the existing onshore 
network efficiently, in preference to triggering new onshore upgrades. There is some 
development of offshore wind and marine technologies which become commercially 
available during the period, focussed on the southern North Sea, south coast and south-
west coast. There is no coordinated or anticipatory approach to offshore transmission 
infrastructure, and so offshore projects are developed on an individual basis with radial 
connections. The conditions are most favourable for low carbon generation technologies 
which can be flexible about location. As a result, several new nuclear stations are planned 
but only Hinkley Point C comes online by 2023.  
8.3.3.2 Generation mix 
As in SLSP, there is a modest increase of 1 GW in onshore wind in Scotland – 
although this is the most cost effective renewable technology it is locationally 
disadvantaged. This increase is permitted by a network charging policy which includes 
measures to encourage thermal generators in Scotland to reduce their output during windy 
conditions, allowing some sharing of network capacity. This increase is limited by the 
available existing network capacity, allowing for network sharing with conventional 
generation. 
Some further developments in offshore wind are possible, connected by 
project specific radial lines to bring power from the projects ashore. However due to the 
transmission charging regime, there is a greater incentive for projects to connect in the 
south of England than in northern England and Scotland. The lack of strategic anticipatory 
approach to offshore grids means that projects connect radially to the closest onshore 
connection point. Hornsea is able to add 1.2 GW to its existing capacity, but there is no 
further development at Dogger due to network constraints around the North-East and 
Humber. The East Anglia zone begins its development with 1.2 GW, and the very 
southerly zones Rampion and Navitus are developed to their full available potential of 0.7 
and 1.1 GW respectively. 
Locational charging also encourages tidal and wave technologies, which are 
approaching commercialisation, to locate in southerly locations. Tidal stream is installed, 
400 MW in waters off the north Devon coast, and 200 MW in the Solent. A 500 MW wave 
power project is installed off the north Cornish coast. A further important new addition in 
this period is the new nuclear station at Hinkley Point. 
Also significant in this period are plant closures. The effect of the EU’s 
Industrial Emissions Directive is felt, with a number of the older coal and gas plants opting 
out and closing by 2023. In addition, around 3.5 GW of nuclear plant closes due to its age. 
New CCGT plants opening at Thorpe Marsh (960 MW) and Drakelow (1320 MW) 
contribute to maintaining a positive capacity margin. 
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Figure 69 gives the overall impression of the change in plant mix in this period. 
 
Figure 69: Change in installed capacity, 2018 to 2023, SLWP 
This generation mix gives the following system indicators in 2023.  
Table 18: SLWP 2023 system indicators 
System derated capacity margin 
(%) 
 
0.9 
Proportion of annual electricity 
demand met by (%): 
Renewables 
Nuclear 
Other 
 
 
26 
18 
56 
Carbon intensity of electricity 
(g/KWh) 
 
305 
Renewables have increased substantially, however the locational signal 
combined with the lack of anticipatory network investment has limited the expansion of the 
network and contained the level of renewables deployment. The approach has stimulated 
interest in low carbon sources with greater locational freedom, however in the case of 
wave and tidal these have only recently commercialised and roll out remains slow. In the 
case of nuclear, the planning horizon is such that still only Hinkley Point C has come 
online, although other plants are in planning.  
8.3.3.3 Network investment 
Due to the locational effects of charging policy, new generation is located such 
that it causes little requirement for major onshore upgrades. A new 400kV line from 
Hinkley Point to Seabank is constructed to carry power from the new nuclear station. The 
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main new offshore infrastructure upgrades are the radial connections to the various new 
offshore sites. The geographical arrangement of the network upgrades in this period are 
shown in Figure 70. 
 
Figure 70: Network upgrades SLWP 2018 - 2023 
8.3.3.4 Resultant power flow 
At the winter peak, in all wind conditions there are moderate constraints in 
three important corridors: from Humber into Sheffield constraints are found as power 
from Hornsea and Dogger wind farm zones, as well as fossil generators in the area, is 
exported west; from Cottam to East midlands, as power from the same areas is exported 
into the Midlands load centres; and from Merseyside to West Midlands as power from the 
North, including outflow of the western HVDC link, flows south.  
In addition high constraints are found in all conditions on the line flowing east 
from Melksham to Bramley, carrying power from the south-west towards London. 
Constraints on this line are a result of a number of factors. First the addition of Hinkley 
Point C, with Hinkley Point B still operational, significantly increases available power in 
the south-west. Second, there are also significant quantities of thermal plant around the 
Severn and south-wales. As these outputs are less during high wind periods, the constraints 
on the Melksham – Bramley line are less in high wind conditions (Figure 71). The winter 
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low wind condition sees constraints and high line utilisation in the south west, due to a 
combination of new nuclear and renewables, plus existing fossil in the region (Figure 72). 
In spring, similar constraint corridors are found but in general Midlands 
constraints are lower than in winter. But in high wind conditions (High, NS and Average) 
more constraints are found in Scotland due to the lower demand here causing higher 
export. Melksham – Bramley again sees high constraints, again somewhat correlated with 
low wind. 
The summer conditions have generally lower constraints, with the exception 
of NS, but again Melksham – Bramley stands out with very high constraints. 
 
 
Figure 71: SLWP 2023 Winter High Wind power flow 
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Figure 72: SLWP 2023 Winter Low Wind power flow 
 
8.3.4 2023 – 2028  
8.3.4.1 Overview of period 
Remaining within the CCC’s carbon budgets, and remaining on track to hit 
the electricity carbon intensity target of 50gCO2/kWh by 2030, is a key priority for this 
period. The strong locational signal and lack of strategic anticipatory network development 
means that during this period low carbon generation with the ability to locate in the south 
of the network is favoured. In Scotland the existing portfolio of renewables already meets 
the available export capacity, and so no further development of renewables occurs. There 
is some additional expansion in southern offshore wind, wave and tidal, and two new 
nuclear power stations are commissioned. 
8.3.4.2 Generation mix 
Moderate expansion of southern North Sea offshore wind sites is permitted 
along with a programme of selected onshore network upgrades in the Midlands and East 
Coast. Thus, Dogger expands by 1.2 GW with a new connection to Teesside, Hornsea by 
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1.8 GW and East Anglia by 1.2 GW. A further 500 MW is added to the Cornish wave hub, 
and a new 1 GW wave installation connects to the coast of North Devon. Two new nuclear 
stations open, Sizewell C and Wylfa.  
As in all scenarios, this period also sees a significant number of fossil and 
nuclear plant retirement, owing to age and the effect of the Industrial Emissions Directive 
(IED). 4.8 GW of nuclear plant and 12.6 GW of coal plant close. In addition to the 6.4 
GW of new nuclear plant, a further 12.7 GW of new CCGT plant is required to maintain a 
positive capacity margin.     
Figure 73 gives the overall impression of the change in plant mix in this period.  
 
Figure 73: Change in installed capacity, 2023 to 2028, SLWP 
This generation mix gives the following system indicators in 2028.  
Table 19: SLWP 2028 system indicators 
System derated capacity margin 
(%) 
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Proportion of annual electricity 
demand met by (%): 
Renewables 
Nuclear 
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21 
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Carbon intensity of electricity 
(g/KWh) 
 
206 
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8.3.4.3 Network investment 
Additions to the radial connection lines are required to connect the new 
offshore sites, and a new line connecting Dogger with Teesside is constructed. In addition a 
number of onshore network upgrades are made. The existing double circuit running west 
from Humber to Yorkshire is uprated; in North Wales the single circuit running from 
Wylfa to Trawsfynnyd is doubled; the Deeside to West midlands circuit is uprated; in the 
West country circuits between Melksham, Bramley and Cowley are uprated; and an 
additional circuit is added between Sizewell and Bramford. The geographical arrangement 
of the network upgrades in this period are shown in Figure 74. 
 
Figure 74: Network upgrades SLWP 2023 - 2028 
  
8.3.4.4 Resultant power flow 
The average wind condition at winter peak is virtually entirely compliant, 
with only a small constraint. However this is contrasted by a wide range of different kinds 
of constraints in different places, in the other conditions. The high wind condition sees 
moderate constraints in Scotland and in Suffolk, as combined output from the Sizewell 
nuclear stations and the East Anglia offshore zone runs westwards (Figure 75). The low 
wind condition finds south western areas constrained due to the added contribution from 
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fossil plant in Somerset and South Wales, as well as a constraint between Grain and London 
(Figure 76). The NS condition has constraints in the north of Scotland but nowhere else, as 
the high northern wind output supresses the output of southern fossil plants, at the same 
time as southern renewable output is low. The largest constraints are found in SN, as a low 
overall wind output causing higher fossil output, is combined with a disproportionately 
high output from southern renewables, causing constraints across the south-east and south-
west. It is also noticeable that the power flow is south to north in this condition, as low 
northern wind output sees northern GB importing from the south. The highest constraint is 
found between Humber and Yorkshire, as output of the southern north sea renewables and 
Humber fossil plant is exported west and northwards (Figure 77).  
The spring patterns are similar to those found in winter, although with some 
differences in constraint levels due to the different balance between available output and 
demand. The average condition has moderate constraints as lower demand in key areas – 
north Scotland and East Anglia, require greater export. Constraints are much lower in the 
SN condition compared to Winter, and the north-south power flow is preserved.  
Summer conditions are similar but in some cases constraints are bigger than in 
spring. For example, in summer high wind, and SN, both of which have notably high 
constraints between Sizewell and Bramford, as high wind output relative to the lower 
demand in the region causes more export. The power flow in SN is again south to north, 
though less extreme than winter. 
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Figure 75: SLWP 2028 Winter High Wind power flow 
 
Figure 76: SLWP 2028 Winter Low Wind power flow 
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Figure 77: SLWP 2028 Winter South to North Wind power flow 
	  
8.3.5 2028 – 2033  
8.3.5.1 Overview of period 
The consistent policy approach of promoting low carbon technologies with a 
strong locational network signal but no anticipatory network investment has provided a 
conducive environment for nuclear generation. In this period a number of planning 
applications for new stations reach completion and there is a major expansion in nuclear 
power. These stations are spread around the country and are largely able to utilise network 
capacity that has been made available by a further tranche of fossil plant retirements. A 
comparatively moderate expansion in renewable capacity also takes place, in locations 
where network capacity is still available, largely south of the Humber, although the 
retirement of Peterhead allows an expansion of the Moray Firth offshore zone. While there 
have been some sizeable onshore upgrades of areas of network surrounding the large new 
nuclear stations, the general picture in 2033 is of a network very similar in structure to 
2018, following the western HVDC link, with the most notable additions being radial 
connections from offshore sites, the majority of which connect in southern locations.    
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8.3.5.2 Generation mix 
This period sees the construction of five new nuclear stations, which take up 
each of the remaining available designated nuclear sites: Sellafield, Hartlepool, Heysham, 
Oldbury and Bradwell. This constitutes 16 GW in five years, or an average of 3.2 GW per 
year. This is a fast build rate, but comparable to build rates found in other scenarios and in 
historical examples (DECC, 2010a).  
There is a further 13.8 GW of fossil retirement due to the age of the plant. 
Offshore wind expands with 1000 MW at Moray Firth, Hornsea and East Anglia adding 
1000 MW, and there are new developments of 1000 MW and 1200 MW in the Irish Sea 
and Bristol Channel zones respectively.  
Wave power again pushes forward in southerly zones, with 1000 MW added 
in waters off the Devon, Cornwall and Pembrokeshire coasts. Large tidal barrages are also 
built in southerly areas – Severn, Thames, and the Wash – and a new tidal stream project is 
developed at Alderney. 
Despite the large amounts of fossil retirement, no new fossil needs to be built 
to maintain a positive capacity margin.  
Figure 78 gives the overall impression of the change in plant mix in this period. 
 
Figure 78: Change in installed capacity, 2028 to 2033, SLWP 
This generation mix gives the following system indicators in 2033.  
	   271	  
Table 20: SLWP 2033 system indicators 
System derated capacity margin 
(%) 
 
4.0 
Proportion of annual electricity 
demand met by (%): 
Renewables 
Nuclear 
Other 
 
 
38 
49 
13 
Carbon intensity of electricity 
(g/KWh) 
 
53 
Despite the larger installed capacities of renewables, nuclear meets the 
greatest proportion of electrical energy demand due to its higher load factor.  
8.3.5.3 Network investment 
Due to the locational spread of the new generation projects, this scenario 
again avoids the construction of major bootstraps or boundary upgrades, nonetheless there 
are a number of important and in some cases substantial network upgrades to be made. 
The new offshore projects require radial connections, notably the new 
Alderney tidal development. In addition, significant onshore upgrades occur in some key 
network corridors. Line uprates are required in the north of England around the new 
nuclear stations at Sellafield and Hartlepool, and an additional single circuit is added to the 
double circuit between Harker and Hutton. In the west of England the addition of Oldbury 
requires an uprate on the Seabank to Melksham line, an uprate of the Bramley to Cowley 
line plus new additional double circuits on the route from Melksham through Bramley to 
London. The Hinkley Point to Melksham line is uprated. In the east of England, Sizewell to 
Bramford and Grain to Sellindge are uprated, and Bramford to Eaton Socon receives 
another double circuit. Grain to London, Exeter to Lovedean, and Wylfa to Deeside are 
also uprated. 
The geographical arrangement of the network upgrades in this period is shown 
in Figure 79.  
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Figure 79: Network upgrades SLWP 2028 - 2033 
8.3.5.4 Resultant power flow 
In winter, as in 2028, the average wind condition is almost completely 
compliant, however there are significant variations from this created by the effect of the 
different wind conditions (Figure 80). The high wind condition sees some relatively minor 
constraints in the north but is also mainly completely compliant (Figure 81), and the low 
wind condition also sees only minor constraints. The NS condition sees a slightly larger 
constraint between Blyth and Durham, with higher wind output combining with output 
from Hartlepool nuclear station. The highest constraints are found in the SN condition, 
notably on the corridor from Melksham to Bramley to Cowley, and between Pembroke 
and Walham as power is exported from the high producing south west. There is also a 
strong south to north power flow in this condition, with exceedences over the Cheviot 
boundary due to power flowing into Scotland (Figure 82). In the high wind condition the 
interconnectors were used on full export in order to avoid nuclear ramp down. 
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Figure 80: SLWP 2033 Winter Average Wind power flow 
 
Figure 81: SLWP 2033 Winter High Wind power flow 
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Figure 82: SLWP 2033 Winter South to North Wind power flow 
In spring, the average wind condition is similarly compliant, though with 
some constraints in Scotland due to lower demand. The situation is very similar for the 
high wind condition and for NS. In low wind there is constraint from Torness to Edinburgh 
as power flow is flowing south to north into Scotland, and also constraints from the west 
country into London. Notably SN has no constraints at all. For Hi and SN conditions, 
interconnectors are on full export but there is still required some ramp down of nuclear. 
In Summer, the average, high and low wind conditions all have very low 
constraints. NS sees some constraints on north-south export corridors, particularly 
Durham to York. SN has very minor constraints in the east of England. For Hi and SN 
conditions, interconnectors are on full export but there is still required some ramp down 
of nuclear (though only 800 MW per plant for SN).    
 
8.4 Weak location strong plan (WLSP) 
8.4.1 Overview of whole scenario 
In this scenario the overriding network philosophy is that networks should be 
at the service of the higher order aim of decarbonisation. The premise is that renewables 
should play a significant role in the decarbonisation process, that locational network 
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charging is something which runs counter to this higher priority government objective and 
is thus no longer useful or relevant. This results in a rapid expansion of renewables in the 
early years of the scenario, with a strong focus on northern areas of GB including the 
Scottish islands. This requires substantial network upgrades which are undertaken as far as 
possible on an anticipatory basis, and which service a system with very high levels of power 
export from the north to the south of the country. Interconnector projects occur in later 
years as the potential for spill from renewable output becomes greater, though the precise 
locations of these connections are not influenced by locational pricing. By 2033 the picture 
is of a system with high levels of interconnection to neighbouring systems, and high 
capacity transmission corridors both offshore and onshore which are required to distribute 
the high levels of peak production across the country, on a predominantly north-south 
gradient. The system supports 75 GW of renewables and 14 GW of nuclear generation. 39 
GW of fossil thermal remains online for balancing during low wind conditions. Although 
the system achieves compliance during the winter peak high wind condition, the sheer 
variety of variable output across the system makes it hard to plan the system to be 
compliant in all weather and demand conditions, and curtailment of renewables may be a 
frequent occurrence.   
8.4.2 2013 – 2018  
8.4.2.1 Overview of period 
In 2013 the most significant network concern is the export of power between 
Scotland and England. This relates to the integration of Scottish and English systems under 
BETTA, and is being added to by increasing development of renewables in the north of GB. 
There are plans to invest in the network to bring the Scotland-England boundary into 
compliance. Notably, these include reconductoring and other works on the existing border 
circuits, and the construction of the new HVDC offshore link between Hunterston and 
Deeside (Table 8, Chapter 7). 
The EMR package has come into effect which, it is hoped, will provide 
sufficient incentive for low carbon generation to meet EU 2020 targets and the CCC 
carbon budgets.  
However, as well as the planned upgrades required to achieve compliance of 
the Scotland-England boundary based on generation expected in 2013, transmission 
planning in this scenario goes significantly further to extend to previously unconnected 
areas of the grid and unlock renewable potential in these regions.  
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8.4.2.2 Generation mix 
Onshore wind is deployed according to the base assumptions in all scenarios, 
with the addition of wind projects in mid-Wales, wind projects and a and a 20 MW wave 
demonstration in the Hebrides, and a 100 MW tidal project in the Orkneys which are 
supported by new strategic network upgrades.  
Offshore wind sees all consented and under construction projects in 2013 
move to completion, with the further addition of the first 2.4 GW project at Dogger. 
The final reactor at the Wylfa nuclear site is closed, and a number of closures 
of coal and oil plants occur under the Large Combustion Plant Directive. Figure 83 shows 
the effect of these generation investment decisions on the total installed capacity during the 
period. 
 
Figure 83: Change in installed capacity, 2013 to 2018, WLSP 
This generation mix gives the following system indicators in 2018. 
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Table 21: WLSP 2018 system indicators 
System derated capacity margin 
(%) 
 
6.2 
Proportion of annual electricity 
demand met by (%): 
Renewables 
Nuclear 
Other 
 
 
21 
19 
60 
Carbon intensity of electricity 
(g/KWh) 
 
352 
 
This scenario provides the highest renewable contribution in 2018 with a 
further 360 MW of onshore wind in Mid-Wales, in addition to the Hebrides additions, and 
contribution from tidal in the Orkneys (100 MW). These additional contributions have a 
small effect on the carbon intensity of electricity compared to the other scenarios. 
8.4.2.3 Network investment 
Confirmed network upgrades as of 2013 are included in this scenario, most 
significant of which are the upgrades over the Scotland-England boundary, including the 
HVDC western link between Hunterston and Deeside (Table 8, Chapter 7). In addition to 
these, this scenario also sees island connections to the Western Isles (HVDC link) and 
Orkneys, and a new transmission line to Mid-Wales, connecting with the East Midlands. 
The geographical arrangement of the network upgrades in this period is shown in Figure 84. 
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Figure 84: Network upgrades WLSP 2013-2018 
8.4.2.4 Resultant power flow 
In Winter the effect of the investments in renewables in Scotland, and the lack 
of locational signal to affect the operation of fossil plants in Scotland and northern England 
during times of high congestion, results in clear constraint patterns running from north 
Scotland as far as London. The high wind condition finds constraints in the central belt of 
Scotland and at the English border. Particularly high constraints can be found between 
Humber and Cottam, relating to the output of Dogger wind farm as well as regional fossil 
plants; and from Deeside, where the HVDC western link now lands, running south. 
Constraints continue on the corridor from the east Midlands to the major load centre of 
London (Figure 85). Constraints are substantially lower in the low wind (Figure 86) as well 
as in SN conditions. NS has in general lower constraints, although the constraint between 
Deeside and the west Midlands is still high, owing to the large throughput from the 
western link. The average wind condition shows a similar pattern to the high wind 
condition, though without constraints in Scotland (Figure 87).  
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Figure 85: WLSP 2018 Winter High Wind power flow 
	  
Figure 86: WLSP 2018 Winter Low Wind power flow 
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Figure 87: WLSP 2018 Winter Average Wind power flow 
Similar patterns and constrain corridors are observable in Spring and Summer. 
Although in general lower demand and lower wind conditions lead to lower constraints, 
there are variations. For instance while the combination of low demand and low wind leads 
to low constraints in the summer low wind condition (Figure 88), the higher northerly 
output in spring NS leads to relatively high constraints (Figure 89). 
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Figure 88: WLSP 2018 Summer Low Wind power flow 
	  
Figure 89: WLSP 2018 Spring North to South Wind power flow 
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8.4.3 2018 – 2023  
8.4.3.1 Overview of period 
In the context of the continued push towards staying on track for the CCC’s 
target of 50gCO2/kWh in 2030, locational signals continue to be smoothed, and significant 
on- and offshore network upgrades take place in anticipation of the rapid growth in 
renewables.  
8.4.3.2 Generation mix 
The prime technology choice and location under this scenario is onshore wind 
in Scotland, which increases by 3 GW during the period. 500 MW are installed on Orkney 
and 1 GW in mid-Wales. Hydro also receives a boost in this period and additional 300 MW 
is added in Scotland. Offshore wind development takes place at all available locations: 
Moray Firth (1500 MW), Forth (1050 MW), Dogger-Teesside (2400 MW), Hornsea 
(1200 MW) Irish Sea (2200 MW), East Anglia (1200 MW), Rampion (700 MW) and 
Navitus (1100 MW). 
Tidal stream is developed at Orkney (300 MW), Pentland Firth (500 MW), 
Solent (200 MW), Western Isles (500 MW) and Bristol Channel (400 MW). Wave power 
is also commercialised in this year, and 500 MW are installed at each of Orkney, Hebrides, 
Western Isles, Devon and Cornwall.  
Hinkley Point C nuclear power station also comes online during this period. 
Figure 90 shows the effect of these generation investment decisions on the total 
installed capacity during the period. 
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Figure 90: Change in installed capacity, 2018 to 2023, WLSP 
This generation mix gives the following system indicators in 2023. 
Table 22: WLSP 2023 system indicators 
System derated capacity margin 
(%) 
 
3.0 
Proportion of annual electricity 
demand met by (%): 
Renewables 
Nuclear 
Other 
 
 
39 
18 
43 
Carbon intensity of electricity 
(g/KWh) 
 
238 
 
 
8.4.3.3 Network upgrades 
Very substantial network upgrades are implemented in line with the 
aggressive development of renewables across the country. Required island connections are 
made and uprated, and radial connections of offshore zones. In addition, the new Hinkley 
Point C link and upgrades of networks in Scotland, the Cheviot boundary and the North-
East of England are undertaken. New HVDC bootstraps are also required, between 
Peterhead and Blyth (4.4 GW), Durham and Norwich (2.2 GW), Wylfa and Pembroke 
(2.5 GW), and Torness and Lackenby (2.2 GW). In addition another cable is added to the 
existing HVDC link from Hunterston to Deeside HVDC link, raising its total capacity to 
4.4 GW.  
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The network upgrades for this period are represented geographically in Figure 
91. 
 
Figure 91: Location of network upgrades, WLSP 2018 - 2023 
8.4.3.4 Resultant power flow 
In winter the most common constraint, which occurs in all conditions, is on 
the line between Melksham and Cowley, owing to the high production in the south-west, 
emanating from Hinkley Point B and C, in combination with a number of wave and tidal 
installations in the south-west. Aside from this, constraints occur on different parts of the 
east coast network, depending on the different relative outputs from northern Scottish 
renewables, and north sea offshore zones.  In the high wind condition, constraints are 
experienced between Durham and Yorkshire, as high output from Dogger finds its way 
south, and Norwich and Bramford as the high output from Dogger and Hornsea lands in 
East Anglia (Figure 92); in the NS condition constraints occur between Blyth and Durham 
due to the high output through the east coast bootstrap, and between Walham and Cowley, 
as high northerly output transmitted through west-coast bootstraps and onshore upgrades is 
pulled in towards London (Figure 93).  
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Figure 92: WLSP 2023 Winter High Wind power flow 
	  
Figure 93: WLSP 2023 Winter North to South power flow 
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Similar patterns are observable in Spring, with Melksham to Cowley again 
being constrained in all conditions. The high wind condition sees the highest constraints 
elsewhere, on both the west coast between Harker and Hutton, and on the east coast from 
Teesside through to Yorkshire (Figure 94). The average wind condition also sees constraints 
between Walham and Cowley (Figure 95). 
 
Figure 94: WLSP 2023 Spring High Wind power flow 
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Figure 95: WLSP 2023 Spring Average Wind power flow 
In summer constraints are lower overall but again high constraints occur 
between Melksham and Cowley due to the south western output. Highest constraints 
elsewhere are found in the NS condition (Figure 96). 
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Figure 96: WLSP 2023 Summer North to South Wind power flow 
 
8.4.4 2023 – 2028  
8.4.4.1 Overview of period 
The generation mix in 2023 represented good progress towards the target of 
50gCO2/kWh by 2030, but with some way still to go. This period sees a concerted push 
towards that target, again with low carbon generation connecting throughout the country, 
and with network investment having to move quickly to keep up and minimise constraints. 
The rapid growth in renewables creates huge amounts of variability in the patterns of 
output, which result in variable power flow patterns depending on the weather conditions. 
The variability of output also creates commercial opportunities for interconnectors, 
however the location and operation of these interconnectors is not influenced by locational 
signals. 
8.4.4.2 Generation mix 
Onshore wind continues to expand with a further 3 GW in Scotland mainland 
and a further 500 MW in Shetland and Orkney. Mid Wales also sees a further expansion of 
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1 GW. Wave power is developed in Shetland, Orkney, the Hebrides, the Western Isles, 
Devon and Cornwall, and tidal stream is developed in the Pentland Firth. 
In addition a number of tidal barrage schemes are opened, in the Solway Firth, 
Deeside, the Wash and Bristol channel. 
As in all scenarios, this period also sees a significant number of fossil and 
nuclear plant retirement, owing to age and the effect of the Industrial Emissions Directive 
(IED). 4.8 GW of nuclear plant and 13.6 GW of coal plant close. Two new nuclear plants 
are opened at Sellafield and Sizewell. However, owing to the large numbers of renewable 
installations, a comparably small amount of new CCGT is required to come online in order 
to maintain a positive capacity margin, with around 5.3 GW commissioning by 2028. 
Figure 97 shows the effect of these generation investment decisions on the total 
installed capacity during the period. 
 
Figure 97: Change in installed capacity, 2023 to 2028, WLSP 
This generation mix gives the following system indicators in 2028. 
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Table 23: WLSP 2028 system indicators 
System derated capacity margin 
(%) 
 
2.9 
Proportion of annual electricity 
demand met by (%): 
Renewables 
Nuclear 
Other 
 
 
60 
21 
19 
Carbon intensity of electricity 
(g/KWh) 
 
81 
There is now a very large contribution from renewables, and the carbon 
intensity of electricity is close to the required 50g / kWh. 
8.4.4.3 Network upgrades 
In addition to the required upgrades to radial links, major upgrades are again 
made to the network of offshore bootstraps, required to transport the large volumes of 
power from north to south. New lines are added to the bootstrap routes along the east 
coast, and onshore upgrades made in East Anglia where the power reaches land and heads 
toward London. Along the west coat, a new series of bootstraps head from Thurso to 
Stornoway and down through Inverary to Hunterston where it joins the Western HVDC 
link, which itself receives a further upgrade. Onshore upgrades occur in lines between 
Teesside and Yorkshire, and in Cumbria. The Wlyfa-Pembroke HVDC also receives an 
upgrade, and there is a new direct link from Norwich to Sellindge where the French 
interconnectors are met. The geographical arrangement of the network upgrades in this 
period is shown in Figure 98.  
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Figure 98: Network upgrades WLSP 2023 - 2028 
8.4.4.4 Resultant power flow 
Massive upgrades have been required to keep the system broadly compliant. 
Even so all conditions have constraints, many significant, and there is a high level of 
variation as to where these occur, as the combination of swings in renewable generation 
and interconnector activity create dramatic changes in flows. Interconnectors are active in 
exporting power during high wind conditions and importing power during low wind 
conditions. Without the activity of interconnectors, in high wind conditions wind or 
nuclear output would have to be curtailed, and in low wind conditions fossil plant would 
be called on to generate.    
In winter, the high (Figure 99) and NS conditions have significant constraints in 
southern Scotland and the cheviot border; the low wind condition has isolated constraints 
in the south east due to imports from the interconnectors (Figure 100); SN and the average 
wind condition have a few constraints in southern Scotland and northern England (Figure 
101). Notably there are lower constraints between the south-west and London than in 
previous years, due to lower output from fossil plants as a result of the higher overall 
renewable output.  
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Figure 99: WLSP 2028 Winter High Wind power flow 
	  
Figure 100: WLSP 2028 Winter Low Wind power flow 
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Figure 101: WLSP 2028 Winter Average Wind power flow 
In spring, constraints vary considerably depending on the balance between 
local demands which are lower than in winter, and wind conditions, which can in some 
instances be almost as high as winter. In the high wind condition constraints are only found 
in northern Britain, and in the low wind condition there are isolated constraints in the 
midlands and south. The NS condition has significant constraints in northern England and 
isolated in constraints in the south (Figure 102); and in SN the constraints are relatively 
smaller but clustered around the cheviots. It is the average condition in which constraints 
are spread most widely around the country, in Scotland, northern England and the south 
(Figure 103).  
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Figure 102: WLSP 2028 Spring North to South Wind 
	  
Figure 103: WLSP 2028 Spring Average Wind power flow 
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In summer constraints are in some cases higher than in winter and spring, due 
to a still high renewable output but matched to a lower demand level, causing more export 
of power from high generating areas. In the high wind condition, constraints are high in the 
Cheviots, western England and Norfolk (Figure 104); in the low wind condition the 
constraints are focussed in the south, around the interconnectors; in NS constraints are 
focussed in northern England, and western England; in SN, in northern England and 
Norfolk; and in the average wind condition, in Scotland, northern England, and western 
England (Figure 105). 
 
Figure 104: WLSP 2028 Summer High Wind power flow 
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Figure 105: WLSP 2028 Summer Average Wind power flow 
 
8.4.5 2028 – 2033 
8.4.5.1 Overview of period 
The major expansion of the previous decade allows for a comparatively lower 
rate of generation build out than in the previous decade of this scenario, but network 
upgrades continue to be made in order to achieve compliance across as much of the 
network as possible.  
8.4.5.2 Generation mix 
The remaining available space at Round 3 offshore wind zones is used, adding 
1800 MW to Dogger and 3000 MW to East Anglia. 500 MW of wave are added at Orkney 
and Hebrides. A new nuclear power station is added at Wylfa. 
There is a further 13.8 GW of fossil retirement due to the age of the plant. 
Due to the comparatively small number of low carbon openings, maintaining a positive 
capacity margin requires that 13 GW of new fossil plant is commissioned during the 
period.  
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Figure 106 shows the effect of these generation investment decisions on the 
total installed capacity during the period. 
 
Figure 106: Change in installed capacity, 2028 to 2033, WLSP 
This generation mix gives the following system indicators in 2033. 
Table 24: WLSP 2033 system indicators 
System derated capacity margin 
(%) 
 
3.3 
Proportion of annual electricity 
demand met by (%): 
Renewables 
Nuclear 
Other 
 
 
62 
26 
12 
Carbon intensity of electricity 
(g/KWh) 
 
49 
 
8.4.5.3 Network upgrades 
Upgrades are undertaken in the west of Scotland and north-west England. The 
line from Auchencrosh to Windyhill is upgraded to a double, and the western corridor 
from Windyhill, through Gretna and Harker to Hutton has another single line added to the 
existing double circuits. The geographical arrangement of the network upgrades in this 
period is shown in Figure 107. 
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Figure 107: Network upgrades WLSP 2028 - 2033 
8.4.5.4 Resultant power flow 
The power flows arising from this generation mix again show significant 
within-season variation depending on the weather conditions. Reinforcements undertaken 
on the network within the last decade of the scenario are such that the winter high wind 
condition is almost entirely compliant (Figure 108). However the low wind condition has 
more constraints, although lower utilisation overall, as can be seen in the diagram), 
particularly in the south-east due to imports from interconnectors (Figure 109). A 
comparison of these two figures also indicates that the low wind condition has lower 
utilisation overall – the high wind condition achieves a more even spread of power, with 
low wind having more concentrated point sources, notably the interconnectors. The NS 
condition finds constraints particularly in Scotland and north-west England, as well as in 
the south-east from Sizewell and the East Anglia offshore wind zone (Figure 110). The SN 
condition has fewer northerly constraints but more in the west of England and Wales and in 
particular a very large constraint on the lines running west from Sizewell, due to combined 
nuclear and offshore wind output (Figure 111). The average condition sees constraints 
throughout the network with again particularly high constraints running west from Sizewell 
(Figure 112).  
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Figure 108: WLSP 2033 Winter High Wind power flow 
 
Figure 109: WLSP 2033 Winter Low Wind power flow 
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Figure 110: WLSP 2033 Winter North to South Wind power flow 
 
Figure 111: WLSP 2033 Winter South to North Wind power flow 
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Figure 112: WLSP 2033 Winter Average Wind power flow 
In Spring, the high wind (Figure 113), SN and average conditions all have zero 
constraints. By contrast the NS condition has high constraints exporting south (Figure 114), 
and the average condition has very high constraints in the south east.  
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Figure 113: WLSP 2033 Spring High Wind power flow 
 
Figure 114: WLSP 2033 Spring North to South Wind power flow 
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In Summer, constraint problems occur in all conditions as the low demand 
requires greater export in the highest producing regions. High wind (Figure 115) sees 
constraints in Scotland and in southern exporting corridors, as well as in the circuits west 
of Sizewell. Low, NS and SN all have a range of constraints spread across the network, and 
the average condition (Figure 116) has high constraints across the network. 
 
Figure 115: WLSP 2033 Summer High Wind power flow 
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Figure 116: WLSP 2033 Summer Average Wind power flow 
 
 
8.5 Weak location, weak plan (WLWP) 
8.5.1 Overview of whole scenario 
In this scenario the overriding network philosophy is that networks should be 
at the service of the higher order aim of decarbonisation. The premise is that locational 
network charging is something which runs counter to this higher priority government 
objective and is thus no longer useful or relevant. However, there are also remains a 
reluctance to engage in significant anticipatory forward planning of network requirements, 
on the basis that the precise generation mix of the future cannot be known, neither is there 
any wish to attempt to impose a blueprint on the industry. The role of networks is 
therefore to follow the pattern of generation investments as far as possible as they occur.   
This results in a spread portfolio of renewables and nuclear in locations across 
the country, though with a less rapid expansion of in the early years of the scenario than in 
WLSP, as behind the curve network investments put a slight break on the pace of 
generation investment. By the mid-2020s new renewable investments in the north of GB 
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are such that substantial onshore network upgrades are required along north-south 
corridors, along with both east and west offshore bootstraps. However, the level of 
offshore investment is significantly less than in WLSP due to the higher capital cost and 
greater forward commitment this requires, an approach which is not favoured in this 
scenario. By the late 2020s a network is emerging which is highly compliant in low wind 
conditions, but with high constraints in high wind conditions, as reactive network 
investment struggles to keep pace with generation investments uninfluenced by network 
constraints. This situation is further exacerbated in 2033 with the addition of sufficient low 
carbon generation to meet the carbon intensity target – largely compliant low and SN 
conditions contrast with extremely high constraints in high wind or NS power flows. The 
final generation mix is of 58 GW renewables, 20 GW nuclear and 37 GW fossil. However, 
the high constraints with which the system is operating creates serious questions about 
whether such a system would be in practice feasible, given potentially very high constraint 
payments made to renewable generators in Scotland. This issue could cause a reappraisal of 
the value system (with either a move towards more locational control or influence on 
generation investment, or a more strategic anticipatory approach to network investment). 
Alternatively, it may cause a political and public reaction against renewables, the apparent 
source of the problem, that causes low carbon targets to be missed.   
8.5.2 2013 – 2018  
8.5.2.1 Overview of period 
In 2013 the most significant network concern is the export of power between 
Scotland and England. This relates to the integration of Scottish and English systems under 
BETTA, and is being added to by increasing development of renewables in the north of GB. 
There are plans to invest in the network to bring the Scotland-England boundary into 
compliance. Notably, these include reconductoring and other works on the existing border 
circuits, and the construction of the new HVDC offshore link between Hunterston and 
Deeside (Table 8, Chapter 7). 
The EMR package has come into effect which, it is hoped, will provide 
sufficient incentive for low carbon generation to meet EU 2020 targets and the CCC 
carbon budgets.  
Transmission investment in this scenario does not extend significantly beyond 
planned 2013 upgrades, and generation investments proceed largely as in the other 
scenarios.  
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8.5.2.2 Generation mix 
In addition to the standard additions detailed in Section 7.3.1.6, this scenario 
includes more development in the Western Isles (Stornoway). The lack of strong locational 
signal has encouraged proposed projects in these areas, with the addition of new wind and a 
20 MW wave demonstration in the Hebrides, causing the HVDC link to be built reactively 
within the time frame. Developments in the Orkneys and mid-Wales however do not 
occur due to the continued lack of connection to the main network. Offshore wind sees all 
planned projects in 2013 move to completion, with the further addition of the first 2.4 
GW project at Dogger. 
The final reactor at the Wylfa nuclear site is closed, and a number of closures 
of coal and oil plants occur under the Large Combustion Plant Directive. Figure 117 shows 
the effect of these generation investment decisions on the total installed capacity during the 
period.  
 
Figure 117: Change in installed capacity, 2013 to 2018, WLWP 
 
This generation mix gives the following system indicators in 2018. 
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Table 25: WLWP 2018 system indicators 
System derated capacity margin 
(%) 
 
6.0 
Proportion of annual electricity 
demand met by (%): 
Renewables 
Nuclear 
Other 
 
 
20 
19 
61 
Carbon intensity of electricity 
(g/KWh) 
 
354 
 
8.5.2.3 Network investment 
Confirmed network upgrades as of 2013 are included in this scenario, most 
significant of which are the upgrades over the Scotland-England boundary, including the 
HVDC western link between Hunterston and Deeside (as described in Table 8, Chapter 7). 
In addition to these, this scenario sees the HVDC island connection to Stornoway in the 
Hebrides. 
Figure 118 illustrates the network upgrades in this period. 
 
Figure 118: WLWP network upgrades 2013-2018 
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8.5.2.4 Resultant power flow 
In winter the effect of the investments in renewables in Scotland, and the lack 
of locational signal to affect the operation of fossil plants in Scotland and northern England 
during times of high congestion, results in clear constraint patterns running from north 
Scotland as far as London. The effect of transmission investments can be seen by the 
reduction of constraints in northern Scotland – however the generation investments 
contribute to contribute to increased constraints further south. The winter high wind 
condition has high constraints in the central belt of Scotland, south of the Beauly-Denny 
line, and constraints persist over the England-Scotland border. Very high constraints are 
now observable south of Deeside, as the operation of existing north western fossil and 
nuclear plants is now added to by the output of the 2.2 GW HVDC line. In addition a line 
of constraints can be found from the Humber towards London, as the Humber region 
contains a large amount of fossil generators and now also receives input from Dogger and 
other east coast wind farms.  Similar constraint patterns are found in the NS and average 
conditions, as these include moderate to high wind output in Scotland, which is exported 
south causing constraints in similar areas. However these conditions have lower constraints 
between Humber and London due to lower output from southern north sea zones. In the 
SN and low wind conditions the significantly lower northern wind conditions results in 
recognisably lower constraints over the network – however lower north to south power 
transfer results in the south east pulling more power in from the west, and as a result both 
of these conditions cause a constraint on the line from Bristol to Melksham, as power flows 
west to east.  
	   309	  
 
Figure 119: WLWP 2018 Winter High Wind power flow 
 
Figure 120: WLWP 2018 Winter North to South Wind power flow 
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Figure 121: WLWP 2018 Winter Low Wind power flow 
Spring patterns are very similar, with the primary driver of north-south 
constraints, and constraints between Humber and London, being the north-south pattern of 
wind output. Due to the lower demand, constraints are lower on the south west- south 
east corridors in low wind conditions. Constraints are also high in summer conditions, as 
the low demand causes greater export from high power producing regions – moderate 
constraints are spread throughout the network in the summer NS condition.  
KEY TO BRANCH COLOURS 
 Up to 80% utilisation 
 80-100% utilisation 
 Up to 25% exceedence 
 Up to 50% exceedence 
 Over 50% exceedence 
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Figure 122: WLWP 2018 Spring High Wind power flow 
 
Figure 123: WLWP 2018 Spring South to North Wind power flow 
KEY TO BRANCH COLOURS 
 Up to 80% utilisation 
 80-100% utilisation 
 Up to 25% exceedence 
 Up to 50% exceedence 
 Over 50% exceedence 
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Figure 124: WLWP 2018 Summer North to South Wind power flow 
	  
8.5.3 2018 – 2023 
8.5.3.1 Overview of period 
In the context of the continued push towards staying on track for the CCC’s 
target of 50gCO2/kWh in 2030, locational signals continue to be smoothed. Transmission 
planning continues to operate primarily in responsive mode, and lags the development of 
renewables. Significant constraints continue to be experienced and the growth in 
renewables is less rapid than in WLSP.  
8.5.3.2 Generation mix 
There is a continued strong development of renewables in particular in the 
north of the system, as weak locational signals apply. However, the lagging development of 
the network in practice puts a break on the development of renewables by comparison to 
WLSP. There is just under 750 MW additional onshore wind on mainland Scotland and less 
than 100 MW additional hydro.  
KEY TO BRANCH COLOURS 
 Up to 80% utilisation 
 80-100% utilisation 
 Up to 25% exceedence 
 Up to 50% exceedence 
 Over 50% exceedence 
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Offshore wind development takes place at all available locations: Moray Firth 
(1500 MW), Forth (1050 MW), Dogger-Teesside (1200 MW), Hornsea (1200 MW) Irish 
Sea (2200 MW), East Anglia (1200 MW), Rampion (700 MW) and Navitus (1100 MW). 
Tidal stream is developed at Pentland Firth (125 MW), Solent (200 MW), 
Western Isles (500 MW) and Bristol Channel (400 MW). Wave power is also 
commercialised in this year, and 125 MW are installed at Hebrides, and 500 MW at Islay, 
Devon and Cornwall. 
Hinkley Point C comes online, while Harltepool, Heysham 1 and Dungeness 
B close. Fossil retirements are as the standard background for this year (Table 9, Chapter 
7). Figure 125 shows the effect of these generation investment decisions on the total 
installed capacity during the period. 
 
Figure 125: Change in installed capacity, 2018 to 2023, WLWP 
This generation mix gives the following system indicators in 2023. 
Table 26: WLWP 2023 system indicators 
System derated capacity margin 
(%) 
 
0.4 
Proportion of annual electricity 
demand met by (%): 
Renewables 
Nuclear 
Other 
 
 
33 
18 
49 
Carbon intensity of electricity 
(g/KWh) 
 
269 
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8.5.3.3 Network upgrades 
In addition to new offshore radial lines connecting new offshore renewable 
projects, a number of upgrades are made to network transfer capability, in view of the 
constraint issues found in the previous time stage. Upgrades are made to lines from the 
north-south of Scotland, including on the Beauly-Denny corridor, to which a second circuit 
is added, and on the Kintyre-Hunterston subsea cable. The eastern HVDC ‘bootstrap’, 
from Peterhead to Blyth, is completed. Further uprates and added lines add capacity to 
both the east and west coast corridors from the Scottish central belt to the Midlands, 
including an uprate of the line running south of Deeside, which was heavily constrained in 
the previous time-stage due to the infeed from the HVCD western link. As in all scenarios 
a new line is added in the south-west to accommodate output from the new Hinkley Point 
C nuclear station. 
The geographical arrangement of the network upgrades in this period is shown 
in Figure 126. 
 
Figure 126: Network upgrades WLWP 2018 - 2023 
8.5.3.4 Resultant power flow 
Transmission investments in this period mean that the winter high wind 
(Figure 127) condition sees a significant improvement in many of the key constraint 
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corridors identified in the previous time stage. However, the growth in renewables in 
Scotland, though more modest than WLSP, still causes constraints in this condition in the 
highlands of Scotland, and between Beauly and Kintore as power is drawn eastwards by the 
new HVDC bootstrap. Constraints remain on the east and west coasts of northern England, 
and new constraints have emerged in north-west Wales, due to infeed from the Irish Sea 
wind farm zone, and in the south west due to infeed from wave and tidal installations in 
Cornwall and the Bristol Channel. NS has similar constraint patterns to high wind. The 
lower wind conditions, low wind and average (Figure 128) see reduced constraints across 
northern Britain, however the west-east line between Melksham and Bramley is 
consistently constrained owing to south-west marine installations, Hinkley Point C as well 
as remaining fossil plants in the region.  
 
Figure 127: WLWP 2023 Winter High Wind power flow 
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Figure 128: WLWP 2023 Winter Average Wind power flow 
 
The Spring high wind condition (Figure 129) however sees the return of very 
high exceedences, as the combination of high spring winds with lower demand produces a 
greater north-south export. High constraints are found again in northern Scotland and also 
on key corridors in northern England, between Harker and Hutton on the west and 
Teesside to north Yorkshire on the east coast. The latter constraint also relates to the new 
connection of Dogger to Teesside as well as Humberside. As in winter high wind, 
constraints are also found in north Wales and Wiltshire, contributed to by western offshore 
renewables. The NS condition has a similar constraint pattern to high wind. Low wind, SN 
(Figure 130) and average conditions all have greatly reduced constraints in northern GB than 
high wind, but continue to have constraints in the west, notably north Wales and Wiltshire 
/ Somerset, due the increase in renewable output in these areas.  
KEY TO BRANCH COLOURS 
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 80-100% utilisation 
 Up to 25% exceedence 
 Up to 50% exceedence 
 Over 50% exceedence 
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Figure 129: WLWP 2023 Spring High Wind 
	  
Figure 130: WLWP 2023 Spring South to North Wind power flow 
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In summer constraints largely follow the same pattern as the other two 
seasons, but with noticeably lower constraints as the lower demand in general means lower 
stress on the network. The exception is the NS condition (Figure 131), where the 
combination of the comparatively high northerly wind condition with an overall low 
demand sees high constraints in northern Scotland, as well as other constraints throughout 
the network as excess available power is shifted through low demand regions towards the 
south east.  
 
Figure 131: WLWP 2023 Summer North to South Wind power flow 
 
  
8.5.4 2023 – 2028 
8.5.4.1 Overview of period 
Transmission investments in this time-stage respond directly to the key 
recurring constraint corridors in the previous time-stage. At the same time ongoing 
generation investments see a growth in all forms of low carbon generation. The growth in 
renewables in northern GB is slower than in WLSP, and there are two new nuclear 
stations.  By 2028 system power flows show significant variation between high compliance 
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with areas of under utilisation in some conditions, and very high constraints in other 
conditions.  
8.5.4.2 Generation mix 
The lack of locational signal presents no disincentive to invest in northern 
Britain and other network constrained areas. However, the lack of forward network build 
out under these conditions creates potential for high constraint costs. This slows 
investment in renewables in the northern parts of GB by comparison to WLSP.  
Onshore wind in Scotland increases by a total of 1500 MW, a tidal stream 
installation of 500 MW is commissioned in the Pentland Firth and 200 MW of wave 
projects brought online in Hebrides and Islay. 200 MW wave farms also commission in 
Devon and Cornwall. Offshore wind increases by 1000 MW in each of Forth, Dogger, 
Hornsea, East Anglia and Irish Sea. Two new nuclear stations are commissioned, at 
Sellafield and Sizewell. According to the standard background assumptions for this scenario 
year there are 4978 MW of nuclear closures and 12602 MW of fossil closures. Maintaining 
a positive capacity margin requires commissioning of 10 GW new fossil plant, which is 
assumed to be distributed across the network, at the following former station sites: 
Longannet, Drax, Fiddler’s Ferry, West Burton and Rugely.    
Figure 132 shows the effect of these generation investment decisions on the 
total installed capacity during the period. 
 
Figure 132: Change in installed capacity, 2023 to 2028, WLWP 
This generation mix gives the following system indicators in 2028. 
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Table 27: WLWP 2028 system indicators 
System derated capacity margin 
(%) 
 
0.5 
Proportion of annual electricity 
demand met by (%): 
Renewables 
Nuclear 
Other 
 
 
39 
21 
40 
Carbon intensity of electricity 
(g/KWh) 
 
170 
 
8.5.4.3 Network upgrades 
Network upgrades in this period are focussed on resolving the main recurring 
constraint areas in the previous time-stage. Thus, further reinforcements are made in 
northern Scotland and from Beauly to Kintore, allowing power to transfer to the eastern 
HVDC link. The corridor from the southern western isles link with Islay to the central belt 
is also reinforcements. Reinforcements take place on both the east and west coast of 
northern England, the east coast particular due to the added infeed form the eastern 
HVDC. Infeed from the Irish Sea and North Sea renewables causes reinforcements in North 
Sea and Humberside. There is also strengthening of the west-east corridors from Somerset 
and Wiltshire towards London, and considerable strengthening of the eastern England 
network owing to infeed from the East Anglia wind farm.  
Upgrades in the north-west and south-east of England also relate to the 
commissioning of Heysham and Sizewell nuclear plants in this period. Though this scenario 
is not anticipatory in network development, the long lead time and large single source 
power output of nuclear plants mean that even in a non-anticipatory regime, networks can 
be strengthened in time with nuclear builds.   
The geographical arrangement of the network upgrades in this period is shown 
in Figure 133. 
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Figure 133: Network upgrades WLWP 2023 - 2028 
8.5.4.4 Resultant power flow 
The power flows arising from this generation mix show the successful 
resolution of several of the key constraint areas from the previous time-stage. However the 
continued increase in generation investment means that there already strong north-south 
power flow in high wind conditions has increased further, with high constraints persisting 
on the main north-south transit routes. These high wind, high constraint conditions are 
contrasted with very low constraint power flows during low wind conditions.  
Winter high wind (Figure 134) shows Scotland now largely compliant though 
with a constraint on the southern section of the Beauly-Denny corridor. High constraints 
however persist down the west coast as Scottish and Atlantic renewables are exported 
south. There also remains a constraint between Teesside and Humberside due to renewable 
infeed from the North Sea and the eastern HVDC link, despite onshore reinforcements 
having taken place in this area during the period. NS shows a similar pattern, although 
without east coast constraints due to lower southern North Sea output (Figure 135). Low 
wind and average wind are both free of constraints, as the spread of relatively low output 
renewables around the country results in no stressed export areas. SN is similarly free of 
constraints, except for the corridor between Humber and central Yorkshire, as high 
southern North Sea output is drawn westwards (Figure 136).  
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Figure 134: WLWP 2028 Winter High Wind power flow 
 
Figure 135: WLWP 2028 Winter North to South Wind power flow 
	   323	  
 
Figure 136: WLWP 2028 Winter South to North Wind power flow 
Spring high wind exhibits a similar pattern to winter high wind, with 
relatively small constraints in Scotland, but high constraints moving down the west coast of 
England as lower demand causes larger transfers. There is also a noticeable constraint 
corridor between Humber and central Yorkshire as north sea offshore wind feeds into the 
system (Figure 137). In NS constraints are focussed on the west coast of England. Low wind 
and average are again free of constraints (Figure 138), and SN largely free except for the 
Harker-Hutton line in north-west England.  
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Figure 137: WLWP 2028 Spring High Wind power flow 
 
Figure 138: WLWP 2028 Spring Average Wind power flow 
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In Summer, the NS condition exhibits a similar pattern to previously discussed 
conditions with high constraints in central Scotland and down the west coast of England 
(Figure 139). High wind also has similar but lower constraints in Scotland and north-west 
England. However, in addition a significant constraint is now found between Sizewell and 
Bramford as power from the East Anglia wind farm is transferred towards London. 
Average and low wind are again largely constraint free. SN is constraint free except for 
another large constraint between Sizewell and Bramford, relating to East Anglia wind 
output (Figure 140).  
 
Figure 139: WLWP 2028 Summer North to South Wind power flow 
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Figure 140: WLWP 2028 Summer South to North Wind power flow 
	  
8.5.5 2028 – 2033 
8.5.5.1 Overview of period 
A continued steady growth in renewables continues during this period in the 
most resource rich areas of the country. However, transmission capacity ultimately places a 
limit on northern renewables’ growth as constraint costs rise. As a consequence three new 
nuclear plants make a required contribution towards meeting the 50gCO2/kWh target by 
2033. Transmission investments again respond to constraint issues in the previous section, 
but are behind the curve of the still rapid growth in renewable capacity over this period. By 
2033 then the system continues to experience high constraint costs during high wind 
conditions, and isolated constraints as well as under-utilisation in low wind conditions. 
8.5.5.2 Generation mix 
Scottish onshore wind adds a further 2 GW, creating a total of 11 GW, and 
further 1.5 GW of tidal stream capacity is added at the Pentland Firth. Wave power 
continues to expand with 800 MW added at Hebrides, Islay, Devon and Cornwall. 
Offshore wind is expanded in Forth (1000 MW), Dogger (3500 MW), Hornsea (800 
MW), Irish Sea (1000 MW) and East Anglia (3200 MW). Three new nuclear plants are 
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commissioned during the period, at Heysham, Wylfa and Bradwell. As in all scenarios in 
this time-stage, a further 13.8 GW of fossil plant retires. In this scenario 5 GW of new 
fossil plant opens in order to maintain a positive capacity margin – 2 GW at Peterhead and 
Deesside / Connah’s Quay, and 1 GW at Keadby. 
Figure 141 shows the effect of these generation investment decisions on the 
total installed capacity during the period. 
 
Figure 141: Change in installed capacity, 2028 to 2033, WLWP 
This generation mix gives the following system indicators in 2033. 
Table 28: WLWP 2033 system indicators 
System derated capacity margin 
(%) 
 
1.8 
Proportion of annual electricity 
demand met by (%): 
Renewables 
Nuclear 
Other 
 
 
50 
37 
13 
Carbon intensity of electricity 
(g/KWh) 
 
50 
 
8.5.5.3 Network upgrades 
This time-stage continues with the ongoing upgrade of offshore networks, 
primarily relating to facilitating peak north-south transfer. In Scotland, additional capacity 
is added on the Western Isles link to the Hebrides, and a third circuit on the southern 
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section of the Beauly-Denny corridor. In England new circuits are added along the west 
coast transmission corridors, and on the east coast south of Teesside, and re-conductoring 
adds east-west transfer capacity between Harker and Blyth. Another circuit is also added 
between Sizewell and Bramford in the south-east. 
The geographical arrangement of the network upgrades in this period is shown 
in Figure 142. 
 
Figure 142: Network upgrades WLWP 2028 - 2033 
8.5.5.4 Resultant power flow 
The pressure of meeting the 50gCO2/kWh target by the end of this time stage 
means that the pace of installation of renewable technologies has significantly outstripped 
the installation of transmission capacity in this scenario. High wind conditions have 
widespread high constraints relating to a significant north-south power flow which exceeds 
available transfer capacity. Lower wind conditions in general have much lower utilisation 
but still produce high, albeit more isolated constraints.  
The winter high wind condition (Figure 143) produces extremely high 
constraints throughout Scotland and across the Cheviot boundary, and along the west coast 
of northern England and north Wales. Particularly high constraints are also found along the 
east coast of northern England, due to infeed from the Eastern bootstrap combined with a 
major increase in capacity increase in offshore wind in the southern North Sea. The NS 
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condition is similar although with lower constraints along the east coast due to lower 
output from southern North Sea renewables. A similar pattern but with lower overall 
constraints is also observable in the average condition. In the low wind condition (Figure 
144), the output of Scottish wind in combination with Pentland Firth tidal capacity 
(obviously unaffected by low winds) and by fossil plants at Peterhead and Longannet, called 
into operation due to low overall winds, is sufficient to cause constraints in Scotland. 
However, in the rest of the country there are no constraints. The SN condition by contrast 
(Figure 145) is free of constraints in the north of GB, however isolated constraints occur in 
England and Wales relating to high output from major clusters of renewables – in north 
Wales due to the Irish Sea zone, and in East England due to the East Anglia zone.   
 
Figure 143: WLWP 2033 Winter High Wind power flow 
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Figure 144: WLWP 2033 Winter Low Wind power flow 
 
Figure 145: WLWP 2033 Winter South to North Wind power flow 
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In Spring the high wind condition (Figure 146) has a very similar constraint 
pattern to the winter high wind condition. The NS condition is also similar to its equivalent 
winter condition although it has higher constraints on the east coast, as the output from 
Dogger is greater. SN also has constraints in Scotland and northern England. The average 
condition (Figure 147) has some high constraints in Scotland, otherwise England is almost 
entirely unconstrained except for two key corridors which again relate to high offshore 
output – from the Irish Sea zone in North Wales, and from East Anglia in East England. 
The low wind condition however is entirely unconstrained.  
 
Figure 146: WLWP 2033 Spring High Wind power flow 
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Figure 147: WLWP 2033 Spring Average Wind power flow 
 
The summer conditions show similar patterns. The high and NS (Figure 148) 
conditions show widely pervasive and high constraints relating to a strong overall north-
south power flow. The low, SN (Figure 149) and average conditions are free of constraints 
through the majority of the network, but have isolated high constraints in key corridors 
relating to the infeed from high producing renewable sites, typically the Irish Sea and East 
Anglia zones. 
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Figure 148: WLWP 2033 Summer North to South Wind power flow 
 
Figure 149: WLWP 2033 Summer South to North Wind power flow 
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8.6 Scenario comparisons and sensitivities 
The scenarios described in the previous sections explore how different 
approaches to the utilisation and expansion of transmission networks could affect and 
interact with the trajectory taken by the system towards a carbon intensity target of 
50gCO2/kWh by the early 2030s. The following section makes some comparisons of key 
system indicators across the scenarios, and explores the effects of some additional 
uncertainties upon the network configurations described by the scenarios. 
8.6.1 Comparison of final networks 
Figure 150 compares the network configuration of the four scenarios in the 
year 2033, and the power flows they experience at the winter high wind condition.  
SLSP has achieved targeted strategic network upgrades in specific renewable 
rich areas – mid-Wales, Scottish and English North Sea regions – and avoided major 
onshore reinforcements. It uses bootstraps between England and Scotland on both west and 
east coasts, and from north to south Wales. High capacity interconnectors to Denmark and 
Norway are integrated with offshore networks and respond to locationally specific signals 
to affect their operation. This means that at various different network conditions power 
transfers between regions within GB are smoothed, and the utilisation level of the 
networks kept relatively consistent. At the winter high wind the system trades strongly 
with neighbouring systems through interconnectors, which has the overall effect of 
avoiding constraints on the system despite relatively low investment in onshore network 
strengthening.  
SLWP has made onshore network investments in certain key corridors, 
however it has not made bold anticipatory investments to exploit areas such as mid-Wales, 
the Scottish North Sea and the Scottish islands. It has also avoided the need for any further 
bootstrapping between Scotland and England, beyond the western HVDC link. The strong 
locational signal has limited the development of renewables in Scotland, but it has 
encouraged the development of southern renewables, particularly marine and tidal barrage, 
offshore wind in the southern North Sea, and nuclear – all of which can find connection 
points in relatively uncongested areas of the network. The lower output volatility caused 
by the lower renewable content of this scenario has meant a reduced incentive for 
interconnectors, so the system is less interconnected than in SLSP. Nonetheless, due to the 
spread of generation capacity around the network the winter high condition is met whilst 
almost entirely avoiding constraints. 
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WLSP has avoided signalling locational network constraints to generators. 
This has provided strong incentives for generators to invest in a portfolio of technologies 
across the network, including extensive development of renewables in the resource-rich 
northerly areas. In order to keep pace with the rapid deployment of generation capacity 
including in previously weakly connected network areas, an extensive programme of 
anticipatory network investment is undertaken. This includes high capacity HVDC 
interconnectors from the north of Scotland down the length of the east coast to Suffolk, 
and down the length of the west coast to south Wales. The output volatility created by the 
large renewable capacity creates incentives for interconnectors to trade power with 
neighbouring systems at times of high and low renewable output; however the lack of 
locational signal means that the operation of these interconnectors responds to overall GB 
system balance, without taking into account network conditions in the particular 
connecting zone. This means that interconnector activity can at times add to network 
transfer requirements, rather than reducing them as in SLSP. The high level of GB network 
investments in this scenario however mean that the high wind winter condition, despite 
very large power transfers, is almost entirely compliant. 
WLWP has also avoided giving strong locational signals to generators, and has 
thereby encouraged development in renewable-resource-rich but weakly connected 
northern areas of GB. However, its approach to network investment has not been 
anticipatory but responsive to the development of generation as it has been committed. For 
nuclear power, due to the length of time between when a project is considered committed 
and when it is finally commissioned, responsive network investment can deliver required 
upgrades in time for the first day of the project’s operation. For renewables however, the 
number of different projects and the speed with which they can move from planning to 
commissioning means that a responsive transmission approach can result in transmission 
investment lagging generation. In this scenario the result is high constraints, especially in 
high wind conditions, as transmission investment struggles to keep pace with the 
generation investments made within each time stage. With little additional strategic 
network investments beyond the east and west HVDC bootstraps, the scenario proceeds 
with successive incremental reinforcements of sections of the onshore network, as more 
renewable capacity is added. This results in a network whose overall shape is similar to the 
present one, but with greatly increased capacity in key onshore north-south corridors. 
Nonetheless, the lack of anticipatory network investment puts a practical brake on the pace 
of renewable investment, and this scenario relies on a greater quantity of nuclear power 
than WLSP, in order to meet the 50gCO2/kWh target. In 2033 the winter high wind 
condition experiences high levels of constraint throughout Scotland, northern England and 
the Midlands, as the high output from northern renewables is transferred south through a 
network whose investment levels are still lagging those of the generation portfolio.      
 
	   336	  
 
  
  
Figure 150: Comparison of four scenarios in year 2033, winter, high wind 
8.6.2 Trajectory of decarbonisation 
Figure 151 shows the change in carbon intensity of supplied electricity in 
g/kWh, by scenario and scenario year. 
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Figure 151: Change in carbon intensity of electricity by scenario and scenario year 
 
The figure shows that WLSP follows a concave trajectory with strong early 
action, whereas SLWP follows a convex trajectory, leaving a steep reduction in carbon 
intensity to the end of the period. SLSP’s trajectory is slightly convex, and WLWP is 
almost straight-line. The intensive build-out of renewables with accompanying rapid 
expansion of network capacity seen in the early and middle periods of WLSP is the main 
factor behind its concave decarbonisation trajectory. The convex trajectory of SLWP 
reflects its slower early deployment of renewables and reliance on a more extensive 
nuclear programme, which comes to fruition later in the period. In SLSP expansion of 
renewables is enabled, but waits for strategic anticipatory network expansions before these 
are considered viable. This results also in a later action trajectory, though for different 
reasons than SLWP, as the final period sees a rapid growth in renewables, due to available 
infrastructure, as well as some new nuclear. WLWP’s trajectory can be contrasted with 
WLSP, indicating that the absence of forward infrastructure planning, in a weak locational 
policy context, slows the trajectory of renewable deployment. The limits on renewable 
deployment means that nuclear is important to maintain the course of the trajectory in the 
later stages of the scenario.   
8.6.3 Contribution of renewables 
Figure 152 shows the annual output from renewable sources by scenario and 
scenario year, and Figure 153 shows the percentage contribution this makes in each case to 
overall electricity supply.  
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Figure 152: Annual renewable output by scenario and scenario year 
 
Figure 153: Annual renewable contribution to electricity supply by scenario and scenario year 
Comparing WLSP and SLSP again highlights the early- and late-action 
characteristics of these scenarios, with WLSP making its push for renewables early on in 
the period, and with renewable expansion happening later in SLSP following the strategic 
build out of the network. Despite their different trajectories however, the two scenarios 
finish up with similar levels of renewable generation, with WLSP producing 248 TWh and 
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62% of its supply from renewable sources, and SLSP producing 228 TWh and 57% of its 
supply from renewables. WLWP maintains a steady growth in renewables, but is overall 
less steep than WLSP due to the infrastructure limitations. Renewable growth in SLWP is 
the least steep of all scenarios. As a result this scenario has the largest contribution of the 
three from nuclear, which comes online in significant quantities in the later periods of the 
scenario.  
  
8.6.4 Final generation mix 
Figure 154 shows the final generation mix in the four scenarios. 
 
Figure 154: Final generation mix of scenarios 
All four scenarios employ large quantities of all three broad generation types. 
Even though SLWP has maximised the use of nuclear by developing all eight available sites, 
it still requires a not insubstantial 44 GW of renewables to achieve a sufficiently 
decarbonised supply. Conversely, although WLSP has expanded its networks considerably 
to enable the development of 75 GW renewables, it still relies upon a significant fleet of 
nuclear stations amounting to 14 GW. SLSP and WLWP also, whilst having large 
renewables portfolios of 68 and 58 GW respectively, also require substantial nuclear 
portfolios of 17 and 20 GW respectively – which are critical to meeting the target due to 
their higher load factors. The locations and network implications of renewable build out in 
these scenarios were already challenging, and the implications of attempting to meet the 
target without a nuclear contribution, were stretching plausibility. All three scenarios also 
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maintain very similar levels of fossil plant of 35-40 GW to maintain the security of the 
capacity margin.  
Similarities and correspondences between the generation mixes of the 
different scenarios belie differences in the network configurations the scenarios build to get 
there. In particular, the final installed capacities of SLSP and WLSP turn out to be quite 
similar in terms of the three broad categories of technology types – however the network 
architectures they have built to support this are very different, as discussed in the following 
section.  
 
8.6.5 Quantities of network upgrade 
Figure 155 compares the lengths of lines receiving different kinds of network 
upgrades, and Figure 156 combines this with the level of capacity upgrade to provide the 
overall quantity of upgraded network in GWkm (quantity of upgrade in GW * length of 
upgrade in km).  
 
Figure 155: Length of total network upgrades by scenario and type of upgrade 
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Figure 156: Quantities of total network upgrades by scenario and type of upgrade, in GWkms 
WLSP has the largest levels of network expansion, with a particularly large 
offshore expansion due to the large numbers of bootstrapping offshore cables required to 
convey high peak output renewables and interconnector output from north to south. It also 
has a high onshore impact, with upgrades of new onshore lines around double that in SLWP 
and SLSP. SLWP has the lowest upgrade requirements. A key difference between SLWP 
and SLSP is that whereas SLWP’s expansion is spread between uprating of existing lines, 
new onshore lines and offshore lines, SLSP uses offshore lines not just as radial connections 
to offshore sites, but as bootstraps and networked meshed connections which enable the 
conveyance of power across the system with a relatively low onshore upgrade requirement. 
The scenario with the largest levels of onshore upgrades – both line uprates and new 
overhead lines – is WLWP. This is due to the scenario’s high peak output requirement, 
combined with its lack of investment in strategic offshore upgrades, as can be seen by its 
much lower investment in this category compared to WLSP.  
8.6.6 Costs of network upgrades and comparisons with 
other scenarios and projections 
Projections of future costs are subject to uncertainties, however based on 
available estimates of the costs per km of the different types of upgrade, estimates of the 
total costs of new transmission investments (above like-for-like renewal) for each scenario 
can be produced, for any point in each scenario trajectory. This section reports on 
estimated transmission network investment costs for the scenarios, in the medium-term 
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and the longer-term. Details of the cost estimation methodology are provided in Appendix 
F.  
In order to provide some context to these costs, as well as presenting 
estimated medium-term and long-term network investment costs for the scenarios 
developed in the current thesis, this section also compares these cost estimates to similar 
available estimates on possible future transmission network requirements, as well as 
broader energy system cost projections and the expected costs of other major 
infrastructure projects that may take place in the future. 
8.6.6.1 Medium term investment costs 
Section 1.2.1 discussed a number of studies which have in different ways 
considered the future prospects for electricity networks under a decarbonising electricity 
supply mix. Two of these – ENSG (ENSG, 2009, ENSG, 2012) and Barnacle et al (2013) –  
include estimates of the total investment costs of delivering the strategic network upgrades 
required under their specific low carbon scenarios out to 2020. Clearly the cost estimates 
in these reports, corresponding to their respective partially decarbonised 2020 scenarios, 
are not comparable to the final cumulative network costs of the scenarios developed in this 
thesis, which extend to a heavily decarbonised system in 2033 – these final costs will be 
discussed in the next section. However, it is nonetheless informative to compare the 
network costs estimates of ENSG (2012) and Barnacle et al (2013) to the cumulative costs 
at a comparable intermediate point in the trajectory of the scenarios developed in this 
thesis. It is also possible to compare the geographical architecture of the transmission 
networks described in the scenarios at such a comparable intermediate point, with the 2020 
transmission architecture proposed in ENSG (2012). Barnacle et al (2013) do not make 
explicit the geographical arrangement of their proposed upgrades, so such a comparison is 
not possible in this case.   
In order to establish a meaningful comparison it is necessary to choose an 
appropriate intermediate scenario year, the conditions of which compare adequately with 
the 2020 scenarios used by ENSG (2012) and Barnacle et al (2013) – ‘Gone Green’ and 
‘Market Rules’ respectively.  
As shown in Table 29 and Table 30, the generation mixes of all four scenarios 
for both of the years 2018 and 2023, and the outputs for Market Rules and Gone Green for 
the year 2020, all have certain broad similarities especially around the capacities of fossil 
plant (coal, gas and oil), and nuclear. This reflects the long lead-times for plant 
construction in the case of nuclear, such that there is little flexibility for considering a mass 
rollout over the next ten years; and in the case of fossil-fuel powered plant, that a similar 
amount of capacity continues to be required in the medium term for capacity margins, such 
that expected closures are assumed to be replaced across all scenarios.  However, greater 
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divergences are found in the scenarios’ assumptions on deployment of renewables. The key 
difference between Gone Green and Market Rules is in their deployment of offshore wind 
– Gone Green installs 16.6 GW, Market Rules only 7 GW. As Table 29 and Table 30 show, 
this means that Market Rules is more comparable to the 2018 outputs for the scenarios 
developed in this thesis; Gone Green on the other hand is more comparable to the 2023 
outputs. 
Table 29: Comparison of installed capacities (GW) of scenarios for year 2018, with ‘Market Rules’ for year 2020. 
‘Market Rules’ data from Barnacle et al (2013), Table 6 
Installed Capacity (GW) SLSP 
2018 
SLWP 
2018 
WLSP 
2018 
WLWP 
2018 
Market Rules 
2020 
Offshore wind 9.9 9.9 9.9 9.9 7 
Onshore wind 7.2 6.8 7.6 7.3 9.4 
Other renewables 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.2 5.2 
Nuclear 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 10.7 
Fossil 52.1 52.1 52.1 52.1 54.53 
Other 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 9 
 
 
 
Table 30: Comparison of installed capacities (GW) of scenarios for year 2023, with ‘Gone Green’ for year 20204. Gone 
Green data from ENSG (2012), Figure 3 
Installed Capacity (GW) SLSP 
2023 
SLWP 
2023 
WLSP 
2023 
WLWP 
2023 
Gone Green 
2020 
Offshore wind 20.7 14.1 21.2 20.0 16.6 
Onshore wind 8.2 7.8 12.1 8.1 9.1 
Other renewables 4.3 4.3 8.0 6.1 3.1 
Nuclear 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 12.3 
Fossil 45.7 47.2 44.9 44.9 50.0 
Other 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 9.3 
 
 
In both Barnacle et al (2013) and ENSG (2012), the cost estimates do not 
appear to have been adjusted by a discount rate. In order to aid comparison with these 
reports therefore, the undiscounted cumulative costs of investment in onshore upgrades 
and HVDC links, but not including radial connections to offshore renewables, are reported 
for all scenarios. Scenario cumulative costs for the year 2018 are reported for comparison 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 ‘Market Rules’ fossil includes 2.3 GW Coal CCS  
4 ‘Gone Green’ figures are transmission connected only 
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with Barnacle et al (2013), and costs for 2023 are reported for comparison with ENSG 
(2012).  
Barnacle et al (2013) produce a range of costs, as the genetic algorithm 
approach used in the paper to define networks for the generation mix scenarios produces a 
range of solutions. In Table 31 the range of the results quoted in Barnacle et al for ‘Market 
Rules’ in 2020 is compared to the cumulative costs for the scenarios in this thesis, for the 
year 2018.   
Table 31: Undiscounted cumulative costs (£bn) of network investment in the four scenarios in 2018, compared with the 
‘Market Rules’ 2020 scenario, as reported by Barnacle et al (2013) 
 SLSP 2018 SLWP 2018 WLSP 2018 WLWP 2018 Market 
Rules 2020 
(Barnacle 
et al., 2013) 
Network 
costs (£bn) 8.1 6.6 8.8 8.1 0.3 – 0.8 
The upper end of the range of costs in Barnacle et al (2013) is an order of 
magnitude lower than the cost estimates for the scenarios in this thesis in the comparable 
year (in terms of generation capacity) of 2018. In considering this difference, it can be 
observed that the Barnacle et al cost ranges appear low even compared to the projected 
costs of projects currently known to be proceeding, such as the Beauly-Denny line 
(estimated cost £600m, (BBC, 2013a)) and the Western Link (estimated cost £1bn, 
(National Grid and Scottish Power, 2015)). Though a detailed description of what upgrades 
are made to accommodate the Market Rules scenario is not provided, Barnacle et al do 
note in relation to the network plan which provides the lowest investment of their overall 
range, that ‘this minimal cost is however understandable as the overloads under this line 
loading condition, and under this 2020 scenario, occur at lines of small distance and 
capacity. The largest line capacity for an addition of a line, for this plan, is only 132 MVA, 
and the largest route length is only 85.5 km’. These levels of network reinforcement on a 
2020 scenario are aptly described as ‘minimal’ when compared to the scenarios developed 
in this thesis, as well as to the ENSG analysis (described further below). The explanation 
for the comparatively low level of network investments found by Barnacle et al is likely to 
reside in a combination of the assumptions taken by the authors for the geographical 
distribution of the Market Rules generation mix, and their assumptions about the output of 
the various generators, especially the renewables, (high, low or average) at the point of the 
power flow being analysed. Comparisons of the various scenarios and power flow 
conditions explored in this thesis have shown that these two variables can have a 
considerable impact on the requirements of the transmission network (as discussed in detail 
in Sections 8.2 to 8.5). However, the assumptions about geographical distribution and 
temporal variation of output are not made clear by Barnacle et al (2013).   
	   345	  
ENSG also calculate the total costs of the network investments they consider 
necessary to accommodate the Gone Green 2020 scenario. These investment costs are 
compared in Table 32 to the network investment costs of the four scenarios developed in 
this thesis, in their 2023 reporting years.  
Table 32: Undiscounted cumulative costs (£bn) of network investment in the four scenarios, compared with the Gone 
Green 2020 scenario, as reported in ENSG (2009, 2012) 
 SLSP  
2023 
SLWP 
2023 
WLSP 
2023 
WLWP 
2023 
Gone 
Green 
2020 
(ENSG, 
2009) 
Gone 
Green 
2020 
(ENSG, 
2012) 
Network 
costs 
(£bn) 
9.2 
 
6.7 
 
18.9 
 
8.9 
 4.7 8.8 
The network investment costs for 2023 for the scenarios developed in this 
thesis, are much closer to the ENSG calculations (2009, 2012) than the 2018 costs were to 
those reported in Barnacle et al (2013), being broadly within the same order of magnitude, 
and in some cases very similar. The difference between the cost estimates in ENSG (2009) 
and (2012) is in large part due to the greater inclusion of offshore HVDC links in the later 
report, including links to Scottish islands (ENSG, 2012). As can be seen from the table, in 
the 2023 scenario year, investment costs in SLSP and WLWP are very close to the estimate 
for Gone Green 2020 given in ENSG (2012). SLWP requires a little less – around 75% of 
the Gone Green investment quoted in ENSG (2012). WLSP is the clear outlier, with more 
than double the investment costs of the others. A comparison of the network investment 
maps for the scenarios in 2023 (Figure 157) with the equivalent map of the required 
network for Gone Green provided by ENSG (2012) sheds some light on the differences in 
investment costs.  
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Figure 157: Comparison of networks of the four scenarios at 2023, Winter High Wind 
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Figure 158: Map of potential network reinforcements identified by ENSG (2012) based on Gone Green 2020 
 
As shown in Figure 158, the ENSG analysis based on Gone Green 2020, 
suggests a number of major reinforcements, including offshore interconnectors across the 
Moray Firth, between Scotland and England along the east and west coasts (the Western 
Link is present but not highlighted in the ENSG map (Figure 158) as it was considered a firm 
project by the time of the 2012 report), from north to south Wales, as well as numerous 
onshore upgrades, especially in critical north-south corridors. By comparing Figure 158 with 
127 
 
9 Appendix C – NETS Showing Potential Reinforcements 
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Figure 157, it is possible to compare the ENSG’s network for Gone Green 2020 with the 
networks built by the scenarios presented in this thesis up to the year 2023 (the most 
comparable scenario year in terms of generation mix to Gone Green 2020). Although none 
of the four 2023 networks provide an exact match to the ENSG Gone Green network, 
arguably the most similar is WLWP 2023. Like the ENSG network, WLWP has built by 
2023 both the eastern and western offshore ‘bootstrap’, as well as the Moray Firth 
interconnection, and substantially strengthened other key onshore corridors. SLSP and 
SLWP both avoid the need to build the eastern bootstrap, however SLSP has made 
substantial onshore investment which puts its costs closer to Gone Green, whereas SLWP 
has even avoided most of these onshore upgrades, allowing it to achieve costs significantly 
lower than Gone Green. Although WLSP in 2023 has some similarities to the ENSG’s 
Gone Green network which the other 2023 scenarios do not, namely the addition of the 
north-south Wales offshore bootstrap, and the new mid-Wales connection, it also has many 
substantially greater upgrades than found in other scenarios, such as a doubling of the 
eastern and western bootstraps, further addition of bootstraps down the east coast as far as 
Norwich, and other substantial onshore upgrades. These constitute a very much greater 
level of network investment than in the other 2023 scenarios, and the ENSG’s Gone Green 
network, which explain the very noticeable difference in investment cost. 
The drivers for the different levels of investment in transmission relate 
primarily to the location of the generation plant and the degree of operational flexibility 
within the system. These drivers and their effect on specific transmission investment 
choices, and resulting overall pattern of investment, have been discussed in greater detail 
earlier in this chapter during the exposition of the scenarios themselves, and further policy 
implications from these issues will be discussed in the remainder of the thesis. However, at 
the high level, the comparison of the scenarios developed in this thesis and the resulting 
network investment cost calculations, with similar calculations undertaken by ENSG, 
indicate that for a broadly similar kind of network the method developed in this thesis 
calculates a similar investment cost to that provided by ENSG. In the scenarios where the 
investment costs are significantly lower or higher than the ENSG analysis, clear reasons can 
be identified in terms of the physical characteristics of the networks, for why this should be 
so.    
  
8.6.6.2 Long term investment costs 
For the longer term investment costs, all transmission upgrades including 
radial offshore connections are included. This is because in scenarios with a more strategic 
approach, offshore networks emerge in which lines are serving wider network purposes as 
well as the conveyance of power from particular individual wind farms, so the distinction is 
harder to maintain. In any case, consumers will have to pay for the costs of all of these one 
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way or another. The investment costs are discounted using the annual discount rate of 
3.5% recommended by the Green Book. Details on cost assumptions are in Appendix F 
The total undiscounted and discounted investment costs for each scenario are 
presented in Table 33. 
Table 33: Total undiscounted and discounted cost of network investment in each scenario 
Scenario Undiscounted cost (£bn) Discounted cost (£bn) 
SLSP 49.1 32.1 
SLWP 25.2 17.8 
WLSP 87.6 58.6 
WLWP 43.9 29.9 
 
For comparison, a high level estimate of onshore, offshore and 
interconnection investment requirements in scenarios out to 2030 was made by Pollitt et al 
(2013). Their range was from £22bn-£52bn (though it is unclear whether these totals are 
discounted). The total undiscounted network investment costs for three of the scenarios fit 
comfortably within this range. WLSP is noticeably outlying beyond the high end of Pollitt 
et al’s range, however as in the earlier discussion of medium-term investment costs, there 
are clear reasons, relating to the significantly greater level of physical network investment 
in this scenario, for understanding why this should be so.  
In considering the relative magnitude of these network investment cost 
ranges, a comparison can be made to estimated generation investment costs over a similar 
period. The Carbon Plan estimates the net present cost of low carbon policies affecting the 
electricity sector as £62.3 bn until the end of the third carbon budget period (2022). In the 
Electricity Market Reform consultation document it was estimated that £70-75bn of 
investment was required in electricity generation by 2020. Moving beyond the early 2020s, 
significant additional generation investment would be required. The CCC estimate that the 
total investment costs in electricity generation for scenarios reaching a carbon intensity of 
electricity of 50gCO2/kwh by 2030 would be up to £200bn between 2014 and 2030 
(CCC, 2013b). The distribution of these generation investment costs for one such scenario 
is shown in Figure 159. 
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Figure 159: Capital expenditure on low-carbon technologies in CCC 'Higher Energy Efficiency' scenario reaching 
50gCO2/kwh by 2030. CCC calculations based on Poyry and Redpoint modelling. Appears as Figure 2.6 in CCC 
(2013b), p. 46 
It should be recognised of course, that these total investment costs are based 
on projections of expected future costs for individual technology types, which are 
themselves subject to considerable uncertainty, as made clear within the CCC’s analysis on 
the power sector (Chapter 2 of CCC (2013b)). This root uncertainty necessarily implies 
uncertainty around the overall £200bn figure – nonetheless it is based on robust analysis 
and thus, in spite of the uncertainty, may be considered a reasonable guide to the region of 
generation investment costs that may be expected.  
The comparison of this projected £200bn figure for generation investment 
with the range of costs for new transmission investment projected by the scenarios in this 
thesis, strongly suggests that the costs of transmission will be substantially less than the 
costs of generation – however, not necessarily a negligible amount. In interviews for this 
thesis, it was suggested that costs of transmission investment were historically in the region 
of 5-10% of the cost of generation (see section 5.2.1), and thus should be considered of a 
much lower priority to optimise, compared to optimising generation costs. However, 
comparing the undiscounted total transmission investment costs for the scenarios 
developed in this thesis to the CCC’s estimate of £200bn in electricity generation for highly 
decarbonised scenarios over a similar time-period, suggests that the cost of transmission 
investment could range from just over 10% to about 40% of the total cost of generation 
investment. The wide range of network costs suggested by the scenarios, and the 
particularly substantial costs at the high end of the range, suggest there are strong reasons 
to think about network management policy as a means of minimising network investment 
costs within a low-carbon transition, rather than assuming that network costs will always 
be negligible in relation to generation costs, and consequently adopting an approach which 
assume transmission costs are not worth optimising. 
46 Fourth Carbon Budget Review – technical report | Sectoral analysis of the cost-e!ective path to the 2050 target | Committee on Climate Change
Since then, the Government has introduced Electricity Market Reform (EMR) to support the 
transition to a low-carbon power sector, which includes provision of long-term contracts to 
developers/generators to provide revenue certainty for low-carbon projects. The Government 
has recently published !nal strike prices for various low-carbon technologies as well as contract 
terms, and has established a Levy Control Framework to control subsidy costs. 
The EMR should work to support portfolio investment in low-carbon technologies and supply-
chain investment, thereby ensuring early decarbonisation of the power sector. Remaining 
challenges include ensuring that strike prices have been set at the right level and providing 
con!dence to investors that there will be su"cient and ongoing volume to 2020 and beyond. 
Possible barriers to !nance
We have also looked further into the infrastructure and !nancing challenge to deploying low-
carbon generation over the next two decades. 
While over the past years capacity has ramped up quickly under support from the Renewables 
Obligation (renewables capacity has doubled from around 6 to 12 GW over the past 5 years)11, 
there is the question as to whether these deployment rates can be sustained. Renewables 
deployment will need to continue, while at the same time signi!cant capital expenditures on 
nuclear and CCS projects will be required. 
We estimate that the total capital costs of scenarios reaching around 50gCO2/kWh by 2030 
could be up to £200 billion between 2014 and 2030 (Figure 2.6). 
11 DUKES (2013) Chapter 6 – Renewables sources of energy.
Figure 2.6: Capital expenditure on low-carbon technologies in CCC ‘Higher Energy E"ciency’ scenario reaching 
50gCO2/kWh by 2030
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The overall costs of any electricity system will of course be a combination of 
generation and network costs. In the scenarios developed for this thesis, the scenario with 
the lowest network investment cost is SLWP. This scenario also has the highest installed 
capacity of nuclear. This is due to the relative locational flexibility, including availability in 
the south, of nuclear, meaning that it has an advantage in a scenario where the network 
policy is based on strong locational signals and the avoidance of large-scale anticipatory 
network projects in the context of uncertainty. For similar reasons, non-wind renewables 
such as wave and tidal power, which have relatively good locational diversity, are also 
strongly represented in this scenario. This supports the conclusion that the greater the 
locational flexibility of the technology, the greater the potential to reduce network costs. It 
does not however support the conclusion that a nuclear scenario would necessarily be 
lower cost overall. Establishing such a conclusion would require comparing generation 
investment costs as well as network costs, and there remain very considerable uncertainties 
around future generation investment costs, as discussed by the CCC (2013b), and as 
indicated by ongoing uncertainties about the final cost of the proposed new nuclear plant at 
Hinkley Point C (Macalister, 2015). Such a combined analysis of generation and network 
costs, including uncertainties about future generation costs, is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
What is within the scope is a cross-comparison of the network investment 
costs of the scenarios, which includes some consideration of both the similarities and 
differences of the generation mixes achieved in each one. As noted above, the relative 
locational flexibility of technologies such as nuclear, wave and tidal are significant drivers of 
the relatively low transmission investment requirement in SLWP. However, it is also 
interesting to note that although the network investment costs of SLSP and WLSP are quite 
different, with the cumulative figure for WLSP almost double that of SLSP, the broad 
generation mixes for each scenario are quite similar. As shown in Figure 154, the installed 
capacities of renewables in the two scenarios are within 7 GW of each other, and for 
nuclear the difference is 3 GW, or one nuclear power station. The difference in network 
requirements and resulting investment cost is a result partly of different choices about 
where to locate these capacities, but also to do with the operational incentives of the 
regime which rewards flexibility in plant for which this is an option. The lower cost is thus 
achieved by locational decisions but also by operational incentives. 
Considering the possible evolution of the real electricity system, it is clear that 
the precise future generation mix that emerges is an area of major uncertainty, not least 
because of the uncertainties around the future costs of the various generation technologies. 
It is inevitable that the precise mixture of generation technologies will affect the overall 
network configuration and its costs, and network planning has to some extent to be 
responsive to this. However, an important message from comparing the scenarios 
developed in this thesis is that for any given generation mix, the policies which govern the 
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relationship between transmission network investment, generation investment, and system 
operation, can make a significant difference in whether the total cost of the transmission 
network is small (albeit not negligible) in relation to the cost of generation; or whether it 
becomes a significant proportion of the overall system costs, and of a magnitude that 
threatens the economic viability of the system.    
Transmission system costs might also be compared to other major 
infrastructure investment projects. Table 34 compares some of these. They suggest that at 
the lower end of the scenarios’ range, the transmission network costs are of an order which 
is comparable to other major infrastructure projects, which, though controversial because 
of their cost as well as other issues, have received significant political backing as being in 
the long-term public interest. This suggests that a political argument could be made for a 
transmission investment project in this range. At the higher end of the range – WLSP’s 
£88bn (undiscounted) – it becomes harder to envisage strong political support, and such a 
programme would be more vulnerable to being abandoned once the costs became 
apparent. This further emphasises the real long-term value in paying attention to a network 
investment and management regime which is able to deliver flexibility but also cost-
effectiveness in responding to whatever emerges on the generation side. 
Table 34: Comparative costs of other major infrastructure projects 
Project Expected cost (£bn) Reference 
HS2 High Speed Rail Link 50 (Lords Select Committee, 
2015) 
Trident replacement 15-20 (BBC, 2013b) 
Crossrail 14.8 (Crossrail, 2015) 
Hinkley Point C 24.5 (Macalister, 2015) 
 
 
8.6.7 Network utilisation 
Figure 160 shows the average network utilisation in 2033 for the five wind 
conditions under each scenario. The two ‘weak location’ scenarios have a more volatile 
network utilisation level in different wind conditions. WLSP and WLWP produce the 
greatest variation, with significantly less well-utilised networks than the other two 
scenarios in low and SN wind conditions. SLSP achieves the most consistent level of 
utilisation across all conditions, as the location of its plant and the operation of its 
interconnectors contribute to smoothing the variability of renewable generators. WLWP 
achieves the highest utilisation level at NS and average conditions – however it does this at 
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the expense of major constraints in overloaded lines, as highlighted in the discussion of this 
scenario in Section 8.5.  
 
Figure 160: Average network utilisation at winter peak 
 
8.6.8 Non-actor-contingent elements 
The scenarios have been developed based around policy strategies which could 
be pursued by policy makers, and the possible effects of these on other system actors have 
been explored. These strategies are by definition within the control of policy makers and 
are thus considered ‘actor-contingent’ elements. However, in addition there are also 
possible future elements which are less directly controllable by policy makers, but which 
could have significant and important effects upon the development of the system. These are 
‘non-actor-contingent’ elements, and a selection of these will now be discussed in terms of 
their possible effects on each of the scenarios.  
8.6.8.1 Electric vehicle charging patterns 
Is discussed in Section 6.3.3 and Appendix E.3, a fixed assumption of an 
exponential growth pattern for electric vehicles, culminating in close to 100% of passenger 
transport kilometres met by electric vehicles in 2048, forms the background for each 
scenario. The trajectory of the growth curve means that by 2033 electric vehicles are 
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accounting for around 9% of total passenger vehicle transport demand, equivalent to about 
9 TWh. This is combined with assumptions from the National Grid Future Energy 
Scenarios on re-charging patterns, which assume a relatively spread overnight re-charging 
pattern, with the result that 4% of the total daily charging requirement takes place within 
the winter peak hour of 5-6 pm. By 2033 this only adds 1 GW on to winter peak.  
However these fixed assumptions are subject to various uncertainties. A faster 
uptake in electric vehicles would increase the power demand by 2033. Additionally, 
charging patterns other than those hypothesised by National Grid, could see greater 
demand clustered around winter peak, and technological changes such as the development 
of vehicles with the ability to fast-charge could also increase the risk of peak demand 
clustering.  
The effect of changing the proportion of daily demand assumed to be charging 
over the winter peak from 4% to 50% was explored. The impact is the addition of almost 
12 GW of peak demand above the 1 GW added from EV charging in the standard 
scenarios. This kind of clustering could occur with faster charging technologies, and no 
behavioural incentives to stagger recharging. However, a similar kind of increment could 
also have been the result of similar spread-charging behaviours to the National Grid 
hypotheses, but with an increased rate of diffusion of electric vehicles leading to a larger 
number of vehicles by 2033. The additional demand is spread amongst the demand nodes 
using the same proportions calculated to allocate the other demands.  
In SLSP the effect of this added peak is noticeable in mostly moderate but 
occasionally large increases in constraints on certain lines – however these remain mostly 
isolated, and reflect the same pattern of constraints found in the equivalent original 
scenarios. Figure 161 compares the winter NS condition with and without the additional 
electric vehicle charging. It can be seen that the pattern of constraints is almost identical, 
although the constraints in the EV variant are usually higher, and there are some significant 
additional constraints on lines not constrained in the original pattern – notably an 800 MW 
constraint running from Grain into London.  
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Figure 161: SLSP Winter North to South Wind power flow, standard and EV variant 
 
A similar effect is found in SLWP – comparing the winter high wind 
conditions with and without the added EV charging sees some increased constraints in the 
north of GB, though maintaining the same broad constraint pattern, and some increased 
constraints in the south-west and south-east leading into London (Figure 162). There is 
some reduction of constraint on the line north of Teesside. 
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Figure 162: SLWP Winter High Wind power flow, standard and EV variant 
A greater effect is found in WLSP, with the addition of the increased EV peak 
causing increased constraints through the network including key north-south export 
corridors, and in southern and central England as shown in Figure 163. The same type of 
effect is found in WLWP winter high wind – moderate increases in constraints are found in 
the areas of the north of GB which were originally already highly constrained, but the 
noticeable increases in constraints are in the south of England (Figure 164). 
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Figure 163: WLSP 2033 Winter High Wind power flow, standard and EV variant 
  
Figure 164: WLWP 2033 Winter High Wind power flow, standard and EV variant 
 
Overall the increase in constraints from the added EV peak was more 
noticeable in the weak location scenarios, as the existing strong north-south power flow in 
these scenarios is made more acute by the increase in southern demands. Across the 
scenarios the more noticeable effect of an increased EV peak tends to be in southern areas 
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of the network, where high constraints can occur on previously unconstrained lines. In the 
north of the network however the impact is more muted (and reduces constraints on 
certain lines). This different effect of EV charging in different regions can be attributed to 
the fact that the cost or benefit of added demand on the network depends on other overall 
network conditions. In most scenarios the conditions see only slight increases in constraints 
in northern areas because the additional network transfer requirements caused by the 
overall demand increase is mitigated by the fact that increased demands in exporting areas 
brings export power flows down and thus reduces constraints. In the south which is in 
general an importing region the effect of added demand tends to be to increase constraints. 
The reverse is true in scenarios where there is an overall south-to-north power flow, such 
as SLWP SN. In this condition the constraints in Scotland are much more noticeably 
increased by the EV peak – this is due to the fact that in this particular condition Scotland is 
already an importing zone, and thus the increased EV demand in Scotland exacerbates 
rather than mitigates this situation Figure 165. 
  
Figure 165: SLWP 2033 Winter South to North Wind power flow, standard and EV variant 
This being the case, the ability to control and alter demands in different 
regions in response to network conditions may be of some value. A further sensitivity was 
applied to the highly constrained WLWP high wind EV condition, which was to increase 
demand from all nodes north of the Mersey and Humber by 20%, and reduce the demand 
of all other nodes by 20%. This produces a condition with lower constraints than both the 
EV condition without demand response, and the original WLWP high wind condition, as 
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the additional northern demand soaks up power and reduces export requirement, whereas 
the reduced southern demand reduces import requirement (Figure 166). 
 
Figure 166: WLWP 2033 Winter High Wind power flow, EV variant with DSM 
This suggests that the increase in electricity demands from technologies 
including electric vehicles, as well as potentially increasing stress on the network could also 
create opportunities if their demand can be influenced in a way that reflects locational 
network conditions as well as time of use. 
8.6.8.2 Grid-scale storage 
In order to see the possible effect of storage a sensitivity was run in which the 
availability factor at dispatch for each renewable technology was set equal to its average 
annual capacity factor – offshore wind at 40%, tidal at 30%, etc. This represented the 
smoothing effect of widely applied grid scale storage, absorbing power during high output 
periods and feeding power back on to the grid during low output periods, achieving an 
overall smooth output. 
The sensitivity considers a technology breakthrough in grid scale storage from 
the mid 2020s. The alternative storage pathway begins at the 2023 scenario year. The 
generation investment decisions for the final two time stages are held constant, but with 
the smoothed load factors applied to the variable renewable technologies. This alters the 
decision making on required network investment for the final two stages. The comparison 
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of the alternative storage pathway over the final two time stages with the original scenario, 
suggests the effects that storage could have on required network investment in the final two 
time stages.  
  
  
Figure 167: All scenarios Winter 2033 power flows, storage variants 
Figure 167 compares the 2033 network configurations of the four scenarios, 
and their power flows at winter peak. A comparison with Figure 150 shows at a glance some 
significant reductions in network investments. WLWP also shows a noticeable change from 
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being highly constrained to largely compliant at the winter high wind condition. Figure 168 
compares the lengths of network investment in all scenarios with and without storage. The 
lengths of avoided network upgrades in kms, and quantities of avoided network upgrades in 
GWkms, are presented in Figure 169 and Figure 170 respectively. The most dramatic savings 
are made in WLSP, followed by SLSP, both of which avoid significant quantities of offshore 
HVDC connections – in particular WLSP which has been sized for a peak renewable output 
considerably higher than the average output. In SLSP interconnectors meshed into offshore 
grids are an important means of smoothing renewable output. However the smoothing 
assumed from grid-scale storage from 2023 onwards reduces the case for interconnection 
in this scenario variant. Reductions in SLWP are less dramatic due to the lower quantities 
of renewables in this scenario, and the way in which they are spread around the system, 
which avoided the network having to deal with major exporting regions. Due to the 
significant reduction in peak flows in WLWP, the size of required network upgrades is 
reduced which means that more of them can be addressed through line uprates, rather than 
new lines. As shown in Figure 169 this actually results in a slight increase in the length of 
lines uprated in the storage variant compared to the original scenario, but with clear 
benefits in terms of avoided new onshore lines.   
 
Figure 168: Length of total network upgrades in all scenarios, standard and storage variants 
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Figure 169: Length of network upgrades saved by storage 
 
Figure 170: Quantity of network upgrades saved by storage 
Large grid-scale storage could therefore address one of the major drivers 
behind the very significant expansions in network capacity which occur across the 
scenarios. The high estimated costs associated with these expansions shown in Table 33 
suggest that there may be significant value to the system of the development of grid-scale 
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storage, in terms of avoided network investment. If the operation of storage could be 
influenced by locational network constraints, as well as by the overall system supply-
demand balance, it could have a critical effect in delaying or avoiding the need for 
expensive transmission system upgrades.   
8.6.8.3 Solar PV 
The future level of deployment of solar PV is another factor which was 
beyond the scope of the study to include as an internal system variable, but which could 
nonetheless have significant impacts on power flows at the transmission level. Large-scale 
ground mounted PV installations of sufficient size to connect directly to the transmission 
network are conceivable. However, distribution connected PV could also have impacts on 
transmission flows by reducing the demand at the nearest transmission entry point, or if 
installed in large numbers by actually causing power to flow up voltage levels from the 
distribution network to cause an export on to the transmission network. There are 
numerous technical challenges associated with these different possibilities. However, for 
the purposes of this study, which uses a nodal model of the transmission network, each has 
the same effect – an increase or decrease in the net load or generation at a node, has the 
same effect in the load flow whether it is thought of as being caused by an increase in 
transmission connected generation, a spill over of distribution connected generation onto 
the transmission network, or a reduction in load at the transmission entry node.  
The modelling approach selected was to add solar PV as a technology category 
at the top of the merit order. Installed capacities were added to reflect an even scaling up of 
the current distribution of all large and small scale PV units. There is currently a clear 
pattern in PV installations with a concentration band stretching from south-west England to 
East Anglia. This distribution is maintained and the locational installed capacities scaled up 
by the same factor to deliver an overall increase from today’s levels of 2.8 GW to 10 GW 
by 2033. Figure 171 compares the regional distribution of current PV with the 2033 
scenario assumptions.   
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Figure 171: Current and 2033 scenario PV installed capacity by region. Current figures from Westacott (2014) 
The regional distributions of PV capacity under the 2033 assumptions were 
shared equally amongst all nodes within that region. The scenarios were run for the 
summer condition – 12-1 pm in July / August – with a simplified assumption of all units 
operating at 100% load factor. Evidently the winter peak condition of 5-6 pm in December 
/ January would receive no contribution from solar PV. 
In the SLSP conditions the effect of the added solar PV is generally to create a 
slight shift in the locations of constraints, though without significantly altering the overall 
pattern and overall levels of constraint. The comparison of SLSP summer high wind with 
and without the solar PV additions demonstrates this – the occurrences of constraints shift 
on to different lines, with a slight shift of southerly constraints from the south-east to the 
south-west (Figure 172).  
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Figure 172: SLSP 2033 Summer High Wind power flow, standard and PV variant 
In SLWP the effects of the added solar PV are more noticeable. Southern 
constraints are tangibly increased, particularly on corridors between the south west, with 
its high concentration of solar, and London, as can be seen from comparing the summer 
high wind conditions with and without solar (Figure 173). In the NS condition on the other 
hand, the addition of solar noticeably reduces constraints by balancing out the north-south 
gradient (Figure 174).  
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Figure 173: SLWP 2033 Summer High Wind power flow, standard and PV variant 
 
  
Figure 174: SLWP 2033 Summer North to South power flow, standard and PV variant 
In WLSP the effect of adding PV in the summer condition tends to be positive 
as it reduces the north-south power flow and thus reduces north-south export constraints. 
This is particularly noticeable on the NS condition.  
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Figure 175: WLSP 2033 Summer North to South Wind power flow, standard and PV variant 
A similar positive effect is found in the WLWP summer high wind condition. 
This scenario has a strong north-south power flow from renewables investments, but a 
much lower capacity network than WLSP. The original high wind condition sees high 
constraints in Scotland and northern England. The addition of solar very significantly 
reduces the overload on north-south corridors by reducing the demand in the south. In 
other conditions in this scenario a similar, although less dramatic effect can be seen.  
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Figure 176: WLWP 2033 Summer High Wind power flow, standard and PV variant 
 In general the runs show the potential benefit, from the transmission network 
perspective, of complementary sitings of renewables. In scenarios where the generation 
mix has already been spread in response to locational signals, the benefits are in general 
reduced and constraints increased as a result of adding PV in southern areas, because there 
is already comparatively high infeed onto these areas. Exceptions may be found in the NS 
conditions of these scenarios (Figure 174). However, the weak location scenarios have a 
strong northern renewable concentration and thus a more consistently strong north to 
south power flow. The addition of solar – predominantly in the south under the 
assumptions of this variant – is largely quite beneficial in such scenarios as it reduces this 
north-south export flow by suppressing southern demand.  
An additional question raised by all of these scenarios however relates to the 
flexibility of nuclear. In several of these low demand summer conditions, with the addition 
of solar PV, the penetration of renewables is such that the required nuclear output in some 
wind conditions is reduced to very low levels, whilst still being required in substantial 
quantities in other conditions. It would be more manageable if a low output for nuclear 
could consistently be expected at certain times of year, so that plant could be scheduled in 
advance. However, strong variation in nuclear requirement occurs in relation to different 
wind conditions which – as shown by the MET Office data used to generate the conditions 
– could occur at the same time of year. In all of the summer peak conditions modelled, 
there are major variations. SLSP with solar sees a swing between 13% and 49% capacity 
output required from nuclear plants between the high to low wind condition. SLWP with 
solar, despite its lower renewable content sees nuclear output swing from 25% to 100% 
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between high and low wind conditions; in WLSP with solar, nuclear requirements swing 
from zero to 86%; and in WLWP with solar from zero to 100%.    
8.6.8.4 Public acceptability of future systems 
It was beyond the scope of the scenarios to include public attitudes towards 
generation technologies as internal variables within the scenarios – for example assuming 
that in some scenarios public attitudes were more tolerant towards certain technologies or 
infrastructures than others. However, taking the overview of the scenarios presented in the 
preceding sections it is possible to consider implications and trade-offs which are of 
relevance to the public acceptability of the overall transition. 
Nuclear is a technology which remains perennially controversial (Corner et 
al., 2011, Poortinga et al., 2013). In this context, a noticeable feature of the scenarios is 
that they all deploy nuclear in significant quantities, though with a large range between the 
highest and lowest deployment level. The requirement for nuclear in all scenarios arises 
from the boundaries set by the scenario assumptions for maximum deployment levels of 
other key technologies – for example offshore wind, the outer boundary for which is 
guided by the projected capacities of the Round 3 sites. Further exploration of sites for 
fixed turbines, or the development of floating turbines could dramatically increase the 
outer potential of offshore wind. Equally the inclusion of CCS and large scale biomass to 
electricity generation could have contributed to a no-nuclear scenario – however these 
technologies were excluded due to remaining technological and supply chain uncertainties. 
Thus, an outcome of the analysis is the proposition that under reasonable assumptions 
limited to existing demonstrated technologies, a scenario which meets the required carbon 
targets must include some nuclear. Scenarios which met the target without nuclear could 
be developed, but the level of technological uncertainty involved in the assumptions about 
the remaining generation technologies would be significantly increased. 
All of the scenarios involve significant network upgrades, with estimated 
investment costs that would represent a non-negligible part of the overall costs of a low-
carbon transition. New transmission lines can cause controversy, especially in 
environmentally sensitive areas (Devine-Wright et al., 2010). The scenarios suggest that 
both the costs and the visual impact of new transmission network upgrades could become 
major issues in the public debate around the low carbon transition. If it is considered an 
important priority to minimise transmission investment, a strong locational signal 
combined with a responsive approach to network investment is capable of delivering a 
system which successfully meets the target with comparatively low network investments 
(although in the real world with the absence of counter-factuals, the SLWP investment 
programme would still likely be perceived as quite substantial). However, the trade-off of 
this approach is the reduction in investment in onshore wind and northern offshore wind, 
and the increased investment in nuclear and tidal barrage, each of which may entail 
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controversies (Corner et al., 2011, Poortinga et al., 2013, Devine-Wright, 2011). In 
SLWP, nuclear in particular is deployed with 3.2 GW stations at each of the 8 potential 
locations listed by DECC. 
The strong planning scenarios SLSP and WLSP deliver substantial additional 
network capacity through offshore meshed networks and bootstraps, which as well as 
linking offshore renewables provide additional transit capacity for power flows across the 
system. This reduces the visual impact of new onshore lines and pylons, but at a 
substantially increased cost – investment costs for HVDC subsea cable are estimated to be 
close to ten times the cost of a standard transmission line upgrade (Appendix F). Both 
visual impact of transmission lines and costs of network upgrades as translated onto 
consumer bills are areas of potentially significant public controversy, and attempt to reduce 
one may have the effect of increasing the other. Survey work by Devine-Wright et al 
(2010) appeared to uncover a public preference for putting transmission lines ‘out of 
sight’, regardless of the cost. However, as explored by Hobman and Frederiks (2014) there 
may be a gap between expressed attitudes and actual willingness to pay in the context of 
low carbon energy systems. The scenarios SLSP and WLSP also build high levels of on and 
offshore wind, technologies which also have issues with public acceptance (Haggett, 2011, 
O’Keeffe and Haggett, 2012, Jones and Eiser, 2009). 
Equally, the cost implications of high constraint levels could become highly 
controversial, particularly if understood through media commentary and public and 
political debate in terms of renewable generators being paid large sums not to produce 
energy (Mendick, 2015). The constraint levels that emerge from WLWP – where there is 
no locational signal and no anticipatory investment – imply levels of constraint costs which 
may not be politically and publically feasible to maintain. Such a scenario would likely 
either be forced to change its value system – to adopt locational signals, or a more 
anticipatory transmission investment programme – or to abandon the low carbon 
trajectory. Alternatively it could be rescued by a technological breakthrough that resolves 
the deadlock, for example grid-scale storage, as explored in Section 8.6.8.2.    
There are clearly challenging issues involving public acceptance for any kind of 
large infrastructure programme, and new transmission investment is no different. More 
subtly however, transmission infrastructures are closely bound up with developments on 
the generation side. Parkhill et al (2013) have explored public acceptance of whole energy 
systems, considering supply and demand issues. A logical next step for this kind of whole-
system public engagement research is to include the costs and benefits of transmission 
infrastructure, and its trade-offs against electricity generation technology preferences, 
within the discussion. 
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8.7 Post 2033  
Though all scenarios have reached the 50g/kWh target, there remain 
considerable ongoing challenges. Notably, if the electrification of passenger vehicle 
transport was to continue, and at the same time the carbon intensity of power generation 
was to be maintained at close to 50g/kWh, this would require maintaining a strong pace of 
investment in low carbon generation, and corresponding transmission investments. The 
demand assumptions developed for the scenarios see overall demand rising from 376 TWh 
in 2013 to 399 TWh in 2033 – an increase of only 6%, as modest demand increases in 
demand electric heat and vehicles are largely offset by efficiency improvements in 
appliances and other end use technologies. As previously noted, electric vehicles are only 
adding 1 GW to winter peak demand in 2033, under the spread charging assumptions 
which are used in the standard scenarios. The post 2033 trajectory sees a take-off in electric 
vehicles as passenger transport is electrified. Along with increasing demands in other 
sectors, the electrification of passenger transport contributes to a 45% increase in overall 
electricity demand, from 399 TWh in 2033 to 578 TWh in 2048. Under the same spread-
charging assumptions used in the standard scenarios, this increase adds 9.8 GW at winter 
peak. If each of the scenarios from 2033 was to maintain a carbon intensity of 50g/kWh 
with this level of increased demand, they would require investments equivalent to 21 GW 
of nuclear, or 44 GW of offshore wind. The prospect of this additional level of investment 
beyond 2033 would present challenges in each of the scenarios. Thus in the longer term the 
level of demand that may be expected from electric vehicles is a question with significant 
implications for network planning.  
8.8 Conclusions 
Using a three-level system representation consisting of policy value-sets, actor 
networks and technological configurations, four contrasting scenarios were created which 
explored the iterative effects of transmission and generation investments within different 
policy contexts. The structure of the scenario process differentiated actor-contingent 
elements, which are potentially within the control of ‘prime-mover’ system actors, from 
non-actor-contingent elements, which are less controllable. This structure is useful for 
differentiating between proactive, protective and consensus building policy-related insights 
which emerge from the scenarios. In the following chapter, the scenarios will be compared, 
analysed, and policy recommendations drawn. 
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9 Implications and 
analysis       
This chapter discusses implications from the scenario and sensitivity analysis 
reported in Chapter 8. The first section briefly summarises the high level implications from 
undertaking low carbon transmission network scenarios, drawing insights from the process 
as a whole and high level comparisons between the scenarios. The second section analyses 
in more detail specific challenges thrown up by the scenarios, and what these might suggest 
about potential challenges in the real system. The third section draws on both of these 
sections in order to consider the policy options available to policy makers with respect to 
the system under study. 
9.1 High level implications – the role of 
transmission networks in a decarbonising 
electricity system 
An important high-level conclusion from the scenarios is that there is an 
important role for transmission networks in a decarbonising electricity system. The 
scenarios explore alternative pathways towards the same decarbonisation target, through 
different combinations of low carbon generation technologies, and within different 
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transmission network policy regimes. In each of the scenarios a significant expansion of the 
transmission network architecture takes place, over and above the like-for-like renewal of 
existing assets. The scenarios suggest that it is not possible to fit a sufficiently low carbon 
generation mix into the existing network infrastructure design, due to the lack of 
correlation between the potential locations and capacity sizes of new low carbon 
technologies, with those of the existing generation mix. Without new investment, 
therefore, transmission network capacity will be a significant barrier to decarbonisation. 
This makes the requirement for careful attention to design and investment in new 
transmission architectures of some kind, a strong conclusion from the scenarios.  
However, the scenarios also show considerable differences in the levels and 
locations of new transmission investment required – there is more than one possible 
network configuration and associated generation mix which would succeed in delivering 
the target of 50g/kWh carbon intensity of electricity by around 2030. The scenarios 
indicate contrasting possible trajectories for the coevolution of the electricity generation 
and transmission system, and the final design of the transmission networks in each case 
reflects this co-evolutionary development of the generation and transmission mix through 
the scenario period. This means that the appropriate network design is strongly interrelated 
with investment decisions on the generation side, and the complete adherence to a single 
blueprint of the future transmission network based on particular assumptions around 
generation investments, would risk some level of redundancy or inadequacy if for any 
number of reasons a different generation mix emerged.  
Thus transmission network planning requires both a forward looking 
approach, and flexibility. A lack of forward thinking in relation to the evolution of 
transmission and generation investment creates a risk that insufficient or inappropriate 
transmission investment becomes a barrier to the successful decarbonisation of the system. 
However, as there is not one single network design which will be optimal for any and all 
generation mixes, flexibility is also a key requirement to allow generation and transmission 
to co-evolve in a coherent manner.  
  
9.2 Challenges 
The scenarios highlight different challenges for transmission network planning 
and operation. This section highlights the main challenges, comparing across scenarios for 
the different ways they emerge and the different levels of robustness each scenario has to 
them. 
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9.2.1 Generation location and network utilisation – 
investment time scale  
The current configuration of the transmission network reflects its historic 
development, notably with strategic decisions taken to improve connection between areas 
with high generation output, such as the coalfields of northern England, with high load 
centres such as London. Political decisions, such as the separation of the southern Scotland 
area from the England and Wales system, have also had their impact. Historically, the 
network was developed on a ‘generation-led’ basis, designed primarily to accommodate 
the output of coal stations. If the network were being designed from scratch at the present 
time with the next forty years in mind, it would undoubtedly take a somewhat different 
shape to the one which we have inherited. There is a certain logic to the proposition 
therefore that if previous generations planned their transmission network according to the 
requirements of their anticipated supply portfolio, we should do the same and plan the 
network to meet the generation mix of tomorrow, not accept the design of yesterday. 
Conversely however, there is an argument that the reality of the physical 
infrastructures that exist cannot be wished away and it makes sense to make best use of 
these wherever possible, before expanding the network. Further the sheer distance of some 
of the potential sources of renewable energy do present serious challenges in terms of the 
amount of network investment that would be required to connect them to load centres. 
The policy approaches followed in the different scenarios create different 
conditions that affect how this challenge is experienced. The weak location scenarios do not 
provide locational network signals, with the result that renewable generators are strongly 
incentivised to locate in the north of GB where the greater renewable resources are 
located. This creates a strong location bias of generation in the north of GB, resulting in a 
large north-south power flow in typical conditions, in particular in high wind or high 
northern wind conditions (e.g. Figure 108, Figure 110 and Figure 143). The network 
configuration of WLSP indicates the requirements in network terms of meeting the peak 
output of this kind of generation mix. WLWP has a more responsive network investment 
approach, accepting interim congestion costs. Its winter high wind power flow however 
indicates the high level of congestion that could ensue in certain wind conditions, from not 
building to meet peak output (Figure 150). 
The strong location scenarios provide locational signals to generators, which 
encourage a more spread generation mix around the network. This results in a dramatic 
decrease in required network investment compared to WLSP. As shown in Figure 156 
SLWP’s total network investment amounts to 11,138 GWkm, a little more than a third of 
that required in WLSP (29,692 GWkm). SLSP takes a more strategic approach to 
facilitating deployment of northern renewables. This increases its network investment 
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levels in relation to SLWP (Figure 156), but at 17,830 it is still only slightly over half of that 
required in WLSP – a notable saving given that its total deployment of renewables is only 
slightly behind that of WLSP (Figure 154). In SLWP then the reduced network investment 
is primarily achieved by spreading the generation mix around the network and thus 
avoiding major export requirements from particularly high generation zones to load 
centres. In SLSP the same effect on locational investment occurs, but greater penetration of 
renewables than in SLWP is enabled largely due to the greater development of 
interconnectors, and the fact that their location as well as operational characteristics are 
affected by locational network signals. Thus there are two important kinds of locational 
signal. The first effect takes place at the investment timeframe, assisting with a general 
spread of projects around the network avoiding severe generation-supply gradients in terms 
of installed capacity. The second effect takes place at the operational timeframe, and 
concerns the responsiveness of technologies to variation in network availability as a result 
of the dispatch. In conventional systems accounting for the first effect largely covers the 
operational timeframe too, due to the similar operational characteristics of conventional 
plant. In a high-renewable system however, operational characteristics become a significant 
additional variable which incentives targeted at the investment time frame can only 
partially address. 
9.2.2 Build rates, lead times and pathway issues – 
managing the transition 
As discussed above, network investment strategies are highly interrelated with 
generation investment strategies. However, the question of how anticipatory or responsive 
the network strategy is, in relation to existing and possible future generation investments, 
affects what kind of network will be built. 
An important factor in relation to the coordination of generation and 
transmission investments is the relative size and lead-times of the investments. Nuclear 
power stations are high capacity and have long development lead times. As such these can 
be anticipated by transmission. Renewable projects are generally considerably smaller and 
more numerous, owned by a number of different companies. They can in some cases 
proceed from planning to commissioning more quickly than transmission line projects can 
be planned and built. This makes it harder for transmission to build in step with renewable 
deployment – it must either attempt to anticipate the trajectory of renewable deployment, 
or respond to it on a lagging curve. The latter approach is broadly the one currently 
favoured by the connect and manage regime. There is much to be said for this approach in 
that it hedges the risk of which specific projects will actually come through, and builds out 
when there is greater certainty, accepting some small constraint costs. The hedging strategy 
of connect and manage, followed by responsive transmission investment, has been 
appropriate to the historical rates of project completion compared to the number of 
	   376	  
projects that sought connections particularly in the pre-BETTA rush in 2005. However, 
challenges to this approach may emerge from the early 2020s on. If carbon budgets are to 
be met, the deployment rates of renewables during this period must increase dramatically 
by historical standards, as shown by the deployment rates of renewables in the four 
scenarios, illustrated in Figure 177.  
 
 
 
  
Figure 177: Installed capacities of non-thermal renewables. Historic data (1998-2008) from DUKES Table 6.4 
(DECC, 2013a). 2013-2033 data from scenarios. 
The deployment rates for renewables appear steep by historic standards in all 
scenarios, particularly in SLSP and SLWP in the mid- to late-2020s. The most moderate 
deployment rate is found in SLWP which leads to the lowest renewable capacity of the 
scenarios, in combination with the highest nuclear capacity. Chapter 8 discussed in detail 
the network upgrades which occur in tandem with these generation deployments. SLSP and 
SLWP each follow an anticipatory approach with bold network investments including 
deployment of HVDC offshore links, in order to reduce constraints. WLWP does not keep 
pace with renewable deployment and as such experiences high constraints throughout the 
scenario period.  
The decarbonisation trajectory recommended by the CCC implies very 
significant generation investments through the 2020s. The scenarios make clear that these 
will need to be coordinated with significant network investments, which must be timely if 
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they are not to delay achieving that target. At the same time this must be balanced against 
the risk of making transmission investments which turn out to be surplus to requirements 
due to different generation outturns.  
At the time of writing the near-term network challenges are focussed on 
bringing the Cheviot boundary into compliance. All scenarios show that the currently 
planned network upgrades listed in Table 8 will broadly deliver this compliance. However, 
all scenarios also indicate that in the medium term of 2018-2023 the follow on from this 
will be increased constraints in the north and midlands of England, when power flowing 
south from Scotland in high wind conditions meets the still high output from coal and gas 
generation in the north of England. This could present a transitional challenge as to 
whether to invest further to bypass these constraints, or wait for this plant to retire during 
the 2020s.   
The mid-2020s presents a significant branching point in terms of potential 
major renewal of the generation mix. In particular, there could be a significant number of 
retirements clustered around the mid- to late-2020s, as existing fossil plant, many of which 
were built during the ‘dash for gas’ in the 1990s, reach retirement age, at the same time as 
the IED could force the closure of coal and other non-compliant fossil plant, and all but one 
of the currently existing nuclear stations reach the end of their scheduled operational lives.  
At this period in the transition it is unlikely that a fully functioning low carbon 
generation mix will be established, meaning that there will be a very strong impetus for the 
commissioning of new fossil plant. At this point, new gas plant would contribute to 
reducing emissions if it displaced coal, and in all scenarios in this medium term period a 
significant amount of the decarbonisation is done by the switch from coal to gas in the 
generation mix. The continuing commissioning of new gas plant into the mid-2020s then 
does appear to be likely under reasonable expectations of progress in renewable 
deployment up to that point. There are a number of risks associated with this prospect. A 
key risk is that if these new gas plants are commissioned under a regime which gives them 
the expectation of running in the long term as baseload and without incentives for flexible 
operation, this could create a carbon lock-in for the electricity system. However, it should 
also be noted that each of the scenarios maintains substantial capacities of fossil plant on the 
system by 2033, ranging from 30 to 40 GW. This is due to the requirement of all scenarios 
in all years to achieve at minimum a positive de-rated capacity margin, using Ofgem’s 
derating factors. In a decarbonised mix it seems likely that these plant would still be 
required, but would be operated on an increasingly intermittent basis. Thus, approaching 
the 2020s it will be important to provide the correct incentives to encourage these plant to 
be built, but if their commissioning is to be compatible with a low carbon system, 
structures will need to be in place to reward their increasingly intermittent and flexible 
operation, in response to the variable output of renewables.  
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9.2.3 Variability of output and its effects on power flow 
– operational time scale 
Renewable generators typically have an average output of 30-40% of their full 
rated capacity (Appendix E.5.4). This presents a question for network sizing of whether to 
attempt to meet the full or only the average output of the generator. The situation becomes 
more complex with multiple generators situated in various parts of the network, when the 
swings between an under-utilised and a heavily constrained network depending on 
renewable output, can be considerable. 
The concept of ‘Capacity Factor’ (CF) is sometimes used to consider the 
extent to which renewables can provide firm capacity which allows the displacement of 
conventional plant. This factor is calculated based on a probabilistic assessment of the 
likelihood of renewable generation not being available when required, and thus requiring 
conventional back-up. The CF of a renewable technology would tend to decline the higher 
the overall installed capacity of renewables, because although higher renewable capacity 
results in more delivered energy, it also results in greater risks in significant drops in 
renewable power output at particular times, which means each added unit of renewable 
capacity has the ability to displace incrementally less conventional back-up capacity, whilst 
maintaining an acceptable level of system security. However this calculation is not used in 
the scenario analysis for this thesis, because the method in this thesis does not involve 
probabilistic calculations of renewable availability – instead, as discussed in Section 6.4.2 
and Appendix E.5 it collects historic weather data at specific times of day and year, and 
analyses the impact on the system of specific conditions chosen as representative of the 
spread of conditions for that time of day and year. Hence the technology ‘availability 
factors’ discussed in Section 6.4.2 and Appendix E.5, are different from CFs, and the latter 
are not used in this analysis. As discussed in Section 7.3.1.2 the issue of system security 
with increasing deployments of renewables is addressed through the method of calculating 
the de-rated capacity margin of the system. 
Section 9.2.1 compared the locational signal across scenarios in terms of its 
effect on investment decisions. It discussed the effect in terms of avoided network 
investments of having a locationally spread generation mix, rather than one with output 
clusters distant from load centres. However, a characteristic of high-renewables systems in 
contrast to conventional systems, is that as well as the impact on system power flows and 
constraints caused by long term investment decisions, for any given generation mix a 
similar level of power flow variation could be created by variations in weather conditions. 
Weather-related variation in constraints and power flows can already be 
identified in the 2013 conditions (comparing Figure 39 and Figure 40). In the 2018 scenario 
year, although the Scottish borders are largely compliant, significant constraints have 
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passed down to northern England and the Midlands, which are again wind-related (for 
example comparing Figure 47 and Figure 48). 
In these early stages, although constraint impacts of renewables can be felt, 
they remain confined to reasonably predictable corridors. In later stages though as more 
renewables connect in more locations, a greater diversity of power flows and constraint 
patterns emerges in response to different weather conditions, creating different constraint 
corridors in each case. This natural power flow variation arising from the locational 
variation of weather conditions across the country at any given time makes the 
identification of constraint corridors and the justification of network upgrades more 
complicated.      
In a conventional system, the greatest constraints would generally be expected 
at the time of peak system utilisation, or winter peak. For this reason, network adequacy 
studies by national grid have traditionally been focussed on studying power flows at winter 
peak (National Grid, 2011b). However, in a system with growing proportions of variable 
renewables, constraints will occur at a greater variety of demand times depending on the 
overall balance between supply and demand. In 2028 and 2033 SLWP and WLSP find 
higher constraints in summer conditions than in winter or spring, when patches of high 
renewable output coincide with low local demand to contribute to high inter-regional 
transfer. 
Even at similar annual demand times (e.g. the winter peak) contrasting 
generation output patterns, and contrasting network power flows may be experienced on 
different days, despite a very similar demand pattern. Each of the scenarios sees 
considerable variation in the level and pattern of constraints across different wind 
conditions in their final years. SLWP and WLSP see considerable variation of power flow 
and constraints at the same demand time but with different wind conditions, as can be seen 
by comparing SLWP 2033 Winter average wind (Figure 80) with SN(Figure 82), and in 
WLSP 2033 Winter, the high wind condition (Figure 108) with SN (Figure 111) and NS 
(Figure 114). SLSP has less variation than the other scenarios between different wind 
conditions (e.g. Figure 61 and Figure 64). This is due to the effect of the interconnectors 
which in this scenario operate in a manner responsive to the conditions of the area of the 
network to which they connect, not just to the overall system balance. In the case of the 
Norway interconnector this allows the smoothing of export from Scotland and the Scottish 
North Sea, so that there is a relatively stable flow of power southwards; a similar effect is 
achieved by the Danish interconnector in respect of the English North Sea zones. 
Overall most scenarios and conditions continue to show a strong north-south 
power flow across the network, as in all scenarios the capacity of renewables installed in 
Scotland is sufficient to create a significant export flow south at the windiest times. 
However, certain wind conditions produce a very substantial reversal in this flow 
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direction. Notably, in SLWP, with its nuclear dominated England and wind dominated 
Scotland, the Winter 2033 SN condition sees a substantial export from England to Scotland 
(Figure 82). Other examples of non-standard conditions are the level of east-west transfer 
required in different wind conditions, with some conditions seeing high constraints on the 
east-west link between Humber, Yorkshire and Lancashire (e.g. SLWP 2028, Winter SN, 
Figure 77), if low output in Scotland pulls power from the north sea across the network. 
Lines running west-east from south Wales and the west country, and east-west from East 
Anglia, into load centres in central England and London, also experience variable 
constraint levels across the scenarios. In general these lines have greater congestion when a 
low overall renewable output condition maximises output from southern nuclear power 
stations – these conditions are exacerbated when combined with a high southern renewable 
output at the same time as a low northern output (e.g. SLWP 2033 Winter SN (Figure 82); 
WLSP 2033 Winter SN (Figure 111) and Average( Figure 112)). The high wind conditions 
however tend to reduce constraints on these corridors – reflecting that the high wind 
condition typically has a prominent north-south gradient, and it is for this gradient that the 
networks have been primarily adapted. Constraints can also be found in low demand 
conditions, if they coincide with high wind output, particularly in the north – for example 
WLSP 2033 Summer high and average wind conditions (Figure 115 and Figure 116).  
In general then, the scenarios suggest that power system adequacy will no 
longer be able to be planned against a standard assumption of the system condition at 
winter peak, but will have to take account of the interaction of both demand and output 
across a range of system demand and weather conditions. This variation can lead to 
significant alterations in the overall gradient of the power flow, with the traditionally 
expected north-south gradient changing in some conditions for a south-north gradient, and 
other conditions having significant east-west and west-east flows in certain regions. It also 
leads to considerable variations in the constraint experienced in particular regions or power 
flow corridors, which in some conditions may be constrained, in others under-utilised. The 
increased power flow variability may be a source of increased network expenditure due to 
the need to invest above the average utilisation level in a number of network locations – 
rather than being able to expect a relatively consistent power flow pattern with ‘typical’ 
high power flow corridors – in order to avoid constraints across the network. This kind of 
power flow variability adds complication to the process of planning and justifying network 
upgrades. It also raises questions about the appropriate design of policy instruments for 
giving locational signals to generators which reflect actual network conditions at any given 
time. The existing TNUoS charge is based on annual calculation of the ‘centre of gravity’ of 
the system at winter peak, and reflects the distance of the generator from the point in the 
network to which power is on average pulled. Although this currently is a reasonable proxy 
for costs imposed by generators on the network, the scenario analysis indicates that the 
range of system conditions that could be experienced across different demand conditions as 
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a result of the variability of renewable output, could make the TNUoS charge, both 
because of its methodology and its annualised nature, increasingly less appropriate. 
9.2.4 System responsiveness to variable output – what 
helps or hinders, and its effect on network 
investment  
The locational signals in the strong location scenarios are assumed to provide a 
signal at the operational, as well as the investment time frame. This begins to show a 
benefit from the early stages of the strong locational scenarios by allowing for fossil plant to 
respond flexibly to renewable output in the same region of the network. Up to 2023, both 
SLSP and SLWP achieve sustained investment in renewables in northern GB without 
incurring major constraints (as in WLWP) or triggering major early upgrades (as in 
WLSP), beyond those already scheduled in all scenarios in the first time stage. This is 
achieved as a result of fossil plant in Scotland and northern England turning down their 
output to avoid congestion during times of high renewable output. This kind of dynamic is 
useful to those scenarios in the short to medium term, effectively providing a delay option 
on transmission investment, whilst still avoiding major constraints in the near term. As 
noted in Section 9.2.2, the rewarding of flexible responsive fossil plant becomes an 
increasingly important issue in view of the new plant which will be commissioned in the 
mid-2020s. 
The weak location scenarios by contrast have to deal with significant 
constraints during the transitional period of the 2020s as a result of the combination of 
growing renewable output as well as significant persisting fossil output. For example, in 
WLSP in 2023 many of the constraints are related to the still high output from fossil 
generators in northern England and the Midlands under certain conditions – though the 
constraint is also caused by high renewable output flowing north to south, the still high 
fossil output is adding to this (Figure 93 and Figure 94). In other words, this scenario 
suggests a period in the mid- 2020s when the system could be experiencing the ‘worst of 
both worlds’ in terms of constraints – a large north-south power flow from high 
renewables outputs combined with a still high midlands fossil output. The situation is 
further exacerbated in this scenario due to the lack of locational signal to influence the 
operational regime of fossil plant. However, this situation is in part resolved from 2028 
when greater output from higher merit order renewables and nuclear reduces the fossil 
output in northern England and the Midlands, which actually relieves the constraints in 
these areas. In such cases, it is possible to see that the case for or against transmission 
investment could usefully be informed by a reasonable expectation of what the future 
might hold for fossil plant, as their declining output might serve to resolve constraint 
problems without further network investment. The utility of this longer term view may be 
a seen as a justification for an arms length system planning body. On the other hand, the 
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pattern of fossil retirements will be affected by commercial considerations which would not 
be predictable or influenceable by such a body, which points to the advantage of a more 
flexible reactive approach. It is also noteworthy that a clear locational signal affecting both 
investment and operational decisions, as exists in the strong location scenarios, would help 
to resolve these issues and possibly reduce the need for intervention from a formally 
established strategic planner. 
By the final two time stages however, there are increasing examples of 
conditions in all scenarios in which none of the remaining fossil plant is dispatched due to 
the quantity of higher merit order low carbon plant on the system. There are examples of 
nuclear being the marginal generator, with the nuclear plants operating at less than full 
output. In later periods, constraints are much less frequently found in the northern England 
and Midlands areas typical of early periods, which were due to the combination of high 
output fossil plants with renewable output flowing south. Instead constraints are more 
related to areas in which nuclear outputs combine with outputs from large renewable 
zones. For example SLSP Winter 2033 high wind is largely unconstrained, as the networks 
are of sufficient capacity to manage an overall high renewable output spread across the 
network (Figure 61). The overall wind output in this condition is such that nuclear stations 
are slightly ramped down. However the low wind condition has constraints in lines coming 
out of Sizewell and Wylfa (Figure 62). This is due to the fact that the overall low wind has 
required full output from nuclear stations, at the same time as pockets of reasonably high 
wind output in the southern North Sea and Irish Sea. Similarly, SLWP 2033 Winter SN 
shows a situation in which high southern renewable output combines with output from 
nuclear stations at Hinkley and Oldbury to create constraints in the south-west. These 
conditions suggest that in addition to incentivising flexibility in fossil generators there 
would be significant value attached to any flexibility that was achievable in a non-wind 
based low carbon technology – whether this was nuclear, CCS, biomass or tidal barrage 
with reservoir storage. This is both in view of conditions where overall renewable output 
makes nuclear the marginal technology, and of examples where the ability to flex down in 
favour of renewables would avoid a constraint.  
The level of interconnection between GB and neighbouring systems is likely 
to increase over the coming decades. There are a number of factors influencing this. First 
the EU target model envisages greater unification of markets, which will promote 
opportunities for physical interconnection. Second, a GB supply mix dominated by wind 
and nuclear could provide strong commercial incentives for interconnection, as oversupply 
of energy at high wind times would create low GB prices, and under supply at low wind 
times would create high GB prices, in both cases potentially providing arbitrage 
opportunities with neighbouring systems, depending on conditions in those systems. While 
interconnections are generally argued to be positive for security of supply and overall 
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system balancing, their impact on network planning and constraints depends on the level of 
locational signal influencing their design and operation.  
In both SLSP and WLSP new interconnector projects are commissioned from 
2028, the point at which the combination of nuclear and renewables begins to mean that 
high wind conditions will produce an excess supply of power. The effect that such new 
interconnections could have on the GB network depends on the extent to which their 
location and operation responds to GB network conditions. In SLSP, the entry point of two 
key interconnectors, with Norway and Denmark, via large offshore hubs, is influenced by 
the location of large renewable areas, and the operation of the interconnectors is driven by 
conditions on the GB system, such that at high wind times (Figure 61), excess power is 
spilled from the offshore grids through these interconnectors, and at low wind times power 
is exported onto the spare available network capacity (Figure 62). This reduces the variation 
of power flows experienced through the onshore network, which creates better network 
utilisation and reduces the need for onshore upgrades. In WLSP the interconnectors 
connect directly to the mainland at points which have less consideration of network 
conditions, and they are operated in response to overall system prices but not local 
conditions. For example, in WLSP 2033 Winter NS (Figure 110), the Norway 
interconnector imports into Blyth, due to the less than maximum overall wind output and 
therefore potentially higher GB prices available. However, because there is still high wind 
in the north, there is still a large power flow through the Eastern HVDC link, which also 
terminates at Blyth. Thus in this example even though the overall system balance may 
encourage import through the interconnectors, the additional power is unhelpful to the 
region of the network to which the interconnector is feeding in. Whereas in SLSP the 
Norwegian interconnector connects directly into a Scottish North Sea offshore grid 
allowing a direct integration with the output of that zone, in WLSP, without a strong 
locational signal, it connects at Blyth in Northumberland. This means that in WLSP the 
variability of Scottish output must still be accommodated in added network capacity down 
the length of east Scotland and north-east England before the power can be exported. The 
effect of this in terms of network investment can be seen by comparing the additional 
bootstrapping required in north-eastern part of the network in WLSP, as well as south of 
Blyth, compared to SLSP (Figure 150). In SLSP the Danish interconnector connects via the 
southern north sea offshore grid which means that when output from this offshore region is 
surplus to capacity on the east coast, it can be exported directly to Denmark. In WLSP the 
connection of the Danish interconnector directly onshore at Humber feeds and extracts 
power directly to and from the eastern onshore network. This misses the chance for direct 
interaction with the southern North Sea wind farms, and means that greater upgrades are 
required between East Anglia and London to accept the full output of the southern North 
Sea zones (Figure 150). The locationally responsive smoothing effect of interconnector 
operation in SLSP allows the scenario to achieve a relatively stable utilisation factor across 
different weather conditions. The utilisation factor of WLSP is more variable, and drops 
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significantly during low wind conditions, as a result of the network’s requirement to invest 
in sufficient capacity to manage a peak output which is significantly greater than average 
utilisation (Figure 160). 
A technological uncertainty of potentially major significance is the possible 
development of economic large-scale electrical storage. The potential benefit of storage in 
temporal supply-demand balancing has been discussed (Grünewald, 2012), however its 
potential impact on avoided network expansion has been less emphasised. The storage 
sensitivities show very high levels of avoided network compared to the original scenario. 
The storage variant of SLSP, SLWP and WLSP each reduces network investment by a 
similar proportion of between 60 and 70% of the original. In real network size terms, these 
are evidently greater the higher the network investment in the original scenario, so that 
WLSP has the highest network investment reduction between the standard and storage 
variant (Figure 170). The value of these network investments may be seen as one measure of 
the value of storage, or possibly the regret associated with investing in peak-sized network 
and then large-scale storage being deployed – particular when considered in the context of 
the range of network investment costs estimated in Table 33. In WLWP the under-invested 
network in the standard scenario is closer to being the perfect size in the storage network, 
and it has a comparatively smaller reduction of 30% between the standard scenario and 
storage variant. The more noticeable effect of storage in WLWP is the eradication of the 
major constraints in this scenario. 
If electric vehicles are deployed in large numbers, then the extent to which 
the charging patterns of the vehicles can be influenced according to system and network 
conditions will be significant in affecting whether their effect is beneficial or not. The EV 
sensitivity analyses explored an increased charging intensity of electric vehicles over the 
winter peak, and found in all cases some increased stress on certain sections of the network 
in response to this. However, the effects were more marked in the weak locational 
scenarios, as the particularly strong north-south power flow in these scenarios is further 
exacerbated by the greater increase in southern demands (Figure 163 and Figure 164) In the 
strong locational scenarios the added constraint from the EV variant was less definitive – 
although there were some shifting of constraints onto different lines in southern areas, the 
overall pattern was not greatly altered, and there are some constraint reductions in 
northern areas (Figure 161 and Figure 162). This suggests that the greater spread of 
generation around the network achieved in the strong locational scenarios makes them 
more robust to higher demand peaks. A further sensitivity on WLWP 2033 Winter High 
Wind EV deployed a simplified example of locationally differentiated demand side 
response, increasing demands north of Mersey and Humber by 20%, and reducing all other 
demands by 20%. This resulted in lower constraints than both the EV variant and the 
original version of the condition, suggesting that locational demand side response may assist 
transmission network management (Figure 166). Growth of EVs then potentially poses 
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challenges to the transmission network, but also opportunities. Overall these sensitivities 
indicate that the long term influence of locational signals on transmission and generation 
investment are beneficial in reducing the impact of added peaks from demands such as EVs. 
They also suggest that on the operational time scale locational signals may also be useful in 
helping EVs to become an opportunity for increasing the efficiency of network operation. 
However, it is also important to recognise that this study has not modelled the distribution 
network, and developments in demand that are beneficial to the transmission system may 
have the opposite effect at distribution level. 
A major roll-out of solar PV could also have very noticeable impacts on power 
flows. In scenarios and conditions characterised by an existing strong north-south power 
flow, the addition of predominantly southerly-sited PV helps to reduce the gradient of this 
power flow and thus reduce overall constraints. Thus the weak location scenarios see the 
greatest benefit from the addition of southern PV across conditions (Figure 175 and Figure 
176), although strong locational scenarios also see constraint reduction when the output 
pattern creates a north-south power flow, as in the SLWP NS condition (Figure 174). These 
sensitivities again indicate the added value of generation the location of which complements 
existing generation – the weak location scenarios seeing the greater benefit from the 
addition because their networks had been lacking this complementarity. However, an 
important issue here is that if much of the PV is in fact connected to distribution networks, 
its location would not be affected by transmission network policy, despite the fact that at 
the levels explored in this scenario it could have a material impact on transmission power 
flows. 
9.2.5 Public acceptability of transmission in an energy 
system context 
Section 8.6.8.4 highlighted some of the different public acceptability issues 
that could emerge from each of the scenarios. It is beyond the scope of the current study to 
undertake a full investigation of the relative public acceptability of each of the scenarios. All 
scenarios involve high deployments of technologies which have the potential to raise public 
objections, such as nuclear, onshore and offshore wind, and tidal barrage. Any ranking of 
scenarios by public acceptability would involve judgements about the relative preferability 
of such technologies. For example, SLWP might prima facie appear to entail public 
acceptability challenges due to its high nuclear deployment, however this would be based 
on a subjective assumption that nuclear is generally considered less desirable than offshore 
wind – clearly for anyone who had the opposite perception, SLWP would be more 
appealing. Detailed investigations into the trade-offs individuals would make between 
alternative energy futures have been undertaken by Parkhill et al (2013). 
	   386	  
As a general observation however, it is possible to say that the different 
scenarios present very varied transmission architectures both in terms of physical 
deployment (Figure 150) and cost (Table 33). Because the scenarios have been premised on 
alternative policy value systems, they suggest that there are policy choices which can be 
made to direct the system towards one kind of future network or another. If the impact of 
transmission is of sufficiently high order amongst public acceptance concerns, then these 
concerns could be taken into account to optimise the impact of transmission network 
according to public concerns. However, the trade off is that a less extensive network 
inevitably reduces the choice in available generation technologies, particularly in view of 
the high onshore, offshore and marine resources potentially available in Scotland and 
northern Britain. This in turn implies that as the carbon constraint gets tighter, with fewer 
technologies to choose from, there would be a greater risk that technologies with greater 
potential for public controversy may be required. The scenarios thus indicate that in 
developing constructive public engagement on future energy systems the role of and 
required investment in transmission is an important variable to consider in comparing 
different generation portfolios and energy system choices. 
9.2.6 Technological uncertainties 
As noted, the scenarios were quite tightly bounded in terms of technology 
availability, with technologies over which there is some significant technological or supply 
chain doubt, excluded. This was to avoid the proliferation within the scenarios of uncertain 
elements not within the control of the key prime mover system actors. Nonetheless it must 
also be acknowledged that there are still levels of uncertainty around the low carbon 
technology types that were included. Onshore wind is perhaps the least uncertain of the 
low carbon technologies, being mature and with few major technological challenges. 
Offshore wind is technologically well-understood and with high levels of commercial 
deployment, however there remain considerable uncertainties about its future costs 
(Heptonstall et al., 2012). Wave and tidal stream are not technologically complex however 
their development remains in a pre-commercialisation phase (RenewableUK, 2011). Tidal 
barrage has been demonstrated at scale, for example at La Rance in France, which has a 
peak output of 240 MW. However the projects included as options within this scenario 
approach are typically three to four times the size of this (Appendix E.4.3.3). Nuclear is of 
course mature in the sense that nuclear stations have existed since the 1950s, however the 
European Pressurised Reactor (EPR) type being planned at Hinkley Point C is a new 
design, an example of which is not yet in operation (although EPR stations are currently 
under construction in Finland, France and China). Thus the levels of nuclear deployment in 
all of the scenarios, but particularly SLWP, may be considered subject to the uncertainties 
surrounding the successful completion and economic operation of the new generation of 
EPRs. As already noted, each of these technologies may experience limits on expansion due 
to public objections, as can the transmission network itself.  
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Each of the scenarios is at or very close to the outer limit of total available 
capacity (defined in Appendix E.4) for at least one of onshore wind, offshore wind or 
nuclear, as well as having to use significant quantities of tidal and wave power. There 
would not be a large amount of room for manoeuvre if any of the assumptions on available 
capacity of particular technologies proved to be too optimistic. 
 
On the other hand, key technologies not included in this analysis due to 
uncertainties are large scale biomass electricity generation, and CCS, which if successfully 
developed and deployed at scale could widen the options and reduce pressure on other 
technologies. Figure 178 shows potential geological storage sites, and thus suggests that if 
CCS were successfully developed, favourable locations could be in the north-east of 
Scotland near Peterhead, in the east of England near the Humber, or around the Mersey 
close to the Irish sea. In each case the location is very close to areas of the network which 
could be experiencing high infeeds from offshore wind zones. At the time of writing the 
two projects that have received funding under the UK CCS competition to undertake front 
end engineering and design studies are based on potential projects at Peterhead, 
Aberdeenshire and Drax, North Yorkshire (DECC, 2014d).  
 
Figure 178: Proximity of the UK's largest emitters to CO2 storage sites in the North and Irish Seas. Map provided by the 
Energy Technologies Institute, source: 
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Biomass has potentially greater locational flexibility. The location of existing 
thermal power plants (particularly coal) may gives some indication as they tend to be linked 
to ports via railway lines.  
 
Figure 179: Location and size of CCGT and coal plants 
The potential locations of biomass and CCS may therefore have significant 
transmission network implications, as they are likely to feed in to areas of the network into 
which large renewable zones will also feed. As previously noted, whether CCS or biomass 
can be demonstrated and deployed at scale, a particularly valuable characteristic of a non-
weather related low carbon generator will be flexibility, both for avoidance of local 
network constraints when output and location coincides with output from large renewable 
zones, and for overall system balancing. 
9.2.7 The effect transmission policy on the emerging 
generation mix 
As discussed throughout the thesis, the policy value systems which govern the 
different scenarios apply specifically to the area of transmission policy, with other policy 
areas, including policies on generation incentives, held constant. This is justified first by 
arguing that there is no inherent reason to view transmission policy and generation policy 
as strongly coupled (7.3.1.1), and second by drawing on the scientific principle that 
independent variables should not be simultaneously allowed to vary, without generating 
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additional scenarios (Section 2.6.2). The clarity that this provides is that any differences 
between the scenarios can be traced to choices in the transmission policy area, with no 
other variables interfering.  
An interesting outcome in the scenarios is the different generation mix which 
is delivered by each one, despite a uniform assumption of technology neutrality in 
generation incentives across each scenario. The contrasting generation mixes do not mean 
that despite intentions to the contrary there were in fact implicit generation biases acting 
on the scenarios. Rather, this outcome is evidence of the important interactions between 
generation and transmission. In which direction the influence is strongest – whether 
transmission leads generation, or generation leads transmission – depends on the 
transmission policy regime, and how it manages this interaction. How the transmission 
policy regime manages this interaction has significant impacts on the evolving generation 
mix. 
The critical variable is the locational signal. Scenarios with a strong locational 
signal favour technologies with greater locational flexibility, such as nuclear, wave and 
tidal. This is simply because in a situation where a particular area of the grid is becoming 
constrained and thus more costly for generators to connect to, technologies with the 
flexibility to locate in other areas of the grid will be able to continue to deploy whilst 
incurring lower transmission costs. By contrast, based on assumptions about the optimal 
locations for onshore wind, and locations of proposed large offshore wind zones, locational 
options for wind are more limited. This means that options for deploying wind can become 
limited by transmission constraints more quickly than other technologies, in scenarios with 
a strong locational signal. In scenarios with a weak locational signal, options for wind are 
never closed down, regardless of any transmission constraints that are being created. In 
each case, the anticipatory planning dimension operates to dampen or exacerbate the 
effect. In the strong location scenarios, the weak planning aspect in SLWP effectively 
confirms the limitations placed upon locationally challenging technologies by being 
conservative about network expansion; the strong planning approach in SLSP by contrast 
periodically re-opens up areas of the network which had been partially lost to high 
transmission charges, by taking anticipatory investment decisions. In the weak location 
scenarios, the strong planning approach in WLSP becomes the strategy for responding to 
the demands of generation unencumbered by locational signals – a generation leads 
transmission situation; by contrast, the weak planning approach in WLWP does not affect 
the generation choices created by the weak locational signal, but does ensure that the 
system experiences high constraints as a result of the combination of ‘unhelpful’ locational 
choices of generators, and an un-anticipatory transmission investment regime. 
Thus the four scenarios deliver different generation mixes as well as different 
transmission configurations. However, because of the tightly defined system boundary used 
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in the scenarios, which focussed on transmission policy and treated generation policy as an 
external, frozen variable, it is possible to identify these changes in both generation and 
transmission as being related to choices made specifically within transmission policy, rather 
than from an unclear mix of multiple simultaneously varied policy variables. 
9.2.8 Contradictions and tensions emerging from the 
scenarios 
The scenarios were defined as combinations of two possible policy variables 
within the area of transmission policy. As argued in Section 4.5, though both are related to 
the broader state vs markets questions which frequently recur within energy policy, they 
are different versions of this question operating in slightly different areas of the 
transmission policy space. They were thus treated as independent internal variables, policy 
choices which could be made independently and simultaneously. The fact that these policy 
choices could be made independently does not necessarily entail however that the result of 
doing so would always be harmonious and free of problems or tensions. Unlike trend based 
scenarios which treat a value system as a homogenous end point (Section 2.4.1), the 
scenario method developed in this thesis is designed to follow through the outcomes of 
particular value driven choices without pre-judging whether the outcomes will be 
successful and harmonious, or problematic and contradictory. The resulting scenarios 
illustrate this point well. 
As described in the commentaries to the scenarios in Chapter 8, and as also 
emerges in the discussion in Section 9.2.7, three of the scenarios have policy value 
combinations which manage to address the challenge of a rapidly decarbonising electricity 
supply mix with more-or-less success. A critical factor is having a strong locational signal 
(i.e. SLWP) to utilise network effectively – if a strong anticipatory planning approach is 
added (SLSP) this increases the available technology options which will be successful within 
the locational framework. A weak locational signal can be made to work, but increasingly 
drives a strong and of necessity anticipatory approach to transmission planning (WLSP) in 
order to accommodate the new generators whilst avoiding excessive constraints.  
Thus three of the scenarios (SLSP, SLWP, WLSP) are operating with a policy 
combination which, in different ways, could successfully interact with new generation to 
build a system that works. The fourth however (WLWP), as noted in the discussion in 
Chapter 8, seems to have a strategy that will be hard to sustain in the face of the challenges 
of the decarbonising mix. As constraints rise from generation that is being fed no locational 
information, and a network without an anticipatory strategic planning approach, the system 
looks increasingly less viable, and it seems increasingly likely that something will be forced 
to change. This could either be that a) a locational pricing strategy is reverted to (so that 
the scenario becomes something much like SLWP), or that b) an anticipatory planning 
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strategy is reverted to (so that the scenario becomes something much like WLSP), or that 
c) neither the policy on location or planning changes, but the carbon target is abandoned.  
It would have been possible to revise the scenario along one of these lines, 
instead of persisting with a scenario whose feasibility was becoming increasingly 
questionable. However, it is argued that a useful part of a scenarios process is the 
generation of infeasibilities, contradictions or ‘failures’, as these can be as informative as 
the harmonious successes. Therefore rather than trying to smooth away the tension which 
builds up in the scenario, the decision was made to follow through the logic of premises, 
drawing attention to and highlighting the tensions and possibilities of failure, and to treat 
such tensions as useful outputs of the process, and part of the analysis. 
   
9.3 Policy options 
The scenarios are framed around different policy options, themselves 
informed by different value systems. The framing of the scenarios allowed the exploration 
of the interaction of two policy spectrums – locational signals and anticipatory investment 
/ coordination. This section draws together the implications for policy of the scenario 
work, within each of these two areas individually and in terms of how they interact 
together.    
9.3.1 Locational signals in the transmission network 
Locational signals in transmission networks are intended to indicate to users 
the relative benefits or disbenefits of activities which take place at different areas of the 
network. The principle is that users whose locational choices are of benefit to the network 
should be rewarded relative to users who impose costs on the network by their locational 
decisions.  
The scenarios suggest potentially strong benefits of using locational signals to 
influence long-term investment choices. Scenarios with a portfolio of generation 
technologies spread across the network achieve a lower level of network investment 
(comparing SLSP and WLSP), or lower constraints (comparing SLWP and WLWP). They 
appear to be more robust to growth in peaks, for example from electric vehicles. 
Additionally the effect on interconnector investment decisions is more likely to create 
benefit for the network (comparing SLSP with WLSP).  
However, the scenarios also suggest that a locational signal acting only on 
long-term investment decisions, and not on real-time operational decisions, will be 
increasingly unsatisfactory. In the present GB system the main locational signal is provided 
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through the TNUoS charge, which is levied on capacity, and recalculated annually using a 
methodology which estimates the change in power flow arising from the hypothetical 
addition of another MW at each location in the system. Locational signals are not fed back 
to users in real time on the basis of dispatch operations, as GB system prices do not change 
by location, and constraint costs are socialised amongst users through the BSUoS charge. 
This approach is predicated on a system in which power flows are reasonably 
consistent in direction and quantity, with the result that the constraints which arise are 
reasonably predictable in terms of where and at what time of the day and year they occur. 
In such a system, a fixed annual charge can be a reasonable proxy for representing the 
network conditions that are actually experienced at various times through the year.  
The scenarios indicate that a future low carbon system is likely to exhibit 
significantly greater variation in power flows, due to the variability of renewable generators 
which could be located in various regions of the system, causing a greater variability in the 
relative utilisation of the network in its various regions at different times. The outcome of 
this is that the relative benefit or disbenefit to the system of an additional MW of 
generation in a particular location, is something which could change on a daily or even 
hourly basis, even given similar demand conditions, given the wide potential variability in 
output patterns. In this context, an annually fixed capacity based signal would be less 
appropriate than it currently is. 
Locational network signals affecting real-time operation could usefully 
influence the behaviour of a range of existing and potential new system actors. They have 
the potential both to stimulate network-efficient utilisation of known and existing 
technologies and practices, and to create market niches for new technologies and practices 
which could be of benefit to the network.  
There are a number of characteristics and innovations which could create 
system benefit, and which could be incentivised by locational signals: 
Flexibility of fossil plant – in the near and medium term the flexibility 
and responsiveness of fossil plant in the context of rising renewable contributions will be 
increasingly valuable. In the transitional period of the 2020s it will extend the potential for 
coexistence of fossil plants and renewable generators within existing network limitations, 
offering a delay option on major transmission investment whilst there is still significant 
fossil on the system, and the precise configuration of renewable generation is to be 
decided. In the longer term flexibility of fossil plant is likely to remain a critical part of 
overall system balancing. 
Co-location of complementary generators – although renewable 
generators are mostly non-dispatchable, the natural output cycles of different kinds of 
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renewable resources have greater or lesser degrees of correlation. In the longer term, this 
could be increasingly relevant as a wider technology portfolio of renewables emerges. An 
incentive to site renewables in locations where the existing renewable resource would be 
less correlated to the cycles of the new generator, would improve network utilisation.  
Interconnection – interconnection has the potential to assist the 
management of variability but also to add constraints. If the operation of the 
interconnectors responds to signals which take account of regional network availability as 
well as the overall system supply-demand balance, this would encourage the use of 
interconnectors in a manner that ameliorated rather than exacerbated network constraints.  
Demand side response – the ability to shift demand in response to 
network constraints could also provide a useful solution to variability within network 
capacity limitations, potentially reducing constraints and delaying the need for network 
upgrades. In terms of network utilisation and managing power flows, demand side 
response has equal per-MW value to generation response, and should be rewarded as such. 
Roll out of electric vehicles may provide significant challenges but also opportunities in 
providing additional demand side response. Consistent locational signals would in the 
longer term create incentives for innovative business models for example aggregating the 
demand response of a number of consumers. 
Storage – a significant driver of the high network investment requirements 
of a scenario such as WLSP is the gap between average and peak utilisation entailed by the 
natural output cycles of most renewables. A breakthrough in grid-scale storage could have 
significant impacts in reducing the investment required to achieve compliance for a given 
low carbon portfolio. A key problem with incentivising storage lies in establishing 
structures which convey a reasonable proportion of its system value to the storage operator 
(Grünewald, 2012). Real-time locational network signals, incentivising both generation 
and demand in the right locations, could create a strong value proposition for storage.  
Flexibility of low carbon technologies – as well as the already growing 
importance of flexibility in fossil generators, in the longer term flexibility in low carbon 
technologies will be an increasingly attractive characteristic from a network and system 
management point of view. Establishing a signal which consistently rewards this is of great 
value for long term innovation, as development work on emerging technologies such as 
CCS, biomass generation, as well as new nuclear designs and tidal lagoons, can be given a 
clear signal about the value of flexibility.  
These examples indicate the benefit of introducing the locational network 
signal soon. First, because in the short and medium term there are significant benefits to be 
derived in terms of efficient network utilisation and retaining network investment options, 
whilst significant quantities of fossil plant continue to coexist on the network with a fast 
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growing portfolio of renewable generators. Second because in the longer term there are 
major benefits to be won from the new technologies and behaviours described above and 
explored through the scenarios. Encouraging the innovation to deliver these when they are 
critically needed requires the creation of niche opportunities to which these innovations can 
respond. This requires a persistent signal about the kind of characteristics that will be 
valued. It is not clear whether one of these particular solutions will become dominant, or 
whether a portfolio will emerge. There may be competitive dynamics between them, as for 
example early success in storage might reduce the business case for interconnection or 
demand side response. However, a locational network signal has the potential to provide a 
technology neutral driver to which all have the possibility to respond. 
The scenarios did not specify the precise policy mechanisms by which real-
time locational network signals were assumed to be provided. The range of options will 
now be discussed.  
The approach favoured by many academic commentators is locational 
marginal pricing, according to which prices of energy vary by location according to the 
generation, demand and import and export capacity available. It is argued that this provides 
a long term signal, in that observers can identify regions in which prices are consistently 
high and infer that this would be a good place to make a new investment; but it also 
provides a short term signal which participants follow in order to guide their operational 
behaviour in real time.  
Despite the highly consistent academic view on this issue (Newbery, 2011, 
Baldick et al., 2011, Green, 2010), the GB system has not taken steps towards the LMP 
model, and there are strong reasons for thinking it unlikely that this will happen in the near 
future. Interviewees (Chapter 5) commented that the transition to an LMP system is 
inhibited by the institutional inertia and transitional costs of doing so, with one 
commenting that it would be politically a bold move to bet that the transitional costs would 
be outweighed by the benefit of the new model. Recent years have seen very significant 
levels of effort expended in reforming institutions within the current electricity regime, 
through EMR, Project Transmit, and the RPI-x / RIIO reform. These reforms represent 
considerable institutional investment in the incumbent regime, which would be a form of 
policy stranded investment if the system was completely overhauled.  
These within-regime reforms inevitably generated uncertainty, which it was 
reported was inhibiting investment (Royal Academy of Engineering, 2013).  The 
uncertainty created by a major industry restructure would be greater and unlikely to be 
politically realistic at a time when both capacity constraints (Royal Academy of 
Engineering, 2013) and decarbonisation targets (CCC, 2014) remain pressing concerns and 
prominent political issues. 
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The historic analysis traced the sharp change of direction from a centrally 
controlled to a market-led system in the 1990s. It also showed how, almost as soon as that 
market transformation had been completed, the intervention and coordination of the state 
and its arms lengths bodies began to be drawn back in to the process. As observed by 
several interviewees in Chapter 5, we are now in a mixed period, where principles of 
private investment and market based system operation, sit alongside very high levels of 
strategic state intervention, in particular through the setting of feed-in-tariffs and the 
growth in importance of capacity auctions for security of supply. Thus it is also unclear in 
terms of the currently dominating political value-set how plausible a return to the kind of 
purer market system in which LMP could operate would be. 
Interviewees observed that it could be that EU developments, rather than 
internal reforms, move the GB system towards zonal pricing. The EU Third Energy 
Package, it has been observed, aims for regional market splitting as part of overall EU 
market integration, and its ‘target model’ is akin to the Nordic markets which employ 
Locational Nodal Pricing. Whilst this is a possibility it is not inevitable, and is also a 
development which is less within the control of UK policy makers. As such there is a strong 
argument that other means should be found of signalling real-time network constraints and 
availability, in order to capture the benefits listed above. 
There is the possibility of reflecting real time locational network conditions 
using existing institutions. One of the interviewees considered that the possibility of 
locational BSUoS was a debate worth having. Unlike a locational energy price, locational 
BSUoS would be a retrospective charge, but if skewed to be higher per MWh for 
generators in the areas of the network where constraints occurred, it would provide an 
incentive for generators where possible to control their output in view of network 
constraints. It could also send negative price signals to areas where generation would 
relieve constraints, and in theory both signals could incentivise the corresponding opposite 
behaviour on the demand side. It would thus help to create potential market niches on the 
demand side for innovators such as demand side response aggregators and storage 
providers.  
If neither LMP or locational BSUoS were pursued it would be possible to 
deliver some of the effects achieved in the strong-locational scenarios through a more 
coordinated and strategically managed approach. For example, if the System Operator, 
transmission owners, offshore developers and potential future interconnector investors 
were to come together to negotiate an agreed plan on offshore networks and 
interconnection. To encourage the development of storage, capacity payments for storage 
units in particular locations of system value could be offered. However such approaches are 
likely be somewhat inflexible, entail policy risk, and be less sensitive to real-time operating 
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conditions. It is also noteworthy that they would involve the state being further drawn in to 
an even more interventionist position in respect of the system.    
9.3.2 The need for coordination 
The appropriate level of centralised intervention and coordination in the 
electricity industry is an issue which has repeatedly resurfaced in policy debates throughout 
the history of the industry. On the one hand the argument goes that private actors acting 
independently without centralised coordination will deliver better technological innovation 
and a more efficient system overall. On the other hand arguments have been made that the 
public service nature of the industry, and its inherently networked structure mean that 
centralised coordination interventions are frequently required in order to achieve efficient 
system outcomes. In the current UK policy context, the higher watermark of the non-
intervention approach in the mid-1990s has since been receding in the light of new public 
policy concerns relating to the electricity industry, as well as of the possibility of significant 
new network requirements. Views from the interviewees on this issue were mixed, with 
some highly sympathetic to the development of a strategic long-term blueprint or plan for 
electricity networks; others less convinced of the utility of this.  
From a historical perspective it would seem to be a relevant observation that 
the major expansions of transmission networks in the UK have all been achieved under 
centrally coordinated programmes. At the same time, however, it must also be 
acknowledged that these expansions took place during periods of growing demand, and 
during most of which there was only one significant large-scale generation technology – 
coal – which gave some certainty to the question of the relative location of load and 
generation, and to the prospect of the future utilisation of these networks.  The current 
context is of a system which it is expected will undergo significant changes in generation 
mix, with potentially also significant growth in demand. However, the precise trajectory of 
demand growth is much less clear than, for example, in the post-war years. Furthermore, 
there is larger diversity of generation technology options, each with different locational 
characteristics, and with considerable uncertainty about their relative future costs and 
operational characteristics.    
Nonetheless, if targets are to be met this entails a rapid growth in installed 
capacities of some combination of low carbon sources. One important consideration is the 
relative lead times of generation technologies and transmission infrastructure. As noted by 
one of the interviewees, transmission build lead times are comparable to those of nuclear 
power stations, hence network upgrades specifically responding to new nuclear power 
stations can be built responsively, in ‘lock-step’ with the nuclear build programme. The 
SLWP scenario describes a largely responsive transmission build programme which 
primarily follows the commissioning of nuclear stations. For renewables however the 
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situation is more complex, as projects can move from planning to commissioning more 
quickly than the typical lead times for transmission infrastructure. Further, there are 
multiple parties involved, the sum total of which might be sufficient to trigger an upgrade, 
but which as individual projects would not do so. An argument could therefore be made 
that if there is a policy priority to bring on large amounts of renewables quickly, to avoid 
delays judgements should be taken about the likely areas for these, and appropriately sized 
networks built out in advance. WLSP describes a scenario in which an aggressive 
deployment of renewables is pursued, with transmission networks as far as possible laid 
down in advance of this. WLWP does not have such a forward edge on transmission and 
thus experiences delays, and greatly increased constraints. Thus, one potential argument in 
favour of a strategic coordinated approach is the avoidance of delays and constraint costs 
while transmission catches up with generation.     
Another argument concerns the potential difference of a strategic approach 
compared to a non-coordinated approach in terms of achieving synergies and economies of 
scale in network planning. It is easy to conceive of relatively small and dispersed renewable 
energy hubs connecting to the network in a radial fashion without there being much added 
value in a strategic coordinated plan for how these individual farms connect up. However 
in the longer term large amounts of renewable generation capacity are required to meet the 
targets, even in scenarios with large nuclear fleets. In relation to the large round 3 offshore 
wind zones, significant bottlenecks emerge without coordination. For example, the ability 
of SLSP to connect all of the Round 3 potential, is strongly assisted by the development of 
strategic meshed offshore networks particularly off the east coast of Scotland and in the 
southern North Sea. SLWP by contrast, with its radial connection approach, meets onshore 
constraints much earlier. The issue may be particularly pertinent for the large offshore 
zones, particular those which infeed into high nuclear areas. Another key point is that SLSP 
has more offshore network and therefore gets away with less onshore network, compared 
to SLWP.  
The key argument against a strategic blueprint approach points to the 
numerous uncertain and uncontrollable factors which pertain to the future system, 
especially its future generation mix, and the degree of impact these uncertainties could 
have on the characteristics of the system and its power flows. Significant uncertainties were 
uncovered both by the internal variation of the scenarios, and by the non-actor-contingent 
uncertainties applied across all of them. First, against identical demand backgrounds, the 
scenarios developed quite contrasting power flows and resulting network requirements, 
entirely due to the variation of the different combinations of nuclear and renewables 
developed in each. It might be argued that we can anticipate broadly the most favourable 
areas for renewables – the north of the country – and that transmission infrastructure 
should be built out in expectation of the development of these areas. However, such a 
broad characterisation is unlikely to be sufficient to justify a real transmission link of a 
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particular capacity in a particular location. Each of the scenarios shows major upgrades, 
though due to the variations in precise locations and quantities within the generation mix, 
there many differences between them. The non-actor-contingent elements suggest further 
uncertainties – the roll out and charging patterns of electric vehicles, a breakthrough in 
storage and the mass deployment of PV all have effects on the power flows. In addition it 
would be possible to list a number of other possible developments which, it would be 
reasonable to surmise, would also have impacts on the system – development of CCS, due 
to the specific locational requirements of CCS plant; the use of hydrogen or biofuels for 
transport, due to the resulting impact on electricity demand.  
As shown in the comparisons of the network investment levels and costs in 
Sections 8.6.5 and 8.6.6, the magnitude of investment in all scenarios is considerable, and 
the difference between the scenarios also great. The costs of transmission investment are 
not likely to be negligible but will form a considerable proportion of the total costs of the 
transition. In this context oversizing simply for the sake of erring on the side of caution is 
unlikely to be an acceptable strategy. Thus for reasons of maintaining societal support for 
the transition, as well as purely financial constraints, it is still beneficial to use transmission 
network efficiently and avoid their expansion to levels significantly greater than required.     
On balance the degree of variation between the networks developed within 
each of the scenarios does not suggest a strong case for fully comprehensive network 
expansion blueprint. The range of potential sources of variation which could affect network 
requirements is such that predicting an optimal network decades in advance is too risky. A 
level of flexibility and periodic review in responding to actual generation outturns and 
other technological and system developments, as is contained within the RIIO process, is 
likely to remain sensible for the forseeable future. However, it also emerges that given 
certain conditions of developments to high levels in certain areas, some degree of forward 
thinking about the development trajectories of particular zones in the network, with a view 
to joining up and coordinating network solutions, could be rational and beneficial. 
Candidate areas for such treatment include: 
Scotland and its east coast offshore region, and its interface with 
England and potentially Norway 
The large potential for renewable resources in Scotland raises questions about 
the sizing of interconnector capacity. Interactions with Norway could help to smooth the 
export south and is a factor worth considering in the expansion of the Scottish offshore 
network and connections to England 
The English east coast offshore zones 
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The English North Sea contains a number of very high capacity offshore wind 
zones. Radial connections could contribute to very high constraints in the onshore network 
around the East Midlands and East Anglia. The development of a north sea offshore grid 
with numerous connections to different locations along the east coast, as well as potentially 
more interconnectors to Europe, could add benefit when the North Sea zones are 
generating very large amounts of power. The English east coast zones could also experience 
high infeeds from eastern Scotland if high capacity interconnectors, and particularly east 
coast offshore bootstraps, are constructed. 
Irish Sea and Wales / north-west England  
This area could experience a number of very significant infeeds. The HVDC 
western bootstrap is under construction. If it is joined by the Wylfa nuclear plant and a 
fully developed Irish Sea zone, there could be considerable combined infeed into this area, 
particularly at high wind times. The benefits of Irish interconnection, and a Wales HVDC 
should be monitored in respect of this area. 
A further issue which has been suggested by some of this analysis, is the 
question of the relative benefit of different developments to the transmission network, 
compared to the distribution network. In particular, the effect of developments at the 
distribution network of growing electric vehicle demand and growing distributed 
generation, were explored in terms of their impact on the transmission network. It was 
found that there could be situations in which the alteration of demands on the transmission 
network caused by these distribution network activities, may have beneficial effects for the 
transmission network. Key examples of this were the increase in demand in northern 
Britain relative to a decrease in southern Britain using demand responsive EV charging, 
reducing the north-south power flow gradient and thus reducing constraints; and similarly 
an increase in southern PV output also reducing the north-south power flow gradient. 
However, in both cases these power flows would have had very significant impacts on 
distribution networks, not all of which may have been positive. The challenges of such 
dynamics to the distribution networks were noted by interviewees. However, if such 
developments scale up they may also create implications for the transmission network. This 
suggests that another potentially valuable area for forward planning and coordination may 
be conversations between TNOs and DNOs about the increasing possibility of interaction 
between different voltage levels, and how beneficial effects can be captured, and negative 
impacts mitigated.   
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9.3.3 The balance between locational signals and 
coordination 
This section explores how the two key policy variables of locational signals 
and coordination can be brought together in a coherent policy framework. 
A strong conclusion from this work is that a locational signal is increasingly 
important in a low carbon system to promote efficient network utilisation and to maintain 
options on transmission network investment in the face of uncertainty around precise 
future generation mixes. It will be increasingly important that this signal affects real time 
operational decisions as well as investment locational decisions. This implies a move away 
from, or some kind of addition to, the current form of the TNUoS which is the only way in 
which locational signals are currently conveyed to transmission system users. 
In theoretical terms the neatest solution to this would be to establish a market 
based on locational marginal pricing, as this would provide all of the above signals and 
allow the relevant actors to respond and make their decisions in an autonomous and 
decentralised way. It is possible that such a market could eventually develop in the UK, and 
currently the thing looking most likely to drive it is the EU Third Package. 
However, the specific project of reorganising the market along these lines is 
one which involves numerous obstacles. The transitional costs of market reorganisation 
would be high, and the inertia from the various existing actors who are accustomed to the 
functioning of the existing market could work against the process, particularly given the 
significant amount of investment that has recently been undertaken in upgrading 
components that still fit within the incumbent policy regime.  
Furthermore, the components which have been added through EMR have 
moved the system more towards a mixed system with an underlying market structure 
combined with strong intervention. These developments have significantly pulled the 
system away from a pure unimpeded market pricing approach. The reality of this policy 
value drift has to be acknowledged in order to produce policy recommendations that are 
tractable.  
It has been suggested in Section 9.3.1 that creating a locational BSUoS charge 
is a step which could exist within the incumbent regime and also produce something close 
to the desired effect. Failing this, the implication of keeping on track with decarbonisation 
trajectory recommended by the CCC is either very high network investment (as in WLSP) 
or very high constraint levels (WLWP), either of which could create significant public and 
political tension and endanger the successful achievement of the targets. It is possible that 
in such a situation the problem of variable power flow and network utilisation would draw 
in increasingly high centralised coordination, for example using capacity mechanisms to 
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commission flexible generation or storage in specific areas, or with the state becoming 
increasingly involved in interconnection projects. Such an increase in interventionist 
solutions may create an increasingly stronger rationale for the creation of an independent 
syste operator (ISO) or other kind of central coordinating body, to coordinate the 
allocation of contracts for difference and capacity payments in a way that was also rational 
from the point of view of the network.  
Thus it is possible to see how a weaker overall locational signal could 
eventually require higher levels of coordination in order to make interventions to resolve 
issues arising from it. However, the variables also have some independence, and there have 
also been areas identified where some forward planning and coordination may be useful in 
addition to a locational signal.  
The question arises because of the multi-actor nature of the system on the 
generation side, compared with the monopolistic characteristics of the transmission 
network. The network provider can provide information to each of the various actors 
about network conditions at any given time; however, the robustness of decisions taken on 
this information will also be affected by subsequent decisions taken by other actors, to 
which they are not party. Equally the network provider cannot predict in advance how each 
of the other actors will respond. Without coordination the only option is for each actor 
including the network operator to act in response to each actor step. However, this can 
lead to a solution which is someway below optimal at the system level. In order to get a 
better outcome, there is an argument for the sharing of information on intended actions, 
such that the network operator can plan for the activity of multiple actors several stages 
ahead, not just one step ahead. For example, multiple actors may each receive a signal 
which encourages them to invest in offshore wind in the southern north sea. Taking each of 
those planned projects as individual projects the network owner may rationally offer radial 
connections to each to a similar point on the grid, as the marginal impact of each is low. 
However, taking a slightly longer term view and taking the projects as a portfolio may lead 
to the identification of more strategic links with longer connections to other parts of the 
network. The ability to do this requires giving the network owner the ability to make 
advanced investments with some of that cost paid by near term projects, but with the 
possibility to recoup costs against future, less firm projects, when they arise. Though 
carrying some element of risk, the future potential payoff may justify this.     
 Thus even in a market with strong locational signals there may still be 
relevant opportunities for coordination between the multiple actors involved, when it 
comes to network investment. Locational signals and strategic anticipatory network 
planning are not mutually exclusive – even in a system with perfect locational signals some 
strategic planning of network is likely to improve the efficiency of outcomes. However, the 
weaker the locational signals, the more that coordinated intervention may become 
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necessary to attempt to achieve an efficient utilisation of the network, given the increasing 
challenges with variation in network usage and power flows which could be faced in a 
decarbonising system. 
9.3.4 Institutional arrangements 
This section discusses the extent to which new institutional arrangements may 
be required in relation to the different options. The key policy requirements highlighted by 
the analysis are the need for a means of reflecting real time locational signals to generators 
as well as only long term signals; and an institutional arrangement which facilitates the 
identification of beneficial opportunities for strategic coordination between various actors 
and regimes, without attempting to implement a fixed blueprint.  
The creation of an LMP market would require substantial reorganisation of 
the market, including the creation of an ISO (or TSO) with responsibility for calculating 
the energy price at each node. In a discussion paper Pollitt et al (2013), outline this model 
and stress its benefits, but acknowledge the substantial reorganisation it implies. The 
inclusion of a locational element in the BSUoS charge on the other hand, which while it 
may be a theoretically less elegant solution from an academic standpoint, could be achieved 
with no major institutional changes, being a modest adaption of an existing mechanism. 
This is not to say however that such a move would be straightforward, as it would 
inevitably create winners and losers against the status quo. As has been seen with Project 
Transmit, such reforms can result in a very long discussion process.  
However, as noted above, both of the above approaches to locational 
incentivisation would also benefit from some level of strategic foresight on network 
planning, due to the potential benefits of identifying synergies in network connection 
strategies in view of the multiple generator actors involved in the system. There have been 
calls (including in interviews for this thesis) to establish an independent system planner, or 
system architect, whose role would be to set the direction of travel for the system and to 
authorise the strategic build out of the network for this purpose. On the basis of the 
scenario analysis carried out in this thesis it is not possible to go so far as to recommend 
this, due to the range of different network designs which may be compatible with a low 
carbon system, and the technological uncertainties associated with them. However, the 
analysis has identified that there could be genuine benefit from creating institutional 
capacity to keep a watching brief on developments in generation investment, to highlight 
how more strategic and anticipatory approaches to network investment in particular zones 
may be of long term benefit.  
It is useful to break down the different elements of what would be required in 
such institutional capacity. The first requirement is for some kind of independent and 
unbiased strategic oversight which can look across regimes and identify potentially 
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beneficial opportunities. The second requirement is that those who would actually build 
the assets have the freedom and remit within the price control structure to undertake 
anticipatory and coordinated investments. The third requirement is that there is scrutiny 
that any proposed multi-purpose project does indeed represent a value for money 
contribution to government strategic objectives.   
On the second point, in fact there appears to be sufficient provision within the 
RIIO framework to encourage and allow this. The RIIO framework is designed to 
encourage network companies to ‘play a full role in the delivery of a sustainable energy 
sector’, (Ofgem, 2010c) and in so doing they are permitted to take longer term view on 
investment, considering ‘the costs of reinforcing the network in the context of a twenty-
five year asset management plan, rather than in the context of what is needed for the price 
control period itself’ ((Ofgem, 2010a), p. 50). Companies are also encouraged to ‘work 
with others’ in the industry or in other sectors ‘to identify potential joint solutions that may 
provide long-term value for money’ (Ofgem, 2010a) and to be involved in whole-system 
planning for a low carbon future (Ofgem, 2012b).  
On the third point, scrutiny of investment proposals is something which most 
clearly falls within Ofgem’s remit. Pollitt et al (2013) discuss the possible requirements for 
new bodies to undertake the scrutiny of future transmission investments, arguing that 
Ofgem suffers from a lack of capacity to do this effectively. However, if Ofgem’s capacity 
is as limited as Pollitt et al suggest, this primarily suggests an argument for Ofgem to 
ensure their capacity is sufficient in this regard, rather than creating a new scrutiny body 
and confusing Ofgem’s purpose and remit.  
It is in relation to the first point that there may be an argument for some 
institutional development. There is currently no organisation with the remit and 
responsibility to look across transmission regimes in the context of a rapidly changing 
generation mix, and identify opportunities for synergies and network coordination. This 
would not entail a one-off future forecast and resulting system blueprint. Rather, the body 
would have to periodically re-examine opportunities in the context of the evolving 
generation mix. Any coordination opportunities it identified could then be incorporated as 
evidence supporting the needs case for a multi-purpose project in transmission company 
plans within the RIIO process, and would thus ultimately remain subject to scrutiny from 
Ofgem through existing processes. Equally, if this strategic body identified particularly 
beneficial coordination opportunities which were not being pursued by companies, 
Ofgem’s scrutiny within the terms of RIIO could conceivably include requiring the 
companies to coordinate with each other and give greater consideration to such plans. 
The role of such a body would be comparable to the recent role played by 
ENSG, where their work on transmission requirements out to 2020 was much cited by 
Transmission Companies in justifying the needs cases for their plans, and also directly gave 
	   404	  
rise to a major strategic project – the western HVDC link – which was a joint venture 
between two companies, National Grid and Scottish Power Transmission.  
As such, the new body discussed in this section could simply be an evolution 
from the ENSG. To ensure its long-term robustness however, there would be a need to 
ensure its independence from the commercial interests of any of the existing actors, and 
that it could transparently demonstrate this. It would also need to develop a transparent 
and robust approach to considering future scenarios, and be able to demonstrate what 
expectations about the future were underlying the needs cases it developed.  
A potential advantage of such an approach is the minimal institutional upheaval 
it requires, and the fact that the activity already undertaken by the ENSG provides a test 
case for how it could work. The role of Ofgem in scrutinising any emerging plans would 
remain crucial, and it is therefore important that Ofgem has sufficient capacity to 
undertake such scrutiny. 
9.3.5 Conclusions – policy recommendations 
The previous discussions give rise to the following policy recommendations.  
The first recommendation is that the move from a locational signal which 
influences investment only to one which influences real-time operation primarily, and 
investment by extension, will be of significant importance and value to the decarbonising 
electricity system. Bearing in mind the existing set of policy commitments within the 
electricity system and the direction of travel, it is judged that the most tractable way of 
achieving this will be to work towards a locational BSUoS charge, targeted equally at 
generation and demand, and with the potential for negative prices to provide incentives for 
generation that helps the network, as well as penalties for generation that does not help it.  
The second recommendation is that even with locational signals indicating the 
costs and benefits to generators of network connection in different areas, there is still 
benefit in some level of strategic anticipatory consideration of future network needs. It 
requires modest institutional change, namely the creation of an organisation with 
independence from the TOs, the SO and Ofgem. The new organisation would not have the 
power to launch projects itself, but its recommendations could be referred to as evidence 
for a joint-needs case between TOs and other merchant actors as appropriate, for review in 
the normal manner by Ofgem. It may be sufficient to deliver this body by making minor 
amendments to the ENSG, improving the transparency of its processes and clarifying its 
scope and remit.  
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10 Conclusions 
This chapter summarises the conclusions of the thesis. It first considers the 
scenario method developed for application in this research, identifies its novelty, and 
reflects upon the usefulness of this approach in considering future policy problems. It then 
summarises the conclusions specifically relating to the policy area under discussion, the role 
of the transmission networks in a decarbonising electricity system. It highlights the 
technical challenges revealed by the scenario process, and recalls the key policy 
recommendations arising from the analysis. Finally some suggestions are made for future 
research. 
10.1 Conclusions on the scenario method 
10.1.1 The role and purpose of scenarios 
The use of scenarios to consider possible future situations to aid near-term 
decision-making is an intuitive human activity practised at every scale from the individual 
considering personal plans, to the more formalised and corporatised procedures 
undertaken by large organisations. The range of tools and methodologies which have been 
applied to producing scenarios is vast, as might be expected given the range of sectors in 
which scenario analysis has been applied. To the heart of every scenario process however 
runs Pierre Wack’s challenge: ‘Do they lead to action? If scenarios do not push managers to 
do something other than indicated by past experience, they are nothing more than 
interesting speculation’ (Wack, 1985a). Volkery and Ribeiro make the same challenge to 
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public policy scenarios, affirming that ‘having an impact on the design and choice of policies 
remains a litmus test for the relevance of scenario planning’ (Volkery and Ribeiro, 2009). 
The prevailing existence of uncertainty about the future is not in any sense an argument 
against the utility of doing scenarios. Scenarios are not intended to remove or wish away 
uncertainty, but to provide a logical framework for analysing the possible effects of 
decisions within that context of uncertainty. ‘The future is an emerging landscape with 
unknown contours; the constraint is that despite the unknown horizons, we have to take 
decisions today that commit us for the future. Even if the information is degraded we have 
to place our bets now, to create the future rather than submit to it’ (Godet, 1987). 
Successful scenarios should not be expected to eliminate uncertainty entirely, but should be 
expected to help to improve decisions that must be made in respect of the future, within 
that context of uncertainty. 
10.1.2 Limitations of public policy and low carbon 
scenarios 
Scenarios should help to inform and improve decision making in the context 
of future uncertainty. However, the success of public policy scenarios, including low 
carbon scenarios, according to this criterion has in fact been mixed. Volkery and Ribeiro 
report that scenarios are more often used in the early phases of the policy cycle, for 
‘indirect forms of decision support’ such as ‘awareness-raising’ and ‘issue-framing’ but that 
more progress needs to be made with incorporating scenario planning into ‘processes of 
policy design, choice and implementation’, noting that ‘the role and purpose [of scenarios] 
within the decision-making process is not always clear’ (Volkery and Ribeiro, 2009).  
Hughes and Strachan (2010) criticised low carbon scenarios for failing to 
represent the role of human actors in the transition process, and for the separation of 
technological systems from human systems which failed to represent the co-evolution of a 
socio-technical system. They argued that this results in a lack of tractability in the policy 
space, as the underlying structure of the scenarios is not conducive to allowing policy 
makers to trace the role of their own decision making within the alternative futures 
presented. In the case of ‘trend based’ scenario methods, the futures are a complex blend 
of different kinds of political, social and technological drivers, often at regional, national 
global scales, which present vivid storylines but with such compounded uncertainty that the 
scope for impacting on the future seems non-existent. In the case of ‘technical feasibility’ 
or ‘modelling’ based scenarios, the description is of an energy system as a purely technical 
model whose operation can be guided through the pulling of constraints and levers that 
have at best only a passing resemblance to the way that actual policies impact upon real 
system actors and their choices. 
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10.1.3 The contribution of the scenario method 
developed in this thesis 
The scenario method developed for this thesis addresses this deficit in two 
ways. The first is by developing a conceptual model of the system which draws on three 
different approaches scenario methods have taken to representing the system under study, 
to produce a three-level model of the system, representing the constant interaction 
between political values, actor strategies and decisions, and technological system 
outcomes. The model understands policy choices as emanating from politics, itself subject 
to the influence of prevailing systems of values or ideology. It considers the impact of these 
policy trajectories upon the strategies and choices of system actors, and the effects of these 
choices upon the technological system, as well as the effect that technological system 
conditions have upon system actors. The model requires an iterative movement between 
these three levels, calling for a cross-disciplinary approach which brings together qualitative 
data on interpreting political values and actor strategies, with quantitative data on system 
performance.  
The second important aspect is the development of a scenario process based 
on tightly defining the key focal question and the system under study, and systematically 
categorising different kinds of future element. Elements which are considered ‘pre-
determined’ are separated from those which are contingent upon decisions which could be 
made by prime-mover system actors, or ‘actor-contingent’, and from those which are less 
easily attributable to the decisions of identifiable system actors, and thus more profoundly 
uncertain, or ‘non-actor-contingent’. The actor-contingent elements are the policy 
approaches encapsulated by the value sets which are the starting hypotheses for each 
scenario within the three level model. Thus the scenarios are fundamentally defined and 
differentiated through alternative policy approaches which could be taken by prime-mover 
system actors. This puts the perspective of the policy maker, and their agency within the 
system, at the centre of the scenario process, which is thereby rendered more likely to 
deliver tractable policy relevant recommendations.  
10.1.4 Reflections on strengths and weaknesses of the 
new scenario method 
10.1.4.1 The tightly-defined system boundary 
Critical to the clarity offered by this approach is the very clear focus on a 
specific policy question, alternative responses to which are varied as the key ‘actor-
contingent’ elements which differentiate the scenarios. The system boundary is set such 
that the number of independent internal system variables, or actor contingent elements, is 
small enough that they can each be systematically varied within a manageable number of 
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scenarios. In the current study there were two independent variables (locational signal and 
anticipatory planning) each with two levels (strong or weak). The combination of these 
variables at each of their possible levels yields four possible scenarios. Had there been an 
additional variable with two levels, this would have implied a total of eight scenarios – 
already stretching the bounds of manageability. When the manageable limit of the number 
of scenarios is reached, the system boundary has to be drawn around the independent 
variables that have generated these scenarios, with all other potential variables set as 
external to the system. This means that they have to be treated as ‘extraneous variables’ 
and held constant during the actor-contingent scenario development part of the process, 
though they can form part of a selective ‘stress test’ in the non-actor-contingent part of the 
process.  
The strength of this method, as argued in Section 2.6.2, is the greater clarity 
it allows in perceiving the effect of the independent variables of interest without 
interference from extraneous variables, as opposed to approaches which produce scenarios 
from a mixture of many different independent variables at various different levels, making 
the effects of any particular variable hard to attribute. This principle is strongly related to 
the well established principles of experimental design in behavioural, psychological and 
physical sciences, which require the holding constant of extraneous variables in order to see 
the effect of an independent variable of interest. In other words, the method is arguing that 
scenarios should be conducted with comparable design rigour to controlled scientific 
experiments, conducted in order to rigorously test the effect of identified variables of 
interest. It is this design rigour which assists in producing scenarios which can make 
strategically effective contributions to policy making, by highlighting the impacts of 
identifiable actor choices. 
The trade-off to this focal clarity is that significant parts of the energy system 
which do not fall within the system under study as defined by the focal question, are held as 
constant, with a handful of non-actor-contingent elements identified to test the robustness 
of the actor-contingent scenarios. Significant elements not internally varied by the scenarios 
in this study included alternative demand profiles, alternative approaches to generation, 
and the possible breakthrough of major but technologically uncertain technologies such as 
CCS. The scenarios also limit their focus to the transmission network, meaning that 
distribution level activities are out of scope and for the most part not considered, with the 
exception of the non-actor-contingent element of a large growth in solar PV, much of 
which can be assumed to be distribution connected. This means that the scenarios have 
considerably fewer elements being simultaneously varied than is typically found in energy 
scenarios, which typically aim to ‘cover the waterfront’ of possibilities across multiple 
criteria, using just a handful of scenarios. In particularly, other recent electricity system 
focussed scenarios such as those associated with the LENS and Transition Pathways projects 
(Ault et al., 2008, Foxon, 2013), reviewed in Section 1.2.1, have included more radical 
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visions of the future, including highly decentralised electricity systems. The current 
scenarios, due to the limitation of their focus on the transmission network, are inherently 
precluded from exploring such futures.  
The broad, multi-variable approach to energy scenarios has clear attractions 
given the multi-sectoral and interlinked qualities of energy systems, the fact that they are 
embedded in social processes, and that long-term technological transitions can be 
powerfully understood as complex processes involving integrated changes in technology, 
society, economics and culture. It could be argued that the tightly focussed approach 
developed in this thesis, for all its focus on experimental clarity, misses out on these cross-
sectoral dynamics which are characteristic of real transitions. Conversely, the disadvantage 
of the broad multi-variable approach is a lack of clarity about what question the scenarios 
are trying to answer, and what specific policy decisions they are to be related to. The 
fundamental argument for the tightly bounded scenario development process developed in 
this thesis is that it is better to have a clear answer to very specific question, than a vague 
answer to a very big question.  
A potential area of interest for future research in energy scenarios will be on 
how to bring together the strengths of these contrasting approaches. This thesis continues 
to propose that scenario processes should always aim to deliver practical and usable insights 
to their users, and rigorous and controlled design of the process is argued to be critical to 
this. However, if this design rigour can be combined with a broader multi-sectoral scope 
then this could increase the richness of scenario storylines, allowing for a broader range of 
potentially significant drivers to be included in the analysis, and potentially increasing their 
interest and uptake amongst a wider range of stakeholders. Ultimately, however, 
researchers will always have to confront a trade-off between the breadth and scope of what 
is considered, and the precision and depth with which it can be considered.  
10.1.4.2 Value systems, tensions and contradictions 
The process of making political value systems the starting hypothesis for the 
scenarios, in addition to clarifying the elements of the system which can be related to 
proactive choices, may also assist policy makers in seeing their decisions in the context of 
the values that may be informing them. Value systems are a constant and natural part of 
human decision making processes – in a highly complex world, without making some 
judgements about what we expect to the world to be like, it would be hard to make any 
decisions at all (Forrester, 1971). However, the risk is that value systems can become 
implicit and cease to be questioned. An important role of scenarios is to make such value-
sets or world views explicit and consider how they could influence decision making (Wack, 
1985a, Wack, 1985b). By making explicit the value-sets which are affecting decision 
making, policy makers can consider if there is benefit in changing them. If they choose not 
	   411	  
to, they can focus on the scenario that most closely reflects their value system and consider 
their options within it.  
The three-level system concept used in the scenario approach can also have 
the effect of testing the consistency of value-sets against emerging technical realities. For 
example, WLWP produced a technical system exhibiting considerable stresses, which 
would be likely to force a change in the guiding value set. As discussed in Section 9.2.8, the 
internal stresses implied by the scenario suggest that a relaxation or abandonment of either 
the ‘weak location’ or ‘weak planning’ principles, or of the underlying decarbonisation 
trajectory, would be the eventual likely outcome   Just as in past examples (as shown in 
Error! Reference source not found.) technological system stresses have forced value 
shifts, the three-level scenario approach provides the opportunity to consider similar future 
interactions. It might be argued that a scenario approach which is capable of generating 
contradictions and inconsistencies is in some sense flawed. On the contrary, the analysis in 
this thesis has illustrated the usefulness of using scenarios to explore how certain 
combinations of choices which are possible for policy makers to take, can lead to tensions 
and contradictions. It is far more interesting and informative to discover through scenarios 
the possible problems and failures which could result from certain policy-choice 
combinations, than to produce a set of scenarios in which harmonious success is a pre-
determined assumption.  
10.1.4.3 The mixed-method approach: integration of quantitative 
and qualitative approaches 
The process involves inductive reasoning to integrate both quantitative and 
qualitative information from each of the three levels at each time stage, and to infer likely 
decisions of system actors in response to this. This is clearly a process which does not 
produce optimal outcomes according to an objective function, and which employs human 
judgement to integrate qualitative and quantitative inputs, rather than purely deterministic 
calculations from purely quantitative inputs. There is a potential weakness here, in that 
throughout the scenario process choices and judgements which would in reality be taken by 
many different actors with access to detailed commercial information, are taken in the 
scenario by the individual researcher, with much less quantitative detail and some degree of 
subjectivity. On the other hand, the commercial information that would be available to an 
energy company in the year 2033 is no more available to a purely quantitative modeller in 
the present time than a qualitative analyst. The modeller will still at some point have to 
make a subjective judgement as to what the quantitative input data should be, even if on the 
basis of the input data it receives, the quantitative model can then proceed to make a 
watertight ‘deductive’ argument (see Section 7.2.5). Thus subjective judgement about 
future conditions is essentially common to all modelling and scenario approaches – the key 
difference is that the approach used in this thesis merely misses out a line of calculation 
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compared to modelling approaches. For example, in the case of a scenario with a strong 
locational signal, the economic model argument would run, ‘let’s assume that the 
transmission charge at this location is £x/MW, and that this is sufficient to discourage 
investment in relation to other available areas’, whereas the approach in this thesis would 
be, ‘let’s assume that whatever the transmission charge at this location, it is sufficient to 
discourage investment in relation to other available areas’. In either case you have an 
outcome which is dependent on subjective assumptions. Whilst the model may provide the 
analyst with a number, it is a number to which subjective assumptions are attached; it 
doesn’t remove the subjectivity from the entire process.  
Another frequent feature of quantitative economic models is the production of 
optimal solutions – based on a set of input criteria and a clearly defined objective function. 
The current approach clearly does not produce optimal outcomes according to any 
objective function. It does however produce narratives through which the perspective of 
actors making judgements in a multi-actor system with limited foresight and imperfect 
information can be explored. That the outcomes of these narratives are in no sense 
optimal, that some indeed are highly problematic, is not in itself a weakness. The 
consideration of scenarios that create problems – for example when actors are motivated to 
make decisions which are not system optimal; or of scenarios which come close to failure – 
for example when the value-set of the scenario seems to be increasingly incompatible with 
a key system objective; is just as useful as considering scenarios which succeed. The key 
point is that comparing scenarios which have different kinds of problems, or indeed ‘sub-
optimalities’, which arise from different combinations of decisions which could be taken by 
identifiable prime-mover system actors, is more informative from a policy making 
perspective than the comparison of multiple ‘optimal’ solutions, whose differences are 
generated by the varying of uncertain assumptions which have no clearly identifiable link to 
the decisions of system actors. 
Nonetheless the approach set out in this thesis is intended to be flexible, and 
to be capable of incorporating inputs and insights from a range of quantitative and 
qualitative tools, as appropriate to the focal question. Further quantitative detail in the 
analysis, notwithstanding the qualifications noted above regarding the inevitable 
subjectivity relating to assumptions about future quantitative data, could add detail and 
insight, for example on the trade-offs between different technologies with different 
investment costs, and the relative costs of deploying these in different areas of the network. 
Whereas the scenarios in this thesis were undertaken using a spreadsheet to list the 
assumptions made about generation investment, the incorporation of generation and 
transmission costs within different areas of the network within an energy system model 
could produce additional insight, provided the time-staged iteration within prevailing value 
systems could be maintained. 
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10.2 The role of the electricity transmission 
network in a decarbonising electricity 
system – technical insights and policy 
recommendations 
The scenario process summarised in the previous section was applied to the 
key focal question: 
• How can transmission network policy choices affect the role that the 
transmission network plays in helping to deliver a low-carbon electricity 
system by the early 2030s? 
This section summarises the technical insights and policy recommendations 
that emerged from the analysis. 
10.2.1 Significant expansion in transmission network 
capacities is required to facilitate a low carbon 
transition 
The scenarios explore alternative pathways towards the same target of 
50gCO2/kWh carbon intensity of electricity generation, guided by alternative policy 
approaches to transmission regulation and planning. They employ different combinations of 
generation technologies and transmission network designs to reach the target. In each of 
the scenarios a significant expansion of the transmission architecture takes place, over and 
above the like-for-like renewal of existing assets. This is due to the lack of correlation 
between the potential location and capacity sizes of future low carbon generators, and 
those of existing conventional generators. Thus, a strong conclusion is that transmission 
networks will be required to play an important role in the low carbon transition, through 
their expansion to accommodate new forms of generation.    
10.2.2 The level and location of required transmission 
network expansion varies substantially in 
response to different possible low carbon 
generation mixes and policy strategies 
Although increase in network capacity is a common factor in all scenarios, the 
scenarios also show considerable differences in the levels and locations of new transmission 
investment required – there is more than one possible network configuration and 
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associated generation mix which would succeed in delivering the target of 50g/kWh 
carbon intensity of electricity by the early 2030s. The variations in the networks developed 
emerge as a result of the alternative policy strategies pursued in each scenario, and of the 
resulting interactions between transmission network capacity and generation investment 
decisions. Further variations in network requirements were suggested by sensitivity 
analyses of ‘non-actor-contingent’ elements, which considered alternative electric vehicle 
charging patterns, the growth of solar PV and the development of grid-scale storage. Thus, 
while policy choices around transmission planning and regulation will substantially 
influence the way the network develops, the pathway taken will also be strongly 
interrelated to investment decisions on the generation side, and demand-side changes. The 
resulting potential for variation in network requirements makes it hard to identify a 
comprehensive future network ‘blueprint’ which could appropriately and efficiently apply 
to the range of all plausible future scenarios. Thus transmission network planning requires 
forward thinking, to ensure that insufficient or inappropriate transmission investment does 
not become a barrier to decarbonisation, but also flexibility, to allow generation and 
transmission to co-evolve in a coherent manner.  
10.2.3 Challenges and opportunities for transmission 
networks in a decarbonising electricity system 
The scenarios suggest a number of challenges and opportunities that will be 
faced in the planning and operation of the transmission network over the coming decades.  
Several inherent characteristics of low carbon technologies present direct 
network challenges. Renewable resources are in many cases located distantly from high 
load centres and will require network upgrades. In many cases the speed with which they 
can be built will outpace that with which transmission lines can be built, presenting a 
coordination challenge, particularly in the 2020s when the pace of decarbonisation must be 
rapid. 
The transitional period of the 2020s could see challenges as the combination 
of growing renewables alongside still high fossil output creates risk of high exceedences. 
This period will also be likely to require new CCGT investment, which must be operated 
intermittently otherwise there is a risk of fossil lock in. 
There will be considerably greater variation in power flow patterns and 
constraints in different seasons, and under different wind conditions within the same 
seasons – this creates challenges for how much to size the network, as well as network 
management issues. Flexible and responsive fossil as well as low carbon plant, will be of 
increasing value.  
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Storage, electric vehicles with load shifting, and distributed generation all 
have the potential to make significant impacts on transmission constraints and investment 
requirements, both positive and negative. At the same time these technologies would also 
impact on the distribution network, though there may be situations in which a beneficial 
outcome for the transmission network is the opposite for some distribution networks, and 
vice versa. 
Interconnection also has the potential to balance renewable variation and help 
to avoid constraints and onshore network investment – however if it is not responsive to 
regional network conditions it may increase constraints. Large offshore zones may also 
contribute to significant onshore constraints, but if coordinated could assist with relieving 
GB system constraints 
Overall the physical size and costs of the required transmission network are 
potentially very large, as is the difference in size and cost between the alternative systems 
presented in the scenarios. Networks are not a marginal part of the cost and impact of the 
overall low carbon transition.  
10.2.4 Policy recommendations 
10.2.4.1 Primary policy recommendations 
There are two primary policy recommendations arising from this analysis. The 
first is to establish a locational signal at the operational, as well as investment timescale. 
This would 
• incentivise existing fossil generators to avoid using the network at high 
wind times 
• encourage the co-location of renewables with complementary output 
patterns 
• provide stronger signals for the siting and operation of interconnectors, 
helping to ensure that they relieve congestion and avoid onshore network 
upgrades, rather than add to them 
• provide the appropriate innovation signal for developing technologies such 
as CCS, storage and electric vehicles, and for socio-technical innovations 
such as demand response aggregation – that flexible response is something 
that is valued and will be rewarded on the system 
	   416	  
There are different options for how the locational signal can be provided. 
Given the realities of the current regime and policy value-set, the approach most likely to 
achieve results is to include a locational element within BSUoS.  
The second primary recommendation is to create a body with a remit to 
oversee strategic interactions between the various actors and regimes of the electricity 
system, and to identify potentially beneficial opportunities for strategic coordination 
between them. There are potentially significant benefits to be obtained from joining up 
thinking between onshore, offshore and interconnections. There will also be increasing 
interactions between transmission and distribution networks. The new body would provide 
evidence for a needs case which could be taken up in transmission companies network 
development plans, and subsequently scrutinised by Ofgem. This may be a natural 
evolution from the existing ENSG, but would need to be transparently independent from 
commercial interests of system actors, and to have a transparent approach to assessing 
future uncertainties in the context of government targets.  
10.2.4.2 Interactions between locational signals and strategic 
coordination 
There are clear interactions between the locational and the coordination 
dimensions. Not least, the weaker the locational signal, the stronger the case will become 
for coordination and intervention, for example to direct interconnector connections, or 
commission  plant in specific locations for network balancing reasons. However, more 
positively the locational signal potentially works well alongside a coordinated approach. As 
noted above, transmission network planning requires forward thinking, to ensure that 
insufficient or inappropriate transmission investment does not become a barrier to 
decarbonisation, but also flexibility, to allow generation and transmission to co-evolve in a 
coherent manner. The key to this balance is a locational signal. A locational signal is of 
potentially great value to an anticipatory or coordinated scheme, as it provides the 
transparent information required to justify the benefits of the scheme. Additionally, once 
projects have been built, the locational signal (especially if it operates at the operational 
timescale) encourages the efficient utilisation of the network that has been built, 
maximising the investment and avoiding further investments. 
10.2.4.3 Additional policy suggestions 
The scenarios show very high levels of variation in power flows within years, 
due to a combination both of different demand profiles, but also very substantial in 
response to different weather conditions. This suggests that for all kinds of network 
analyses, the traditional approach of analysing the winter peak as the time of greatest 
network stress, will no longer be sufficient. Rather, a range of system conditions, affected 
by both demand and locational renewable output, will need to be analysed. 
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Finally, the scenarios show that transmission networks will constitute a 
significant part of the overall costs and impacts of the transition. The public consent for the 
transition as a whole is vital. Whilst studies have explored public acceptance of 
transmission architecture, and of generation technologies, given the interactions between 
these as shown in the scenarios, it will be of increasing value to have public conversations 
about these in which the interactions and trade offs between generation and transmission 
are made explicit. 
10.3 Suggestions for future work 
This thesis concludes with some suggestions for areas of future research. 
10.3.1 More detailed policy analysis on locational BSUoS 
or alternatives  
A key recommendation was creating a locational signal on dispatch via 
locational BSUoS. Given the potential for controversy and extended debate in any change 
to system codes which creates winners and losers, more research is required into the 
specific advantages, disadvantages and institutional challenges of creating a locational 
BSUoS charge. It would also need to be established that the incentives it creates could also 
be accessed by demand side participants. If the challenges are too great, then alternative 
means of creating a locational dispatch signal need to be suggested.   
10.3.2 Identification of the precise institutional 
requirements for a strategic coordinating body  
The research proposes an independent body tasked with overviewing system 
developments and identifying beneficial opportunities for coordination between actors and 
regimes. Further research could define more precisely how the remit and structure of the 
body could be arranged such that it had industry authority as well as independence from 
commercial interests, and whether it could be established through an evolution of the 
ENSG. 
10.3.3 Integration of transmission issues into 
conversations around public acceptability of 
energy system transitions 
The generation mix and the transmission network are integrated, co-evolving 
elements of the same system. Different generation mixes have different implications for 
transmission, and limitations on transmission can also imply limitations on generation 
choices. Important work on public acceptability of whole system energy transitions has 
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been undertaken by Parkhill et al (2013). An important next step for the public 
conversation is the integration of transmission networks into this whole system picture, and 
integrated generation-transmission scenarios could be an important tool to assist in this.  
10.3.4 Scenario method refinements  
A number of refinements and improvements to elements of the scenario 
method developed in this thesis could be undertaken in future research. A key area is the 
representation of different wind conditions, in a way which incorporates a more developed 
statistical understanding of the likelihood of different conditions, without smoothing the 
outputs entirely to averages and thereby ignoring the significant effects of gradients across 
the system at specific times.  
Another potential avenue is to enhance the generation system representation 
by soft-linking the approach to an energy system model (ESM). This would require not 
running the ESM in standard full-optimisation mode, but rather in a staged or ‘myopic’ 
optimisation mode, allowing iteration with the power flow, values and actor analysis of the 
scenario approach.   
10.3.5 Broader applications 
The scenario method developed in this thesis has been applied to a specific 
question of transmission network policy. However, the method could also be applied to 
other questions of sociotechnical transition, in which there is deep uncertainty, but where 
the role of policy in affecting the direction of system evolution can nonetheless be 
significant. A key feature of the scenario approach developed in this thesis is the tightly-
constrained system scope, which is intended to ensure clarity in the analysis of the effects of 
the independent variables of interest, whilst holding other variables constant. However, as 
noted, the tightly-defined system scope recommended in this method may be considered at 
odds with the range and depth of system transformation that could be envisaged in the 
context of a low carbon transition. A challenge for future research is whether it is possible 
to maintain the rigorous approach to system scope and independent variables 
recommended in this thesis, with a more holistic view of the wide ranging challenges and 
potential transformations which may be faced by a decarbonising energy system.  
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Appendix A: Power system basics 
A.1 Electricity networks 
Electricity systems are connected through networks of electrical circuits. In 
countries with large interconnected electricity systems, bulk, long-distance transfer of 
electrical energy is usually achieved on high voltage circuits strung on steel pylons. At the 
local scale, smaller quantities of power are delivered to final end-users on low voltage 
circuits, which often disappear beneath the roads once they have entered towns and cities.  
A.1.1 Voltage and losses 
Losses of electrical power occurring due to resistance5 within a conductor are 
given by: 
Equation 2 
 
𝑃!"## = 𝐼!𝑅,   
 
where Ploss=power losses, I=current and R=resistance. Thus, for a given 
resistance, power losses are proportional to the square of the current. Further, because: 
Equation 3 𝑃 = 𝑉𝐼, 
 
where P=power, V=voltage and I=current, an increase in voltage 
proportionally reduces the current for a given power flow. Thus increasing the voltage 
reduces resistive losses in proportion to the square of the voltage change. High voltage 
networks therefore have significantly lower resistive power losses than low voltage 
networks. Because resistance in a conductor increases in proportion to its length, high 
voltage networks are preferred for the transfer of power across long distances.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Resistance is a concept which applies to direct current (DC) systems. The analogous concept in alternating 
current (AC) systems is impedance. For simplicity, these fundamentals are set out here using the concept of 
resistance, as for DC systems. However, the fundamental principles are transferrable via the concept of 
impedance to AC systems. 
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A.1.2 Loading limits of electrical circuits 
The amount of power that can be safely transferred across electrical circuits is 
limited by three considerations: thermal limits, voltage drop limits, and stability limits.  
Thermal limits occur as greater power increases current (Equation 3), which 
in turn increases power losses (Equation 2) resulting in a greater amount of energy being 
dissipated in the wires as heat. The increased temperature in the wires causes sagging, 
increasing the proximity of adjacent wires to each other as well as to other external objects, 
which can create a risk of power arcs and short circuits.  
Transmission of power over long distances also results in a reduction of 
voltage at the receiving end of the line. The voltage drop occurring within a resistor (such 
as a transmission line) can be calculated by Ohm’s law: 
Equation 4 𝑉 = 𝐼𝑅, 
which shows that voltage drop is proportional to resistance, which itself 
increases with distance. Thus long distance transmission lines are susceptible to significant 
voltage drops. Voltage drops must be minimised in order to preserve system efficiency and 
ensure correct operation of electrical equipment. Voltage drops can be controlled by 
limiting the loading on vulnerable line sections, however, reactive power provided by 
shunt capacitors and reactor compensations can also be used to control voltage levels.  
Power system stability is defined by Kundur et al (2004) as ‘the ability of an 
electric power system, for a given operational condition, to regain a state of operating 
equilibrium after being subjected to a physical disturbance, with most system variables 
bounded so that practically the entire system remains intact’. The type of stability being 
considered can be subdivided according to whether the disturbance is small and the time 
frame gradual, which can include the normal load changes during everyday operation – 
often referred to as ‘steady state stability’; or whether the disturbance is large and sudden, 
such as a loss of generation or line fault, often referred to as ‘transient stability’ (Glover et 
al., 2008). Kundur et al (2004) further define stability types according to the mechanical 
issue of concern in each case. Voltage stability is concerned with maintaining steady 
voltages at all system buses, and avoiding voltage drops, as discussed above. Rotor angle 
stability ‘refers to the ability of synchronous machines of an interconnected power system 
to remain in synchronism after being subjected to a disturbance’ (Kundur et al., 2004). 
The rotor angle, or power angle, is the phase difference between the voltage waveforms of 
generators at either end of a transmission line. The power transmitted across the line is 
proportional to the cosine of the power angle – hence a power angle of 90° would achieve 
maximum power transfer. However, exceeding a power angle of 90° has non-linear effects 
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as generators become increasingly out of synchronism, risking reversal of power flows with 
cascading destabilising impacts on the rest of the system. Operators therefore limit power 
angles considerably below 90° to avoid this risk following an unexpected disturbance. This 
can place a limit on the acceptable power transfer capability of a line which is some way 
below its maximum thermal loading level. A third type of stability is frequency stability. 
The GB system operates at a frequency of 50 Hz, and the nominal frequency is maintained 
as long as load and generation are in balance. Sudden losses of loads in parts of the system 
can lead to frequency swings which in turn can lead to further tripping of generating units 
and loads. An interconnected network can mitigate against this risk by ensuring that load 
can be maintained even in the case of an unexpected fault or line-outage – however 
maintaining this responsive capacity may again require limiting the loading of transmission 
lines below their theoretical thermal maximum. 
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Appendix B: Additional policy detail 
B.1 The British Electricity Trading and 
Transmission Arrangements 
The production and consumption of electricity in Great Britain takes place in a 
market governed by the various codes and standards known collectively as the British 
Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements (BETTA). The bulk of electricity 
trades within BETTA are bilateral – the result of contracts between electricity generators 
and electricity retailers, who in turn then sell electricity to consumers. Some large 
consumers also buy energy wholesale direct from generators under bilateral contracts. 
Bilateral trading ends one hour before real time (called ‘gate closure’), after which point 
only the system operator (SO) National Grid may undertake further trades (Green, 2010).  
During trading, participating companies will have provided National Grid 
with indicative information about their trades, in order to assist the SO with its network 
planning. At gate closure, companies notify National Grid of their final intended 
contractual positions (the energy they have agreed to buy or sell as a result of bilateral 
trading) and their intended physical positions (the energy they actually expect to supply or 
consume, which may be different from the contractual position due to unexpected events). 
From gate closure to real time, the SO can make further trades through the 
Balancing Mechanism (BM). The role of the SO at this point is to ensure that supply and 
demand are balanced, while respecting transmission network constraints. The SO may 
need to buy or sell in order to balance energy shortfalls or over-supply resulting from 
differences in contracted and physical positions of market participants – for example a 
generator may be short of power due to an unexpected plant outage, or a retailer may 
require more power due to incorrectly forecast demand. In addition, even when supply 
and demand are matched on aggregate, the SO may have to trade to re-arrange the 
geographical provision of supply in relation to demand, due to transmission constraints. In 
such a case, the SO ‘sells’ energy back to a generator on the exporting side of the constraint 
(reducing the overall generation behind the constraint), and must then ‘buy’ the resulting 
shortfall back from another generator on the importing side of the constraint. The level of 
trading which must be undertaken by the SO in the BM is therefore partly related to the 
level of congestion on the grid. 
Participants in the BM submit ‘bids’ to buy power (for a generator this means 
buying back power they have already sold, or in other words reducing their output; for a 
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large consumer this means increasing consumption); as well as ‘offers’ to sell power (for a 
generator this means increasing generation, for a consumer reducing demand). In the case 
of ‘offers’ the potential for profit for a generator is straightforwardly that of the additional 
reward for producing more power. In the case of bids, the profit margin occurs because the 
generator will bid to ‘buy’ back their own power (turning down their generator and saving 
fuel) for less than the price at which they previously sold it. Successful participants in the 
BM require a high level of flexibility in their operation patterns; hence nuclear and 
renewable generators find it difficult if not impossible to participate in the BM.  
In a situation where more power is required at a given location, the SO will 
require to buy more power and will therefore look for offers from suitably placed 
generators. In the situation where less power is required, the SO will need to sell excess 
power back, and will therefore be looking for bids from suitably placed generators. The 
total cost of these exchanges to the SO will be the money spent in accepting offers, minus 
the money recuperated from accepted bids. Figure 180 illustrates this graphically, in a 
situation where both bids and offers, in different locations, are required to resolve a 
transmission constraint. 
 
Figure 180: Illustration of the balancing mechanism 
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The prices at which companies make bids and offers for the BM are indicative 
of their propensity and willingness to participate. The figure below shows average bid and 
offer prices for the BM, compared to the market index price, for the year 2008/09. 
 
Figure 181: Balancing mechanism bids and offers compared with market index price, 2008/09 (Baker et al., 2010) 
The table below presents the bid / offer assumptions used in modelling of 
transmission access options by Redpoint for DECC, in terms of their deviation from the 
market price. The data are derived from historical observation. For example, using these 
assumptions, for a market price of £50/MWh, Coal would submit a bid of £45/MWh and 
offer at £85/MWh. The cost incurred by the system operator if were able to select this 
technology both for constraining on and off, would be the difference between the actual bid 
and offer prices (or the sum of the discount and the premium) – in this case £40/MWh.  
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Table 35: Assumed deviations from short-run marginal costs in the balancing mechanism used in Redpoint modelling 
(Redpoint, 2010) 
Plant type Bid discount Offer premium 
Coal 5 35 
Coal LCPD opt out 8 90 
CCGT 10 50 
OCGT 10 70 
Oil 10 300 
Hydro 20 20 
Offshore Wind 80 10000 
Onshore Wind 40 10000 
Biomass regular 40 10000 
Biomass energy crop 80 10000 
Marine 120 10000 
Nuclear 150 10000 
The very low bid prices submitted by renewable generators reflect the fact 
that if they do not generate they will not qualify for ROCs – thus the margin between the 
price at which they sold the energy and that at which they bid to buy it back, must at least 
compensate them for the loss of the ROC. The implication of the discount level used by 
Redpoint for offshore wind and marine would be a negative bid price in most 
circumstances – that is they would receive a payment not to generate. Similarly, nuclear 
plants would typically submit negative bids due to the cost of flexing down a nuclear plant 
at short notice. 
At the other end of the scale, the extremely high offer prices submitted by 
most renewables and nuclear indicate that they do not wish to be asked to increase 
generation. For renewables this is due to the fact that they would be physically unable to 
increase their output beyond what was available from their renewable energy source; for 
nuclear it reflects the fact that if running, the plant would be running at full available 
output, without the ability to flexible ramp up at short notice. 
The BM is not the only mechanism available to the system operator for the 
balancing of supply and demand, or resolution of transmission constraints at or close to real 
time. Through the Short-term operating reserve (STOR) the system operator pays rent to 
participants to keep spare generation on standby at specified times. Triads are a means of 
triggering industrial demand side response. The Capacity Mechanism, one of the reforms to 
be introduced as a result of the forthcoming Energy Bill, would further increase this type of 
strategic reserve available to the system operator. 
At the end of each half hour trading periods, the trades made by the SO within 
the BM are summed. If the SO had to accept more offers than bids (or buy more energy 
than it had to sell), then overall there was a shortage of generation and the system as a 
whole was ‘short’. This triggers a ‘system buy price’ (SBP) to be calculated from the 
average of a representative sample of the SO’s purchases, excluding those made for system 
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reasons such as resolving transmission constraints or running spinning reserve. Participants 
who were short of power in a short system are then made to pay the SBP, effectively paying 
the SO for the purchases it made on their behalf in the BM. Participants who had excess 
power in a short system receive payments for their excess based on the price of recent 
trades.  
If the SO had to accept more bids than offers (or sell more energy than it had 
to buy), then overall there was an excess of generation and the system as a whole was 
‘long’. This triggers a ‘system sell price’ (SSP) to be calculated. 
B.2 The TNUoS calculation method 
In the GB system the standard charge for access to the network for both 
generators and consumers is known as the Transmission Network Use of System (TNUoS) 
charge. The current method for setting TNUoS charging tariffs is based on a calculation of 
the notional increase in network costs associated with any incremental change in generation 
at each location on the network. It is known as ‘investment cost related pricing’. 
The model begins from the assumption that the time of system peak demand is 
the point against which the security of the network, and choices about investment in new 
network, must be defined. The method scales total transmission entry capacity (TEC) by a 
uniform factor so that over the whole network, total generation = total demand. A load 
flow model calculates the power flowing down each branch under this system condition, 
and multiplies this by the length of the branch to give a network usage indicator, in 
MWKm. The sum of MWKms on each branch yields a total MWkm figure for the 
network. Generation is then increased at one node, and the calculation performed again. 
The difference between the MWKm figure now calculated, and the original base case 
MWKm, is the nodal incremental MWkm figure, which will be positive or negative, 
depending on whether the additional MW of generation increased or decreased power 
flows. The incremental MWKm figure is then multiplied by an ‘expansion factor’ 
representing the different costs of different line types, and by a global locational security 
factor, which allows for the additional security standards of a secured network according to 
the GB SQSS. This yields a cost increment (or decrement) resulting from increasing 
generation at one node. By repeating the calculation for each node, a set of incremental 
costs per additional MW are calculated. Nodes with similar costs are then grouped together 
into zones, and an average cost per MW calculated for each zone. This produces an 
unadjusted zonal tariff in £/kW. This tariff is adjusted by a constant, c, so that the revenue 
recovery is 73% from demand and 27% from generation. (This split was defined at 
privatisation and appears to be entirely arbitrary (Bell et al, 2011)). Local charges are then 
computed using the same method as for the wider tariff. Finally a fixed residual non-
locational component is added to the charge to make up the full cost-recovery 
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requirements for maintaining the network and building new capacity, as the locational 
component recovers only about 20% of ‘Total Allowed Revenue’ allocated by the 
regulator to the transmission companies (Bell et al., 2011, Kirk-Wilson, 2010) 
B.3 NETS SQSS 
Transmission network investment levels are subject to different pressures. 
The transmission network is required to convey power between generation and load 
centres. In order for this to be achieved with an acceptable level of security of supply, 
standards are defined to which the network must conform. Changes in generation and 
demand patterns may increase or change the stresses placed on the network, which may in 
turn create the need for new network investment. On the other hand an objective to 
deliver an acceptable level of service at the minimum possible cost has a constraining effect 
on levels of network investment.  
 Since the 1970s, transmission network planning has been undertaken 
primarily through analyses of its required performance at the time of the highest demand 
on the system, or ‘system peak’ (Bell et al., 2011). As well as managing power transfers at 
system peak, the system must be resilient to an additional set of stress factors coinciding 
with the peak. These are defined in the document known as the National Electricity 
Transmission System Security and Quality of Supply Standard (NETS SQSS). The system 
must be planned such that for any of the following events: a fault outage of a single circuit 
(N-1), a double circuit over head line on the ‘supergrid’ (400kv) (N-d), a double circuit 
line in SHETL or NGET’s region, a section of busbar, or a fault outage following a prior 
outage if both are within NGET’s network (N-2); the following will not occur: loss of 
supply capacity, unacceptable overloading of primary transmission equipment, 
unacceptable voltage conditions or system instability (National Grid, 2012b). 
In the operational timescale, the standards are slightly more flexible. The N-1 
standard remains binding, though the system does not have to be secured against loss of 
supply capacity less than 1500 MW for a double circuit fault; and for the loss of double 
circuits on the Supergrid unacceptable voltage and circuit overloading must be avoided 
although no avoidance of loss of supply is mentioned. No mention is made either of N-2 
requirements (National Grid, 2012b). 
B.4 Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP) 
Under locational marginal pricing, a market clearing price is calculated for 
every location in the network, based on the marginal costs of the plants available to supply 
the load to that specific location at that specific time. Transmission constraints are reflected 
in these prices, as locations unable to access generation from the cheapest plant due to lack 
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of transmission capacity, will be given a price which reflects the marginal cost of the plant 
that is available to them. Thus, generators will receive a lower price if they are located in 
an area of the network which already has high availability of low cost generators sufficient 
to meet local demand, and where additional generation is likely to cause export; conversely 
generators located in areas where load is exceeding local generation, or where local 
generators have higher marginal costs and import capacity is limited, will receive a higher 
price. The PJM operates with a day-ahead market and a real-time market. The day-ahead 
market calculates hourly LMPs for the following day, based on submitted generation offers, 
demand bids, and scheduled bilateral trades. The real time market is a spot market with 
LMPs calculated every five minutes based on the actual operation of the system (PJM 
website). Figure 182, Figure 183 and Figure 184 illustrate the variability of prices by location 
and time in the PJM. At 7:10am on a weekday morning, there are relatively low prices 
across the network, but the higher prices are clustered around the areas where load is 
highest – cities and conurbations like Washington, Ohio and Chicago. At 7:20am, prices 
across the whole network have increased, probably reflecting a spike in demand as the 
working day begins. By 7:30am, prices have been suppressed, probably reflecting the 
activity of generators in ramping up to meet demand. The picture looks similar to how it 
was at 7:30, though with slightly different gradients, probably reflecting the availability to 
different locations of generation to meet demands. These prices are therefore signals which 
influence real time operational decisions. Further, by observing their patterns over the 
longer term, generators would also be able to consider their potential new investments in 
different areas of the network according to the revenue they might expect to receive there. 
Additionally, the prices can serve as signals for independent transmission owners to make 
new transmission investments between regions where the price differential is persistently 
large. Locational Nodal Pricing is a variant on LMP which is used in the Nordpool, a 
market including a number of northern European countries. It is based on a similar 
principle but with the locational energy prices clustered into larger regions, rather than 
being provided at every individual network entry point. 
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Figure 182: Contour map showing price variation across PJM market, Tuesday 11th March, 7:10 am, Eastern Daylight 
Time. Source: PJM 
 
Figure 183: Contour map showing price variation across PJM market, Tuesday 11th March 2014, 7:20 am, Eastern 
Daylight Time. Source: PJM 
11/03/2014 11:17
Page 1 of 1https://edata.pjm.com/eContour/#app=ecca&e929-selectedIndex=2
11/03/2014 11:24
Page 1 of 1https://edata.pjm.com/eContour/#app=ecca&e929-selectedIndex=2
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Figure 184: Contour map showing price variation across PJM market, Tuesday 11th March 2014, 7:30 am, Eastern 
Daylight Time. Source: PJM 
	    
11/03/2014 11:37
Page 1 of 1https://edata.pjm.com/eContour/#app=ecca&e929-selectedIndex=2
	   443	  
Appendix C: Semi-structured 
interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were carried out with seven senior-level 
stakeholders in organisations involved in the GB electricity system. The stakeholders 
spanned: 
• Energy companies 
• Transmission owners 
• The System Operator 
• The Regulator 
The interviews were carried out on the basis of the Chatham House Rule – 
views would be cited but not attributed to individual or organisation. The interviews were 
recorded, transcribed and analysed for cross-cutting themes. The resulting analysis is 
presented in Chapter 5. 
C.1 Interview structure 
The following structure was observed for all interviews. 
C.1.1 Introduction – the basis of the research 
The aim of the research was introduced: to investigate the role of the 
transmission network in a decarbonising electricity system. In particular, it considers the 
interaction between transmission and generation policies and investment decisions in the 
development of a low carbon electricity system. 
C.1.2 Part 1: the 2x2 axis 
The 2x2 axis developed from the policy analysis presented in Chapter 4 was 
presented to the interviewee (Figure 185).  
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This graphically lays out the two policy areas which are the focus of this 
research, represented as intersecting axes: the level of locational signal provided for 
generators; the degree of strategic or anticipatory decision making in transmission 
investment. It also places aspects of the current policy mix along each axis, showing that 
different aspects of the current policy mix have a different emphasis.  
• Q1. Bringing together the cumulative effect of these various policy 
elements, where would you currently position us on this grid? 
• Q2. Where do you think we should be? 
• Q3. Are there important variables not covered by these axes? 
C.1.3 Part 2: locational signals 
• Q4. Should generators be exposed to full (‘deep’) connection costs and 
locational transmission charges? Or should network costs be a socialised 
cost, so as not to disadvantage any generator whose location may be 
determined by resource availability? 
Figure 185: Intersection of two policy variables - strength of locational signal and level of strategic approach ot 
transmission investment 
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C.1.4 Part 3: strategic planning 
• Q5: Should we have a strategic plan for network development? Or is this 
too interventionist? 
C.1.5 Part 4: other issues 
• Q6. Is there a requirement for institutional change? 
• Q7. Are there other important issues which relate to the development of 
the transmission network within the context of an increasingly low carbon 
generation mix, which have not been mentioned here? 
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Appendix D: Heuristic model 
development 
D.1 General approach 
Any model of a technological system employs some simplifications of the real 
world system. Judging what simplifications can reasonably be made within the model in 
order to make the process workable, whilst maintaining sufficient technical detail to enable 
analysis of key questions, is an important part of model development. A useful heuristic in 
guiding the balance between simplification and complexity is the principle known as 
‘Ockham’s razor’ or lex parsimoniae (the law of parsimony). Though it has been applied 
widely and restated in many forms, its original formulation appears to be:  
Plurality must never be posited without necessity (William of Ockham) 
Applying the principle to the process of constructing a model suggests that a 
model should be as complex as necessary to answer the question being asked of it, and no 
more complex than this. In relation to the above research question, the requirement is for a 
model that has enough detail to represent the effects of specific actor investment decisions 
and policies relating to the UK electricity transmission network, and to demonstrate how, 
in the long term, these decisions are more or less favourable to the deployment of low 
carbon generation technologies. There is less requirement, in the context of this research 
question, for a model capable of analysing near term operational issues, relating to voltage 
drops, transient stability, faults and outages. 
D.2 National grid boundaries 
In the 2011 Seven Year Statement (SYS), National Grid divides the GB 
transmission network into 17 study zones, divided by 17 boundaries, for the purposes of 
analysing power flows across key points of interest in the network. The location of the 
boundaries and study zones in relation to the main interconnected transmission system is 
shown in Figure 22. Each boundary divides the entire network into two sections, so that 
the number of zones on one side of the boundary added to the number of zones on the 
other side of the boundary is always 17. The 2011 SYS provides indicative generation and 
load figures for each study zone for the anticipated Winter Peaks of the years 2011/12 to 
2017/18 (National Grid, 2011b). This data provided a useful starting point for model 
development. 
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D.3 Heuristic model development approach 
D.3.1 Boundary analysis 
Given locational load and generation data, it is possible to calculate the power 
flow across any boundary which divides a power system into two parts, using a simple 
arithmetical process, without recourse to the power flow equations of a load flow model. 
Neglecting losses, within any network where total generation = total demand, when split 
into two parts by a single boundary, the power flow across that boundary can simply be 
calculated by subtracting load from generation on either side of the boundary. A negative 
figure indicates the importing side of the boundary, a positive figure indicates the exporting 
side. This process is set out in Table 36 for the generation and load data provided in the 
SYS for the year 2011/12. The discrepancy between the power flow values on either side 
of each boundary are due to the fact that there is a discrepancy in the data of 7MW between 
total system load and generation.  
Table 36: Generation, load and power flows across 17 SYS boundaries at Winter Peak, 2011/12 
Boundary 
Load 
North 
(LN) 
Load 
South 
(LS) 
Gen North 
(GN) 
Gen South 
(GS) 
Power flow 
from North 
(GN-LN) 
Power flow 
from South 
(GS-LS) 
1 511 58323 915 57926 404 -397 
2 1120 57714 1905 56936 785 -778 
3 65 58769 273 58568 208 -201 
4 1702 57132 2634 56207 932 -925 
5 2895 55939 4792 54049 1897 -1890 
6 6025 52809 8734 50107 2709 -2702 
7 8886 49948 11704 47137 2818 -2811 
8 21434 37400 29198 29643 7764 -7757 
9 29832 29002 39226 19615 9394 -9387 
10 51451 7383 55796 3045 4345 -4338 
11 14177 44657 21841 37000 7664 -7657 
12 46230 12604 49963 8878 3733 -3726 
13 55884 2950 57055 1786 1171 -1164 
14 49330 9504 57091 1750 7761 -7754 
15 56684 2150 53627 5214 -3057 3064 
16 15134 43700 28383 30458 13249 -13242 
17 51393 7441 55355 3486 3962 -3955 
Would such a boundary analysis be sufficient for the current research? A 
boundary flow analysis can deal only with one section of the network at a time, and 
aggregates a broad range of assumptions around what is happening across the rest of the 
system, in terms of load, generation and network. For example, a boundary analysis of SYS 
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Boundary 6, which runs along the border between Scotland and England, would not 
distinguish amongst the power flow across that boundary between particular onshore 
upgrades, or the proposed DC offshore cables. It would not see how actions taken to 
relieve pressure on this boundary would affect other areas of the network, as the analysis 
effectively assumes that all other areas of the network are balanced. Therefore, a boundary 
analysis could be a useful tool to generate quickly a large number of scenarios, if the 
interest is in examining one area of the network in particular, or one at a time. The 
boundary analysis is less suitable for assessing interconnected network development effects, 
such as corridors of power flow, and the effects of developments in one area upon another. 
The controversies around renewable generation installations and transmission line upgrades 
occur in specific locations, and may involve interrelated impacts across the network, and 
potentially trade offs between investment decisions in different areas. The aim of this 
research is to set such controversies in the context of different evolving system options. 
Future networks, having undergone different levels of investment may also have different 
capacity and bottleneck issues to the present one, for which the existing SYS boundaries 
have been drawn up. Thus, a simple boundary analysis is not sufficiently fine-grained or 
flexible for the purposes of this research. 
D.3.2 17 node load flow with generic branch data 
Initial load flows were conducted using a 17 node representation of the GB 
transmission network. This was convenient due to the fact that aggregated generation and 
demand data is available for the Winter Peak for 17 study zones in the National Grid’s 
Seven Year Statement (SYS) (National Grid, 2011b) for the years 2011/12 to 2017/18.  
A means of representing the connections between these regions was sought 
which provided greater spatial detail than the boundary analysis, but which was still high-
level enough to be sufficiently manageable and flexible within the broader scenario method 
employed in this project. Detailed line parameters for every section of the GB transmission 
network are available in Appendix B of the 2011 SYS (National Grid, 2011b). In each case, 
the key data provided are the identities of the two nodes connected, the length and voltage 
of the line, and the line parameters of resistance (R), reactance (X) and susceptance (B), 
and the thermal capacity rating of the line in MW. For the purposes of this initial simplified 
model, the parameters for three sections of real lines were selected, to be representative of 
short, medium and long distance transmission line sections in the model. Table 37 provides 
the relevant parameters of these line sections.  
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Table 37: Parameters of three indicative line types 
Line 
Type 
From 
Node 
To Node Length 
(km) 
R (% 
on 100 
MVA) 
X (% 
on 100 
MVA) 
B (% 
on 100 
MVA) 
Winter 
Rating 
(MVA) 
Long Cottam Eaton Socon 135.23 0.15 2.35 89.14 2780 
Medium Norton Osbaldwick 83.84 0.11 1.59 51.05 2009 
Short Cottam Keadby 34.63 0.06 0.67 20.61 2102 
 
By examining the distances between the centres of each pair of connecting SYS 
zones, the choice of whether to apply the short, medium or long line data to connect the 
corresponding nodes was taken. Where zones were connected by more than one 
transmission line, the number of lines connecting the corresponding nodes was doubled, 
tripled or quadrupled as appropriate. For example, Figure 186 shows that Zone 6 and Zone 
7 are separated by Boundary 6, and that the principal lines which cross this boundary are 
two 400 kV double circuits – one from Strathaven to Harker, the other from Eccles to 
Stella West. The distance between these centres was judged to be ‘medium’. Thus four 
individual lines of line type ‘medium’ (representing two double circuits) connect Node 6 to 
Node 7 in the model. Figure 187 is a representation of the simplified approach to 
representing this section. The same process was repeated to produce a branch matrix 
providing an approximate version of the GB transmission network, consisting of 17 nodes 
which correspond to the 17 SYS study zones. 
 
Figure 186: GB transmission network, boundary 6 
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Figure 187: Approach to simplified network representation with generic branches 
D.3.2.1 Testing through reproducing SYS flows, and strawman 
scenarios 
As a means of model validation, the power flows through relevant branches 
were summed to reproduce the power flows across each of the SYS boundaries, and 
compared to the boundary transfers identified in the SYS. The model was also run with a 
selection of ‘strawman’ scenarios, showing high development of renewables in the north, 
in order to further verify the model’s output.  
Load flows for the Winter Peaks of years 2011/12 to 2017/18 were carried 
out in the model described above, using the SYS load and generation data reported in 
(National Grid, 2011b). This produced power flows through each of the lines specified in 
the model. By adding together the power flows through relevant lines it was possible to 
reconstruct the power flows across the 17 SYS boundaries. Table 38 compares the modelled 
boundary flows (LF) with those stated by the SYS, for the Winter Peaks of each of the years 
2011/12 to 2017/18. It also compares the differences between the totals of load and 
generation in all zones stated by the SYS. 
nodes   generic branches   bus bars   Real line data  
Strathaven   Cockenzie  
Harker  Stella West 
Node 6   Node 6  
Node 7   Node 7  
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Table 38: Comparison of modelled load flows (LF) with SYS boundary flows (SYS) based on SYS load and generation 
winter peak projections 
 
2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 
Boundary LF SYS LF SYS LF SYS LF SYS LF SYS LF SYS LF SYS 
1 397 404 470 477 572 580 1158 1166 1116 1148 1139 1140 1130 1132 
2 778 785 844 851 975 983 1826 1834 1946 1978 2173 2174 2296 2298 
3 208 208 233 233 266 266 259 259 254 254 246 246 110 110 
4 925 932 1010 1017 1163 1171 2019 2027 2730 2762 2921 2922 2836 2838 
5 1890 2134 1991 1961 1907 1992 2799 2989 3470 3695 3864 4178 3956 4025 
6 2700 2882 3141 2984 3188 3034 4269 3962 4502 4764 4845 5228 5998 5999 
7 2811 2812 3138 3138 3097 3098 4372 4372 4857 4855 4642 4642 5179 5178 
8 7757 7758 7997 7997 8004 8005 8531 8531 8546 8545 7957 7958 7858 7857 
9 9387 9387 9570 9570 9601 9600 
1019
1 
1019
1 
1044
4 
1044
3 8757 8757 7398 7397 
10 4338 4339 4555 4555 4748 4748 4813 4813 4836 4836 4104 4104 3415 3415 
11 7657 7658 7587 7587 7226 7227 8180 8180 8498 8497 7926 7927 7965 7964 
12 3726 3727 3676 3676 3555 3555 4503 4503 5322 5322 4322 4321 3441 3440 
13 1164 1164 1184 1184 1189 1190 1231 1231 1243 1243 620 620 29 29 
14 7754 7755 8067 8067 8366 8366 8373 8373 8351 8351 8266 8267 8213 8214 
15 3064 3065 3130 3130 3234 3235 2996 2997 2847 2848 2800 2800 2668 2669 
16 
1324
2 
1324
3 
1324
9 
1324
9 
1301
7 
1301
8 
1397
5 
1397
5 
1441
9 
1441
8 
1319
4 
1319
4 
1247
1 
1246
9 
17 3955 3955 4089 4089 4194 4195 4135 4135 4023 4023 4468 4469 4966 4966 
Total 
Load 
(MW) 58834 59010 59188 59447 59713 59972 60229 
Total 
Gen 
(MW) 58841 59017 59196 59455 59745 59973 60231 
Gen-
Load(M
W) 7 7 8 8 32 1 2 
 
Most of the modelled boundary flows (column LF) confirm those stated in the 
SYS exactly, or within 1 MW, a difference which can be attributed to rounding. Where 
there are greater discrepancies, some (highlighted in yellow) can be explained by the fact 
that the total generation and demand figures given in the SYS for all zones do not match (as 
shown in the final three rows of the table). Matpower’s ‘slack bus’ (node 1 in this case) 
compensates by adjusting its generation output. This means that the northern side of all 
boundaries is producing less in the Matpower model than stated in the SYS, by the amount 
given in the final row of the table, which is also the amount of the discrepancy between SYS 
and modelled boundary flows in the cases highlighted in yellow. Other larger 
discrepancies, highlighted in red, cannot be explained. However, as previously noted the 
expected boundary flow across any boundary which divides a network in two can be 
calculated simply by subtracting total generation from total demand on either side of the 
boundary. This simple calculation confirms the modelled boundary flows as accurate (as 
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shown in Table 36 for the year 2011/12), and suggests either errors or unexplained 
working in the SYS data and calculations. 
The 17 node model with generic line parameters was also used to test two 
‘strawman’ scenarios in order to see how the model would reflect growing penetrations of 
different technology types in different areas. They are both scenarios for the year 2018, 
under the assumption that low carbon policies stimulate strong investment in renewable 
generation technologies. In Scenario A the developments are locationally unconstrained and 
are thus strong in areas of high wind potential; in Scenario B the investments are spread 
across the network more evenly, as for example might be expected if locational pricing 
signals across the network were stronger. 
In both Scenarios, A and B, the nodal demands are as given in the SYS for the 
year 2017/18, as shown in Table 36. The installed capacities by technology type and zone 
for Scenario A are shown in Table 39. These figures have been aggregated from the data 
given in the SYS 2011 Appendix F (Table F.11) (National Grid, 2011b) for the year 2018. 
This SYS list of generation capacity includes plants under construction, consented, as well 
as those which have only been proposed. It is therefore unlikely that all of the plant 
included in Table 6 will be built. However the figures serve as a useful starting point for 
testing a scenario with high penetrations of renewables.  
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Table 39: Installed capacity (MW) by technology type, Scenario A, 2018 
Zone 
Onshore 
wind 
Offshore 
wind Wave  Tidal Hydro Nuclear 
Fossil / 
Thermal Peaking Total 
1 2528 2220 0 0 577 0 0 300 5625 
2 113 0 0 0 18 0 1192 0 1323 
3 234 0 0 10 230 0 0 0 474 
4 393 1075 0 0 259 0 0 0 1727 
5 148 2275 0 0 0 0 2475 440 5338 
6 3784 0 0 0 33 2289 185 0 6291 
7 0 0 0 0 0 1207 4003 0 5210 
8 0 2395 0 0 0 0 14542 0 16937 
9 184 1421 0 0 0 4078 8965 2004 16652 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 9172 0 9172 
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 4587 0 4587 
12 0 5985 0 0 0 1207 4031 0 11223 
13 475 1515 0 0 0 0 9944 0 11934 
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 2737 0 2737 
15 0 1201 0 0 0 1081 6090 0 8372 
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 1673 0 1673 
17 0 0 0 100 0 2931 1045 0 4076 
Total 7859 18087 0 110 1117 12793 70641 2744 113351 
 
The installed capacities by technology type and zone for Scenario B are shown 
in Table 40. These figures have been produced by revising downwards the penetration of 
onshore and offshore wind in the network constrained Scottish zones (Zones 1-6), and 
increasing the penetration of onshore and offshore wind in less constrained English zones. 
The total penetration of wind in Scenario B is 20,263 MW, slightly less than the 25,946 
MW in Scenario A. 
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Table 40: Installed capacity (MW) by technology type, Scenario B, 2018 
Zone 
Onshore 
wind 
Offshore 
wind Wave  Tidal Hydro Nuclear 
Fossil / 
Thermal Peaking Total 
1 1000 0 0 0 577 0 0 300 1877 
2 113 0 0 0 18 0 1192 0 1323 
3 234 0 0 10 230 0 0 0 474 
4 393 0 0 0 259 0 0 0 652 
5 148 0 0 0 0 0 2475 440 3063 
6 2000 0 0 0 33 2289 185 0 4507 
7 0 0 0 0 0 1207 4003 0 5210 
8 0 4000 0 0 0 0 14542 0 18542 
9 184 2000 0 0 0 4078 8965 2004 17231 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 9172 0 9172 
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 4587 0 4587 
12 0 7000 0 0 0 1207 4031 0 12238 
13 475 1515 0 0 0 0 9944 0 11934 
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 2737 0 2737 
15 0 1201 0 0 0 1081 6090 0 8372 
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 1673 0 1673 
17 0 0 0 100 0 2931 1045 0 4076 
Total 4547 15716 0 110 1117 12793 70641 2744 107668 
 
 
To produce generation output figures for the condition to be modelled, 
assumptions must first be made as to the availability factor of the total installed capacity per 
technology type. For both scenarios the AF of conventional technologies was set at 90%. 
Each scenario was modelled with high (90% AF) and low (30% AF) output from renewable 
technologies. 
Multiplying the installed capacity by the AF gives a total dispatchable potential 
for each technology. This potential is dispatched according to a simple merit order, until 
demand is met. In these scenarios the merit order is the order of the arrangement from left 
to right of the technology type columns in Table 39 and Table 40. After some 
experimentation it was decided not to differentiate between coal and gas but rather to have 
a catch-all ‘fossil / thermal’ category. It was decided that a detailed treatment of the 
uncertainties around relative future prices of coal and gas was beyond the scope of this 
thesis, hence the technologies are not differentiated. Renewable technologies, on the other 
hand, are differentiated. This is not due to greater certainty around their future costs but 
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because of the significance of the locations, and on the intermittency characteristics of 
different types of renewables on the network.  
 
In each case the resulting power flows between the nodes were compared 
with the maximum boundary capabilities noted in the SYS Chapter 8 (National Grid, 
2011b). Where a power flow between nodes was greater than the relevant boundary 
capability this was considered a boundary overload. 
As shown in Figure 188, Scenario A with high wind assumptions produces 
significant boundary overloads across boundaries 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7. Boundaries 8, 11,14 
and 17 also have smaller overloads. Thus, the greatest boundary exceedences are 
experienced in the North of GB, particularly Scotland, as a result of high installed capacities 
of both onshore and offshore wind, and the limited transfer capabilities in these zones, in 
comparison to other areas of the UK. 
 
Figure 188: Boundary transfers, Scenario A, high wind 
 
Figure 189 shows the effect of assuming a low wind condition for Scenario A. 
Almost all boundary exceedences are removed. 
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Figure 189: Boundary transfers, Scenario A, low wind 
Scenario B represented a mix of installed capacity with renewables spread 
more evenly throughout GB, rather than concentrated in Scotland, as is the case in Scenario 
A. The effect of this is that even in a high wind condition, boundary pressures are 
significantly less in the north of the network, as shown in Figure 190. 
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Figure 190: Boundary transfers, Scenario B, high wind 
 
Under a low wind condition, Scenario B experiences still lower boundary 
pressures (Figure 191). 
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Figure 191: Boundary transfers, Scenario B, low wind 
As well of the effects of wind in the North, it is also noticeable that boundary 
14 is exceeded in all scenarios, and boundary 17 in all except Scenario B, low wind. These 
boundaries encircle the cities of London and Birmingham respectively, and the exceedences 
are thus understandable as being related to the high levels of demand at these nodes.  
Although the results of these initial runs validated the model and showed that 
it could be used to simulate broad power flows in high-renewable scenarios, it quickly 
became clear that the use of generic line data meant that the approach was revealing little 
more than could have been achieved by a boundary analysis. The use of identical line data 
to describe for example lines classified of length ‘medium’ meant that current would divide 
equally down each, whereas in reality the lines were of different impedances which would 
cause a different current division for each one.    
D.3.3 17 node load flow with real line data 
A second version of the model attempted to increase line detail without 
increasing the number of system nodes. This required representing nodes as ‘bus bars’ – 
points at the end of the more accurately characterised lines would be represented in the 
model as the same node, as if they were connected by a zero-impedance bus bar. This 
allowed the possibility of a model which described more detailed power flows across 
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specific identifiable lines, whilst avoiding the increased data requirements of defining 
generation and load at a larger number of nodes. 
For example, Node 6 was now connected to Node 7 using the following 
approach. Node 6 was defined as a bus bar joining Cockenzie and Strathaven. Node 7 was 
defined as a bus bar joining Stella West and Harker. The connections between Node 6 and 
7 were defined using the real line parameters for the two separate double lines, from 
Cockenzie to Stella West, and from Strathaven to Harker. It would thus be possible to 
analyse in a load flow analysis the power flow across this border through both of these 
separate sections of line. The approach is illustrated in Figure 192. 
 
Figure 192: Bus bar and real line data approach to representing networks 
 
It was found that the bus-bar approach is a useful means of short cutting 
around the representation of relatively complex but minor and local sections of network, 
which would otherwise require significant time to parameterise in full. However, problems 
are encountered when the distances between sections of network represented as connected 
on a bus-bar are of a similar size as, or are even greater than, the distances of the sections of 
the network which are actually parameterised. In an extreme example, the connections 
between Zones 5 and 6 (across Boundary 5) were defined with a high level of line detail, 
but still with only one bus-bar node for each zone. The result was a misleading comparison 
between levels of impedance in each line. The longest line connecting these two nodes was 
the line between Longannet and East Kilbride, which is 60km long. The shortest was 
Lambhill to West George Street at only 4km. The shorter line is parameterised with much 
smaller RXB values simply because of its real length. However, the model sees West 
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George Street and East Kilbride as being the same point, Node 5, and the Lambhill to West 
George Street section therefore as a low impedance short cut. Hence, it experiences 
greater power flows and appears to experience constant thermal overloads. 
Clearly this is an extreme example, as the inclusion of the Lambhill – West 
George Street section was almost certainly over-specific. Nonetheless, it is useful as a vivid 
example of a problem which may be more subtly present in approximated network 
modelling where bus bars approach a size comparable with the length of parameterised 
lines. Future work could attempt to define the maximum allowable ratio between bus-bar 
size and parameterised line length, before spatial distortions become too great. 
A further, related concern was the effect of amalgamating different large 
generation types at opposite ends of an SYS zone, into one nodal generation output, 
particularly when there are clear alternative ‘corridors’ of transmission lines running 
through zones. For example, in Figure 186, Zones 6 and 7 are shown as having two clear 
East and West corridors of 400kV transmission lines. With limited interconnection 
between them, output from Hunterston and other large stations on the West coast would 
largely flow down the western corridor, and output from Torness and for example large 
offshore wind farms in the North Sea, would flow predominantly down the East. However, 
if there is only one node per zone, this kind of corridor analysis cannot be undertaken 
meaningfully, even if both the East and West line sections are defined in full using real 
data. As both East and West power output are lumped together, the power will simply be 
divided between the two corridors according to Ohm’s Law.   
Finally, it should also be noted that the 17 SYS zones are drawn up to 
represent the system boundaries of greatest significance for power flow analysis at the time 
of publication of the SYS. Looking forward decades into the future, the anticipated 
changing balance of the generation mix will cause different power flows across the 
network, which could significantly alter the location of where such boundaries would be 
drawn in the future. Maintaining such boundaries as fixed points in a scenario analysis 
looking forward decades may become increasingly inappropriate therefore. 
A key conclusion therefore was that the greater degree of line specificity 
demand by the research question was driving a need for a greater number of nodes than 17. 
This led to the development of the 50 node model, as described in Chapter 6. 
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Appendix E: The 50-node model: 
further detail and assumptions 
Appendix D described the heuristic process by which the appropriate 
resolution for the network representation was established. This led to the development of a 
model based on 50 onshore nodes, plus additional offshore nodes. This model is described 
in Chapter 6, and forms the basis for the outputs in the rest of the thesis. This appendix 
provides further detail on working and assumptions underlying this final model.  
E.1 Defining line loading limits 
Under any given system condition, the flow of power through different 
branches of the network is dictated by the overall balance of load and generation at each of 
the system nodes, and by the relative impedances of the lines. However, transmission lines 
have loading limits which must be respected. If the loading of any line on the network 
threatens to be in breach of its limits, the System Operator must take actions to reduce 
generation output on the exporting side of the line, and increase generation output on the 
importing end of the line, in order to reduce power transfer across the line.  
Line loadings are limited by three factors: thermal limits, avoidance of 
excessive voltage drops, and preservation of system stability (Appendix A.1.2). Appendix 
B of the SYS (National Grid, 2011b), which provides parameters for all GB system lines, 
indicates the maximum thermal rating of all lines. However, the additional constraints 
placed by voltage and stability considerations can often mean that the upper limit of 
allowable line loading is lower than the thermal rating (National Grid, 2011b, National 
Grid, 2012a).  
It is important that the analysis compares simulated power flows against a 
realistic approximation of line loadings – using thermal ratings alone would be an 
unrealistically high loading, which would never be allowed to occur in reality. 
The National Grid Ten Year Statement (National Grid, 2012a) provides a 
boundary commentary, which assesses the transfer capability of the 17 system boundaries 
depicted in Figure 22, accounting for whichever is the lower constraint between thermal, 
voltage and stability limits. The total thermal transfer capability of each boundary which 
would be represented by the equivalent network model, can be established by summing the 
listed thermal capacities of each section of line crossing a boundary. These total thermal 
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capacities can be compared to the actual transfer capability stated in the Ten Year 
Statement. This comparison is shown in Table 41. 
Table 41: Comparison of total thermal rating with actual transfer capability at 17 system boundaries 
Boundary Total 
thermal 
winter 
rating 
(MW)  
Actual 
transfer 
limit 
(MW) 
Ratio – 
actual:thermal 
rating 
Notes 
1 1314 500 0.38 Reinforcements from 
capacity additions 
2 3304 1600 0.48 Reinforcements from 
capacity additions 
3 792 350 0.44 Reinforcements from 
capacity additions 
4 5198 1860 0.35 Reinforcements from 
capacity additions 
5 5285 3660 0.68 Thermal limit 
6 8800 3300 0.38 Voltage and stability 
limit. Addition of series 
capacitors and some 
uprating can raise to a 
limit of 4400 MW (ratio 
0.5) 
7 11634 3600 0.31 Taken from ENSG 
(2012) – a thermal limit 
8 18974 11300 0.60 Voltage limitation 
9 24421 12600 0.52 Thermal and voltage 
limit 
10 16975 6000 0.35  
11 22909 9200 0.40 Voltage limitation 
12 20030 5900 0.29  
13 9474 2000 0.21 Transient voltage 
stability limit 
14 6591 9750 0.36  
15 15614 8000 0.51  
16 33490 15000 0.45  
17 21050 6000 0.29 Reactive compensation 
support could raise 
capability by 1GW 
 
The ratio of the actual permitted transfer capability to the total thermal winter 
rating at each boundary, provides a ‘derating factor’ which must be applied to the total 
thermal transfer capability of each boundary in order to arrive at its actual transfer 
capability. In order to reflect the additional constraints of voltage and stability, each line 
will be derated from its total thermal capacity by the relevant derating factor of the main 
boundary it crosses. Where lines cross more than one boundary the higher derating factor 
is chosen. This allows for the possibility of technical solutions such as reactive 
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compensation support and series capacitors to raise voltage and stability limits closer to the 
thermal limit level. Where lines cross no boundary a generic factor of 50% is used, 
representing a typically high rating once the potential for reactive compensation, series 
capacitors and other technical solutions have been applied, within an N-1 capability (as 
shown for example by Boundary 6). 
E.2 Dividing total system demand between 
regional nodes 
As described in Section 6.3.2, the regional annual electricity demands 
provided in DECC (2012b) were allocated to the nearest model node, to approximate the 
nodal distribution of annual electricity demand. However, there is clearly a difference 
between the total annual electricity consumption, and the power demand at any given 
moment in the year, such as the winter peak. The proportion of total annual demand any 
given area consumes may not be the same proportion as that of its contribution to system 
peak. To test whether these two different proportions are substitutable, the annual 
electricity demands by unitary authority were also summed to the level of SYS zone. It was 
then possible to compare the proportional contribution of each SYS study zone to annual 
demand  according to DECC figures, with its proportional contribution to system peak in 
each of seven projected years, according to SYS.  
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Table 42: Comparison of proportional contribution of SYS zones  to winter peak, according to SYS projections, and to 
2011 total electricity demand, according to DECC 
 
Proportion of winter peak in seven year statement 
forecasts (%) 
Proportion of total 
2011 annual 
electricity demand 
(%) 
Zone 
2011/12 
2012/13 
2013/14 
2014/15 
2015/16 
2016/17 
2017/18 
Total 
D
om
estic  
C
om
m
ercial 
/ industrial 
1 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 
2 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.8 
3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 
4 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.1 0.8 
5 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.7 
6 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.2 5.2 4.7 4.8 4.6 
7 4.9 5.0 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.5 5.0 4.7 5.3 
8 9.0 9.0 8.9 8.7 8.6 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.0 8.8 
9 12.3 12.0 11.6 11.6 11.7 12.2 12.7 11.5 11.7 11.4 
10 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.4 2.8 2.9 2.7 
11 12.6 12.4 12.2 12.2 12.1 12.1 12.2 12.0 11.9 12.1 
12 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.5 11.1 12.0 10.5 
13 8.9 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.7 8.6 8.4 10.2 9.7 10.6 
14 16.2 16.6 17.0 17.2 17.4 17.2 16.9 14.4 12.2 15.9 
15 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.1 3.4 3.0 
16 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.3 7.0 6.9 7.8 6.4 
17 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.9 5.0 5.1 4.7 5.4 4.3 
 
As shown in Table 42, the percentage contributions to annual energy demand 
are a reasonable proxy for percentage contribution to system peak. In most zones the 
difference between the proportions is less than one percent. The largest discrepancies are 
found in Zones 10 (1.1-1.4%), 12 (2.6-3.0%), 13 (1.4-1.8%) and 14 (1.7-3.0%). These 
comparisons are made between SYS winter peak figures and the total annual demand. The 
DECC data also provides a breakdown of this total between domestic and commercial / 
industrial demands, as indicated in Table 42. 
The demand proportions of unitary authorities worked out from DECC data 
were therefore used to divide a scenario-based total system power demand figure into 
nodal demands for load flows.  
	   465	  
E.3 Evolution of future demand 
This section provides the underlying figures for the future demand trajectories 
presented in Section 6.3.3. The figures for current (2012) and future annual sectoral 
demands were predominantly derived from DUKES (DECC, 2013a) and the National Grid 
Future Energy Scenarios (FES) document, using the Gone Green scenario (National Grid, 
2013c). The resulting trajectories were presented in Section 6.3.3 in the form of Figure 31. 
The underlying figures are presented in Table 43. 
The FES assumes demand reductions in domestic appliances, lighting and 
resistive heating, as well as in the commercial and public administration sectors, due to 
uptake of energy efficiency measures. However, there is a rising demand from domestic 
heat pumps, and industrial demand also grows. Other sectors specified in DUKES, but not 
in the FES, are agriculture and fuel industries, and in the absence of detailed data their 
demands are held constant. DUKES also accounts for losses, which are included here. 
The ratio of total energy demand to system peak in 2012 was calculated, and 
the same relationship was assumed to hold – as annual energy demand rises, so does the 
demand during the seasonal peak hours considered.  
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Table 43: Annual electricity demand background by sector 
TWh  2012 2018 2023 2028 2033 2038 2043 2048 
Domestic Total 114.698 109.056 108.750 113.592 121.669 146.8 171.924 197.051 
 Lighting 12.123 6.556 5.895 6.095 6.374 6.374 6.374 6.374 
 Appliances 69.864 68.799 67.634 66.953 66.425 66.43 66.425 66.425 
 Resistive heating 32.267 31.367 29.667 29.867 29.567 29.57 29.567 29.567 
 Heat pumps 0.445 2.334 5.555 10.678 19.304 44.43 69.56 94.686 
Commercial 78.206 76.140 72.090 68.040 65.610 65.61 65.610 65.610 
Industry  97.820 101.550 104.630 110.610 116.939 120.9 122.939 123.939 
Fuel industries 29.72 29.72 29.72 29.72 29.72 29.72 29.72 29.72 
Public administration 18.891 17.86 16.91 15.96 15.39 15.39 15.39 15.39 
Transport Total 4.089 5.621 7.340 10.380 16.137 27.56 50.871 99.240 
 Electric trains 4.089 4.626 5.234 5.922 6.700 7.581 8.577 9.704 
 Electric vehicles 0.000 0.995 2.106 4.458 9.437 19.97 42.29 89.53 
Agriculture 3.871 3.871 3.871 3.871 3.871 3.871 3.871 3.871 
Sub total  347.295 343.817 343.311 352.173 369.337 409.8 460.325 534.821 
          
Losses (8% in 2012) 28.946 27.505 27.465 28.174 29.547 32.79 36.826 42.786 
          
Total  376.241 371.323 370.776 380.347 398.884 442.7 497.151 577.607 
          
Winter PEAK sans EVs (GW) 60.000 59.057 58.793 59.944 62.106 67.41 72.537 77.834 
2012 Peak:annual demand ratio 0.159        
% of EV charging in peak hour 0.040        
Addition from EV charging 0.000 0.109 0.231 0.489 1.034 2.189 4.635 9.812 
TOTAL WINTER PEAK 
(GW) 
60.000 59.166 59.023 60.432 63.140 69.6 77.172 87.646 
          
Spring Peak sans EVs (GWs) 50.000 49.214 48.994 49.953 51.755 56.17 60.448 64.862 
2012 Peak:annual demand ratio 0.133        
% of EV charging in peak hour 0.020        
Addition from EV charging 0.000 0.055 0.115 0.244 0.517 1.095 2.317 4.906 
TOTAL SPRING PEAK 
(GW) 
50.000 49.269 49.109 50.198 52.272 57.27 62.765 69.768 
          
Summer Peak Sans Evs (GWs) 45.000 44.293 44.094 44.958 46.579 50.56 54.403 58.375 
2012 Peak:annual demand ratio 0.120        
% of EV charging in peak hour 0.020        
Addition from EV charging 0.000 0.055 0.115 0.244 0.517 1.095 2.317 4.906 
TOTAL SUMMER PEAK 
(GW) 
45.000 44.347 44.210 45.202 47.097 51.65 56.720 63.281 
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The trajectory for electric vehicles however is treated separately. The 
assumption is that a close to full penetration of electric vehicles for private vehicle travel 
demands occurs by 2048, but that the growth occurs on an S-curve shape, with higher rates 
of growth towards the end of the period, as shown in Table 44 and Figure 193. 
Table 44: Growth in electric vehicle demand 
Year % of vehicle kms Bn vehicle kms TWh 
2018 1.1 6.6 1.0 
2020.5 1.6 9.6 1.4 
2023 2.3 14.0 2.1 
2025.5 3.4 20.4 3.1 
2028 5.0 29.7 4.5 
2030.5 7.2 43.2 6.5 
2033 10.5 62.9 9.4 
2035.5 15.3 91.5 13.7 
2038 22.2 133.2 20.0 
2040.5 32.3 193.8 29.1 
2043 47.0 282.0 42.3 
2045.5 68.4 410.2 61.5 
2048 99.5 596.9 89.5 
 
 
Figure 193: Growth in demand from electric vehicles 
These assumptions on annual energy demand are combined with assumptions 
on what proportion of vehicles will be charging at the particular times for which the load 
flows are being run – 5-6pm in December / January, 12-1pm in July / August, and 12-
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1pm in April. The basic assumptions for charging patterns follow the pattern used in FES, 
according to which 4% of the daily demand is recharging during the winter peak hour, and 
2% during the other two conditions (Figure 194). 
 
Figure 194: Percentage of EV charging occuring in each hour, FES assumptions (National Grid, 2013c) 
The resulting addition from EV charging in each seasonal condition is added to 
the rest of demand. 
E.4 Generation assumptions  
As noted in Section 6.4, the generator assumptions are calibrated to the base 
year of 2013, using data from the SYS (National Grid, 2011b) as well as additional public 
information on closings and openings since the publication of the SYS. The following 
sections of this appendix provide more detail on certain key technologies, including 
additional data sources for establishing their capacities in the base year, and assumptions 
which guide and provide a framework for descriptions of how these capacities are added to 
within each of the scenarios. 
E.4.1 Offshore wind 
Table 45 lists the offshore wind sites in operation at 2013, as represented in the 
model at the 2013 base year. 
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Table 45: Operational offshore wind sites, 2013. Source: (RenewableUK, 2013b) 
Site name Capacity (MW) Developer Model node 
Beatrice 10 SSE Renewables 6 
Barrow 90 DONG Energy and Centrica 37 
Walney 1 183.6 DONG Energy / SSE Renewables / 
Ampere Equity / PGGM 
37 
Walney 2 183.6 DONG Energy / SSE Renewables / 
Ampere Equity / PGGM 
37 
Ormonde 150 Vattenfall 37 
Rhyl Flats 90 RWE Npower Renewables 38 
North Hoyle 60 RWE Npower Renewables 38 
Burbo Bank 90 DONG Energy 38 
Lincs 270 Centrica / DONG / Siemens 43 
Lynn and Inner 
Dowsing 
194.4 Centrica Renewable Energy Ltd. 43 
Scroby Sands 60 E.ON UK Renewables 43 
Sheringham Shoal 316.8 Scira Offshore Energy Ltd 51 
Greater Gabbard 504 SSE and RWE Npower Renewables 52 
Gunfleet Sands 1 108 DONG Energy 62 
Gunfleet Sands 2 64.8 DONG Energy 62 
Gunfleet Sands 3 12 DONG Energy 62 
London Array 630 DONG Energy / E.On Renewables / 
Masdar 
62 
Kentish Flats 90 Vattenfall 62 
Thanet 300 Vattenfall 62 
Robin Rigg 180 E.ON UK Renewables 76 
Blyth Offshore 3.8 E.ON UK Renewables 77 
Teesside 62.1 EdF ER 77 
TOTAL 3653.1  
 
 
Table 46 lists offshore wind sites currently under construction, at 2013.  
Table 46: Offshore wind sites under construction, 2013. Source: (RenewableUK, 2013b) 
Site name Capacity (MW) Developer Model node 
Humber Gateway 219 E.ON UK Renewables 30 
Westermost Rough 210 DONG Energy 30 
West of Duddon 
Sands 
389 Scottish Power / DONG Energy 37 
Gwynt y Mor 576 RWE Innogy / SWM / Siemens 38 
Methil Offshore 
Wind Farm Demo 
Site 
7 Samsung Heavy Industries  
TOTAL 1401   
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Table 47 lists offshore wind sites currently with consent, at 2013. 
Table 47: Offshore wind projects currently consented, 2013. Source: (RenewableUK, 2013b) 
Site name Capacity (MW) Developer Model node 
Blyth Offshore Wind 
Demonstration site 
(NAREC) 
99.9 NAREC 77 
Dudgeon 400 Statoil and Statkraft 51 
European Offshore 
Wind Deployment 
Centre (EOWDC) 
77 Vattenfall, Technip and Aberdeen 
Renewable Energy Group (AREG) 
None allocated 
yet 
Galloper (Greater 
Gabbard Ext) 
504 SSE and RWE Npower Renewables 52 
Kentish Flats 2 49.5 Vattenfall 62 
Race Bank 580 Dong Energy Ltd 43 
Triton Knoll 800 RWE Npower Renewables 30 
TOTAL 2510.4   
 
 
This table lists the total capacities of the Round 3 development zones. 
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Table 48: Total potential capacities of Round 3 offshore sites. Source: (Crown Estate, 2013) 
Site name Capacity (MW) Developer / License holder Model node 
Moray 1500 Moray Offshore Renewables – joint 
venture between EDP Renewables and 
Repsol 
6 
Firth of Forth 3465 SeagreenWind Energy Ltd – joint venture 
of SSE and Fluor  
20 
Dogger Bank 9000  Forewind – a consortium of RWE npower 
renewables, SSE, Statkraft, Statoil 
24 (note 
connection 
points at 
Creyke Beck 
and Teesside) 
Hornsea 4000 SmartWind – a joint venture between 
Mainstream Renewable Power and Siemens 
Project Ventures 
29 
Irish Sea 
 
4200 
 
Celtic Array – 50:50 joint venture between 
Centrica Renewable Energy Ltd and 
DONG. 
39 
East Anglia 7200 East Anglia Offshore Wind Ltd – a50:50 
joint venture of SP Renewables and 
Vattenfall Wind power Ltd. 
52 
Southern Array 
(Rampion) 
665 E.ON Climate and Renewables / UK 
Southern Array Ltd 
67 
West Isle of Wight 
(Navitus) 
800 – 1200 Navitus Bay – 50:50 joint venture between 
Eneco Wind UK Ltd and EDF Energy 
Renewables 
68 
TOTAL 30830 - 31230   
The Round 3 sites were selected based on areas of the sea bed where shoals or 
banks make the water shallower than is typically found at such distances from the coast, 
thus making pile-driven offshore wind turbines a more feasible prospect. Significant 
development of offshore wind beyond these areas is therefore likely to require the 
development of floating turbine technology. Though not commercial, floating turbines are 
currently at the demonstration phase, including by the company Hywind which has built 
demonstration floating turbines off the coast of Norway, and which is proposing further 
demonstrations off the east coast of Scotland. However, in these scenarios floating turbines 
are considered too uncertain a prospect to factor in, and therefore the capacity totals listed 
in Table 45-Table 48 are assumed are taken in combination to provide the outer envelope for 
offshore wind deployment in UK waters.  
 
E.4.2 Onshore wind 
Table 49 shows the location of transmission connected onshore wind as 
represented in the model. Data was collected from the Seven Year Statement (National 
Grid, 2011) for the year 2012-13. The SYS lists 117 individual wind farms, each of which 
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was allocated to the nearest model node. The table below presents the SYS data 
amalgamated to the model node level. 
Table 49: Onshore transmission connected wind farms, 2013. Source: (National Grid, 2011b) 
Region Capacity (MW) Model node 
Thurso 363.8 3 
Stornoway 69.4 4 
Beauly 371.5 5 
Kintore 103.2 7 
Peterhead 60.8 8 
Dalmally 217.7 9 
Erochty 204 10 
Tealing 49 11 
Glasgow 35 12 
Kincardine 74 13 
Auchencrosh 322.75 15 
Strathaven 1389.4 17 
Edinburgh 107 18 
Torness Point 392.5 19 
Gretna 115.5 21 
Bristol / South Wales 299 57 
TOTAL 4174.55  
 
The total figure for onshore wind listed by Renewable UK’s Wind Energy 
Database is 6816 MW (RenewableUK, 2013b). This indicates that there are significant 
levels of onshore wind are not connected to the transmission network, but to lower voltage 
networks. 
As Table 49 shows the vast majority of large scale transmission connected wind 
is found in Scotland. This may partly reflect the fact that the definition of ‘transmission’ 
network in Scotland extends to 132 kV networks, whereas in England and Wales the 
transmission network is only the 400 and 275 kV lines. However it is also likely to reflect 
the higher average wind speeds found in Scotland.  
The SYS lists onshore wind projects totalling 7863.55 MW in 2017-18, 
7204.55 of which is in Scotland (along with the existing Pen y Cymoedd in south Wales, 
and two more proposed projects in mid-Wales). An outer envelope for Scottish onshore 
potential is 9.4 GW in addition to the current 3.9 GW, i.e. a total of 13.3 GW. This is 
derived from the Scottish Government’s 2020 Routemap for Renewable Energy in 
Scotland, published in 2011. Section 3.2 of the document lists 2 GW as consented, in 
addition to 3.5 GW awaiting planning determination, and 3.9 GW of sites having 
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requested pre-planning scoping opinion (Scottish Government, 2011). 
(http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2011/08/04110353/5#offshorewind ). 
Following the SYS increase to 7205 MW in 2018, this would leave a further 6071 MW to 
be expanded into (based on 13.3 GW total).  
The Welsh Government’s ambition for onshore wind was recently set at 2 
GW (RenewableUK, 2013a). Mid Wales currently has no transmission access so there 
would be network implications for this. 
Based on the above discussion, the following outer envelopes for wind 
deployment in England, Wales and Scotland, are used in the scenario development. 
Table 50: Outer envelopes for onshore wind deployment in England, Wales and Scotland, as applied in scenario 
development 
Region Model nodes Potential capacity (MW) 
Scotland 1-21 13300 
Wales 34-36, 53, 57 2000 
England Remainder 2000 
TOTAL  17300 
 
E.4.3 Wave and tidal 
The model begins in 2013 with no wave or tidal power deployed. In reality 
there are currently wave and tidal demonstration projects deployed in UK waters, but 
these total only 9 MW. According to Renewable UK, the industry is ‘on track to deliver 
over 120 MW [of wave and tidal power] by 2020’ (RenewableUK, 2013c). This being still 
a relatively small number in comparison to GB peak power demand, the background 
assumption is made across all scenarios that wave and tidal technologies are available to 
deploy at commercial scale, only from the 2023 timeslice onwards.  
E.4.3.1 Wave 
Wave power potential is greatest in areas of UK waters most exposed to long 
range ocean winds. This makes the South and North west coasts of Britain the most 
favourable near-shore areas in UK waters, as shown in Figure.  
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Figure 195: Annual mean significant wave height, UK. Source: (BERR, 2008) 
ECI’s (2005) assessment compares wave resources in 5 different regions, and 
confirms the favourability of sites on the Atlantic-exposed western coasts.  
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Figure 196: Average annual raw wave power by site. Source: (ECI, 2005) 
Establishing an ‘outer envelope’ of wave power potential in the UK is not 
straightforward, as there are not obvious oceanographic constraints as the devices float on 
the water and thus do not require shallow waters. ECI (2005) use an estimate from 
Renewable UK that wave power could provide 15% of UK electricity, which amounts to 
around 19 GW of installed capacity of wave devices, assuming 30% capacity factor. The 
Zero Carbon Britain report (CAT, 2010) quotes the Offshore Valuation Group (2010) as 
estimating total wave potential of 40 TWh per year, which is equivalent to 15 GW at 30% 
load factor. David Mackay’s rough estimate of 4kWh/person/day translates to an installed 
capacity of 33 GW at 30% load factor (MacKay, 2009). DECC Pathways analysis quotes 50 
TWh/year as an estimate of practical resource, with 157 TWh/year cited as a full technical 
potential estimate (DECC, 2010a) – these figures are equivalent to 19 GW and 60 GW 
respectively.  
In this thesis an outer limit of 20 GW installed capacity is assumed. These are 
shared 75-25 between the two Atlantic facing regions, Western Scotland and South-
Western England, which have about 750km and 250km of coastline respectively (MacKay, 
2009). The resource in these regions is shared evenly between the relevant offshore nodes, 
as shown in the table below. 
 
 
 
 
Variability of UK Marine Resources 
 
36 
Overview 
Wave power around the UK coast shows variability at a 
number of scales, including seasonal and inter-annular 
variation, and different levels of availability by location.  
 
This section presents information on the general nature 
and patterns of this variability – the following pages 
provide an assessment of this variability on a regional and 
national scale, and its interaction with electricity demand.  
 
The data used to characterise the UK wave resource are 
presented as both raw wave power (kW/m of wave face) 
and device output – the output characteristics of the wave 
converters studied act to significantly smooth the 
variability shown in the raw wave power data. 
 
 
Variability by Location 
The average annual wave energy experienced at each of 
the 11 sites is shown in the graph (right, top). It is clear 
that there is extremely large variability in ambient wave 
power at different sites. The exposure of the south-west 
and north-west of the UK to the North Atlantic Ocean 
ensures significant wave energy reaches the coast, whilst 
relatively sheltered areas such as the North Sea and Irish 
Sea exhibit very low wave energy levels. The lowest wave 
energy site (Eskmeals, Irish Sea Region) experiences 
around one tenth of the ambient wave energy of the most 
powerful site (Lewis, North West Region).  
 
As a result of discussions with Wave Dragon concerning 
the economic feasibility of sites with very low wave 
energies, data limitations (low wave energy sites show 
artificially low variability due to rounding of the data) and 
the lack of an appropriate device to model wave power 
output from these sites, a decision was taken not to 
include the Irish Sea or North Sea regions in regional & 
optimisation analyses.  
 
 
Variablilty between Years 
Wave power is subject to changes in annual availability, as 
shown in the graph to the right (middle). Data from the 
EWM shows that annual wave power output has varied by 
up to 20% from the long term average level of availability 
during the last 16 years. (Note that data gaps in 2003 
result in an underestimate of wave power that year.)  
 
The standard deviation of annual output variability is 
approximately 4% (as a percentage of average annual 
output), based on the 16 years of data shown.  
Variability by Month 
Wave power shows a highly seasonal distribution (below, 
bottom), with output during winter months almost seven 
times higher than that experienced during summer. Whilst 
the magnitude of this difference is large, the general 
pattern of monthly wave power distribution is as expected, 
given the role of wind speed in driving wave generation 
and the higher wind speeds experienced in the North 
Atlantic and UK coastal waters in winter.  
 
In the context of UK electricity demand patterns, this 
distribution should be seen as beneficial – average 
electricity demand levels are higher in winter than in 
summer, suggesting that the UK wave power resource will 
deliver more energy during periods of higher demand than 
at other times of the year.  
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Table 51: Outer envelope for wave power capacity, as applied in scenario development 
Region Model Node Total potential capacity (MW) 
Cornwall 72 2500 
Devon 73 2500 
Western Isles 75 3750 
Hebrides 4  3750 
Orkney  2 3750 
Shetland 1 3750 
TOTAL  20000 
     
Based on the assessment of Renewable UK, cited above, of the current 
trajectory being towards 120 MW of wave and tidal by 2020, it will be assumed that wave 
is available to be deployed at a commercial scale in these locations from the 2023 timestep 
onwards. The output of wave devices uses the same availability factor data derived for 
wind, as wave is strongly correlated to wind (ECI, 2005).  
E.4.3.2 Tidal stream 
DECC (2010a) reports that there remains considerable variation in 
assessments of maximum tidal energy potential, in part related to the choice of modelling 
method. The report states that a ‘widely quoted’ total potential assessment is 17 TWh per 
year, referring to SKM (2008) – at 40% load factor this is equivalent to 4.9 GW installed 
capacity. At the other end of the scale the report cites assessments of 197 TWh/year 
(Mackay, 2009) (equivalent to 56 GW at 40% load factor). More recently the Offshore 
Valuation Group (2010) estimated 116 TWh per year (equivalent 33 GW at 40% load 
factor).      
ECI (2005) draws on a tidal stream resource assessment by Black and Veatch 
(2005) to provide data for tidal stream potential in different locations across the UK, as 
summarised in the table below. 
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Table 52: Estimates of regional tidal stream resource 
Region Model 
node 
Installed capacity (MW) 
(Black and Veatch) 
Average 
capacity factor 
Corrected 
capacity (MW) 
Channel Islands 78 533 39% 1066 
Shetland 1 149 40% 298 
Orkney 2 169 34% 338 
Western Scotland 75 325 40% 650 
Pentland 3 2292 42% 4584 
Bristol Channel 73 219 32% 438 
Cornwall 72 30 26% 60 
Isle of Wight / 
Portland 
68 119 42% 238 
TOTAL  3836  7672 
 
This assessment appears to be at the conservative end of the scale, and it has 
been suggested that the method used underestimates the resource (DECC, 2010a). A 
recent academic assessment estimated the time averaged maximum potential output from 
the Pentland Firth as being 1.9 GW (Adcock et al, 2013). At a 42% capacity factor this 
would equate to approximately 4.5 GW peak, or double the peak capacity provided by 
Black and Veatch. On the basis that the Adcock et al (2013) report seems to be the current 
state of the art for tidal stream modelling, this factor is taken as a guide for the whole set of 
Black and Veatch estimates, which are all doubled (as shown in the final column of the 
table).  
E.4.3.3 Tidal barrage 
Tidal barrage has the potential to produce large amounts of power from 
specific locations. However it is also a technology associated with significant environmental 
impacts. A 2 year government feasibility study reported in 2010 that it did not see a case 
for public investment in the Severn barrage for the foreseeable future. However, it did not 
preclude private investment. Possible tidal barrage locations and estimated potential 
capacities are listed in the table below, based on DECC (2010a). 
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Table 53: Outer envelope for tidal barrage deployment, as applied in scenario development 
Location Model Node Potential installed capacity (MW) 
Solway Firth 22 7200 
Morecambe Bay 31  3000 
Wash 42 2400 
Humber 28 1080 
Thames 59 1120 
Mersey 33 620 
Dee 33 840 
Severn (various projects) 
Cardiff-Weston Barrage 57  8640 
Shoots Barrage 57  1050 
Beachley Barrage 57  625 
Welsh Grounds Lagoon 57  1360 
Bridgewater Bay Lagoon 57  1360 
TOTAL  16885 – 24900 
 
E.4.4 Nuclear 
The existing nuclear fleet is as listed in this table, and this fleet is reflected in 
the model base year of 2013.  
Table 54: Existing UK nuclear power stations, 2013 
Site Model Node Capacity (MW) Scheduled 
decommissioning year 
Hunterston B 16 890 2023 
Hinkley Point B 71 870 2023 
Hartlepool 25 1180 2019 
Heysham 1 32 1160 2019 
Dungeness B 61 1040 2018 
Heysham 2 32 1220 2023 
Torness 19 1190 2023 
Sizewell 49 1191 2035 
Wylfa 34 490 2014 
TOTAL  9231  
 
Plants are removed from the model in accordance with the published 
scheduled decommissioning years shown in the Table. (Although EDF aims to extend the 
life of the plants scheduled to close before 2020).  
The table below lists the sites proposed as available for new nuclear 
development. The capacity of 3260 MW is that proposed by EdF for the new Hinkley Point 
C reactor. 
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Table 55: Outer envelope for nucelar power stations, as applied in scenario development 
Site Model Node Capacity (MW) 
Sellafield 22 3260 
Hartlepool 23 3260 
Heysham 31 3260 
Wylfa 34 3260 
Sizewell 49 3260 
Oldbury 57 3260 
Bradwell 59 3260 
Hinkley Point 71 3260 
TOTAL  26080 
 
  
E.4.5 Thermal 
Fossil thermal plants in the base year are as listed in the 2012/13 SYS year, 
with additional plant closures since the publication of the SYS factored in. All currently 
existing fossil plant retire at some point during the scenario time frame. These are fixed 
assumptions across all scenarios, as described in Section 7.3.1.7.  
E.4.6 Summary of outer envelopes and build rates 
All scenarios operate within a quantitative assessment of the overall outer 
potential for each technology by location, and a year of availability. Each technology type is 
also confined by a maximum annual build rate, based on DECC (2010a). These key data 
are summarised in the table below.  
Table 56: Summary of outer envelopes and build rates for generation technologies 
Technology Available from Maximum total potential 
(MW) 
Maximum build rate 
(MW/yr) 
Wind offshore 2013 38718 3000 
Tidal stream 2023 7672 1000 
Tidal barrage 2023 16885 3000 
Wave 2023 20000 1000 
Hydro 2013 1417 500 
Wind onshore 2013 17300 1000 
Nuclear 2013 27287 3200 
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E.5 Seasonal availability factors and average 
load factors 
E.5.1 Wind speed data 
Wind speed data was collected and analysed to provide a range of 
simultaneous nationwide wind conditions against which the power flows could be tested. 
As described in Section 6.4.2.2, historic wind speed data was collected from the MIDAS 
database (UK Meteorological Office, 2012) for 9 representative wind monitoring stations, 
from the years 2002-2012. Wind speed data for the hours and months for corresponding to 
the three load flow conditions being analysed, were isolated. This produced three datasets 
– corresponding to the winter, spring and summer load flow conditions – consisting of 
around 350 measurements of wind speeds  at each of the nine stations, in a particular hour 
of the day within a given season.  
The data for each season was arranged and analysed. The mean wind speed of 
the nine stations was calculated for each of the recorded days. The Figure below shows the 
frequency distribution of the mean wind speeds in the winter peak hour.  
 
Figure 197: Frequency distribution of mean wind speed between 5-6pm, December-January, 2002-2012. Source: (UK 
Meteorological Office, 2012) 
  
The nine weather stations were also divided into north and south by location, 
and the mean wind speed of the southern wind stations subtracted from the mean wind 
speed of the northern stations on each measured day, providing an indicator of the north-
south gradient – how much more or less windy it is in the north compared to the south. 
The figure below shows the frequency distribution of the north-south gradient during the 
winter peak condition. It indicates that the most frequent gradient is of a slightly windier 
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northern Britain, specifically a northern mean of between 0-1 knots higher than the 
southern mean. 
 
Figure 198: Frequency distribution of the difference between the northen mean and the southern mean, 5-6pm, 
December-January, 2002-2012 
From this dataset, the days whose conditions produced the 95th and 5th 
percentiles of the means were selected to represent the high and low wind conditions 
respectively; and the days whose conditions produced the 95th and 5th percentiles of the 
northern mean-southern mean, were selected to represent the northern skew (NS) and 
southern skew (SN) conditions respectively. Further, a condition was selected which 
combined having a mean close to the mean of the total set, with having its north-south 
gradient within the modal frequency bin of the total north-south gradients. This condition 
was selected as the average condition. 
The same process was repeated for the spring and summer datasets. This 
produced a set of real measured wind conditions which have taken place at the three 
seasonal hours being used for power flows, which in each case span a range of conditions 
from high and low overall to more northerly or more southerly winds. The selected 
conditions are given in the tables below. 
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Table 57: Selected representative winter wind conditions 
Winter 
Condition, 
5-6pm 
Date 
recorded 
K
irk
w
al
l 
St
or
no
w
ay
 
Pe
te
rh
ea
d 
Bo
ul
m
er
 
W
ey
bo
ur
ne
 
La
ng
do
n 
Ba
y 
M
ac
hr
ih
an
ish
 
Ab
er
da
ro
n 
C
am
bo
rn
e 
95th pc mean 04/12/2007  16 28 20 23 17 18 25 35 19 
5th pc mean 28/01/2012  7 17 3 3 5 10 6 4 6 
95th pc N 
skew 
14/12/2007  17 28 16 4 1 13 18 14 10 
95th pc S 
skew 
17/01/2004  3 7 8 6 25 21 1 17 19 
"Average"  19/12/2011  7 16 11 11 13 13 23 14 13 
   
Table 58: Selected representative spring wind conditions 
Spring 
Condition, 12-
1pm 
Date 
recorded 
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95th pc mean 05/04/2008  22 27 16 18 18 17 18 23 15 
5th pc mean 10/04/2008  6 6 8 13 8 7 7 6 12 
95th pc N 
skew 
29/04/2005  23 23 15 18 7 5 10 14 9 
95th pc S skew 04/04/2004  13 17 10 17 20 17 17 31 18 
"Average" 16/04/2007  21 18 6 7 8 13 11 22 9 
 
	   483	  
Table 59: Selected representative summer wind conditions 
Summer 
Condition, 12-
1pm 
Date 
recorded 
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95th perc mean 17/07/2011  10 24 7 9 14 21 18 22 19 
5th perc mean 12/08/2003  8 12 4 7 7 4 6 11 7 
95 perc N skew 12/07/2006  20 15 17 15 6 5 5 16 7 
95 perc S skew 01/07/2012  10 9 9 11 19 15 14 21 15 
"Average"  20/08/2012  12 14 10 8 9 10 12 15 10 
Following this, some simple conversions were made on the data to deliver 
onshore and offshore availability factors for renewable technologies. The wind speeds in 
knots were converted to metres per second. The wind speeds recorded at 10m in weather 
stations were converted to the wind speed at a hub height of 80m using a formula provided 
by Best et al (2008):  
Equation 5 𝑈! = 𝑈! 𝑏𝑎 ! 
where U = wind speed, a = original hub height, b = converted hub height, 
and p = roughness factor, given as 0.1429 in Best et al (2008). 
Offshore wind speeds were derived from these onshore speeds using the 
following formula suggested by Hsu (1988):  
Equation 6 𝑈!"# = 1.62+ 1.17𝑈!"#$  
 
Finally, offshore and onshore wind speeds were converted to an availability 
using a power curve for a Siemens SWT 2.3 provided by Staffell (2012), illustrated below.  
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Figure 199: Power curve for Siemens SWT 2.3 93 turbine. Source: (Staffell, 2012) 
E.5.2 Tidal output 
A common availability factor was required for tidal power. The output of tidal 
installations in different locations would be staggered as the tides move around the different 
areas of the country. The aim of the approach was to identify the maximum availability 
factor that could potentially apply simultaneously in two distantly located tidal areas. The 
two areas chosen were the Bristol Channel and the Pentland Firth. High and low tide times 
were identified for Cardiff and Scrabster, to represent these areas. On the 25th March, 
2014, these were: 
Table 60: High and low tide times for Cardiff and Scrabster 
 High Low High  Low 
Cardiff 00:34 06:48 13:21 19:31 
Scrabster 03:09 09:36 16:21 22:45 
Source: www.tidetimes.org.uk 
Using the tidal patterns for the relevant regions as indicated in ECI (2005), 
and the relative patterns suggested by the delay between the high and low tide times, a 
possible output pattern for tidal installations in the two areas was reconstructed. 
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Figure 200: Modelled tidal outputs at Scrabster and Cardiff over 24 hours 
This suggests that the maximum simultaneous output at the two sites is a 0.7 
output factor. 
E.5.3 Hydro output 
For hydro, the first stage was to note the highest quarterly output factor in the 
last three years, according to DECC (2014b) as being 0.54, in 2011 quarter 4. This 
maximum output was then scaled against the ten year mean rainfall weighted by location of 
UK hydro resource for the months of January, April and August (DECC, 2014c). These 
were 167.9, 78.5 and 119.0 mm respectively. The January 10-year mean being the 
greatest, this was linked to the maximum output factor of 0.54 for the winter condition, 
and output factors for spring and summer calculated by scaling from 0.54 in proportion to 
the difference in mean rainfall. This produced 0.25 and 0.38 for spring and summer 
respectively. The mean of the three load factors is 0.39, a reasonable annual average figure 
for hydro (DECC, 2013a). 
E.5.4 Annual load factors for emissions calculations 
As well as identifying factors to indicate the available power output of 
technology types at the three seasons being modelled, it was also necessary to establish 
annual load factors from which the annual output from a given capacity of each technology 
could be calculated. This was necessary to evaluate the total contribution of different 
technology types for the purpose of calculating the figure for the carbon intensity of 
electricity. 
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Table 61: Average annual load factors of electricity generation technologies 
Technology Average annual load factor 
Offshore wind 0.4 
Tidal 0.3 
Wave 0.3 
Hydro 0.4 
Onshore wind, northern UK 0.35 
Onshore wind, southern UK 0.3 
Nuclear 0.83 
Biomass 0.9 
CHP 0.9 
Fossil 0.9 
Fossil peaking 0.4 
Sources: DECC (DECC, 2013a), Kannan et al (2007), Sinden (2007). 
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Appendix F: Estimating costs of 
transmission investment 
The following cost parameters were used: 
• Onshore new AC overhead line: £1.58m/km. Based on build cost of 
£118.2m for 6380 MVA, 400kV, 75km line, in Parsons Brinckerhoff 
(2012) 
• Offshore HVDC cable: £9.85m/km. Based on build cost of £739.1m 
for 3000 MW 75km HVDC cable, in Parsons Brinckerhoff (2012) 
• Onshore uprate cost: £0.44m/km. Based on low range of cost 
estimate for reconductoring, of $400/MWmile in Baldick and O’Neill 
(2009) and assuming 3000 MW line. 
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